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To my mother and father 
For their love and wisdom 
To my wife Linda 
For giving me Tristan 
And to my son Tristan 
May you learn to love wisdom. 
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FOREWORD 
It was past midnight. The luggage belt was still going around with a few suitcases 
reappearing with every tum. But all passengers had left. I figured that no more luggage 
would come rolling out. There I was, in one of the basements of Chicago O'Hare Airport 
and completely at a loss. My suitcases had not arrived and I had not the faintest idea 
what to do next. I had never been in the USA, never flown before. My whole life was in 
those suitcases and they could just as well be sitting at London Heathrow. Maybe they 
were on their way to Singapore. 
Of course, in the end - that is, four days later - my suitcases reappeared. But the 
feeling of being at loss remained. And it wasn't so much the immensity of Chicago ~ 
although the city does not impart the impression of being built for six feet tall beings. It 
was the bioethical New World which turned out to be quite familiar yet unfamiliar as 
well. The familiar part, paradoxically, concerned the details. It was the general outline, 
the basic approach, that seemed so awkward. Good old-fashioned philosophers, yet they 
ran around from one clinical meeting to the next; trained to debate the theodicy and 
formal fallacies, yet they carried beepers and visited patients. Kant and Debbie were 
mentioned in one breath, and so were Aristotle and Karen Ann Quinlan. It took only one 
bioethics class with first-year medical students to leam the meaning of the verb »to sue«. 
And one class with philosophy students in order to be initiated in the martial arts of 
patient autonomy versus physician beneficence. 
I had just completed three years of philosophical training, but all this was completely 
new to me. It certainly wasn't foolish. Maybe not sufficiently solid but certainly not 
foolish. This apparent gap between a somewhat superficial and legalistic but clinically 
relevant »American« bioethical pragmatism, and philosophically solid but quite abstract 
»European« ethical theorizing, has held my interest ever since. At times, notably in the 
course of my legal studies, I favored the clarity and decisiveness of the pragmatic 
approach; at other times a deep sense of »boredom« overtook me, and I felt relieved when 
I could turn my attention again to phenomenology and hermeneutics. Although this study 
represents an attempt to unite both perspectives, it is bound to reflect this ongoing 
alternation between perspectives. I am reassured by the knowledge that anybody 
commuting between both continents, nowadays must go by plane, hence can only take two 
suitcases, and is bound to lose at least one. 
I have always been aware that it may be impossible to develop a philosophically 
solid theory of clinical ethics. For that reason, I have »modestly« qualified my study as 
»prolegomena«. In part, false modesty — I must admit. I cannot deny that I am con­
vinced of the feasibility of such a unitary theory, and somewhat arrogantly believe to have 
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contributed to that development But I also readily admit that the present study is mine 
It is written out of a personal sense of dissatisfaction with the seeming dissensus between 
two worlds, and it is aimed at providing first and foremost a personal answer to that sense 
of dissatisfaction 
My desire to find some unity across great diversities has some problematic side-
effects To compensate for lack of time, knowledge, and insight, I generalize consider-
ably First, I generalize empirically I draw heavily on my own moderate experience 
rather than a thorough, empirical study of the clinical context Second, my limited 
familiarity with the vast historical and sociological data on health care undoubtedly has 
caused me to use terms, concepts, and theories inaccurately Finally, I am not giving the 
many quoted authors their due Having drawn from such established and knowledgeable 
bioethicists as Beauchamp, Childress, Engelhardt, Pellegrino, Thomasma, and Veatch, and 
even more renowned philosophers like Heidegger, Lévinas, and Scheler, I am bound to 
have misinterpreted them Moreover, I have heavily relied on secondary literature rather 
than the original sources 
It is, however, quite remarkable that philosophers are the only scientists who are 
required to continuously check and recheck Until an author reaches the status of 
»Philosopher«, until he is awarded a place in the textbooks among such protagonists as 
Plato, Augustinus, 1 nomas, Kant, or Heidegger, his work is but a footnote to former 
philosophers, and any and all interpretations of such predecessors must be thoroughly 
verified m reference to the original texts Undeniably, such »scrupulousness« is very 
valuable, both to prevent hasty conclusions and to do justice to those masters whose work 
with good reason has been granted such distinct status Some interpretations, however, 
are not primarily intended to improve our understanding of the original source, but to 
extrapolate from that source into new domains The author may quote his source out of 
courtesy, since he is indebted to his predecessor for providing a starting point to the 
development of his own new line of thought But the quotation or reference no longer is 
intended to enable verification in reference to the original source 
The tendency to supply every second sentence with a reference - a new phenomenon 
in philosophical literature - is itself a dubious undertaking It suggests that what is quoted 
is not original, and what is not quoted is original, when, in fact, virtually every philo-
sophical statement is in a sense not original and original at the same time In the past ten 
years, the thoughts of hundreds of authors have been stored in my mind, unfortunately, 
most of them without proper labelling If I were to give proper due to all those scholars 
whose thoughts ended up in my writing, there would be few original sentences Quoting 
those few authors whom I accidently remember, unjustly implies the rest of my writing is 
original 
It follows, then, that I should not conclude this Foreword with acknowledgements 
either Indeed, there is a good chance that I will bypass important persons who ought to 
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be mentioned. I hope I do not, but let the unlisted be assured that my brain's limited 
storage capacity for memorized names is to blame, rather than my hearty appreciation of 
memorable persons. There are those whom I owe gratitude because they set an example 
of erudition and scholarly enthusiasm. First and foremost, Henk ten Have who led me 
into the field of philosophy of medicine and bioethics, and generously shared much of his 
knowledge and experience in these fields. I thank Gerlof Verwey for his in-depth courses 
in the field of anthropology and his patiently guiding me into the mode of philosophical 
thinking. David Thomasma introduced me to the field of clinical ethics, while Frans van 
Wijmen guided me in my health law studies. And I thank my former colleagues at the 
Department of Ethics, Philosophy and History of Medicine and the Catholic University of 
Nijmegen for providing an inspiring academic environment. 
The prior list pertains to people who contributed primarily by sharing their scholarly 
expertise. But there have been many more people whose assistance was of vital impor-
tance to the completion of this project. I thank Mr. and Mrs. Kunst and Mr. and Mrs. 
van Megen for their hospitality during my philosophy studies in Nijmegen; Mrs. C. Cahill 
Scarano and Mrs. E. Scarano Looby for their help to a flying Dutchman landing in the 
unknown metropolis of Chicago; the Fulbright Foundation, Thymgenootschap, Benevolen-
tia, Stichting Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs Limburg, and the University of Limburg for 
their financial contributions enabling me to study clinical ethics in the U.S.A.; and I thank 
the Journal of Medical Ethics, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Nederlands Tijdschrift 
voor Geneeskunde, and Theoretical Medicine for allowing me to include previously 
published fragments by different authors as well as myself. 
This study is as much the result of the work of others as it is of the author. But in 
turn, the author is as much the result of others as he is of himself. I hesitate to mention 
names, not because I am bound to forget many people, but more so, because a simple 
word of appreciation does injustice to the many years of commitment, love, time, effort, 
and charity offered by those people. There was my dear grandmother Oma Dymph whose 
perpetual attempts, from the day I was born till the day I married, to add to my physical 
weight reflected an unweighable care and devotion — how we both wished she could have 
seen this result; there is my wife Linda who gave up her academic position and dear old 
Texas to enable me to undertake the research for this study in Nijmegen; and there are my 
parents whose unlimited altruism I will never be able to match nor reciprocate. 
And finally, there is that conceited little fellow, who could care less about this book. 
And rightly so, because what is a book in comparison with a child who, fully unaware of 
and oblivious to the moral dilemmas of the »mature« world, can still enjoy dropping 
pebbles in the sewer, marvel over ladybugs, and delight in singing loudly to the fish. And 
yet, Tristan, you make it all worthwhile. May this book some day increase your love of 
wisdom, but never lessen your joy in life, the most precious of all God's gifts. 
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PART I 
A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY 
MODELS OF BIOETHICS 
2 
CHAPTER 1 
BIOETHICS: CRITIQUE AND REORIENTATION 
An ethicist who is not a philosopher 
or theologian as well, is equally 
absurd as a clinician who is not a 
physician or psychologist as well. 
Van Tongeren 1992", p. 1378 
Introduction 
Bioethicists, particularly the medical practitioners among them, can proudly look back on 
a 2500-year-old history. Some of the greatest scholars in Western history have devoted 
writings to bioethical themes and few documents have had such a lasting impact on man's 
undertakings as the Hippocratic Oath. 
More recently bioethics has developed into an independent, scientific discipline. 
After 2475 years, suddenly there has been an outburst of bioethical concerns and 
activities. In 25 years more than 50,000 publications have been produced. A few 
hundred specialized bioethics journals and periodicals exist, with every year new ones 
being added. Thousands of bioethics committees are in place; every self-respecting 
university medical school has a center, institute or department of bioethics; and Ph.D. 
programs in health care ethics have been established. 
This novel development has not gone uncriticized. Every bioethicist who is a 
philosopher by training, or considers himself first and foremost a philosopher, has a file 
of articles written by medical practitioners in which this new bioethics and/or bioethicists 
are ridiculed, criticized, or condemned as utterly useless. The frustrations of anxious 
practitioners seem to relate to two characteristics of contemporary bioethics: (1) The 
academic background of the persons engaged in it (notably, philosophers and theologians), 
and (2) the methods employed by these scholars. 
1. As to the first, physicians' critiques range from vague anxiety about the increasing 
dominance of non-physicians in the field of bioethics, often without clear and convincing 
explanations as to why that is worrisome [Siegler 1979], to uncompromising rejections in 
terms of medical ethics being none of the philosophers' business [Van der Does de 
3 
4 CHAPTER 1 
Willebois 1988]. Some are afraid that bioethics will hinder scientific progress [Vanden-
broucke 1990], while others fear it will affect the moral quality of clinical practice. Says 
Wynen, Secretary General of the pro-life World Medical Association: "[The physician 
must] ... enjoy total freedom of practice to enable him to make clinical decisions without 
outside interference ..." [Wynen 1988, p. 87]. 
Such critiques of the bioethics movement are seldom worked out in detail and are 
most often limited to a publication of three or four pages or a cynical »Letter to the 
Editor«. But this brevity does not indicate a low prevalence of critical attitudes among 
health care providers towards bioethics. Bioethicists who have worked closely with 
physicians know the frustrations to be commonplace [see, e.g., Ruddick and Finn 1985; 
Ten Have 1990]. Actually, many physicians employ a more effective way of »criticizing« 
philosophers: They keep them off the ward and even out of medical journal sections on 
clinical ethics.1 Those philosopher-bioethicists who in time manage to establish a 
relationship of trust may unexpectedly find out that such trust is on very weak grounds 
[see Ruddick 1980, p. 81-82]. 
Probably, these critiques signal a dissatisfaction with the tendency of speculative 
bioethicists to raise many questions but never to provide answers. Socrates already 
irritated his fellow Athenians with his endless questioning — not to mention his cynical 
explanation of the Delphi oracle calling him the wisest man because he, at least, knew that 
he knew nothing. Argues the Editor of the journal of the Royal Dutch Medical Associa-
tion: As physicians, accustomed to providing ready solutions to patient problems, we seem 
to have great difficulty when a nonphysician fails to provide a similar direct solution to 
our problems [see Spreeuwenberg 1992, p. 1371]. 
On the other hand, as much as physicians dislike hesitation, neither do they like 
others making decisions for them. The less reflective and more decisive bioethicists are 
liable to be discredited as "... one more of a growing number of back-seat drivers" 
[Lyon-Loftus 1986, p. 42]. The rise of the bioethics movement has paralleled (with only 
a few decades delay) the so called emergence of the »medical-industrial complex«, that is, 
the rise of medical science and technology, and the growth in institutions and systems. 
Although the autonomy of the physician has been heavily shaken, he has generally 
remained standing as the captain of the ship. But the ship has changed from a small 
fisher's boat into a cruise liner with administrators, health lawyers, patient advocates, 
1. In the introductory article to the new section in the Archives on Internal Medicine, section 
editor Mark Siegler expressed his concern over the dominance of non-physicians in contem-
porary bioethics and explains that this new section will be open for articles written by 
practicing physicians, presenting the views of practicing physicians, and be directed towards 
an audience of practicing physicians (although the hope is expressed that the publications will 
serve as a resource for nonphysicians upon which to base their analyses and speculations) 
[see Siegler 1979, p. 914]. 
BIOETHICS: CRITIQUE AND REORIENTATION 5 
politicians, social workers, counselors, and a host of other professionals riding along. 
The psychological effects of such a rapid metamorphosis in the work environment have 
already been written about by many more qualified writers. Jumping on the boat while it 
was almost full, bioethicists have been forced to patiently maneuver into the crowd. And 
that patience, in the end, may benefit everyone, for the onslaught of new professionals has 
caused the health boat to make some dangerous sways. 
The question is, however, whether bioethicists have seriously listened to the 
objections of practitioners, listened to the more fundamental critique, over and beyond the 
dislike for any more »backseat drivers«. This brings us to that more fundamental critique 
concerning the methodology of bioethical reflection. 
2. Although the critical notes of practitioners suggest that any and all bioethics and 
bioethicists be disregarded or even boycotted, the arguments presented mainly apply to 
one style of bioethics. This particular, if widespread, style of bioethics applies principles 
and rules of a legal rather than medical nature to health care practices in a quite procedur-
al manner.2 The apparent incompatibility of much applied moral philosophy with clinical 
medicine has prompted clinicians such as Chicago internist Siegler to develop what is now 
called »clinical ethics«. "Clinical ethics", Siegler and Singer contend, "begins with the 
premise that medicine is an inherently moral enterprise ... Clinical ethics identifies, 
analyzes, and attempts to resolve the concrete moral problems that arise in patient care.... 
Decision-making in clinical ethics, often conducted under conditions of urgency and 
clinical uncertainty, must result in a right and good action for a particular patient" [Siegler 
and Singer 1988, p. 759]. 
The manifold articles advocating a clinically based medical ethics typically emphasize 
the importance of gathering clinical data at the bedside, talking to the patient, family, and 
different providers, convening with fellow practitioners, and other such procedures. But a 
genuine method as to how to analyze, scrutinize, evaluate, and integrate all that informa-
tion into a justified moral decision tends to be missing. Stated another way, many 
attempts to develop a foundation of patient-oriented, nonprocedural, clinically grounded 
but methodologically sound bioethics have been unsatisfactory. One example may 
illustrate my point. The popular little handbook entitled Clinical Ethics: A practical 
approach to ethical decisions in clinical medicine, sized to fit in the pocket of a white 
coat, was written by the theologian/philosopher Jonsen, the physician Siegler, and the 
lawyer/philosopher/psychoanalyst Winslade [Jonsen, Siegler and Winslade 1986]. The 
authors admit that the counsel they offer can be further analyzed and criticized in the light 
2. The model of applied ethics is aptly illustrated by the three functions outlined by Dutch 
bioethicists Dupuis and de Beaufort: ethicists can (1) create terminological clarity, (2) devise 
a taxonomy of moral problems, and (3) apply normative theories to those problems and 
suggest solutions [see Dupuis & de Beaufort 1988, p. 19; for a summary critique, see Ten 
Have 1990, p. 33]. 
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of ethical theory, but justify their own limited discussion by arguing that the book is not 
written for philosophers, but for practitioners who are responsible for making clinical 
judgments [see ρ 3] In the tradition of clinical medicine, the book suggests a way to 
»present a patient« for an ethical decision Arranging questions, gathering, organizing, and 
displaying relevant data, focusing on central points, excluding extraneous ones, weighing 
evidence, and reaching a practical ethical decision [see ρ 4] The book provides many 
valuable procedural suggestions, but little indication regarding how to assess relevance and 
centrality versus extraneity, what to use as calibration in weighing or, how to reach a 
decision The authors emphasize that "[conclusions must be drawn by the conscientious 
clinician after using the method to clarify and consolidate her thinking and feeling about 
the case" [p 4-5] But the method consequently provided shows remarkable similarity to 
the principle-oriented applied ethics of philosophers and theologians such as the American 
ethicists Beauchamp and Childress [1979, 1983, 1989], the Dutch bioethicists Dupuis and 
De Beaufort [1988], the British medical ethicist Gillon [1994] and many others Jonsen, 
Siegler and Winslade anticipate that, following a clear presentation of the patient, the 
precise point will become manifest and solutions will begin to appear But even if we 
grant the authors such optimism, the question remains How can it be made insightfuP 
Clinical Ethics: Applied or Practical? 
It may be objected that the search for a more insightful, consistent theory of ethical 
decision-making arises from the wrong starting point That is to say, such a search is 
typical for the kind of bioethics that can never become clinically relevant because it does 
not account for the »practical wisdom« that characterizes medicine 
Jonsen and Toulmin locate the switch from ethics as a matter of practical wisdom 
(such as Aristotle had already claimed it to be) to a theoretical field of inquiry, with 
Henry Sidgwick's book The Methods of Ethics Indeed, Sidgwick claims that notwith­
standing the practical relevance of ethics, the " immediate object [of ethics] - to invert 
Aristotle's phrase - is not Practice but Knowledge , and perhaps a more complete 
detachment of the scientific study of right conduct from its practical application is to be 
desired for the sake even of the latter itself " [Sidgwick 1901, ρ vi, 12-13] From that 
moment onwards, Jonsen and Toulmin contend, ethics became the academic elaboration of 
moral theory and the analysis of moral reasoning [see Jonsen and Toulmin 1988, ρ 163] 
Unlike general ethics, which is as old as philosophy, the specialized discipline of 
»professional« ethics is a very modern phenomenon, not much more than a few decades 
old And yet, the same shift from practical to theoretical professional ethics is noticeable 
It is aptly illustrated, for instance, by the tables of contents of books on professional 
ethics One of the earlier studies on professional ethics, Beroepsethiek, by the Dutch 
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theologian-ethicist Roscam Abbing [Roscam Abbing 1965] begins with what the author 
calls an analysis of the real world of professional life: What kind of humanity is present in 
the work done by professionals? What are the motivations, emotions, relationships in the 
world of professionals? In accordance with these and similar questions raised in the 
introduction, the chapters of the book bear practice oriented titles such as: Personal 
Interest, Obedience, Responsibility, Creativity, Satisfaction, Human Needs, Calling, 
Service, Practice, Organization, and Situation. Clearly, Roscam Abbing's book has 
moved beyond professional »etiquette« and qualifies as a study in ethics.3 But it starts 
from within actual professional practice, and never digresses very far from it. 
On the other hand, one of the most widely read modem textbooks in bioethics, 
Beauchamp and Childress' Principles of Biomedical Ethics, first printed in 1979 and 
revised in 1983 and again in 1989, displays a table of contents which seems more or less 
standard for contemporary professional ethics textbooks, with the first chapter devoted to 
ethical theory in general, the second to types of ethical theory, and consequently four 
chapters devoted to four principles. Only in chapter seven is the professional-patient 
relationship dealt with extensively and in the final chapter Ideals, Virtues and Conscien-
tiousness. In other words, a »body« of general ethical knowledge is applied to clinical 
practice. 
This is not to say that Beauchamp and Childress are out of touch with biomedical 
practice. Rather, they strive to be in touch with actual practice as much as possible. 
Their understanding of ethics as a body of partially incompatible theories about moral 
practice, however, causes them to search for the connection with clinical care in so-called 
»mid-level« principles (rather than in actual practice). That is to say, these principles 
(autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice) are supposed to be located on a 
level between philosophical theory and clinical practice. However, there exists no agreed-
upon ranking of these four principles; depending on the ethical theory adhered to (e.g., 
individual-oriented libertarianism or community-oriented socialism), the ranking will 
differ. In almost all clinical cases more than one principle applies, and prioritizing a 
different principle will entail a different course of action. For lack of an agreed-upon 
ethical theory which could determine the ranking, a principle-based applied ethics seems 
to merely conceal the contingent nature of the clinical-ethical practice.4 
3. For a discussion of the difference between ethics and etiquette, see Chapter 2, p. 22-). 
4. It has been argued more recently that the approach taken by Beauchamp and Childress can be 
salvaged only if the network of mid-level principles and application rales becomes itself the 
foundational theory. However, in doing so, the principles no longer can fulfill their intended 
function: To mediate between vague theoretical notions and individual cases via specification 
of the relevant values and value conflicts. »Upgraded« to the foundational level, the 
principles themselves turn out to be in need of specification. This is exactly what DeGrazia 
[1992] proposes, thereby reinvoking the very problem the principles were supposed to solve. 
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Although the principles (much like codes of ethics) are chosen because of their 
historical roots in medical practice (notably the principles of non-maleficence and 
beneficence), rather than actually guiding that practice, maybe they should be understood 
as a simplified theoretical reflection of a more complex practice [Veatch 1978] Such 
interpretation of principles and codes could »explain« apparent theoretical faults, such as 
the tautology in the Oath of Hippocrates prohibiting the physician to communicate patient 
information to third persons when that information may not be communicated to third 
persons It would also explain the difficulties in balancing the principles of beneficence 
and non-maleficence, and, even more so, the apparent incommensurability of these two 
principles on the one hand, and the principles of autonomy and justice on the other hand 
For unlike beneficence and nonmaleficence, autonomy and justice (as understood in 
present day and age) typically belong in the practice of modern politics and law rather 
than in medicine and health care The solution, then, for the theoretical incommensura-
bility between the various principles must be sought m actual practice rather than at the 
theoretical level 
Are we thus agreeing with physicians who contend that bioethics as an independent 
philosophical discipline, separate from clinical medicine, is a vain, useless, and maybe 
even dangerous pursuit9 Obviously, no However, we do owe those practitioner-critics a 
rationale for bioethics as a separate discipline If we grant Siegler and other physician-
ethicists the notion that medicine itself is inherently moral, that the attending physician 
bears the full and final responsibility (both technical and moral) rather than the ethics 
committee or ethicist-consultant (regardless of his being an MD or PhD5), that the 
5 It goes without saying that neither a physician nor an ethicist necessarily is male I see, 
however, no point in neurotically doubling any male pronoun with a female or changing to 
plural pronouns to hide their gender In fact, such use of language confirms societal gender 
biases in addition to making the text unreadable Sexual virtues are not nurtured by painting 
cloths on Van Eijcks' Adam and Eve, democratic freedom is not fostered by condemning 
aristocracy to the guillotine, and a liberation of women that results from the censuring of 
language rather than the hearts of men, has little affinity with genuine respect 
Grammatical gender has but little affinity with biological gender Since language must 
compress the three-dimensional world of meaningful connections to the one-dimensionality of 
the sentence, a grammatical gender can be assigned to words that have even less sex appeal 
than my typewriter (which, in Dutch, is female) Synthetic languages, such as Latin, hinge 
on the extra connections that can be created by adding one out of three genders to nouns and 
pronouns But even highly analytical language such as English gain clarity when gender is 
used to indicate cross-references In an example such as »a doctor has the obligation towards 
a patient to fully inform her«, it is only when the noun »doctor« grammatically is deemed a 
male word that »his patient« is automatically understood to be the patient of the doctor 
mentioned in the preceding part of the sentence (and not somebody else's patient), and it is 
only when the noun »patient« grammatically is female that »her« must be the patient 
mentioned (and not some family member) 
(continued ) 
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physician is responsible for embodying in his own person and in his daily practice the 
ideals of moral medical practice and, by his example for instilling in students and 
residents an awareness of the importance of ethics to clinical practice; if we grant all this 
to Siegler, the question remains: Can medical ethics be practical, and if so, how? This is 
a 2500-year-old philosophical question. 
The Function of Clinical Ethics 
The assertion that clinical practice is inherently moral obviously does not imply that any 
and all actions undertaken by clinicians are justified. Rather, it means that clinical 
practice is characterized by specialized knowledge, a specific pattern of actions requiring 
special skills, and by an internal value structure. The practice of health care presumes 
certain values that guide this practice; conversely, this practice cannot be adequately 
explained without taking into account the underlying values. 
The discipline of clinical ethics, thus, does not »set« the right course of action: The 
clinical situation does. The situation of a diseased, handicapped, suffering human being, 
knocking on the door of a health care provider and requesting help, constitutes a »call« 
that invokes a sense of »embarrassment« [see Zwart 1993a, p. 22] in the person answering 
the door. The physician, able to provide help, is »compelled« by the patient's condition to 
help, to »do good« (Lat.: bene-ficere). 
If this is the elemental foundation of the morality of health care practice (about 
which more must and shall be said later), naturally, the actual clinical context is much 
more complex. There never is a single patient, nor a single physician, but patients (with 
their families) and physicians (assisted by a host of other providers). There never is a 
single moment, but a patient history, a healing (or dying) process, a lasting doctor-patient 
relationship, and a tradition of health care practice. And there never is a single place, but 
a clinical context influenced by the health care facility, the (un)available technology, the 
body of scientific knowledge, ongoing biomedical research, financial resources, and the 
socio-cultural environment. 
5. (...continued) 
In English, such grammatical use of genders has lost much of its syntactic meaning; when 
the referrals are clear and gender is not needed, one should not needlessly complicate the 
text with »or she« and »/her« appendages, and simply keep personal words male and things 
neuter. But I do advocate the reintroduction of gender when clarity is benefitted, that is to 
say, when in one (group of) sentence(s), different nouns are to be replaced by personal 
pronouns and confusion may result. Except for instances where common language pre-
scribes a particular gender, generally the First noun will be referred to by a male pronoun, 
the second by a female. If accidentally the doctor will end up male, and the nurse female, no 
real-life gender differences are implied. 
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All of this complicates the understanding of the clinical situation and the moral call 
that stems from it. Clinical ethics does not set the right course of action, but »merely« 
assists in the process of discovering and presenting that direction by participating in the 
interpretation of the call that emerges from the clinical situation. Moreover, that process 
of discovery and interpretation is always already being undertaken where health care is 
practiced. From the very moment that there have been patients and care providers, there 
has been a clinical-ethical discourse on the benefits of the individuals involved in the case 
(notably the patient), a discourse that has cogently guided the practice of health care by 
the provider (notably the physician). This clinical-ethical discourse may not always (have) 
take(n) the form of a conscious, reflected, and methodologically warranted discourse - and 
here lies the prime task for bioethics - but it does occur daily in the health care setting. 
If, therefore, the main question underlying this study is the question of whether clinical 
ethics is at all possible, the question should be understood as one seeking the a priori 
conditions of such a cogent, directive discourse. It is not a question about the possibility 
of clinical ethics, but about the a priori »possibility-conditions« of this possibility: Not 
how is clinical ethics possible, but why. 
The General Outline of this Inquiry 
The plea of practicing physicians for a bioethics that can guide the clinical care of 
particular patients has not gone fully unnoticed by contemporary bioethical theoreticians, 
many of whom in the past decade have attempted to meet the demands of practitioners. 
Mainly, these attempts have been made from within the existing methodological frame-
work of applied ethics; that is, applied ethics is »refined« to accommodate ethical 
discourse about the individual patient's case. But the results of those attempts have turned 
out to be unsatisfactory (which is the motive behind this study). When »applying« 
theoretical ethics to the clinical situation, the result is either a non-cogent ethical discourse 
about the case at hand, or a cogent discourse in which the unique characteristics of the 
case at hand are inadequately taken into account. The fundamental problem remains: How 
to develop a cogent ethical discourse that adequately accounts for the more or less unique 
aspects of the clinical case, notably for the individual patient in his particular situation. 
In this study, the question concerning the possibility conditions of clinical ethics will 
be addressed via two different but complementary philosophical methods. In Part I 
(Chapters 2, 3 and 4), the question itself as well as different answers suggested in the * 
bioethical literature will be subjected to a more in-depth analytical examination. Howev-
er, the insights yielded by this examination will be found lacking explanatory power. 
Hence, in Part II (Chapter 5, 6 and 7), an attempt will be made to increase our compre-
hension of the issue at hand via a synthesis (in a more or less phenomenologicallherme-
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neutical mode) of conclusions reached in Part I and insights gained from philosophers who 
have worked mostly outside the domain of bioethics 
Chapter 2 starts out with a review of contemporary attempts to refine applied ethics 
m order to accommodate ethical questions arising in the care of individual patients This 
review forces us to reconsider the structure of the discourse we are seeking What is the 
nature of the cogent discourse that applied ethics is able to provide at a more theoretical 
level and that clinically oriented bioethicists now are trying to discover at the individual 
case level9 More radically, should we at all be seeking a similar kind of cogency, or is 
the very practice of medicine guided by a different »directive«7 
My examination of the structure of clinical-ethical discourse will point to an 
important yet controversial issue Is there a special discernment, or »practical wisdom«, 
that would account for the missing links in the method of clinical ethical discourse7 In the 
literature, two forceful negative responses to the notion of such practical wisdom are 
discernible (1) It exists, but is limited to professionals That is to say, clinical ethics is 
the prerogative of clinicians (2) It does not exist in any meaningful sense, morally 
problematic clinical cases, therefore, must be solved differently (ι e , via contractual 
agreements) Chapter 3 examines the first claim, finding that the concept of professional 
»ethos« is indeed an important aspect of clinical ethics Physicians have often argued that 
medical ethics is of a peculiar nature, a fact which separates it from conventional ethics 
Clinical-medical ethics is a professional »ethic« This thesis could imply that the practical 
wisdom of physicians largely or even fully escapes critical examination However, it is 
only to the extent that clinical ethical discourse is open to critical examination that it can 
be characterized as ethical discourse as opposed to being a matter of purely subjective 
taste De gustibus non est disputandum, about matters of taste one cannot argue 
I will argue that a strong case can be made for a professional ethic in the sense that 
the contents of the patient - provider relationship6 to a large extent escape critical review 
However, this need not entail a reduction of clinical ethical discourse to subjectivism if we 
can demonstrate that it is possible to think (in a meaningful and reasonable way) of the 
patient - provider relationship as a moral relationship, as a relationship which formally is 
grounded in morality In other words, the possibility-conditions of such a regionalized, 
professional ethic must be elucidated This elucidation entails an examination of the 
possibility of intersubjective knowledge of the patient's personal sickness, pain, fear, and 
suffering, as well as his sense of happiness, life-plans, interests, and values — briefly, of 
»sympathy« (the topic of the fifth chapter) 
6 Whenever m this study I use the term »provider«, it is meant as a shorthand for »health care 
provider« Moreover, the term is not meant to connote the idea that care is being delivered 
like a product or service As will be argued in the final two chapters, genuine care requires 
personal commitment on the part of the carer 
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In Chapter 4, I consider the second claim, that is, the denial of the possibility of 
such intersubjectivity and hence of a professional ethic. I show that the arguments 
provided to underpin this denial are flawed; moreover the suggested contractual alternative 
must assume the very same intersubjectivity it denies. A close examination of this second 
claim, as well as various disappointing past attempts to move beyond contractual models, 
reveal two main reasons for this denial (sometimes explicitly presented in the work of 
those authors, sometimes implicitly). The first I call the underlying »black-box« (in the 
sense of »camera obscura«) hypothesis. This view assumes that the human being 
essentially has a one-way communicative relationship with the world: He knows the 
world, but the world does not know him (insofar as he is an individual). Except via 
explicit utterings, the benefits of other people (such as patients) cannot be traced. Human 
beings are moral strangers to one another, not because they have different moral convic-
tions, but because man's interests, values, and moral beliefs are completely hidden for 
other human beings. It is neither the case that the patient lacks expert scientific medical 
knowledge, nor that the modern physician is unwilling or unable to take into account the 
patient's subjective preferences. Consequently, peaceful human relationships, including 
patient-provider relationships, are feasible only on the basis of respect for personal 
autonomy on the one hand and a procedural social organization on the other. The second, 
related reason is to be found in the assumption that ethics must provide the foundation for 
health policy, with a consequent emphasis on, and preoccupation with, problem-solving, 
decision-making and procedure. 
Starting with Chapter 5, I will exchange my negative approach to the topic of this 
study for a more positive approach. Instead of criticizing other bioethicists, I will set out 
to develop an alternative to the »black-box« hypothesis that man is inaccessible to any 
third person. I argue that a convincing argument can be made in favor of human 
intersubjective »sympathy«. The notion of sympathy is all but new in the history of 
philosophy. Notable advocates of an ethics based on sympathy are the British moralists of 
the 18th century (e.g., Butler, Smith and Hume). However, rather than establishing the 
feasibility of genuine intersubjectivity, these authors paradoxically confirm the black-box 
hypothesis. An alternative understanding of intersubjectivity will be developed in 
reference to 20th century phenomenologists such as Scheler and Lévinas. 
At the same time, it will also become clear that the notion of sympathy must itself be 
grounded in a more encompassing understanding of human being. Sympathy may be the 
»apex stone« in the arch of clinical reasoning that binds care provider and patient. But for 
such sympathy to be possible, for there to be an arch, the two columns of patient and 
provider must on principle be »archeable«. A necessary possibility-condition of sympathy 
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is an anthropological theory that can make sense of this primordial connectiveness.7 In 
Chapter 6, therefore, such an anthropology will be sketched, borrowing eclectically from 
different existentialists and personalists (e.g., Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, Marcel, Scheler 
and Mounier). It should be emphasized beforehand that my drawing from these and other 
masters of philosophy is not intended to add to our understanding of their work, but rather 
to show how the bioethical debate can be enriched by including such »hard core« philo-
sophical insights - which is relatively seldom done. Hence, the primary criterion for 
selecting certain fragments from the works of these masters as well as particular commen-
tators is the extent to which they do, in fact, enrich the bioethical debate, notably the 
debate staged in this study. 
Chapter 7, finally, reexamines the doctor-patient relationship in light of the questions 
raised in the second, third and fourth chapters, and the findings of the fifth and sixth. 
The first subsection of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of one author, Von 
Gebsattel, a philosopher well acquainted with the work of such (befriended) contemporar-
ies as Heidegger and Scheler, but also and foremost a practicing psychiatrist. His ideas 
on the nature of the clinical care relationship will be found elucidating but also lacking in 
two crucial regard: They leave unanswered the question how exactly to establish the 
patient's best interests, and what to do if a clear understanding of a particular patient's 
interests remains forthcoming, that is, the issue of decision-making power. The latter -
typically modern - issue will be examined in the final subsections of the seventh chapter, 
bringing to the fore again Engelhardt's assumption that ethics must provide the foundation 
for health policy. It will be concluded that notwithstanding the importance of a prudent 
balance of power, the proper task of clinical ethics is to develop a cogent discourse that is 
grounded in an anthropological understanding of the personal worlds of patients and 
clinicians, and that can guide them towards a careful and trustworthy relationship. 
7. When in this book the terms »anthropology« and »anthropological« are being used, reference 
is made to that philosophical subdiscipline that examines the nature of human being. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE STRUCTURE OF CLINICAL 
ETHICAL DISCOURSE 
The success of the dominating conception of 
applied ethics has more and more segregated 
medical ethics from philosophy in general, 
hence underestimating the need for a broader 
theoretical framework for practical ethics 
Ten Have 1994c, p. 120 
Introduction 
The task at hand is to lay a few stones for a foundation of clinical, practice-oriented 
bioethics. As previously mentioned, other bioethicists have already tried to meet the 
demands of practitioners for a clinically oriented ethics. To a large extent, these attempts 
have been made from within the existing method of applied ethics by »refining« applied 
ethics to include an ethical discourse about the individual patient's case. In this chapter, 
these attempts are evaluated, forcing us to reconsider the structure of the cogent discourse 
we are seeking. By examining the styles of argumentation commonly employed in 
bioethical reasoning, the nature of cogency should become more clear: To what extent can 
conventional arguments be considered »cogent«? Is any of these argumentative methods 
suited to analyze individual cases? Is it possible to maintain, if not the same kind, then 
the same level of cogency in the analysis of clinical cases? And what, finally, would be 
the structure of such a clinical-ethical discourse? 
In the first part of this chapter, I argue that the proper goal of ethics is to provide a 
directive discourse to guide humans toward moral behavior by cogently presenting8 a 
particular course of action. Next, I critically examine various »conventional« bioethical 
methods of presenting such a course of action through logical reasoning, notably deducti-
8. As opposed to »setting« (see p. 9). 
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vism, inductivism, casuistry, and situation ethics. I show that these three methods, while 
providing elements for a theory of clinical-ethical discourse, fail to provide a convincing 
account of the »possibility-conditions« of such discourse. Consequently, the nature of 
»persuasion« is examined in an attempt to clarify the essence of »cogency«, which then 
allows us to evaluate a fifth candidate for a method of clinical-ethical discourse, conduc-
tion. The chapter concludes with a critical assessment. 
What »Ethics« are we Looking for? 
There exists considerable difference of opinion as to the meaning of the word »ethics« 
and, ipso facto, »bioethics«. A charlatan is said to have »little ethics«, in which case the 
term »ethics« refers to the character of the person, his ideas about what is right and 
wrong, and his manners reflecting these ideas. Similarly, when it is argued that the 
»ethics code« of the medical profession is not followed by many practitioners, the 
collection of standards for correct professional practice is being connoted. On the other 
hand, »the ethics« of Aristotle, Spinoza, or Moore refers to their writings about moral 
attitudes, standards of correct behavior, the good life, etc. Similarly, »ethics« as a branch 
of philosophy is the systematic and critical examination of standards of conduct and the 
justifications for these standards. In other words, a distinction must be made between the 
discourse, analysis or study, and their objects, actions, persons or systems. What »ethics« 
are we looking for? 
The original meaning of the word »ethics« cannot help us solve this little definitory 
problem. For »all that concerns the customs« (Gr.: ethika9) could pertain both to the 
study and its object. Unfortunately, »morality«, the only other term commonly used to 
denote some of the same issues, comes from the literal Latin translation of the Greek 
word. To prevent confusion I suggest reserving the term »ethics« for the study and the 
term »morality« for its object. The adjective »ethical« will likewise refer to the study of 
moral issues, and »moral« to the practice or practitioners. Thus, a moral person is 
somebody with a good character, behaving in a justifiable manner. An ethical analysis, 
on the other hand, is an analysis that employs the philosophical methods for studying the 
justifications of actions in an attempt, for instance, to discover the possibility-conditions of 
cogent discourse.10 
9. The greek term ethika. in tum, has two roots, ethos (habit, custom) and ethos (character), 
pointing at the double nature of ethics as concerning both the established mores and the 
virtuousness of the responsibly acting person [see also Pieper 1975]. 
10. In this book, I try to consistently reserve the term »ethics« and »ethical« for the philosophical 
study, and »morality« and »moral« for the standards and justifications themselves. However, 
(continued...) 
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When we define - in the stipulative sense of that term - ethics as a study of human 
actions under the aspect of morality, we do not understand the word »study« to refer to the 
appropriation of existing knowledge by learning, but first of all the process of active 
procurement of new knowledge. But the knowledge thus acquired differs from most other 
forms of knowledge by its cogency: Ethical knowledge directs people toward moral 
behavior. Thus, the aforementioned distinction between ethics and morality is primarily a 
heuristic one. Genuine ethics pertains directly to morality.11 
The thesis that ethics guides men's actions is bound to raise questions (see p. 21), 
but so is the mere claim that it concerns human actions. Why does ethics not pertain to 
other human phenomena as well, such as intuitions, experiences, and emotions? And 
what about a second category of human »activity«: Aspirations, unaccomplished plans, and 
decisions yet to be carried out? Being unable in the framework of this study to provide 
adequate argumentative support, I must limit myself to contending that ethics, indeed, 
pertains to actions only, thereby excluding the first but including the second kind of 
human phenomena, primarily because the first, unlike the second, »overcome« men. It 
does not make sense to ask them to justify why they have these intuitions, experiences and 
emotions, while it does make sense to hold people responsible, for their aspirations, plans 
and decisions. In spite of intuitions and similar phenomena being generated by the person 
himself, rather than being done to him, they have the character of happening to a person: 
A patient experiencing pain is »passive« in the most fundamental sense of the word. This 
quality implies that any attempt to examine the person's responsibility, accountability, or 
culpability for such »activities« would be a »category mistake«. 
But - so it may be counter-argued - we do blame people for not restraining their 
emotions, for getting outraged, or for letting themselves be misguided by sentimental 
feelings. Indeed, my examples do not fully fit the distinction: Human activity, whether 
outrage, passive acquiescence, or radical intervention, is an object of ethical reflection if 
and insofar as it makes sense to hold the person »exhibiting« such activity culpable, 
accountable, or at least responsible. 
It follows from this that I propose a rather wide definition of human actions as all 
human »manipulations«: All influencing, changing, creating, devising the world. 
However, if man is able to alter the world, and if it makes sense to hold him responsible 
for such manipulations, he at the same time must be able to opt not to do so. Both 
options being two sides of the same coin, a human activity does not have to result in an 
10. (...continued) 
the reader is reminded that in quotes from other authors (who do not use the same defini-
tions) the terms may suddenly acquire another meaning. 
11. »Genuine ethics« as opposed to so called »meta-ethics«, the linguistic analysis of the meaning 
of ethical language, which supposedly is itself morally neutral. 
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alteration of the outside world to be considered an ethically relevant action: For each, a 
person can be held responsible and accountable. A decision not to intervene, a plan not 
carried out, an aborted attempt thus all qualify as »actions« [see Wieland 1989, p. 9-10]. 
Conversely, interventions will not become an object of ethical study if it does not 
make sense to hold the person causing the intervention responsible, that is, if these actions 
are nonmoral actions12, despite their definite impact on the world.13 An example of 
such a nonmoral intervention would be jerking in one's sleep, thereby hitting one's 
spouse. To be (im)moral, the intervention at any rate must be voluntary and thus 
preventable. Without that quality there is no use in asking whether that intervention 
should, ought, or might be or have been effected. 
To be a moral (as opposed to nonmoral) action, that is, for the person to be 
responsible, some human activity must have the character of a (1) motivated, (2) intended, 
and (3) willed (4) resolution. If the fourth is missing, there is no determinate item about 
which the actor can be questioned (only God can judge the human person in full). If the 
third is missing the actor could not have acted differently, and the act would not have 
been preventable. If the action is not qualified by an intention (i.e., if no goal can be 
distinguished in direct relation to the action), the act was either an accident or an element 
in a larger intended action [see Raz 1978, p. 2]. If it was an accident, the responsibility 
hinges on the question of whether the actor has the »supererogatory« obligation not to 
make such mistakes (e.g., a physician may be held responsible in spite of a lack of 
intention for careless behavior resulting in the death of his patient, while a layman 
exhibiting the very same behavior would not). If it was a means to, or side-effect of, 
some other intended action, instead of the former, the latter action (including all means 
and side-effects) should be evaluated. Finally, if there are no motives, or if there are 
motives which are beyond understanding, the »nonsense« response of the actor held 
responsible precludes a judgment. For an ethical judgment is always a judgment against a 
larger moral background which itself must be understandable and shared (whether it be 
one that is uncovered or one that is reconstructed). A »freak« action (i.e., an action 
driven by incomprehensible motives) will invoke verdicts such as 'he behaves strangely' -
as the title of Camus' novel L'Étranger (FT.: The Stranger) aptly connotes -, or perhaps 
'he is crazy', but not, 'he acts immorally'. 
The importance of a larger intersubjective background of moral meanings points to 
another important aspect of ethical reflection and evaluation. Though all (im)moral 
12. Nonmoral actions are also called amoral actions. 
13. For lack of a more general term, »moral« may not only refer to activities that are good and 
just, as opposed to bad and wrong (immoral), but also to the opposite of »nonmoral«. An act 
is moral (in opposition to nonmoral) when it can be qualified in such terms as good or bad, 
just or wrong. Thus, in the sentence 'a moral action may be moral', the first adjective 
stands in opposition to nonmoral, the second in opposition to immoral. 
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actions in principle fall within the realm of morality, not all are of interest for an ethical 
analysis. Ethics pertains only to those human actions which seem to preclude an immedi-
ate moral assessment. Ethics, like all other branches of philosophy, arises from wonder, 
doubt, or uncertainty regarding the moral quality of certain actions. To resolve this 
uncertainty, ethics, like any other science, must (1) limit itself to portentous questions, 
and (2) assume some certainties as a frame of reference. 
(1) The first condition, that is, the limited scope of ethics, is necessary because the 
number of voluntary actions (to be) performed by human beings is extraordinary, if not 
infinitely large. Life goes on. Actions have to be performed, and choices must be made. 
Thus it makes sense to focus on critical questions (such as the criteria for a just war or the 
morality of euthanasia) rather than on the morality of drinking milk or of combing one's 
hair. People take much for granted, which is sometimes imprudent, but usually fortunate. 
Life would become too burdensome if every single act had first to be evaluated on its 
moral status. 
Therefore, I propose to call those human actions which are not of primary interest 
for an ethical examination »nonethical« actions. Whereas in the area of morality, a 
tripartite division can be made between moral, immoral, and nonmoral, in the area of 
ethics, an action either is or is not of ethical interest. Since the prefix »in-« or »un-« (as 
in imprudent or unfair) indicates the opposite rather than the zero level, I prefer the term 
»nonethical« for actions and events that do not fall within the range of ethics. It goes 
without saying that all nonmoral events are nonethical as well.14 
The fact that many human actions appear as nonethical actions does not imply that 
any choice in this area is acceptable. Most human actions appear as nonethical because a 
particular manner of performing those actions is taken for granted. This manner can be a 
matter of established »technique« that brings about the best results. Not following (one of) 
the established technique(s) (without excuse for this deviation) is immoral because one 
voluntarily reduces or even destroys part of the wealth of the world. For example, it is 
immoral to do the dishes by breaking all dishes and throwing the pieces away, even if one 
owns those dishes. It is immoral as well to scrub fine china with a steel wool scrubber 
when that scratches those dishes. Though essentially immoral, the latter as well as the 
former way of doing dishes is hardly a matter of great worry to ethicists. A bystander 
may shake his head, thinking it is a shame. But he is not likely to get outraged (unless 
the bystander is my spouse), to the extent he might if I were to commit murder. 
In other instances, various techniques may grant similar results. Nonetheless, I may 
be obligated to choose one rather than another technique if »etiquette« so requires: When 
14. I suggest to reserve the term »anti-ethical« (instead of »unethical«) to classify ideas and 
theories that are of interest to ethics, but only because they constitute an attack on ethics as 
such. 
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in Rome, do as the Romans do. In many an instance, acting one way rather than another, 
even if both yield comparable results, is a matter of »politeness«, and politeness is 
important as a facilitator of a peaceful community of human beings. Again, people may 
frown and murmur that I am boorish or even vulgar when I fail to abide by the rales of 
etiquette. They will not, however, feel an urge to change my manners (except for my 
parents); they will simply evade me. I will return to the phenomenon of »etiquette« in the 
next section. 
Finally, there is a series of nonethical actions that society nonetheless has standard-
ized under penalty of fines and/or detention because of the societal order that is at stake. 
For example, from a technical perspective, driving on the left side of a two-way road is as 
successful as driving on the right side, but everybody has to make the same choice for 
traffic to run in an orderly way. This choice cannot be left to etiquette; it has to be 
legally enforced. Obviously, not all actions regulated by the law are nonethical; some are 
of legal as well as ethical interest. But traffic laws and many other similar practical laws 
pertain to nonethical actions. 
(2) Having thus limited the scope of human actions to »ethical« actions - voluntary 
actions that constitute a serious moral dilemma for which there is no simple technical 
answer, nor a standard satisfactory solution provided by etiquette or law - one more 
restriction must be applied. For within the range of ethical actions, not everything can be 
doubted. If everything is doubtful (as skepticism tries to defend), philosophy, and science 
more in general, are futile endeavors because any answer provided will always remain 
doubtful. Fortunately, skepticism is self-contradictory, for if everything is doubtful, so is 
the claim that everything is doubtful. Certain facts have to be taken for granted, both in 
physics and in philosophy. Certain human actions must be assumed moral beyond doubt 
and others immoral. Upon accepting these assumptions as truths, questionable actions can 
be compared with these standards of (im)morality and evaluated regarding their own moral 
status. 
Because this standardized framework of reference itself consists of ethically relevant 
actions, it can and sometimes even has to be examined. However, doing so invokes a 
serious problem: Either (a) all answers to moral dilemmas provided earlier on the basis of 
this framework no longer can be considered correct (they still may be correct, but it can 
no longer be concluded that they are). Furthermore, a new framework of reference must 
be chosen, which itself is a questionable venture because that framework, to be taken for 
granted, must be constructed out of facts of which the moral status until then was dubious; 
or (b) a circular argument evolves in which as the new framework of reference [N], the 
answers [A] to moral dilemmas reached in reference to the old [O] but now questioned 
framework are chosen: If O, then A. A = N. If N, then O. 
Any scientific analysis, whether in physics or philosophical ethics, will come to face 
the "Münchhausen-Trilemma" [Ricken 1983, p. 39] and must choose between one of three 
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alternatives: To dogmatically assert first principles, to search for second-order criteria ad 
infinitum, or to accept a circular argument. Of these, I would consider the latter the most 
tolerable, for implicit in any circle is a beauty that transcends the mere aesthetic. A 
circle, after all, is the perfect form, no irregularities, no distracting and confusing 
exceptions to the rule which is so miraculously obvious, no infinite regresses that make 
you wonder about the »thereafter«, a closed system sufficient in and by itself, the true 
whole and the whole truth. Returning to one's starting point, particularly if the journey 
has been long, can give one the joyful feeling of finally knowing the whole terrain. In 
fact, any self-sufficient system, be it space or reason, will in the end be circular (see also 
p. 54). 
On the other hand, a circular movement tends to be without a stimulus. The 
recognition that human knowledge is limited, and that the circular movement is a never-
ending movement, would cause humanity to give up on the task of ethics were it not for a 
certain appeal that calls people to search for a better world. The fact that there are things 
that »call« us in to action cannot be proven nor disproved. More in general, the existence 
of »values« that »appeal« to us, attract and affect us, and set a final goal to our ventures, 
cannot be proven but precedes any ethical reflection. For example, the recognition that 
there is the »other« (i.e., my fellow human being), and the »Other« with a capital (i.e., 
God), and the acknowledgement that the »O/other« is of value, and that, therefore, I ought 
to respond in a certain manner, that I owe the other responsibility, cannot be deduced 
from the premise that I am living with others in a confined spatial and temporal area 
which forces me to come to terms with those others. This premise may lead up to a 
conclusion about what is prudent to do, what should(n't) be done, but not what is the 
moral thing to do, what ought (not) be done. The recognition that something should(n't) 
be done underlies politics; the recognition that something ought (not) be done underlies 
ethics. The notion that a better world ought to be realized keeps the moral circle in 
motion; the awareness that there are sick, handicapped, suffering people calling out for 
help is the impetus of health care. The function of bioethics is to assist in the interpreta-
tion of that call so that medical practice will be able to respond ever more adequately to 
that call. 
This remark leads us back to our definition of ethics as the study of morality 
employing philosophical methods of analysis. Does this imply that ethics should be 
located at the meta-level only, that is, in separation of and looking »down« on morality? 
Should bioethics limit itself to pointing out neglected features in discussions on moral 
subjects, spotting contradictions, mapping and critically evaluating the conceptual 
commitments and values conflicts in particular actions and choices, laying out alternatives, 
scrutinizing arguments, and listing sound reasons pro and con [see Nielsen 1984, p. 72]? 
Such a retreat to the minimal role of debate-clarifier is supposed to warrant a morally 
unbiased contribution to the solution of dilemmas. Any and all prejudiced, moralistic 
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preaching should be prevented for the sake of »scientific« neutrality. Bioethicists, so it is 
contended, preferably should not dispense moral adhortations [see Siegler 1981, p. 19-20]. 
And if they cannot refrain from advancing a particular course of action, their proffered 
advice is but personal, non-scientific opinion that carries as much weight as any other 
opinion; at best, its preeminence is warranted by the applied meta-ethical theory. Moral 
discourse itself cannot imply cogency, and if it seems to do so, that cogency upon scrutiny 
will turn out to be a matter of dangerous rhetoric. 
Along with De Visscher, I contend that the many contemporary meta-ethical debates 
about ethical concepts, methods, arguments, models, theories, etc., have generated a kind 
of »fog« that is about to obscure the very motive behind all these meta-debates: Moral 
practice itself [De Visscher 1993; see also Van der Wal 1993]. Obviously, advocates of 
such an approach to ethics will heavily protest qualifying their endeavors as »foggy«, for 
their very goal is to elucidate moral debates. And yet, the question remains why one 
should even attempt to elucidate. Why is an elucidated choice any more desirable than a 
random one? It must be assumed that the elucidative discourse of applied ethics has a 
directive quality, if only in pointing out what alternatives one ought not embark on. 
A similar consideration may be advanced in response to those who reject applied 
ethics, opting instead for a more »modest« role of the bioethicist as the »interpreter«. A 
hermeneutic analysis and clarification of the situation at hand, opening up various 
meaningful practical options, only makes sense if it is assumed that among these options, 
one must be morally preferable. Furthermore, this superiority must be recognizable. 
Lacking some applicable meta-theory - for the very essence of hermeneutic ethics is the 
denial of such a meta-theory - implies that the moral discourse itself must imply the 
morally best alternative. 
This brief and still very tentative analysis of the nature of bioethics makes clear once 
more that the distinction between »ethics« and »morality« cannot be as sharp as suggested 
earlier. Nonetheless, there remains a distinction between moral discourse itself and the 
question - underlying the business of ethics - of how we recognize what discourse is 
morally directive? A brief discussion of two related kinds of directive language, i.e., 
etiquette and law, may help us to locate the essence of ethical discourse. 
Ethics, Etiquette, and the Law 
The confusing multiplicity of meanings for the word »ethics« may be partially due to the 
affinity between »ethics« and »etiquette«. The meaning of these two words in contempo-
rary language seems much too related not to have an etymological connection, yet the 
similarity appears accidental. The etymologic origin of »etiquette« is not the Greek 
adjective »ethikos«, but the old French word etiquette, which in tum comes from the 
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Indogerman »stecken« (to stick). Originally, the word etiquette was a label or ticket 
(which word has the same origin), stuck on a post, reporting the rules of the day for the 
court or the army [Shipley 1945]. Though in the English language nowadays the word 
etiquette is rarely used to indicate a label [Webster 1983], in Dutch »etiket« is still the 
common word for a label (e.g., for the label on a jar). Spelled the French way, the 
Dutch word »etiquette« has the same meaning as the English word »etiquette«: The (rules 
for the) forms, manners, and ceremonies established by convention as acceptable or 
required in society, in a profession, or in official life [Webster 1983].15 
If the difference is stated bluntly, »ethics« being »all that concerns the customs«, and 
»etiquette« meaning »stuck to the wall, for example, with a nail or any other means to 
make it stay in place, clearly readable for all to whom the information pertains«, it is clear 
why the accidental similarity is so unfortunate. In accordance with the etymological 
difference between the terms etiquette and ethics, a difference in the meaning of the 
concepts must be made. Rules of etiquette share with moral rules the characteristic that 
(unlike laws) they are not enforced by a formalized system of trial and sentencing. Their 
binding power lies in the disapproval of the members of the group that follows a breach of 
etiquette. On the other hand, the rules of etiquette and law are similar in that (unlike 
moral precepts) the justification for that binding power is a matter of convention. 
For the sake of stability and predictability, it certainly makes sense to »stick« to a 
behavioral pattern that has been around for some time and is accepted by many people. It 
is not the case that etiquette is »sticking« to customs against better judgment, it is not 
conservatism. But etiquette rules are valid because of the contingent nature of human 
history, whereas moral precepts are valid in spite of the contingent nature of human 
history. Etiquette reflects the sensible notion that, life on earth being full of accidental 
events and changes, it is a good practice to »stick« with certain conventions, contingent as 
they may be. For instance, it is prudent and polite for people to walk on the right side of 
the sidewalk. This custom is as contingent as can be, as the example of Great Britain 
indicates, where people are supposed to walk on the right side but drive on the left. The 
content of the rules of etiquette is of minor or no importance: After all, it makes hardly 
any difference whether one walks or drives on the left or right side. What matters is 
merely that everybody sticks to one and the same practice. 
Though Vanderbilt in her famous and often reprinted Complete Book of Etiquette 
fails to define the nature of etiquette satisfactorily, one of her conclusions is revealing: 
15. In German, the two words are spelled similarly: Etikett being label, Etikette being etiquette. 
Why the latter word ended up having a female gender (like the French étiquette), but the 
former a neuter gender, remains an intriguing question. Maybe »das Etikett« was derived 
directly from the German verb »stecken«, whereas »die Etikette« only entered the German via 
the detour of the French word »étiquette«. The literature available to this author does not 
answer the question. 
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"... [W]e must all learn the socially acceptable ways of living with others in no matter 
what society we move. Even in primitive societies there are such rules, some of them as 
complex and inexplicable as many of our own. Their original raison d'être or purpose is 
lost, but their acceptance is still unquestioned" [from the Introduction to the Original 1952 
Edition, reprinted in Vanderbilt 1978, p. xv-xvi]. This conclusion is interesting in two 
different respects. 
First, it confirms our earlier explanation of the nature of etiquette rules: Even if such 
a rule is inexplicable, even if nobody remembers how this rule came about and why it was 
ever installed, it still must be adhered to for the sake of social order. Secondly, and more 
importantly, Vanderbilt's conclusion illuminates the difference between etiquette and 
morality. If she writes that "... we must all learn the socially acceptable ways of living 
..." [emphasis added - JW\, she thereby indicates that the obligatory power of etiquette 
rules is not immanent in those rules, because in that case she would not have had to 
remind us that we must adhere to those rules. It would have been self-evident that such 
rules are to be obeyed. Moreover, when claiming that we must all act in accordance with 
etiquette it cannot be etiquette that requires us to do so, for that would invoke an ad 
infinitum argument. Some other, external ground(s) for the binding power of etiquette 
rales must exist. 
»Sticking« to an etiquette rule may, of course, merely be a matter of a desire to be 
acknowledged by neighbors as a fashionable, refined, or polite person. In many a case, 
however, obedience to certain rules of etiquette may be required by morality. Although 
there is, for example, no moral rule prescribing which side of the sidewalk to walk on 
(for there is no essential value difference between the right and the left side), morality 
does require to abide by the side which etiquette prescribes, because that way, harm to 
other pedestrians is prevented. The good of society requires such behavior. The 
conviction that the good of society obligates us to behave in accordance with etiquette 
presupposes a particular conception of what is good and valuable, what is right and just, 
what is moral (i.e., an orderly society). 
Whereas in the case of etiquette rules, the obligatory nature is due to general 
unquestioned acceptance of the rule, in the case of a moral rule, it is the content of the 
rule that must be justifiable irrespective of the contingencies of the temporal and local 
context. That is not to say that moral rules disregard the temporal and local context. 
Firstly, such disregard is not entirely possible, not even in abstracto, because the human 
being is essentially a contextual being. And, secondly, such disregard would reduce 
morality to a purely abstract endeavor. Morality pertains to human actions and actions are 
possible only in a real life context. The content rather than the local and temporal context 
must give the rule its autonomous nature (Gr.: auto-nomy = the law being self-set, 
immanent), such that it can survive the contingencies of human history and geography, 
both of which are continuously changing. The obligatory force of moral rules is imma-
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nent and not dependent on an external, higher obligation, such as is the case with etiquette 
rules, which are binding only because of a higher moral rule (Gr.: hetero-nomy = the law 
coming from some »other«, some external source). 
If a particular rule is handed down by tradition, surviving the passing of time and 
changing contexts, this is commonly thought to be a good indication of its transcendent 
character. The tradition itself is not the justification (as it is with etiquette rules), but an 
indication (maybe even evidence) of the rule's transcendent nature which, in turn, justifies 
its binding power. The problem, however, is that in their appearance, rules of etiquette 
and moral rules handed down by tradition are very similar. 
One way to get past the appearances is to analyze the contents of a custom from a 
rational or religious perspective. As mentioned earlier, moral rales are supposed to 
transcend the contingencies of life into a realm of absoluteness (Lat.: ab-solvus = made 
loose, that is, from the contingent context). Since there can be only one such realm, one 
truth - otherwise moral rules would become contingent again, be it upon one of various 
transcendent realities -, the contents of a custom may be found to have this absolute 
nature, in which case the custom should be characterized as a moral rule. 
It may be objected that such a process of verification is unlikely to be successful, 
given man's apparent inability to find a definite answer to most moral questions. This 
study, the reader may add, is evidence just the same of that ongoing struggle with what is 
called »the truth«. Unfortunately, these objections cannot be refuted, if it were only 
because religious perspectives often are too personal a matter to be intersubjective, and 
because man's rational capacities are too limited to fully grasp this absolute transcendental 
truth. Fortunately, objections would equally accompany the logical consequences of the 
alternative hypothesis (that is, no difference exists between so-called moral rules and rules 
of etiquette, or, if there exists a difference, this difference cannot be established by man 
with certainty; in other words, morality is a matter of contingent conventions as well). 
Ethical relativism (the theory that morality is contingent, because it is relative to and 
determined by either accidental historical or cultural circumstances, the individuals' 
preferences, or the particular circumstances of the situation16) can be defended consis-
tently only at the cost of severe incompatibility with common sense and a continuous 
danger to plunge into the abyss of skepticism. Though this conclusion in and by itself, 
could suffice to undermine the relativist attack on an absolutist ethics, such a negative 
defense cannot suffice, and more needs to be said about its feasibility. 
16. And which for that reason is better characterized as »anti-ethical« relativism (see footnote 14 
on p. 19). 
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The Search for Direction in Moral Matters 
As various philosophers have pointed out, notably the contemporary thinker Maclntyre 
[Maclntyre 1981] our world seems to have ended up in a paradoxical dead-lock situation 
where morality is concerned. In our hearts there is still hope for a genuine (i.e., directive 
and cogent) morality, but reason tells us that this hope is definitely futile. Yet despite the 
presumed failure of morality ever being rationally verified, moral debates are more 
frequent and vehement than ever before. This expansion is not due to a heightened moral 
quality of contemporary society. On the contrary, ethical debates are ever more frequent 
because there is ever less consensus among people about the validity of many moral 
precepts. All too quickly, after such debates start, the process of argumentative reasoning 
ends in unverifiable ethical presuppositions, personal opinions, beliefs, and convictions 
that cannot be proven nor disqualified on rational grounds. Unable to prove one's ethical 
stance, yet attacked nonetheless, people become defensive and the debate turns emotional 
and vehement. 
For those observing this development from some distance, only one conclusion 
seems possible: Ethics must be a non-rational endeavor, a matter of personal opinion, a 
question of taste. Since there is no method to rationally decide what is good and just, fair 
and moral, the only solution to the looming aggression and fragmentation of society is to 
adopt a social system in which individual liberty is limited by one principle only: Non-
maleficence (do no harm). 
On the other hand, people continue to discuss so-called moral issues and to look for 
rational arguments that bind every reasonable person, thereby yielding general obligations 
rather than personal preferences (when it has been defended convincingly and audibly for 
everybody interested in these issues, that ethics is not a rational enterprise). The language 
used in contemporary ethical debates suggests that people recognize and acknowledge the 
cogency inherent in ethical discourse. 
What is even more, in the world of modern health care there seems to exist an ever-
growing craving for direction in moral matters.17 The manifest growth of the discipline 
of bioethics presumes not merely a growing awareness of moral dilemmas, but also (1) a 
desire to obtain directive solutions to these dilemmas, and (2) an apparent inability to 
provide that solution. Some people, particularly physicians, may respond that in drawing 
these conclusions I am »framing« the world of health care; that as physicians they have 
always been aware of moral dilemmas; but that the number of dilemmas is not rising or, 
17. It would be interesting to examine whether the heavy and growing emphasis on diagnostics, 
which seems to reflect an increasing uneasiness in working under circumstances of limited 
knowledge, is related to the quest for direction in moral matters, which could reflect a 
parallel uneasiness in carrying the personal responsibility for actions taken under uncertainty. 
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if it is, that it is already being handled adequately by physicians, and that, consequently, 
physicians do not have a desire for solutions from outsiders. But even if not all health 
care workers crave moral certainty, it can hardly be denied that a large number do. 
What is of more interest is the way in which this guidance is obtained. Paradoxical­
ly, in the age of individualism and autonomy, there has emerged an increasing tendency 
among both medical practitioners and philosophically trained bioethicists to behave 
according to other people's suggestions, preferably the suggestions of an »authority« or -
even better - group of authorities. On the micro-level, one can observe this tendency in 
the writings of individual authors that contain ever growing lists of references. Quoting, a 
habit virtually foreign to ethics until recently, seems to have taken the place of self-
reflection. On the macro-level, that is, at the international forum, a similar tendency is 
noticeable. A good example is the so-called Appleton Consensus: An attempt to reach 
worldwide consensus on withholding medical treatment.18 As Ten Have has observed, 
the authority of this document seems to be derived mostly from the long list of famous 
contributors with impressive credentials [see Ten Have 1990, p. 14]. 
One can also observe this tendency at the meso-level, that is, in local health care 
institutions (notably in the United States, but increasingly also in Europe). It is visible in 
the emergence of clinical ethicists: Physicians, theologians, or philosophers who are 
stationed in the hospital, carrying a beeper, providing immediate ethical consultations to 
hesitating practitioners. It is also visible in Hospital Ethics Committees (HECs), multi-
disciplinary committees which, among others, write policies for the hospital and provide 
consultations to clinicians [for a more detailed discussion of НЕС activities, see Scheirton 
1990, 1992, 1993]. 
The aura of credibility which quotations, references, credentials, formal consulta­
tions, and group consensus produces, is, in a sense, little different from the mysticism 
providing a great deal of credibility to religions. The parallel may not be as accidental as 
it seems at first sight. Maybe it is the lack of religious commandments that induces the 
need for other directives. Our present-day world acknowledges only two types of 
authorities: Science and the individual. The idea (or rather belief) that science yields 
unquestionable, well-founded certitudes provokes a tendency to structure all other human 
endeavors in accordance with the models employed by the natural sciences as well. And 
where scientific results cannot be yielded, only individual opinion counts. Opinions have 
become truths. Thus we see in bioethics a hybrid combination emerge between science 
and subjectivism: An obsession with community consensus and a reverence for personal 
opinions. 
18. This international cooperative effort is named after the town in Wisconsin (USA) in which 
the first meeting took place. 
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I share the deep-rooted desire of all those people who continue to discuss moral 
issues, consciously or subconsciously in search of some cogent moral standards that 
surpass personal preference and taste. Actually, even those who try to convince us 
(tenacious seekers for ethical cogency) that we search in vain and that society ought to 
suspend any rules based on such inadequately justified moral tenets still assume that 
something »ought« to be done, that something »must« change, and that it would be 
»wrong« - not merely tasteless - when a subjectivist/libertarian stance were not adopted. 
If we agree with Engelhardt that the very purpose of a study into the foundations of 
bioethics is "... to fashion an ethic ... that can speak with rational authority across the 
great diversity of moral viewpoints" [Engelhardt 1986, p. 4; emphasis added - JW], 
presuming that a single standard for the truth does not exist or cannot be known by man, 
undermines the whole project from the very start. 
When Engelhardt maintains that there are better reasons to presume the existence of 
various equally correct ethical theories (each relative to some other non-moral factor) as 
opposed to a single authoritative account of ethics, he is correct [see, p. 20], but merely 
insofar as these differences are the result of the limited character of the human mind, 
particularly man's rational mind. Not only is there the empirical-historical fact that 
different people always have had differing moral beliefs to such a degree that agreement 
seems impossible even in small communities, a single meta-ethics seems equally impossi-
ble, that is, it is equally impossible to look at this pluralism from a single vantage point 
and presume some form of relativism is the only right answer. The different theories are 
equally true, but only provisionally: Provided, namely, that reasons have yet to be found 
to consider one theory closer to the truth. In so far as Engelhardt considers his own 
theory of bioethics to be correct, to be sincere, he must defend his theory as the one 
closest to that truth. 
Interestingly, in the preface of his book The Foundations of Bioethics [1986], 
Engelhardt, in so many words, admits that his book is a failure - a failure if taken in 
reference to the author's original intentions, which were not to defend a secular pluralist 
ethic but rather the opposite: "I have endeavored to find grounds for establishing by 
reason a particular view of the good life and securing by general rational arguments the 
authority for its establishment" [p. viii]. As I will try to show later, Engelhardt's 
»failure« is due (at least in part) to his setting an overstretched goal for bioethics: To 
provide the foundation of a health policy, a comprehensive program of action that directs 
any and all members of society. If, however, we understand health care ethics to have a 
much more moderate task, if the function of bioethics is to examine the possibility-
conditions of cogent clinical moral discourse, we are on safer grounds. For there is little 
doubt that binding moral discourse exists, or at least, that most health care providers as 
well as patients assume such a discourse exists and act accordingly. 
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Taking the described dead-lock seriously, however, we must seek a system of 
morality whose binding power is grounded, not in a rationality that transcends the 
manifold individuals, with their unique life stories, into some ideal, transcendent, 
monotheistic perspective, but in the very subjectivity of these individuals — without being 
contingent upon and determined by that context. »Subjectivity« here does not mean mere 
»taste« or »opinion«. I contend that one's individuality is the very foundation of morality, 
or, vice versa, that morality is what makes each of us an individual human being - a 
person. 
Cogency and Rationality 
This is not the place to develop an argumentation about the nature of man or the human 
being. I will claim, however, that the non-subjective yet human perspective we are taking 
when engaging in ethics is the »rational« perspective. The quotation marks around 
»rational« indicate that the term should not be understood too narrowly, like the thought 
processes common in mathematics, formal logic, or even the natural sciences. I have 
already pointed out that ethics is doomed to fail with such a narrow interpretation of 
rationality. While the specific nature of ethical reasoning will become clear later in this 
section, I use the term »rationality« to imply that the process of thinking in ethics is not 
totally different from other forms of rationality, because it shares with these the ability to 
convince through communication. 
There are various ways in which we, as human beings, communicate with ourselves 
and with our fellow human beings. When we express ourselves in terms of tastes, 
appetites, likings, inclinations, and so forth, we expect to be taken seriously and to be 
respected in those various personal expressions. However, we do not expect such 
acknowledgement because the message we are communicating can be understood by 
others. When I claim that endive tastes good or that I like yellow flowers, the other 
person can try to imagine what I am talking about but he cannot comprehend the very 
same taste and liking I am experiencing. On the other hand, when Pythagoras claimed 
that in a perpendicular triangle a2 + b2 = c2, and when Galileo maintained that the earth 
was moving after all, they expected others to acknowledge the content of what they were 
saying while disregarding who was saying it. When I argue that Socrates is mortal, since 
all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, others should not merely believe me; they 
should be convinced and able to reconstruct the truth of what I claim. 
Contending that ethics is a rational endeavor, rather than a matter of taste or 
subjective preference, implies that ethical utterances can be supported by arguments that 
justify the claim independently from the speaker's particular subjective and private insight 
or inspiration. This also implies that we are not seeking the reasons that something is 
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being undertaken, but why. Or in the vocabulary of Raz, we seek to locate the »guiding 
context« rather than the »explanatory context« of human actions [see Raz 1978, p. 2]. The 
reason that I eat endive, as well as the reason why I eat it, is my liking it. In matters of 
subjective taste, explanatory and guiding or directive reasons are identical. On the other 
hand, the reason that I take a daily dose of vitamin С is my believing it promotes my 
health, but the reason why I do so is the vitamins being in fact healthy. Thus, the 
directive reasons underlie the explanatory reasons, and their being relatively independent 
of the actor enables the outsider to hold the actor accountable for his actions and/or to 
criticize the actions. 
The rationality of ethics (as a philosophical endeavor) differs from the rationality of 
the empirical sciences (such as medicine), because the body of knowledge contained under 
the former heading is not merely descriptive (such as is typical of scientific knowledge), 
but prescriptive as well. The empirical sciences explain what is the case and the techno­
logical sciences how something can become the case. As such, the technological sciences 
presume the empirical sciences in that the state of affairs can only be manipulated in so 
far as it is known. On the other hand, the former tend to presume the latter in that the 
success of technological attempts to manipulate the state of affairs often is considered an 
important indication of the truthfulness of the empirical sciences: Medicine (as an 
empirical science) is right, because medicine (as technology) works. 
However, the technological sciences are not merely dependent on the knowledge of 
the empirical sciences; the question of how the state of affairs can be changed only makes 
sense once the question has been asked if the state of affairs ought to be changed. This 
third question, to some extent, presumes again the other two; thinking about change 
presumes a knowledge of the state of affairs and of what kind of change has a reasonable 
chance of success. But asking if change ought to happen contains a distinctive prescriptive 
element: It claims that something must be or become the case. Ethics is this third 
»science« of the »ought« and the »must«: It presents the standard for future action. Ethics 
obtains this cogent nature from its independence from the empirical data. It presumes 
such data (and as such, is not prior to those data), but the truth of its conclusions is »a 
priori« in that these conclusions do not obtain their validity from those same empirical 
data (for otherwise the conclusions could not call for a change of the fact or events 
underlying those data). 
Firstly, the a prion nature of ethics is not a matter of subjective opinion. Scientifi­
cally, descriptions of states of affairs are not warranted when based on an expression of 
personal taste. It just won't do if Pythagoras were to claim that he feels like a2 + b2 = 
c
2
. Obviously, technological data seldom gain truthfulness by an engineer contending he 
is inclined to slightly reduce the wing size of the space shuttle. Similarly, the binding 
power of ethical prescriptions cannot consistently and adequately be proven in terms of 
feelings. If moral propositions were to describe nothing else but our emotional reactions 
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to certain events, the object of the moral proposition would not be the actual event, but 
our emotional reaction. Consequently, a claim such as 'murder is wrong', being short for 
'I (or we) get upset and angry about murder', would be true if I (or we) indeed get upset 
or angry. If I (or we) do not get upset and angry about murder, then murder is not 
wrong. But whose emotions count? Only my own emotions? Then my act is wrong if I 
get upset and angry about it. Only those of the spectators? Then the statement 'my act is 
morally right' is true if the others do not get angry and upset about my act. All of the 
others? What if exactly half of the others get upset, whereas the remaining half is 
pleased? Then my act is both wrong and not wrong. What matters is no longer the event 
(in this case murder), but my (our) emotions. The truthfulness of such ethical statements 
is reduced to unverifiable, private feelings. The obligatory character of ethical statements 
is reduced to a matter of power: Is my angry Superego stronger than my Ego? Are the 
angry others strong enough to endanger me? The logical consequences of this theory are 
very intriguing, for it seems perfectly understandable to say 'we are wrong in getting 
angry and upset about that theft'. This, however, is short for 'we are upset and angry 
about the fact that we are getting upset and angry about the theft'. That, suddenly, is 
much less understandable a claim. 
Secondly, it can be shown along similar lines that the binding nature of ethical 
prescriptions cannot be explained in terms of unspoken conditions (e.g., 'if you do not 
want to be punished by your fellow human beings or, for that matter, by God, then . . . ' ) . 
Such conditional rales miss the very nature of a »call«, a cogent appeal that I yet can opt 
to disregard. Conditional rules either force (thereby denying the essential element of free 
will) because the condition is too painful to withstand (anybody can be broken under 
torture), or they are simply a matter of technical calculus, and then the question arises 
why the goal underlying that calculus (e.g., happiness) is appealing. Trying to answer 
this question would imply an ad infinitum argument. 
Thirdly, the binding nature of ethical conclusions cannot be explained in terms of 
conditioning processes, as behavioristic theories insist, or in terms of theories reducing the 
human mind to a »contest« between various powers (e.g., Ego, Superego, and Id). Both 
explanations (implicitly) deny the existence of a free will. Behaviorism either has to deny 
that people recognize being called, or maintain that the very recognition of being called, 
as well as the recognition of being free (not) to respond to that call, are the result of 
conditioning as well. But since those being called do not know this feeling is conditioned, 
nor that their final decision to freely dis(obey) is the result of conditioning as well, to 
them these feelings are genuine. Claiming they are »conditioned« in no sense reduces the 
anguish over the decision and the purposefulness of theories of ethics (regardless of their 
being the result of a process of conditioning as well). 
What, finally, about reasons? Some bioethicists, such as Engelhardt, explicitly deny 
that reasons can justify moral behavior. As mentioned before, Engelhardt's denial is in 
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part grounded in his understanding bioethics as a foundation for health policy, but his 
denial nonetheless may not be disregarded because it has far-reaching consequences If 
bioethics, as I will try to show, essentially is reasonable discourse about the good of 
individual patients, Engelhardt's disqualification of ethical reasoning would imply a denial 
of bioethics as such 
It may be, however, that Engelhardt's understanding of the nature of reasoning is too 
limited for our purposes If one of the main points of critique raised by practitioners to 
contemporary main-stream bioethics is its virtual inapplicability (in spite of the »turn« 
towards applied ethics), if there seems to be an unbridgeable gap between bioethics and 
clinical care, and if this gap is due to the kind of reasoning commonly employed by 
bioethicists but radically different from the discourse of practitioners, we must carefully 
examine the structure of ethical reasoning in an attempt to locate a discourse that will 
cogently guide practice 
First, however, we must examine in more detail what, actually, we are looking for 
What is the »modus operandi« of ethical reasoning and argumentation that supplies ethical 
discourse with the necessary cogency to be directive9 
The Modus Operandi of Ethical Arguments 
The question about the modus operandi of ethical arguments can best be raised in 
reference to our understanding of common arguments of a more epistemologica! nature — 
arguments that serve to underpin descriptive statements about what and how things are, 
thereby warranting the truthfulness of our knowledge 
Truth is a final goal Although much theoretical knowledge is acquired to enable the 
production of technological means to change the world, and although a technology's 
success is often considered an indication of the truthfulness of descriptive knowledge, the 
success is not sufficient proof of the truth The truth of an epistemological argument's 
conclusion must be proven out of the internal merits of the argument itself (1 e , its 
soundness), and is independent of the successful applicability of the conclusion This is 
where epistemological arguments and ethical arguments differ Though ethical arguments 
draw their power of evidence from within, they cannot be said to be genuinely successful 
if they fail to influence the consequent behavior " 
19 Human behavior is not solely the result of rational decision-making Emotions, instincts, 
feelings, etc , may all cause a person not to act in accordance with even those decisions he 
consciously and earnestly had underwritten Whether that diversion should be qualified as 
»weakness« of the will, or rather as a God-given protection against man's finite insights, I 
leave open In spite of their relevance for an adequate understanding of human behavior, I 
disregard such psychological influences in this ethical study of moral behavior 
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An epistemological argument should be able to convince others (irrational persons of 
all sorts excluded). If somebody else is not convinced, we may have to lay out elements 
of the argument by constructing sub-arguments. We may even have to diverge into 
educational strategies to say the same thing in different (more easily understandable) 
terms, or use illustrative means to »get the point across«. But essentially, any rational 
person, in the end, should be able to confirm the conclusion to the argument. Moreover, 
a refusal to do so will either imply (i) that the other person needs some more explanation 
or education, or (ii) that the other person needs so much more explanation and education 
that even the best teacher cannot provide it, in which case that person is deemed irrational 
(e.g., due to a severe mental handicap), or (iii) that the argument itself is failing and 
requires revision. 
The same is true for ethical arguments. All too frequently, however, people fully 
confirm the soundness of an ethical argument and its conclusion, but do not act according-
ly. Again, some may not act accordingly because they are immoral in character. This 
inconsistency between the knowledge of morality and immoral action constitutes the very 
justification of a verdict by others of accountability and consequent punishment of the 
trespasser. Conversely, we may forgive the inconsistent behavior if followed by remorse; 
in that case, as ethicists, we may feel relieved that the argument (be it a little bit late) 
reached the obtained results and may be considered sound. 
But these two categories (of immoral people and remorseful people) do not seem to 
contain all or even most inconsistently acting people. Almost everybody, including the 
very honest and virtuous ones among us, at times decide not to act in accordance with 
ethical conclusions in spite of confirming the soundness of the arguments leading up to 
those conclusions. This inconsistency is of great worry to ethicists, for it is the practice 
of human beings that ethics wants to evaluate and, where necessary, change. 
Obviously, the voluntariness that is crucial to moral actions precludes the possibility 
of ethics ever providing reasons that force the actor to behave consistently. There always 
remains the option of refusal, either out of weakness of the will, stubbornness, recalci-
trance and plain crookedness, or out of conscientious objections. While the former are 
commonly considered a justification for punishment, the latter tends to be understood as 
prohibiting punishment. Even in the Catholic Church with its emphasis on the doctrinal 
authority of pope and bishops, the individual in the end should follow his own conscience. 
Similarly, in positive law, various grounds exist for exclusion or reduction of punishment 
to account for the conflict of duties in which a conscientious person may end up. 
The importance for ethics of freedom, accountability, and personal conscience, at the 
same time, frustrates the process of ethical reasoning, because the level of cogency that 
can be attained in epistemological reasoning is never possible in ethical reasoning. No 
actor, conversely, can justify his actions fully in terms of the most cogent of ethical 
arguments provided by the Catholic Church, hospital ethics committees, or any other 
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authority. The limitations to ethical reasoning, however, do not imply the futility of the 
project of ethical reasoning. Even if it does not bring the final and certain answer, ethical 
reasoning may point out the most likely direction, thus providing guidance to the actor in 
doubt. 
In ethical reasoning generic arguments do not suffice when there is more to be 
argued about. That is to say, even if (i) crookedness or (ii) conscience cannot be 
adequately countered by arguments, there are two more possible explanations of inconsis-
tent behavior that can be argued about. 
(iii) There is the claim: 'Yes, the argument you present in favor of X sounds 
convincing, but in this case, I would rather do Y.' Epistemological arguments tend to 
strive for conclusions with as much generality as possible, mathematics being the ultimate 
example in holding for any and all objects and events, regardless of time and place. 
While there can be value in ethical theorems that pertain to many cases at once (e.g., all 
breaking of promises immoral, because such actions undermine the very meaning of a 
promise), serious doubt will and must arise about such a general theorem when it turns 
out to influence little or no behavior. Rather than always searching for more generality, 
ethics seeks a method that enables case-based reasoning. This we should keep in mind 
when in the next paragraphs we examine various traditional styles of reasoning. But 
before we can do so, the fourth explanation of inconsistent behavior must be discussed. 
(iv) A person may also explain that the argument presented about X sounds very 
convincing, but that he himself would rather do Y. In this case, the actor intends the 
justification of his inconsistency to be subjective — a claim that one may not immediately 
interpret as either crooked or conscientious. The objection could, for example, be a 
matter of opinion (which is quite common nowadays). That, however, is not the fourth 
explanation we seek, since »opinion« cannot be accepted if a slippery slope into anti-
ethical subjectivism is to be prevented. Differentiating between mere opinion and genuine 
conscience may not be easy, but the language used sometimes provides a hint. Such 
phrases as 'that's just how I feel about it', and even more so when followed by 'after all, 
everybody has the right to his own opinion', point to the insecurity of a speaker who feels 
a need not even to be questioned. Typically, a person uses such evasive defenses to 
justify opting for the easier course of action (usually acting as fashion describes). 
The genuine conscientious objector, on the other hand, will try to reason first (and 
only in last resort act notwithstanding disagreement and bear the consequences). For all 
too often, his objections are not based on purely private convictions, but on reasons as 
well, »subjective« reasons in that they pertain to his own history, socio-cultural back-
ground, life-plan etc., but reasons nonetheless. As the uniqueness of a single case will 
pose difficulties for traditional methods of reasoning that strive for generality, so the 
uniqueness of the particular individual will pose difficulties for traditional methods of 
reasoning that strive to convince any and all rational beings equally. But again, if one of 
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the functions of ethical reasoning - if not the most important function - is to change 
behavior, ethical reasoning must strive to account for both forms of uniqueness 
These two constraints we must keep in mind as we now examine some methods of 
reasoning common m bioethics Logic, a distinct subdisciphne of philosophy, has 
uncovered much about the art of reasoning — much more than can be adequately discussed 
or summarized here Our interest pertains merely to those arguments that could relate to 
the bioethical debate, particularly in illustrating the structure of directive and cogent 
clinical-ethical discourse 20 
Deductive Arguments and the Practical Syllogism 
Deductive arguments, defined as those arguments in which the conclusion follows 
necessarily from the premises, have always been favored by mathematicians and philoso­
phers because the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusions As 
DeGrazia summarizes, in (bio)ethics no alternative model has managed to earn 'greater 
theoretical confidence' than deductivism [see DeGrazia 1992, ρ 511] A deductive 
argument such as 'lying is always immoral, and if withholding the truth is a lie, then 
withholding the truth is undeniably immoral' seems extremely helpful in handling common 
clinical dilemmas about what information to give a patient However, there are two major 
problems with this kind of argument 
First, how are we to discover which argumentative form is indeed a valid deduction'' 
The ability to recognize certain deductive arguments as valid presupposes some kind of 
rational capacity that precedes or transcends deductive arguments It is this capacity that 
enables us to also recognize that the argument 'X is yellow, therefore is extended' is 
valid, although it is not a formally valid deductive argument 
It may be countered that the 'X is yellow ' argument is enthymematic because two 
premises are left out 'All colored things are extended', and 'yellow is a color' But is it 
really necessary to add these premises m order to make the argument a valid argument9 
Surely, one can construct a deductive argument to prove the conclusion at hand, but is it 
necessary7 Is it not the case that the recognition of the truth of the »incomplete« argument 
is a precondition for the construction of the complete deductive argument9 
The last question brings us to the second problem The truthfulness of the major 
premise of the deductive argument (e g , 'All X are Z') is always a precondition for the 
20 Much has already been written on the strength and weaknesses of various argumentative 
methods, their validation, verification, and justification The purpose of the next subsections 
is not to summarize, provide a fair evaluation, let alone further these debates Rather, via a 
summary discussion of the structure of these arguments, we will hopefully gain more insight 
in one aspect of such arguments, that is their cogency and its character 
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truthfulness of the conclusion That is to say, it is impossible that the conclusion would 
be found (via some other method) to be false, and yet the major premise remain true 21 
In physics the truthfulness of some general law that is functioning as major premise in the 
deduction may have been established via a mathematical calculation independent of the 
individual cases to be assessed by means of this particular law But how is it, for 
example, to be decided that all lying is immoral9 Rather than accepting the conclusion 
about the (ìm)morality of a particular case on the basis of a formally valid deductive 
argument, in ethics we usually seem to acknowledge the (ìm)morality of a particular case 
and, consequently, underwrite or doubt the truthfulness of the premises on those grounds 
That procedure, however, is fundamentally different from deduction in being its very 
opposite, induction 
The previous doubts about major premises being established independently from the 
deductions' conclusions does not prove that no such universal moral principles functioning 
as undisputed premises in deductive reasoning could ever be formulated But the long 
history of ethics as well as common sense indicate that the more precise those principles 
are, the harder it will be to formulate them Wellman, actually, contends that the only 
such principles having a reasonable chance of ever being convincingly formulated are 
rules that do not connect obligation to descriptions of a practice, but only to its value 
For example " [0]ne ought always to do that act which produces the greatest amount 
of good " [Wellman 1971, ρ 11]гг 
The fact that universal principles which define the obligatory nature of particular 
practices are unlikely to ever be formulated does not imply that we have to give up 
universality Argues Wellman in reference to Kant " [0]ur conception of obligation is 
such that if one person ought to do some act on a given occasion, then everyone ought to 
do the same kind of act in the same circumstances While this in principle requires that 
there be moral principles, universal generalizations to the effect that acts of this kind 
ought to always be done in similar circumstances, this does not imply that we can actually 
formulate these principles or that we must do so to justify our moral conclusions 
Surely a person is acting and judging morally if he acts and judges in the light of the 
relevant considerations whether or not he can formulate a moral principle to fit every 
case" [Wellman 1971 ρ 16-17, emphasis added - JW] 
21 In fact, a common method of proving someone wrong is to show that the conclusions that 
follow logically (ι e , through deduction) from his assertion are false beyond doubt, a so-
called reductio ad absurdum 
22 I am indebted a great deal to the subtle insights provided by Wellman m his Challenge and 
Response Justification m Ethics [1971], but frequently I diverge from Wellman Conse­
quently, although Wellman's study is quoted often, my conclusions cannot be said to be 
Wellman's 
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Figure I: Theoretical and practical argu­
ments schematically compared. [Taken 
from Jonsen and Toulmin 1988, p. 34-35] 
THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS 
Universal major premise 
taken as known for purposes 
of the present argument 
Particular minor 
premises specify­
ing the present 
instance 
So, necessarily, conclusion 
about the present instance 
The keyword in Wellman's thesis 
is the term »relevance«. To qualify a 
judgment on an action as a genuinely 
ethical judgment, the relevance of 
certain circumstances for the morality 
of that action must be universally 
acknowledged. The general consensus 
that a particular action (which is con­
sidered immoral) under certain circum­
stances may not be immoral (e.g., 
lying to a dying and depressed patient 
about her prognosis), and that, there­
fore, the general principle ('all lying is 
immoral') must be revised, proves that 
universal acknowledgement of the 
relevance of circumstances is a condi­
tion for formulating ethical principles. 
On the other hand, the usual response 
to any such forthright assertion that all 
lying is wrong: 'Yes, but in this case 
...', entails the acknowledgement that 
this case is exceptional and requires 
additional justification. Recognizing 
relevance and, even more so, evaluat­
ing and judging its normative signifi­
cance entails a process of weighing. 
Such a process is foreign to any deduc­
tive reasoning that starts from universal 
principles. This weighing process 
presupposes some sense of universality 
and a fixed, absolute scale, yet it in- ^^^^^^™"^^^^^^^^^^"^^^^^™ 
volves more probability and subjectivi­
ty than deductive reasoning can consistently take into account. 
Nonetheless, one very old (dating back to Aristotle) but highly controversial 
argument is supposed to accommodate both deductive cogency and case-related probabili­
ty, the so-called practical syllogism. Jonsen and Toulmin suggest the following schematic 
differentiation between theoretical arguments and practical arguments (see Figure I on 
page 37). The authors suggest (notably by their way of depicting the two arguments), that 
PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS 
Γ 
General warrant based 
on similar precedents 
Present fact 
situation 
(particulars 
of the case) 
Provisional conclusion 
about the present case 
(presumably so) 
ι 
Absent exceptional 
circumstances 
(rebuttals) 
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Figure II: Two formulations of a theoretical 
syllogism. 
theoretical arguments "flow downward", whereas practical arguments "pass sideways" 
[see Jonsen and Toulmin 1988, p. 34-35]. 
The question arises whether Jonsen and Toulmin's conclusion is warranted, or 
merely suggested by depicting the two arguments differently. Firstly, the traditional order 
in theoretical arguments of the major premise on the first line, the minor premise on the 
next, and the conclusion on the third, suggesting a downward flow starting from the 
universal premise, is misleading in that theoretical syllogisms, like practical syllogisms, 
tend to originate from the facts of the case (see Figure II on page 38). It is our wonder­
ing about Socrates' mortality that prompts us to employ the major premise that all men 
are mortal. 
This, secondly, suggests that the 
^
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 difference between the two is not 
a matter of direction, but a matter 
of certainty. Unlike the universal 
premise in the theoretical syllo­
gism, the general warrant in the 
prac tical premise is thought to 
merely hold for most cases, thus 
allowing for exceptional circum­
stances. Interestingly, Aristotle's 
own examples of practical syllo-
gisms do not start with a combi­
nation of facts and a warrant, but 
with a universal premise, for example, 'vitamin X is good for all men over 60' (followed 
by: 'Pig's tripes are full of vitamin X; I'm a man over 60; here are some pig's tripes; 
therefore, I'll have some').23 
Moreover, if in Jonsen and Toulmin's scheme of the theoretical argument the 
universal premise is replaced by a warranted premise, the conclusion will become 
presumable as well, and the two arguments suddenly look very much alike. Conversely, 
if the exceptional circumstances of the practical argument are made part of the general 
warrant while the facts of the case do not qualify as one of the exceptions, the conclusion 
no longer is presumable. Granted, the actual process of reasoning tends to be step-wise, 
starting out with a vague general warrant, yielding a presumable conclusion, which then is 
reexamined in the light of possible exceptions, etc. As we shall argue later, the step-wise 
All men are mortal 
Socrates is a man 
Is Socrates mortal? 
Socrates is a man 
All men are mortal 
Ergo: Socrates is mortal Ergo: Socrates is mortal 
23. Variation by Anscombe on Aristotle's own example on dry foods. As Anscombe has noted, 
Aristotle seldom states the conclusion of a practical syllogism and sometimes speaks of it as 
an action. How this action should be phrased in words, however, is not clear at all [see 
Anscombe 1978]. 
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nature of ethical reasoning points to an important aspect of cogency. But the actual 
process seems to have little bearing on our attempts to understand Aristotelian syllogistic 
reasoning. The internal structure of the ethical argument providing validity seems to be 
very similar to internal structure of theoretical syllogisms. 
On the other hand, as long as we suspect exceptions but cannot decide whether the 
individual case is exceptional, the argument's conclusion remains presumable. This seems 
a likely scenario, notably in clinical health care where certain dilemmas often cannot be 
deliberated at length. But is a presumable directive a genuine directive in an individual 
case? Is any cogency towards telling an old dying patient the truth about incurable cancer 
contained in the directive that in most such cases one ought to tell the truth? Richardson 
claims that "... once our norms are adequately specified for a given context, it will be 
sufficiently obvious what ought to be done" [Richardson 1990, p. 294] — this despite the 
fact that such specified norms only describe what »generally« or »for the most part« ought 
to be done, rather than providing an absolute directive for the individual case. What 
worries us is that the case at hand may be one of the very exceptions to the general 
warrant. As Lustig points out, "[ejven if one grants the intuitive obviousness of the moral 
rules, there seems to be no corresponding obviousness to the scope of their application" 
[Lustig 1992, p. 505]. The practical syllogism seems to offer no method for establishing 
whether the case at hand is or is not defying the warranted and generally accepted moral 
rule. 
In summary, deductive arguments have their place in an ethical debate. Firstly, 
some general if vague moral principles must be accepted to form a point of departure for 
any ethical analysis (see also p. 20), and a deductive analysis enables a conditional but 
consistent application of such principles. And secondly, deduction can be used to falsify a 
too generally stated principle (such as all lying is immoral) by revealing the intenability of 
the principle in its current wording, thereby enabling a refinement of general ethical 
principles. However, in the latter form, deduction is merely a stepping-stone for the very 
opposite style of reasoning: Induction. 
Inductive Reasoning and Thought Experiments 
Commonly, induction is defined as the generalization of a multitude of singular observa-
tions into a universal claim. This process differs from deduction where the general claim 
is the point of departure and the particular is the conclusion. Defined as such, the 
inductive method is common in the empirical sciences but of little use to ethics, since 
ethics must examine what ought to happen, and cannot simply rely on what is the case. 
However, Wellman argues that most scientific research starts with a hypothesis rather than 
with a multitude of facts, and suggests defining induction as the (dis)confirmation process 
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of a hypothesis by establishing the truth or falsity of its implications [Wellman 1971, ρ 
32] 
Wellman's formulation refers back to the previous section, where it was concluded 
that deduction could be used to verify general premises With good reason that kind of 
deduction was characterized as a mere stepping-stone for an induction, because such a 
(dis)confirmation process presupposes that the truth of the conclusion to the deduction can 
be established independently from the deductive argument, which is exactly what inductive 
arguments are supposed to enable 
The power of induction, therefore, is located in the ability to falsify claims that are 
too general Its weakness is located m its inability to verify general claims Some 
philosophers (such as Popper) have argued that this weakness implies that the empirical 
sciences are doomed to »falsifying« what is the case They can prove only what is not the 
case This weakness has given induction a particularly bad name among ethicists 
Corroborated but probable knowledge may suffice for scientists and engineers, but the fact 
that lying has been found to be immoral in most cases is a weak justification for speaking 
truthfully to a depressive, dying patient who may be harmed by hearing the truth In 
science, a single exception may be disregarded as statistically negligible in light of a 
multitude of cases confirming a contrary hypothesis, but in ethics (as in clinical practice) 
the exceptional situation may weigh more heavily than the multitude of standard cases, 
because the exceptional case may set its own moral standard 
On the other hand, every situation m need of a moral evaluation is always and 
necessarily a unique situation (if only because every moment in time is always a unique 
moment, and consequently every event is too) This implies that the probable nature of 
the conclusion to an inductive argument does not necessarily imply doubt about its 
applicability in a new situation 
Induction has been distrusted by ethicists, but not because it leaves room for doubt, 
in some sense, doubt is fertile soil for any philosophical endeavor Induction has been 
distrusted primarily because it tends to be applied in an empirical research context 
yielding a posterion conclusions That is to say, the justification for a conclusion reached 
by means of an inductive argument (for example, an experiment) is commonly found m 
the observed occurrences in the outside world The simple fact that X is observed to be 
the case is thought to underscore the thesis that X is However, in ethics one is not 
primarily interested in what is the case but what ought to be the case Because of the 
uniqueness of every event, it is important to examine in great detail all circumstances 
However, the simple fact that under those or similar circumstances, X is happening, or X 
has happened many times before, is not sufficient justification to conclude that X ought to 
happen in a new case In other words, experiments that intend to examine actual events in 
order to draw ethical conclusions from those findings are of dubious value 
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Wellman, however, has suggested that it is possible to undertake a so called 
»thought-experiment« that fits the inductive model but does not fall into the trap of 
empiricism and its consequent a posteriori conclusions. He points out that such experi-
ments have a long history in philosophy. For example, in his Philebus Plato attempted to 
disprove the theory that the good consists in pleasure without knowledge by imagining the 
case of an oyster without intelligence or memory feeling pleasure [Plato 1980f, § 21c]. 
This example may be rather exotic, particularly since an oyster does not share enough 
similarity with human beings to make the outcome of the experiment relevant for a theory 
of ethics. But that problem - the relevance of the similarities and the irrelevance of the 
dissimilarities - is not an adequate reason to refute any and all thought-experiments. 
Similar problems arise when arguing by analogy, a quite common approach in ethical 
reasoning. In fact, sound analogies - analogies which do not simply argue from prece-
dence (such as in case law), but which are constructed to conclude from what is perceived 
to be a moral response to situation A to what ought to be done in situation A' - are very 
similar to thought-experiments in Wellman's sense. Although in analogous arguments 
seldom a more universal prescription is explicated that could apply to both A and A' 
(which prescription first would have to be validated by examining instance A, and then be 
applied to instance A'), implicitly such a general claim (compromising at least the two 
cases A and A') is needed to account for the moral relevance of the similarities between 
the two cases. 
Thought-experiments in which a hypothetical moral prescription is tested via an 
imaginary case are difficult to construct because, unlike typical bioscientific experiments, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to reduce the number of relevant variables to one or a few 
while guaranteeing independence of all other potentially relevant parameters. Ethics is not 
the only branch facing this problem; other sciences, notably sociology and psychology, are 
confronted with similar troubles. And even the traditional natural sciences are faced with 
an increasing number of biostatistical constraints if their findings are to be qualified as 
significant or in any other sense scientifically valid. 
But in ethics, the problem of relevance is crucial because no relevant parameter is an 
independent variable. Relevance is determined within a world of human beings who give 
meaning to it, who define what is and is not relevant. The particular occurrences A and 
A' always happen in the larger context of the world in which they occur. Because of this 
large network of meaningful connections, it is virtually impossible to construct a genuine 
ethical thought-experiment. Examining occurrences A and A', while taking into account 
the full picture of potentially relevant factors, is bound to become an everlasting thought-
experiment. On the other hand, examining those occurrences while carefully neutralizing 
any possible bias due to other relevant factors may yield results having little to do with the 
daily, human world which is full of such relevant factors. Such an imaginary moral 
theater may fail to resemble the real world, as the actors brought to the stage are not 
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genuine human beings as we all know them When, for example, the patient - provider 
relationship is reconstructed in terms of a legal contract, health care providers correctly 
refute any conclusions beforehand based on such an ethical thought-experiment The same 
can be said for Rawls' attempt to devise a theory of justice by first imagining a world of 
human beings who know nothing about their human condition (neither their gender, age, 
race, physical and mental condition etc , nor the social, geographical, historical and other 
contextual variables of their existential situation), and by wondering next how these men 
»behind their veil of ignorance« would decide about allocation of scarce resources and the 
like [Rawls 1971] 2< 
Much of what is said in later chapters has many similarities with Wellman's thought-
experiments While an attempt is made to better account for relevant facts, thought 
experiments imply probability which can be reduced only by reproducing the experiment 
The reader will need to recapitulate the experiment If, in the end, the reader can 
underwrite the results, the general conclusions will be validated, as much as duplication 
validates scientific claims 
Casuistry 
If we are looking for a method of reasoning that allows us to draw compelling conclusions 
from the circumstances of the unique situation, other than by means of deductive or 
inductive strategies, we may turn to casuistry, if only because the name suggests a case-
based approach Casuists, thus Jonsen and Toulmin summarize in their recent overview 
study The Abuse of Casuistry A history of moral reasoning, insist that " circumstances 
make the case " [Jonsen and Toulmin 1988, ρ 254] The authors suggest to define 
casuistry as "the analysis of moral issues, using procedures of reasoning based on 
paradigms and analogies, leading to the formulation of expert opinions about the existence 
and stringency of particular moral obligations, framed in terms of rules or maxims that 
are general but not universal or invariable, since they hold good with certainty only in the 
typical conditions of the agent and circumstance of action" [p 257] M This complex 
24 Vitek has listed five features of proper though-stimulating examples in moral philosophy 
Complexity, priority, relevance, accessibility and resonance [Vitek 1992] 
25 In this section on casuistry, I dwell mostly on Jonsen and Toulmin's versions of casuistry, in 
spite of their theory not being the sole contemporary casuistic approach to bioethics [see for 
example, Brody 1988], and in spite of criticism that their theory would be anachronistic for 
relying too heavily on a medieval model ot society which no longer applies [Wildes 1993] 
Brody's more modern, pluralistic version of casuistry may reflect more closely contemporary 
clinical-ethical decision-making as it actually occurs in health care institutions, but it seems 
(continued ) 
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definition of casuistry which Jonsen and Toulmin offer only toward the end of their study, 
requires a detailed explanation, but a first impression of eclecticism is obvious. Conse-
quently, this method of reasoning may have inherited the problems of both deductive and 
inductive reasoning (as discussed earlier).26 
Casuistry assumes a dead-lock situation in ethics. It rejects relativism as an 
unacceptable »solution« to apparent moral dilemmas while underscoring that general moral 
rules also fail. For "[t]he considerations that weigh with us in resolving the ambiguities 
that arise in marginal cases, like those that weigh with us in balancing the claims of 
conflicting principles, are never written into the rules themselves" [Jonsen and Toulmin 
1988, p. 8]. This dead-lock situation, however, is not as threatening as it appears, if only 
ethicists drop the "... intellectual dream that, after all, ethics may yet be transformed into 
a universal theoretical science. And that (...) is precisely what, from the outset, 
Aristotle's distinction between episteme and phronesis, or between scientific understanding 
and practical wisdom, was designed to undercut" [p. 20]. Absolute certainty, such as 
Pascal (a mathematician by training) required for ethical claims is an unrealistic demand. 
Casuistry is characterized by the acknowledgement that absolute certitude in moral matters 
is not possible for a variety of reasons, one of them being that all human knowledge is 
doubtful, and the more content there is to it (such as in moral matters), the more doubtful. 
Yet actions must be undertaken (whereby non-acting in many an instance is morally 
similar to acting), and a strategy must be designed to find the morally most probable 
course of action. 
Casuistry is commonly hailed as a suitable method for bioethics because clinical 
medicine itself is essentially casuistic: "All detailed clinical inferences are presumptive; so 
clinical judgments about a patient's condition, and the prognosis for his recovery, are 
never final. Honest and conscientious doctors may therefore read marginal and ambigu-
25. (...continued) 
to do so primarily by adopting a less radical casuistic approach. Thus, for sake of the 
argument and illustrative power, I have chosen to focus on Jonsen and Toulmin. Their 
method in the end will not provide what we are seeking, but hardly because of a change in 
the socio-cultural environment. For that matter, any attempt to reach consensus about moral 
decisions must presume some shared background moral sense, whether Christian or 
libertarian. With DeGrazia [1992], I would agree, however, that a weakness of any casuistic 
method is its reliance on actual moral reasoning, which may, after all, be very flawed. 
26. Various other authors have pointed out such problems in the casuistic method, among others 
DeGrazia [1992] and Wildes [1993]. Wildes has pointed out, for example, that Jonsen and 
Toulmin (as all casuists) rely on paradigm cases, but they fail to show how these paradigms 
are to be established (if not dogmatically asserted). The problem, obviously, is the very 
same deductivists face when trying to justify their major premise or warrant. As DeGrazia 
points out, it may be that casuists (to obtain paradigm cases) rely too easily on actual 
reasoning, which implies the risk inherent in any empirical a posteriori approach of 
uncritically accepting a flawed line of reasoning. 
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ous cases differently, without being open to criticism" [Jonsen and Toulmin 1988, p. 44]. 
Although a potential analogy between clinical casuistry and ethical casuistry is an 
attractive notion for anybody seeking a method of ethical reasoning that is closely tied to 
clinical practices, upon close examination the Jonsen and Toulmin's example also reveals 
that the analogy may be more complex than a first impression suggests. For to what kind 
of criticism are Jonsen and Toulmin referring? If they want to argue that two dissenting 
physicians are not open to moral criticism, they implicitly refer to some kind of unspoken 
but generally accepted moral maxim that limitations in the human condition (in this case, 
limitations in knowledge) are beyond moral reproach. If, however, dissent arises at the 
level of morality itself - and this, after all, is the very raison d'être of casuistry - the 
analogy fails. 
What if two doctors dissent about whether or not to grant a patient's wish for 
euthanasia? A physician reading such a case in a particular manner and acting according-
ly, in spite of dissent from his colleague, is only beyond moral reproach if the dissent 
pertained to a medical fact (e.g., the prognosis) and if the state of the art of medical 
science (at the moment of the decision) does not support the opinion of his dissenting 
colleague. If, on the other hand, the dissent concerns their respective views on, say, the 
morality of terminating life, Jonsen and Toulmin's excuse fails. For in ethics, there is no 
clear division between state-of-the-art certainty which must be adhered to, versus 
uncertainty yet to be researched and (until new scientific data come available), to be 
decided about by the individual practitioner himself. Compared with medicine, in ethics 
all is doubtful, yet the logical conclusion from Jonsen and Toulmin's analogy that, 
consequently, any moral act would be beyond criticism, entails relativism. 
Jonsen and Toulmin locate the difference between medical science on the one hand 
and clinical (and ethical) casuistry on the other in the use of taxonomies: The clinician 
reads the case in taxonomie terms. Syndrome recognition is the key element in clinical 
practice. But their comparison of clinical practice with botany [p. 41] raises new 
problems for the assumed analogy between clinical practice and ethical casuistry. For the 
botany case shows that the knowledge and skills of the botanist are located in his ability to 
distinguish between the characteristics that can be translated into known categories, and 
the new, unique characteristics. The degree of novelty (i.e., whether a race, species, 
family, etc.), probably occurs by default, that is, on how much cannot be translated into 
existing categories. The individuality of the new plant specimen is canceled out when it is 
located in the botanic taxonomy, and likewise the individuality of the patient is canceled 
out when the taxonomy of clinical categories is applied to her. 
The distinction between clinical practice, between medicine as an art, and scientific 
medicine can only be upheld if the clinician is also able to judge adequately what is 
unique about the individual. Jonsen and Toulmin have an imaginary biomedical scientist 
report on the logic of antibiotics in case of infection, and an imaginary clinician report on 
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the condition of an individual patient who is thought to have a streptococcal infection, yet 
who does not improve after a week of anti-streptococcal antibiotics [p. 33]. They use the 
distinction to explain that a good clinician does take into account scientifically warranted 
information on antibiotics without necessarily acting accordingly. After all, science 
describes how things typically go and reality may turn out to be different. Thus, formal 
inferences from scientifically warranted theories do not suffice to adequately address the 
individual case. In the case at hand, the issue is substantive: Is this patient actually 
improving? 
However, Jonsen and Toulmin fail to point out that the substance is essentially 
axiologic. It is the subjectivity of values which defies final and total reduction of 
»improvement« to general rules of conduct. Regardless of the scientific state of the art, if 
the patient does not improve, something is wrong with the universality of the scientific 
practice standard (or at least something should be considered wrong with that standard; 
unfortunately, sometimes science is considered more truthful than the patient). The 
starting point of all clinical practice and its final test is the well-being of the patient. This 
the clinician must be able to adequately judge if he is to differ from a mere biomedical 
scientist. 
If we were to show that, indeed, a clinician is able to read his patient in terms of the 
latter's own well-being, the analogy between clinical casuistry and ethical casuistry would 
turn out to be even more perfect than Jonsen and Toulmin could have hoped for. For it is 
the patient's well-being that directs both clinical practice and ethics. The ability to read 
the individual patient in terms of well-being would »recast« the physician as a bioethicist. 
Jonsen and Toulmin do not explicitly address this issue of gauging the patient's well-
being. But they do concede that in casuistry, "[bjeyond all necessary inferences and 
deductions from general rules, there ... lie other, more basic issues of moral and judicial 
judgment ..., the personal talent Aristotle described as practical wisdom, or phronesis, ... 
[that] rests on a feeling for or a grasp of what is epieikes - equitable, fair, fitting, or 
reasonable ..." [p. 258-259; emphasis changed - JW\.21 Jonsen and Toulmin stress that 
the medieval casuists laid no claim to a special "insight into truth", but were people who 
combined a more common human experience with their uncommon training in thinking 
and arguing [p. 263]. Yet they admit that casuist reasoning was controlled by professional 
standards and procedures established by the learned community of the same casuists [p. 
264]. Thus, the question arises whether "true moral perception" and "discernment" [p. 
329] needed to become a casuist is as commonly available as Jonsen and Toulmin suggest, 
27. "The prudent person has the knack of recognizing that following this or that maxim, in these 
or those circumstances, contributes to the support ..." [Jonsen 1991, p. 304; emphasis added 
-JW\. 
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or more a matter of »professional« insight or ethos, limited to the inaugurated few within 
the casuist community. 
Various aspects of Jonsen and Toulmin's casuistry suggest a heavy reliance on a 
special professional insider's perspective: Bestowing authority upon deceased casuists [see 
p. 167-168]; explaining the (non)persuasive force of certain arguments in terms of their 
being presented to (non)informed hearers [see p. 299]; assuming that the social and 
cultural history of the moral practice itself "reveals" a progressive "clarification" of 
paradigm cases and the admitted exceptions [p. 307]. The authors talk about our affective 
"sensibility" and a cultivated "eye" for the subtle and less obvious [p. 331] ~ special 
kinds of experience that only the professional can obtain. Again, the parallel with clinical 
medicine is apparent: Clinical and ethical casuistry seen as arts rather than as sciences. 
But the parallel elucidates little (at least not in the way it stands). 
The issue of professionalism is discussed more extensively in the next chapter, where 
we find there to be only a very fine line between professional ethics (understood as virtue 
ethics) and professional ethics (understood as ethical relativism). But even if we give 
casuistry the benefit of the doubt in that regard, there is another important reason why 
casuistry does not provide the physician and/or ethicist with the desired case-based method 
of ethical reasoning. Though case-oriented, casuistry seems to employ a different 
understanding of the term »case«. The paradigmatic examples Jonsen and Toulmin discuss 
in their book underscore this hypothesis. Whereas a modern bioethics case-book [for 
example, Veatch 1977] contains an extensive number of descriptions of unique and 
(preferably) real-life events, Jonsen and Toulmin's three exemplary »cases« concern three 
»practices«. The chapter entitled Profit: The case of usury, pertains to usury in general. 
Similarly, the chapter on Perjury: The case of equivocation concerns any and all equivoca-
tions. And Pride: The case of the insulted gentleman deals with all insulting in spite of 
the determinate article »the« (insulted gentleman). 
The term »case« in all these examples refers to a (peculiar) subcategory of a more 
general category of actions, for example, undertaking profitable business, but is itself still 
a class of actions. This different understanding of the word »case« is aptly illustrated by 
Jonsen and Toulmin's common use of the expression »to make a case«. For example: "A 
laxist casuistry may put your conscience at ease, provided only that some case (however 
weak) can be made in favor of your actions; ... but a tutiorist casuistry will not allow 
your conscience to be easy unless you avoid all actions against which any case whatever 
can be made ..." [p. 260; emphasis added - JW\. In both examples, the actions concern 
the actual situation, the case at hand, whereas making a case refers to a more general 
practice of which the moral status has already been positively established. 
Jonsen and Toulmin, toward the end of their chapter on usury, conclude that "[t]his 
long debate shows casuistry at work. Over five centuries there emerges a moral doctrine 
of precise definitions and distinctions, of narrowly limited solutions and well-reasoned 
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arguments" [p. 193]. Their conclusion goes to show that casuistry has only limited 
bearing on the analysis of single events, but pertains rather to the process of moral 
philosophy more in general: Ethics as a theoretical endeavor in which, not unlike physics, 
centuries of continuous searching or increased probability has yielded an ever more 
convincing body of arguments and solutions. 
In an article published three years after The Abuse of Casuistry, Jonsen acknowledges 
that in their book, Toulmin and he "... did not specify in any detail the exact features of 
casuistry as a technique for clinical ethics". In the article Jonsen promises to "become 
more explicit about how casuistry can become a useful technique of practical reasoning" 
[Jonsen 1991, p. 297]. Indeed, he starts out his analysis quoting the famous It's over, 
Debbie case [Anonymous 1988] and lists the various circumstances that "make the case". 
"The work of casuistry is to determine which [moral - JW] maxim should rule the case 
and to what extent" [p. 298 - emphasis added], which is, in turn, "... profoundly 
dependant upon the circumstances" [p. 299]. 
Notwithstanding the use of the term »rule«, clinical casuistry remains a form of 
applying pregiven moral maxims to the case. The particular application to which the 
casuist would conclude clearly derives its cogency from the "weight" that various maxims 
enjoy (e.g., "... autonomy ... ranks high in the panoply of moral principles"), which 
weight, in turn, depends on its "backing" (e.g., "the doctrine of autonomy") [p. 299]. 
But it remains unclear from where the maxims derive this weight and backing. There can 
be little doubt that in contemporary western societies the principle of respect for patient 
autonomy enjoys considerably weight and theoretical backing, and, consequently, cogently 
directs much of modern medical practice. Either this cogency is of a psychological nature 
(de facto), rather than of an ethical (de iure) nature — "[h]e who has not grasped this 
difference has not even begun to understand what philosophy is all about" [Feigl 1963, p. 
116]; or we are back at square one, that is, at the question what provides deductive 
arguments their cogency.28 
People tend to show their real face when confronted with an undesired comparison. 
The same seems to hold for philosophers, at any rate for casuists being compared with 
advocates of so-called situation ethics. As the terms suggests, situation ethics seeks to 
ground morality in the particular situation, which raises the question whether casuistry and 
situation ethics differ in any significant sense. As we shall see later, there are important 
differences (notably because the term »situation ethics« turns out to be rather misleading). 
28. Ethicists who stress the interdependency of situational circumstances, moral maxims, and 
theoretical backing, and suggest to think about morality and ethics in terms of so-called 
reflective equilibria [e.g., Rawls 1951, 1971], or even a single wide reflective equilibrium 
[e.g., Rawls 1980, Nielsen 1993], would nonetheless be unable to guide us through cases 
like the Debbie-case that are characterized by their very challenging the established equilibri-
um. 
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However, Jonsen and Toulmin in their defense of casuistry bring out that casuistry itself is 
not as case-oriented either: "Where casuists had worked with a multitude of paradigms, 
principles and maxims, situationists acknowledged no general principles, or only a single 
principle (i.e., agape or love - JW\ ... Where the casuists had been attentive to 'circum-
stances' as one feature of moral life among many others, situationists reduced the moral 
life to the bare succession of circumstances. The casuists analyzed novel cases by analogy 
with prior or paradigm cases: Situationists focused on moral choices that were concrete 
but unique and isolated" [p. 272]. 
Whether this critique of situation ethics is fair need not be addressed here. May it 
suffice to note that Jonsen and Toulmin's defense reveals that the circumstances of the 
case apparently have limited moral authority. Rules and maxims when put to the test by a 
particular case may turn out to be too general and in need of revision. This revision will 
be guided in part by our reading of the case at hand. The overall focus of casuistry, 
however, seems to be on the body of maxims, rules, and paradigms, rather than on the 
individual case. 
The similarity with Wellman's inductively putting moral propositions to the test is 
apparent: Casuistry aims at systems of moral knowledge -- prudent, probable, pragmatic, 
and (we must emphasize) very valuable knowledge, but systems of knowledge nonetheless. 
Or, to look at the same system top-downwards: Despite Jonsen and Toulmin's repeated 
insistence that moral knowledge is essentially particular [see p. 330], their treatise on 
casuistry suggests that, as far as the single case is concerned, casuistry is but another form 
of applied ethics, the difference being that "... good casuistry ... applies general rules to 
particular cases with discernment, rather than bad casuistry, which does the same thing 
sloppily" [p. 16]. Important, but applied ethics nonetheless. 
Situation Ethics 
As mentioned in the previous section, the term »situation ethics« seems to be too similar to 
the term »casuistry« for the two not to indicate the same kind of ethical theory. However, 
advocates of each heavily oppose such identification. We have seen the casuists Jonsen 
and Toulmin rejecting situation ethics, and likewise Fletcher in his well-known Situation 
Ethics: The New Morality [1966] discards casuistry as a "homage" paid by legalism to 
both ethical relativism and agapistic ethics (the latter of which Fletcher defends) [p. 
19].29 Indeed, Fletcher's main argument to reject casuistry is its objective, that is, to 
29. The situation ethics debate first and foremost seems to have taken place among theologians 
rather than moral philosophers. My choice to discuss in more detail Joseph Fletcher's 
(continued...) 
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"... anticipate or prescribe real-life decisions in their existential particularity" [p. 29-30]. 
This tendency to prescriptive generalization precludes casuistry from taking hold of the 
peculiar, unique and, first and foremost, concrete situation, with its need for concrete 
action [see p. 35]. 
What, then, is Fletcher's alternative? Fletcher sees but three possible routes to reach 
a decision in a moral dilemma: A legalistic approach in which deductivism is supposed to 
yield clear answers out of universally valid rales; lawlessness or anarchy, in which all 
moral decisions are considered purely ad hoc and random; and situation ethics. The 
situationist does not reject principles. On the contrary, he takes them very seriously, but 
only as "illuminators" of the problem, which in any given situation must be set aside if 
love seems better served by compromise [p. 26]. "The pragmatic-empirical temper of 
situation ethics ... tries experientially, not propositionally, to adduce, not deduce, some 
'general' ideas to be held only tentatively and lightly, ... sternly in place [but merely -
JW\ in the role of advisers without veto power ..." [p. 55]. Situation ethics accepts only 
one universal norm - love - and from a universal (according to Fletcher) no other 
universals can be "milked" [p. 27]. 
It must be emphasized that, unlike deduction and induction, the term adduction is 
accidental in that Fletcher considers principles, maxims, rules, and other propositions of 
presumably a more »universal« validity not to have a directive function (Lat.: ducere = to 
guide) [see p. 31].30 Indeed, situation ethics is altogether relativistic in that it considers 
morality to be "... fully and irreversibly 'contingent', not only about our particular [moral 
- JW] ideas, but about the very idea of ideas themselves (cognitive value) and about 
goodness itself (moral value)" [p. 43]. But this does not invoke anarchy, for to be 
29. (...continued) 
Situation Ethics: The New Morality [1966] is motivated by the fact that Fletcher explicitly 
applied his ideas to the area of bioethics in his Moral Responsibility: Situation Ethics at Work 
[1976]. 
30. The term »adduction«, which is seldom used in English, is best defined as the process of 
bringing forward facts, statements or examples for consideration. Adduction should not be 
confused with abduction (Lat.: leading away). In classical logic, an abduction is a syllogism 
of which the major premise is certain, but the minor - and consequently the conclusion as 
well - only probably. According to Peirce, logical reasoning in science does not start with a 
hypothesis. There is a »logic of discovery of discovery«, starting from data and moving 
towards hypothesis. This process of abduction (or »retroduction«; Lat.: leading backward) 
shares with induction that the conclusion amplifies rather than explicates what is stated in the 
premises. However, unlike induction (which primarily classifies a sample under a whole), 
abduction tries to »get behind the facts«, »accounting for« or »explaining« (in terms of a 
hypothesis) the observed body of data. The essence of adduction, then, is its yielding 
innovative (synthetic), rather than cogent insights because the hypotheses it generates are at 
best probable [see, e.g., Buchler 1950; Goudge 1950; Fann 1970]. 
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relative implies being relative to something, which, in the case of situation ethics, 
ultimately is love, Fletcher argues. 
The question remains whether situation ethics can be considered a method of moral 
decision-making, as Fletcher explicitly claims it to be. Ethical propositions (much like 
aesthetic and faith propositions) escape final argumentative justification in that the "leap of 
affirmation", the act of choice, is essential to them [p. 48]. Such affirmation, indeed, is a 
necessary possibility-condition of personal responsibility, which in tum is a necessary 
possibility-condition of ethics. But neither is a sufficient condition. If ethics is to provide 
a directive discourse to guide humans toward moral behavior by cogently presenting a 
particular course of action, it is necessary to do so methodically (Gr. : met-hodos = road 
towards). 
Fletcher's method "... proceeds from (1) its one and only law, agape (love), to (2) 
the sophia (wisdom) of the church or culture, containing many 'general rules' of more of 
less reliability, to (3) the kairos (moment of decision, the fullness of time) in which the 
responsible self in the situation decides whether the sophia can serve love there or not" 
[p. 33; emphasis altered - ІЩ. The steps are clear, but what about the links? Fletcher's 
»met-hodos« resembles more a »triple jump« than a trail with signs to guide the decision­
maker. 
Fletcher leans toward a kind of casuistry in stressing that good and evil are extrinsic 
to patterns of action and fully depend on the situation (for the ethical analysis of which 
situation ethics should provide a method). Yet the crux of Fletcher's situation ethics is 
not the significance of the situation but the notion of neighbor-love. If the morality of an 
action were to be found in the situation (rather than the pattern of action), Fletcher would 
be contradicting himself when he boldly asserts that the difference between vice and virtue 
is "a matter of opinion" [p. 77]. As he contends elsewhere: "The situationist holds that 
whatever is the most loving thing in the situation is the right and good thing" [p. 65; 
emphasis altered - JW\. Morality (i.e., Christian morality) essentially is a matter of 
loving one's fellow men, and ethics is but a matter of understanding the functioning of 
love. 
What, then, is the role of love in ethical decision-making? Fletcher emphasizes that 
the notion of love which guides situation ethics is not »philia« or friendship, nor »eros« or 
romantic passion. Rather, it is »agape«, the kind of love which is purely giving, non-
reciprocal, neighbor-regarding. Agapistic love is not a matter of emotion but of will, not 
a feeling but an attitude or disposition [see p. 79]. More specifically, "[i]t seeks the 
neighbor's best interests with a careful eye to all the factors in the situation" [p. 69; 
emphasis added - JW]. But how, then, is love able to recognize what is good? 
It is fair to survey Situation Ethics for answers to this »how« question because 
Fletcher explicitly claims that love is not a substantial moral concept. It is a formal 
principle that merely describes the type of actions to be performed, that is, those that are 
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beneficial for our fellow men, without providing exactly what is in their benefit [see p. 
60]. If a »love ethics« is to have any directive power other than 'do what benefits your 
neighbor', Fletcher must clarify how love reveals what is in fact my neighbor's benefit. 
When examining Fletcher's Situation Ethics for answers to this most fundamental of 
questions, the first problem is Fletcher's explicitly limiting his discussion to Christian 
situation ethics [see p. 30]: Only in this religious framework is love the highest norm. In 
some other form of situation ethics, the highest norm could, for instance, be self-realiza-
tion [p. 31]. If a »love-ethics« is founded in Christian faith, is love's ability to gauge 
what is good for my fellow-man peculiarly Christian disposition as well, mediated, for 
example, by the Holy Ghost? Fletcher quotes Christ's command to love one's neighbor as 
oneself to underscore the idea that agapistic love is not in contradiction with self-love, 
thus making it insightful that the Christian absolute norm is not contradictory to the 
ancient norm of self-realization. But the question remains how love mediates my 
recognition of another's best interests. One could interpret Christ's command as provid-
ing the very method sought: For example, the good of the other is to be found in oneself. 
But this interpretation seems not probable in the biblical context, nor is it in keeping with 
the essence of agapistic love, that is, to be fully focused on the benefit of the other 
person. 
Similarly, if one were to argue that what is really the good of the other never can be 
radically different from what is the good for me and, for that matter, for any other human 
-being, that - simply - we are all human beings (a thesis which I will actually try to 
defend later on in this study), one ends up contradicting the radically relativistic character 
of situation ethics. 
The conclusion seems inescapable that Fletcher's Situation Ethics does not shed 
much light on the question of how exactly love makes it possible to act in accordance with 
the good that is peculiar to the unique individual in his unique situation. To the contrary, 
Fletcher argues that love prescribes a kind of utilitarianism: One ought to calculate what 
will be in the best interest of most people, because genuine neighbor-love cannot be 
individualistic but is always a love of one's neighbors (plural) [see p. 91, 95]. This, 
obviously, is a non sequitur. But more importantly, utilitarianism essentially is incompati-
ble with situation ethics in that it is only possible to perform the calculus described if one 
disregards whatever benefits are not peculiar for the individuals in the group, which is 
exactly what situation ethics wanted to get at. Utilitarianism presumes the Procrustean 
bed that Fletcher adamantly rejects throughout his book. 
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A Preliminary Assessment 
If, by way of preliminary assessment, we summarize the merits of the main modes of 
ethical reasoning discussed so far (deductivism, inductivism, casuistry uniting the best of 
elements from the former two, and Fletcher's situation ethics), we must conclude that all 
four provide us - at best - with a method for discovering general moral precepts rather 
than specific yet directive and cogent answers to individual cases. The same conclusion 
would follow if we were to proceed with a fifth common theory in bioethics, principlism 
[Beauchamp and Childress 1989], or a more recent variant, specificationism [Richardson 
1990; DeGrazia 1992]. While some of these methods may give slightly more due to cases 
(thereby sacrificing some methodological rigor), they all assume some kind of dialectical 
movement between cases and general warrants. As Green points out, theory cannot be 
applied to individual cases in a meaningful manner without itself being affected or 
modified [see Green 1990, p. 186]. On the other hand, cases themselves can be interpret-
ed and analyzed in a meaningful manner only with a more general background theory of 
bioethical warrants. The available methods, however, seem to provide little instruction on 
how to reach a cogent, directive answer to the dilemma raised by an individual, unique 
case. 
Some may object that the unique aspects of a case will always escape an ethical 
assessment because of their very uniqueness; at best, bioethics can discover the moral 
structure of health care »practice«, never of the individual care. Two counter-arguments 
must be raised. Firstly, if we accept the thesis that a practice is ethically qualified in and 
by its »model« or »paradigm undertaking« [see e.g., Jensen 1987], how is that paradigm 
revealed? For it is not at all certain that the paradigm case is the average case, uniting 
what is common in all undertakings but leaving out the differences. Notably in medicine, 
prototype cases seem more often to be the extreme rather than the common cases. But if 
the paradigm cannot be discovered by seeking what is the most common with statistical 
methods, how can it be discovered at all? - a question that leads us back to our earlier 
discussions. 
Secondly, if the paradigm case is going to be discovered, it should be the paradigm 
case of clinical medicine (rather than of biomedical research). Though the debates about 
the epistemological status of clinical medicine are yet to be concluded, if the qualification 
»clinical« is to have some significant differentiating power, it must emphasize the 
importance of decision-making in individual, unique cases. Clinical medicine is itself, as 
we have contended before, casuistic. Unfortunately, there seems to be as little method-
ological clarity about the process of clinical-medical decision-making on the individual 
aspects of the particular case, as there is about the process of clinical-ethical decision-
making. The answer to both the quest for methods of clinical-medical and of clinical-
ethical decisions may be an appeal to such »virtues« as practical wisdom, insight, 
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phronesis, clinical eye, etc. As will become clear shortly, such an appeal to virtue is 
inescapable although it cannot stand as it does now if subjectivist relativism is to be 
avoided. This will be the topic of the next chapter. 
However, before turning to the phenomenon of moral wisdom, we should take up 
one more time the quest for the nature of cogency in moral matters. For it may be that 
the cogency of clinical-ethical decisions is to be found elsewhere — not in the structure of 
the argument, but in its content. We undertake this last examination in two phases. First, 
we look at non-formal fallacies because these arguments persuade, but - being non-formal 
fallacies - cannot do so by means of their form. Fallacies, thus, must gain their persua-
sive quality from their content. This, secondly, raises the question of whether there can 
be nonfallacious arguments that provide some cogent direction in medical-moral matters. 
Wellman has suggested that »conductive« arguments provide such direction. Conduction is 
therefore examined in the last section of this chapter. 
In Search of Persuasion 
Fallacies are commonly divided into two categories, formal and nonformal. The first 
category we leave aside since these pertain to mistakes in the form of deductive argu-
ments; they are all thus invalid arguments. The mistakes may be difficult to detect, which 
explains their persuasiveness in spite of their incorrectness. But one can assess what is 
(not) a formally valid deductive argument by examining the internal structure of the 
argument (as discussed earlier). 
What exactly makes an argument a fallacy, that is, persuasive but faulty — or maybe: 
faulty yet persuasive? Take the following two fictitious arguments from authority: 
(1) As Dr. Doe has written, abortions have an 0.5% mortality range (Doe, J.: New 
World Journal of Gynecology (NWJG), vol. 356,17 (1990), 37-47). 
(2) Abortion is immoral because the pope says so. 
The first statement concerns a simple factual claim about the medical danger of an 
abortion. As it stands, expertise cannot sufficiently add to the trustworthiness of the 
statement. Doe could have a doctorate in astronomy rather than in medicine. Even if Doe 
is the leading gynecologist in matters of abortion, and even if quoting his name instills 
immediate belief among fellow gynecologists, is such belief any different from that of the 
devout Catholic being persuaded by the second claim? 
The quotation of Doe may refer to research results published in the NWJG. In that 
case the reference is less an argument from authority than a short version of the argu-
ments that can be found in the original Doe's article. The fact that Doe wrote it makes 
little difference. Probably, many quotations referring to original research also »play« with 
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the modem reader's belief that anything published in a leading scientific journal is 
trustworthy.31 On the other hand, quotations from the »leaders in the field« cannot 
simply be discarded as misleading. Neither can the reference to the pope by either 
Catholic or non-Catholic be thrown out summarily. For there is such a thing as »wisdom« 
that exceeds the simple addition of a large number of verified and reproducible bits of 
knowledge. If mentioning the name of Jones to a gynecologist instills trust, because Jones 
is considered by his colleagues a leader in the field, that leadership is not based on his 
extensive list of publications. One is unlikely to be acknowledged as leader without such 
a list, but the list is a token of leadership; it is the leadership, rather than the token, that 
instills trust. Similarly, a non-Catholic could assign trustworthiness to a papal statement 
upon assuming that becoming pope is quite a strong token of moral wisdom. 
I began with two statements and tried to show under what circumstances the 
argument from authority could add to the trustworthiness of the statement. But in order to 
do so, I had to move to other levels. Rather than discussing the relationship between the 
topic at hand (i.e., abortion) and the authority, I looked at the relationship between the 
authority and the person to be persuaded by the claim. In order to back up the latter 
relationship, I could have continued explaining that becoming a leader in an academic area 
is, indeed, a very selective process, and, even more so, becoming pope. The levels of 
discussion would become ever more broad and encompassing. In short, the original 
argument from authority presumes a large value context in which some »bodies« are 
weighted more heavily than others and awarded authority. 
Fallacies exploit the weak spots that emerge when any system is taken apart. 
Whereas genuine authority justifiably carries weight within a much larger value-context, 
fallacies isolate such an experience out of that context and consequently manipulate it. 
The fallacious nature of a circular argument is inversely proportional to the radius of the 
circle: "[Circularity will be tolerable only if the circle is sufficiently encompassing so that 
following around is in fact illuminating" [Engelhardt 1986, p. 21 - emphasis added - JW]. 
While the traditional logical circle has a very small radius and consequently loses its 
illuminative power at second sight, even such circles can gain power when their content 
intentionally refers to a larger context. Take the following example: 'God exists, for that 
is what the Bible tells us; after all, everything that is in the Bible is true, because the 
Bible is God's word.' This circle has persuasive power not because it is illuminating in 
and by itself, for nothing more is said than: 'A exists because В says so; after all, 
anything В says is true, because what В says actually is what A says.' What makes the 
31. The authoritative image granted to quotations becomes most obvious from the contemporary 
quotation craze in the humanities, notably in bioethics. Granted, it is fair to acknowledge 
the author of an original thought rather than plagiarizing him or her, but the intended 
persuasive effect of 'Says Edmund Pellegrino: ... ', or 'Argues Paul Ramsey: ... ', is 
undeniable in many an article on health care ethics. 
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circle persuasive is the power implicit in the term Bible and even more so in the term God 
(as reflected by the capitals which correct English spelling requires), a power that is likely 
to influence even a convinced atheist. Obviously, the circle will be even more illuminat-
ing to the Christian, for whom it is part of a much larger circular argument that comprises 
a complete philosophy of life. 
To be cogent (that is, to obtain an acknowledgement of truthfulness with the greatest 
possible assurance), genuine arguments must take into account the much broader value 
context in which a claim's truthfulness is to be established and verified. In the end, the 
acknowledgement will consist of a simple »yes, indeed«, but in it, the full context itself is 
acknowledged as well. That is why dialectics, the art of argumentation, prescribes any 
argument to convey not merely the necessity of the conclusion, but four other aspects as 
well. Dialectics dictates that the speaker convey, first, the larger context of the topic on 
which speaker and auditor must come to agree; second, the purpose which the auditor is 
to share with the speaker; third, the resolution to be underwritten; and fourth, the 
inadequacy of other resolutions [see Schlüter 1986, p. 48]. Every single argument does 
not have to encompass all four phases explicitly. But argumentation essentially is a 
process of leading the auditor step by step. A sound argument may mislead when, for 
example, it starts out from insufficiently warranted premises. But even when misleading, 
a cogent argument retains its directive aspect. The two categories of arguments discussed 
previously, deduction and induction, aptly connote this directive aspect. And so does a 
third category of ethical arguments which Wellman distinguishes and to which we now 
tum: Conduction. 
Conduction 
Wellman defines conduction as "... that sort of reasoning in which (1) a conclusion about 
some individual case (2) is drawn nonconclusively (3) from one or more premises about 
the case (4) without any appeal to other cases" [Wellman 1971, p. 52]. Its noncon-
clusivity distinguishes this kind of argumentation from deduction. Whereas the truth of 
the conclusion to a valid deductive argument is certain given the truth of the premises, in 
a conductive argument the premises merely support it; there is always the possibility that 
new information will outweigh that support and undermine the conclusion. The inconclu-
siveness is caused by a lack of formality: Whereas in deductive arguments the form 
provides the argument its cogency independent of the particular contents, the plausibility 
of a conductive argument fully depends on the material relevance of the premises to the 
conclusion. In the example »you ought to do it because you promised«, the meaning of 
the term 'promise' is of paramount importance for the plausibility of the argument, which 
therefore cannot be reduced to a mathematical formula. 
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Wellman stresses that it would be a misunderstanding of the very nature of conduc-
tive arguments to attempt a deductive reconstruction of the example given. It is not a 
weakness of conductive arguments that they are not conclusive; it is the weakness of 
deductive arguments that they cannot accommodate new information of greater weight. 
For example, the counter-argument, that doing what you promised might in case X 
actually harm the person, could be adequate reason to doubt that one ought to do what one 
promised. 
The weighing that goes on in such a decision cannot be reduced to some kind of 
utilitarian-mathematical calculus. Argues Wellman: "Conductive reasoning adds up the 
independent reasons, not by a sort of calculation, but by thinking them together, by 
holding them together in the mind. This logical convergence of evidence is quite different 
from the mathematical addition of homogeneous units. ... This way of thinking about 
weighing brings out the comparative aspect and the conclusion that one is more than the 
other without suggesting any automatic procedure that would dispense with individual 
judgment or any introduction of units of weight" [p. 57-58]. 
Rejecting a format identical or similar to deductive argument raises the question of 
the »logic« of conductive arguments. Wellman admits that the reliance on content and the 
lack of formal structure of such arguments precludes the development of a logic of 
conductive arguments that would be separate and independent of ethics: "There is no way 
to judge the validity of such ethical arguments while ignoring their content" [p. 61]. 
However, conductive arguments are not fully without formality. 
Arguments contain three classes of terms: (1) Logical terms, such as if... then .... 
all, some, not; (2) predicate constants, such as mortal, wrong, men; and (3) individual 
constants, such as this, here, John. Formal, mathematical logic is possible only when the 
argument can be completely reduced to logical terms, replacing all constants by symbols 
(All Xs are q, Y is an X, therefore Y is q.) Conductive arguments cannot discard the 
predicate constants, but they do not hinge on the individual constants. This limited 
formality grants conductive arguments the general applicability that distinguishes them 
from mere opinions. Although a claim is made relying on an individual case only, the 
method leading up to the conclusion about that case qualifies as a genuine argument 
because the claim transcends the purely contingent peculiarities of the case into a level of 
intersubjective validity. 
How can this be done? Wellman explicitly renounces some kind of inductive 
strategy. The fact that no appeal is made to other cases distinguishes conduction from 
induction: Past experience with various similar cases or even a single analogous case is 
not required to conductively reach a conclusion. Conductive arguments, says Wellman, 
are entirely a priori [p. 53]. Attempting an inductive reconstruction is futile because the 
predicate constants cannot be neutralized. Consequently, the construction of a more or 
less general rule for cases comparable to the one at hand requires one to look at similar 
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past cases and not merely at analogous cases. Examining each of these past cases 
separately to assess the conclusion to those cases would still require a separate conductive 
argument for each of them. This endeavor would be pointless, for one could just as well 
weigh the reasons in the case at hand. Merely repeating the same weighing process in 
other cases does not provide additional support for the case at hand. 
If the material content of a conductive argument is of such decisive nature that it 
precludes either a deductive or inductive reconstruction to serve as an independent »test« 
to distinguish between valid and invalid conductive arguments, Wellman must suggest 
some other kind of test. He proposes that »thinking through the argument again« 
constitutes such a test. Wellman admits this sounds rather dubious, but maintains that this 
test essentially meets the criteria of any test. Most importantly, this test differs from what 
it is supposed to test. Granted, a greater level of difference between the object of testing 
and the test itself is reached when testing the sweet taste of the urine of a suspected 
diabetes patient with a dip stick for sugar. However, such a level of difference cannot be 
required when testing an argumentative method, because there cannot be a test of 
reasoning which itself is not a matter of reasoning. Consequently, what we are looking 
for is some kind of reasoning that differs from the original reasoning. Thinking through 
an argument once more is not necessarily a mere repetition. If rereading a complicated 
mathematical deduction were a mere repetition, how could I suddenly exclaim (after the 
third try), 'I got it'? Similarly, thinking through a difficult philosophical argument once 
more may result in such a »eureka«. 
In support of Wellman's defense of the conductive argument, we may add two 
insights reached earlier. Firstly, from the fact that some cogent arguments can be reduced 
to formal, symbolic constructions, it does not follow that only arguments that so can be 
reduced are cogent. On the contrary, to recognize that the formal structure grants those 
categories of arguments cogency itself implies the acknowledgement of such logical 
structures as being cogent. And, secondly, to distinguish valid deductive or inductive 
arguments from fallacies (that is, to establish decisively their cogency), it often is 
necessary to disregard the first (dis)affirmative intuition and to examine the argument 
more closely to see whether it really is cogent. But that examination itself can be neither 
deductive nor inductive if an infinite regress is to be averted. 
If an a priori, noncontingent (re)examination of a single case (with reference to a 
larger theoretical background of bioethical warrants but without reducing the unique case 
to any such warrants) can yield a convincing directive, it still is a nonconclusive directive, 
Wellman admits. New facts may be brought to the fore, leading up to a different 
directive. But if there is the possibility that the present directive may have to be changed 
in the future when new facts become available, what justifies acting upon such a tentative, 
conditional directive? 
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As Wieland [1986] points out, the need to act precludes conditionally. In clinical 
medicine, the prime question is not 'What is the matter?' That would be the kind of 
question a scientists asks, a question that can be answered in provisional and révisable 
terms. In fact, Mieth has argued that conditional validity is the hallmark of scientific 
propositions [see Mieth 1977, p. 23]. The question of the clinician is: 'What ought to be 
done?' As Pellegrino and Thomasma put it: "... [T]he physician ... must make moral 
decisions . . . . He has not the scholar's luxury of 'on the one hand' and 'on the other 
hand.' He just acts, and to act is to choose among alternatives ..." [Pellegrino and 
Thomasma 1988, p. 35; emphasis added - JW]. 
Actions, however, are themselves never conditional because they are not révisable. 
Acting implies that any and all theoretical conditions are no longer relevant. Suppose, for 
example, that a careful analysis of a case were to yield the following directive: 'If the 
right to information outweighs all potential emotional harm, one should tell this dying old 
lady the truth about her prognosis.' If the physician consequently informs the patient, he 
thereby either implicitly acknowledges that the right to information outweighs all potential 
harm, or he apparently considers the condition irrelevant and has other nonconditional 
reasons to tell. The act, so to say, »freezes« the reasons at the very moment of action into 
facts that are no longer conditional, because they are no longer révisable in any meaning-
ful sense. According to Wieland, this implies that the ethical reflection demands certainty 
concerning whether an intended action is allowed, required, or prohibited: Conditional 
directives will not suffice [Wieland 1986, p. 32]. 
It is justifiable, then, to act in an individual case, if that case is thoroughly examined 
from all available perspectives in order to obtain as full as possible an understanding of 
the case, and if that interpretation stands unchallenged. The future may bring new facts to 
the fore, but that possibility is purely hypothetical; it does not turn the present directive 
into a conditional directive. The directive standing unchallenged justifies acting in 
accordance with it. For what else could one demand? What else could be the meaning of 
»moral truth« but »standing unchallenged«? 
The very meaning of moral truth, I contend, is its being acknowledged by anybody 
else. Arguments serve to persuade others into accepting viewpoints and — even more 
important in ethical reasoning — acting accordingly. Consequently, a concept of truth that 
is absolute, (i.e., disconnected from human persuasion through dialogue) would be 
meaningless. That is not to say that the concept of truth is definable and limited. It is a 
concept without borders (Lat.: finis, limis = border). Truth is a primary concept that 
precludes any analysis in more basic terms and that at best can be described, but never 
defined. Its sets a goal, unattainable for any given person at any given time, but 
providing a sense of direction nonetheless. 
The principal consequence of such an understanding of truth is that it becomes 
impossible to make decisive and clear-cut distinctions between a sound argument and a 
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fallacy Extremes may be easy to recognize for being either clearly in or out of line with 
the direction of truth Most proper reasoning will be heading towards the truth but not 
straight-on Although we may never find »the« truth, the qualifying adjective »true« could 
be understood as »being in line with the direction of truth« A criterion for such narrow 
»truthfulness« Wellman's theory of challenge could provide Rather than operationalizing 
truth as correspondence, that is, as a correct description of some objective state of affairs 
(which prompts an infinite regress if the correctness of the description is to be defined and 
proven), it may be operationahzed as »standing unchallenged« In accordance with the 
dialogical aspect of truth, standing unchallenged presumes that a process of challenging 
does take place When a statement simply is not exposed to critique, the predicate »true« 
is not justified Taboos, for instance, are never true, they may not be false, but their 
truthfulness has yet to be established The Socratic rule of philosophy »always to wonder« 
and the Cartesian method of perpetual doubt, underscore the dynamic nature of truth For 
an argument to be convincing, there must have been doubt It is only when doubt exists 
that it can be overcome (Lat convincere = to overcome32) 
Some logicians [see, e g , Kahane 1982, ρ 207] prefer to differentiate between a 
»true« and a »warranted« statement What I have described earlier as a »true« statement 
would, in their vocabulary, be a »warranted« statement ~ adequately justified but 
potentially false Kahane gives the example of the once-held theory that whales are fish 
It was warranted, but false nonetheless Such a differentiation prevents one and the same 
statement from being true at one moment in history and turning out to be false at some 
later moment However, the question now emerges what counts as a true statement 
Twentieth century biologists may have sufficient and cogent proof that whales are not fish, 
but there are many contemporary truths which at closer examination are merely warranted 
statements In fact, it may be the case that there is not a single statement beyond 
challenge 33 
Kahane argues that most scientific theories, notably Newtonian mechanics, are " 
extremely close approximation^] of the truth ", but false nonetheless [p 207, note *] 
This, however, implies one of two things Either one assumes (as we have done) that 
»the« truth is unattainable, when any statement not in full accordance with the truth is 
false, then all knowledge is false ~ which m tum would render the concepts of truth and 
32 Note that the Latin verb »convincere« is the etymological origin of two different English 
verbs, their difference being of peculiar interest m the framework of this study To convince 
(which implies an active affirmation by the person being convinced), and to convict 
(implying force being bestowed on a passive subject) As mentioned earlier, the line 
between fallacious, forceful persuasion and free acknowledgement is thin 
33 Including the one about whales, for theoretically m the course of the evolution there may 
have been some animals with various »typical« whale characteristics, but hardly classifiable 
as fish, of which the fossils are yet to be found 
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falsity meaningless. Or, »the« truth is thought to be attainable and describable; in that 
case, truth is a matter of correspondence with the actual matter, which invokes the old 
problem of proving the correspondence itself. Indeed, Kahane goes on to say that such 
scientific theories are extremely »accurate« for most real-life cases such as sending 
spaceships to the moon and firing ballistics. Thus the technical usefulness of the theory 
counts as proof of its utmost approximation of the truth. But what indicates that the full-
blown truth has been obtained? 
Given my »desire« to stick to the meaningfulness of the concept of truthfulness, 
while rejecting the correspondence theory, I understand truthfulness essentially as a matter 
of subjective acknowledgement.34 One may specify that some past qualification as true 
was not warranted, that it was insufficiently justified (i.e., when the statement could have 
been critically challenged at that time) or not justified at all (e.g., when being put under a 
taboo). But a warranted statement can be true, yet challenged again at some later moment 
in history and tum out to be in need of adjustment or even rejection. 
Does such understanding of truthfulness entail relativism? In a sense it does, for it 
acknowledges that truthfulness is tied to the contemporary dialogue among people, which 
is always contextual. However, the context itself does not provide the justification. 
Rather, the justification is found in the public acknowledgement. The process of 
challenge and acknowledgment is set in a particular historically and locally determined 
values context, and is thus limited and dynamic. But the acknowledgement itself is 
neither individually nor collectively contingent. If there are many roads leading to Rome, 
there is only one Rome. 
»The« truth cannot be defined nor attained, but doubting its being would undermine 
the very process of reasoning, and consequently the process of doubting. Every meta-
theoretical assumption that there could exist two fully incompatible understandings of 
truthfulness must already assume the possibility of comparison, which presumes some 
similarity. Either there is truth and something else, or there are two kinds of truths, but 
to classify both as truth (i) they must share that very essential feature that makes both a 
kind of truth, and (ii) there must be an encompassing sense of truth that makes the 
comparison a true proposition. 
Conversely, this understanding of truth as the result of an ongoing process of 
dialogue also bears on our understanding of the purpose of the ethical debate itself. As 
Zwart has noticed, many contemporary theories of (bio)ethics are characterized by their 
emphasis on the importance of conversation [Zwart 1993a]. However, the understanding 
34. This also takes care of the objection that morality is beyond the false/truth distinction 
because moral statements do not represent what is the case, but concern what must be or 
should have been (in Hume's vocabulary, original existences) [For a critical evaluation of 
Hume's thesis, leading up to a similar rejection, see Edgley 1965]. 
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of the essence of such conversation differs considerably. At least five versions can be 
distinguished. Zwart typifies the kind of minimalist ethics - a term used by Callahan 
[1981] - such as advocated by Engelhardt as (1) »gespreks-ethiek« (Du.: conversation 
ethics). Conversation itself is the highest good of ethics, because it is thought to be the 
single means to uphold the peace ~ if only because barking dogs don't bite. Obviously, 
such conversation for the sake of conversation does not coincide with my understanding of 
the importance of ethical dialogue. But neither is (2) conversation for the sake of 
disagreement. Granted, disagreement must be exposed through conversation, but this 
process of exposure is but a first step on the road to jointly discovering the moral truth. 
(3) Zwart sees a third version in Callahan's bioethical writings. Callahan emphasizes 
conversation as a means to reach a common moral language. Unlike the first version of 
conversation (i.e., conversation for the sake of conversation), where the content of that 
conversation is more or less irrelevant, Callahan seems to seek a contentful common 
language, which, however, must be quite minimal if consensus has any chance of being 
reached. (4) Zwart himself seems to strike the opposite balance. He says consensus may 
not force the participants in the debate to sacrifice the moral truth, which tends to be 
much richer than a minimalist approach allows for. For the sake of that richness, 
different moral languages must be respected; conversation allows for an explicitation of 
those languages. (5) I agree with Zwart that the richness of human morality may not be 
sacrificed for the sake of political consensus. But as the very word »conversation« 
connotes, dialogue always is inspired by more than a desire to explicate one's own point 
of view and to be informed about someone else's point of view. Conversation is inspired 
by the desire to convert one's partner in dialogue and/or to be converted by his wise 
insights. We will return to the phenomenon of convers(at)ion in a later subsection (see p. 
101). 
Still, two things stand out as in need of further clarification. First, the soundness of 
a nonconclusive practical directive hinges on one's ability to examine, analyze, and 
interpret a case from a complete range of perspectives, some selection in those perspec-
tives is unavoidable. For there are as many perspectives as there are people (even more, 
if collectives are thought to have their own perspectives as well), however, some 
perspectives (notably the patients' and the health care providers') are likely to be more 
relevant than other perspectives. Does this imply that in the end, clinical-ethical decisions 
are the exclusive (not by power but by definition) prerogative of providers and patients? 
We started out this study with the observation that the clinical-ethical discourse is, 
indeed, the discourse between provider and patient. The bioethicist does not, cannot, and 
should not attempt to construct such discourse, but at most can discover it and examine 
what makes it, in fact, possible. If the discourse itself is the prerogative of physicians and 
patients, and if, consequently, the cogency we seek can itself not be revealed in full, then 
62 CHAPTER 2 
for such discourse to be warranted, at least it must be clarified that such cogent clinical-
ethical discourse can exist. 
Secondly, if the exclusive discretionary ability of the care provider escapes a 
theoretical analysis and description, and if, consequently, this discretionary ability is 
intrinsically linked to the person of the care provider, how is this capacity handed down 
among physicians? To be a patient, one does not have to learn. But medical capabilities 
do not generally »befall« one. As Wieland points out, »practical knowledge« denotes a 
»familiarity« with reality that the very practical involvement in reality itself furnishes prior 
to any and all theoretical reflections [Wieland 1986, p. 11]. Clinical practice can be the 
object of theoretical discourse, as can sense perceptions. But the sense perception itself 
cannot be replaced (in full) by a statement, and neither can the kind of experience that 
guides medical practice. Theoretical reflections about medicine presuppose this practical 
wisdom or »know-how«, which itself cannot be expressed in the same kind of theoretical 
vocabulary, nor assessed and evaluated with the same epistemological standards of validity 
and truthfulness. This is also true for the kind of »practical wisdom« that exists in 
»dispositions« rather than factual data, notably the so-called »competence« of the practitio-
ner: Segments of reality, including the normative structures, are "opened up" to the 
practitioner in and via competencies [p. 33]. Competence cannot be communicated from 
the master to the apprentice; the tutor can support his student, but the latter must 
personally acquire such practical wisdom. According to Wieland, this implies that an 
analysis of the »foundations« of clinical practice cannot be accomplished without taking 
into account the »ethos« of the physician [p. 48]. Earlier, we found Jonsen and Toulmin 
conceding that casuistic reasoning is less a matter of consistent application of theoretical 
knowledge than of judicial discernment, practical wisdom, or phronesis — all of which 
rely on a feeling for or a grasp of what is equitable, fair, fitting, or reasonable (see p. 
45). Thus the dispositional ability to gain insight into the moral qualities of the individual 
clinical case are linked with the physician's professional virtues, i.e., his »ethos«. The 
nature of this ethos, which is supposed to provide for the missing link between case-
related circumstances and the cogent clinical-ethical debate, is to be clarified. 
Summary Assessment 
In this chapter, I have argued that the clinical-ethical debate is characterized by a limited 
formal structure. Cogency is provided first and foremost by the contents of the advanced 
arguments. This requires a keen interpretation of the elements of the case at hand, which 
in tum underscores the significance of moral discernment and the practical wisdom of the 
participants in the debate, notably the patient and care provider. The peculiar structure of 
the clinical-ethical debate precludes a validation via formal logic (for that would imply 
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that the insights provided by moral discernment in the end are reducible to general, 
theoretical knowledge); thus, the »cogency« of the argument advanced can only be 
assessed by a »repetition of the thought experiment«, a process of »Nachvollziehung« 
(Ger.: reproduction) of the argument, thinking it through once more, resulting (or not) in 
a verdict of acknowledgement and affirmation, which, however, escapes final argumenta-
tion. As Mieth summarizes: "In the end, people follow a particular ethos not first and 
foremost because they can provide the necessary foundation for it in an act of reflection, 
but because in its concrete form it convinces them and inspires them to follow suit. ... In 
the end, people follow an ethos, because it concerns them" [Mieth 1977, p. 57]. 
Thus, if we are to continue taking for granted that cogent clinical-ethical discourse 
exists, we must assume that there exists some kind of »practical wisdom«. Since the 
insights that make up this wisdom are beyond description in rational terms, the structure 
of the clinical-ethical discourse can be clarified only via an examination of the personal 
»ethos« of the care provider. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CLINICAL ETHICS AS PROFESSIONAL ETHIC 
It is dangerous nonsense to assert that in the 
practice of their art and science physicians can 
rely on their benevolent intentions, their abilities 
to judge what is the right thing to do, or their 
capacities for conducting their rounds with humanity, 
patience, prudence and wisdom — all supposedly acqui-
red through on-the-job training. It is not that easy. 
Katz 1984, p. xxi 
Introduction 
It has been shown by various authors [e.g., Rothman 1991], that the emergence of 
bioethics as an independent discipline at a distance of, or even separated from the practice 
of medicine has been induced to a large extent by the failure of the medical profession to 
adequately regulate the practice of its own members. First, there were the questionable or 
even plainly immoral biomedical experiments with human beings which turned out not to 
be the »prerogative« of Nazi-German physicians. Second, there were the biotechnological 
innovations that presumably outstretched medicine's moral regulatory mechanisms. Books 
by extraordinary critics such as Van de Berg [1969] and Illich [1975] induced a more 
common public anxiety. In turn, various decisive court cases and a few political 
successes gave way to the American rise of bioethics, soon to be followed by similar 
developments on the European continent. 
There can be little doubt that the break-down of the traditional, politically powerful 
and highly regarded medical establishment, that is, the curtailment of the moral autonomy 
of the medical profession, could occur at this moment in time and with such rapidity only 
because of a more wide-spread public doubt about moral authorities. That is not to say 
that man, whether healthy or diseased, finally had become fully emancipated, free from 
any and all hierarchical powers, determining his life to the maximum extent; other 
authorities in different, less traditional disguises no doubt have filled the gap. But a gap 
there was in that the traditional moral authorities had failed to maintain their authority. 
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The new »order« was one in which the traditional moral authority of the medical profes-
sional had diminished considerably, while society at large was (and still is) characterized 
by the reign of moral pluralism. 
Against this background, understandably bioethicists have shied away from notions 
such as »professional wisdom«, »moral experience of health care professionals«, »physician 
paternalism« and »extraordinary or supererogatory rights and duties of care providers«. 
Yet the former chapter has shown that these notions implicitly play a powerful role in any 
theory of health care ethics, but notably in clinical, case-oriented ethics. If the structure 
of clinical ethical discourse is characterized by a complex and ongoing process of (1) 
interpretation of the clinical situation, which insights, via (2) conductive argumentation are 
validated and communicated, all of which presumes (3) a horizon of moral meaning 
shared by both care providers and patients, and (4) a personal openness towards morally 
significant issues, as well as (5) the kind of practical wisdom that allows patients and care 
providers to gauge the moral significance of the situation at hand against this shared 
background, it seems this complex process must (to a large extent) be confined to the 
health care context. On the one hand, the clinical situation of suffering, disease, 
handicap, aging, dying and death seems to be so »foreign« to everyday life that clinical 
ethics must reflect that specificity. On the other hand, the actions of health care profes-
sionals undertaken in response to this peculiar situation, both at the individual and the 
institutional level, seem to differ to such an extent from common human undertakings as 
to warrant the characterization of a »professional practice«. 
In his 1987 study entitled Practice and Progress, Jensen argues that any »practice«, 
including the health care practices, has three interrelated aspects: Actions, methodic 
knowledge, and values. To be acknowledged as a practice, the actions that are undertak-
en, the epistemological methods warranting those actions, and the particular moral values 
reflected by those actions must constitute a consistent program. The question, thus, arises 
whether the internal morality of clinical medical practice differs sufficiently from common 
morality to warrant the qualification of »specificity«. 
Given our preceding analysis of the methodological process of clinical ethics, in 
which a cogent moral discourse is to be discovered out of the clinical reality, the content 
of this discourse evidently will differ from - let's say - the content of moral discourse in 
business ethics. At this most basic level, where bioethics (generally defined as the study 
of health care practice in its moral aspect) is the most practical and the least abstract, the 
specificity is clear. At the opposite, most abstract end, that is, where bioethics pertains to 
the study of the study, where the process of discovering clinical morality becomes itself 
object of »meta«-ethical analysis, it would make no sense to even raise the question of 
specificity. For the mere question whether - let alone the claim that - bioethics at this 
most abstract level still is specific would presume some even more abstract level of 
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analysis at which the notion of specificity could acquire meaning Obviously, this »more 
than most« abstract level cannot exist 
The question about a specific bioethics thus could be rephrased as follows Is the 
complex and ongoing process of clinical ethics such that it shares with other forms of 
practical, moral reasoning the more general structure of (1) situational interpretation and 
(2) conductive argumentation, but differs from them in that (3) the horizon of moral 
meaning is a restricted horizon, shared by health care providers (and patients9) only, in 
that (4) the »ethos« of health care providers is unlike any other professional commitment, 
and in that (5) the kind of practical wisdom required for the process of clinical ethics to 
take place is the prerogative of physicians (or health care providers more in general)9 To 
raise the same question once more in different terms Granted that there is a professional 
morality, and granted that there cannot be a professional (meta)ethics, is the notion of a 
professional clinical »ethic« feasible9 
Here, I make use of a phenomenon peculiar to the English (as opposed to, e g , 
French, Dutch or German) language, where »ethics« is a plural term English thus 
supplies us with an extra term, the singular word »ethic«, that has a slightly different 
meaning indeed For example, although Veatch in his A Theory of Medical Ethics fails to 
explicitly address the difference between »ethics« and »ethic«, the latter term clearly is 
reserved for a particular, group-specific approach to moral issues [see Veatch 1981, 
particularly ρ 82-83]" 
In this chapter, I will therefore examine different models of a professional clinical 
ethic After a more detailed specification of the notion of professional ethic, I will 
examine whether at all a case can be made for a professional ethic, that is, whether the 
practice of health care is sufficiently distinct I will survey various aspects of medical 
practice that are commonly quoted as foundations of such a professional ethic (notably the 
special knowledge and expertise of health care providers and their presumed extraordinary 
altruism), as well as the so called »separatist thesis«, suggesting that professional ethic is 
sufficiently distinct as to consider it a separate kind of ethics I will refute the latter 
thesis and move on to discuss the significance of professional roles This discussion will 
necessitate a reexamination of the nature of clinical practice This, in turn, will bring to 
the fore the notion of »sympathy«, that is, the ability of physicians to gauge the personal 
needs and interests of their individual patients It is at that moment, that the examination 
of the feasibility of a professional ethic must be interrupted to await the results of the 
consequent chapters that address the foundational nucleus of clinical ethics The underly­
ing anthropological understanding of the patient in his relationship to the health care 
provider 
35 I use the term »approach« - which is not Veatch's - to indicate the mid-level in between 
concrete and abstract ethics at which such a professional ethic would function 
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A Professional Ethic 
As mentioned in the previous subsection, there can be little argument about the thesis that 
professionals, because of the peculiar context in which they are brought, involving special, 
sometimes exceptional or unusual kinds of labor and relationships, have obligations which 
laymen do not. But this is simply because they never face the dilemmas specific for those 
professions. Most of us will never be faced with the surgeon's dilemma whether to 
refrain from giving blood to a Jehovah's Witness who has been shot and is bleeding 
heavily, or save the patient's life but disrespect his wishes. Most of us will never be 
faced with the judge's dilemma whether to keep a rapist out of jail on the basis of a so 
called technicality, thereby giving him all the benefits of a just trial, or to not act on that 
minor procedural mistake, thereby putting him behind bars, but not giving him his legal 
due. 
The question is, however, whether certain professions, such as health care profes-
sions, entail duties which laymen do not have even if they find themselves involved in a 
situation similar to that of a professional. For example, pro-life physicians could make 
the argument that euthanasia defined as either killing the patient or assisting in her suicide, 
even in case of a specific request from the patient to that extent, may be a moral act for 
non-physicians, but physicians have the absolute professional duty to protect life and 
therefore cannot commit euthanasia as defined. Others have argued that the medical 
relationship is so specific that generally acknowledged human rights - or at any rate the 
way they are understood in the world of laymen - cannot be transferred without modifica-
tions to the medical relationship [see Pellegrino and Thomasma 1988, p. 15]. That is to 
say: Universal rights and duties are not universal, they do not hold (in exactly the same 
way) in the world of professionals. 
The issue at hand is not a matter of definitions. Those in favor of a physician's right 
to practice euthanasia often respond to pro-lifers that euthanasia should not be understood 
as murder, not even as killing in the common sense of the word. Euthanasia is essentially 
an act of pain relief, the ending of suffering. In the case of a patient in persistent 
vegetative state, the physician is not even ending the life of a »person« (and only persons 
can be murdered). These responses, however, miss the point of the pro-lifers as quoted in 
the former paragraph. By trying to redefine euthanasia in terms other than killing persons 
and/or murder, they acknowledge an apparent need to redefine euthanasia. Such a need is 
understandable only if it is presumed that euthanasia-advocates cannot condone a definition 
of euthanasia as killing or murder, which in rum presupposes that euthanasia understood 
as such, would be immoral in the eyes of euthanasia-advocates as well. In other words, 
they must be agreeing with pro-life physicians that a physician is not allowed to commit 
murder or kill persons (for if they did not agree, they would not have to go through the 
trouble of redefining euthanasia). 
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Various authors have argued that the introduction of such a distinct ethic serves more 
the professionals themselves than the clients and patients: "... [I]t serves to protect ... 
professionals from public disquiet about their practices" [Downie 1986a, p. 65]. There is 
little doubt that the predicate of »profession« serves to, or is at any rate intended to 
increase social status. Established professions do not shy away from denouncing 
themselves as the highest profession. According to the American Medical Association's 
1847 code, "[t]here is no profession, from the members of which greater purity of 
character and a higher standard of moral excellence are required, than the medical ..." 
[American Medical Association 1978, p. 1741, Chap. II, art. 1.21. But with equal 
haughtiness a former president of the British Law Society has claimed that "[o]f the three 
true professions, it would seem overall that the ethical standards which are required of the 
lawyer exceed those of any other profession" [Napley 1985, p. 823]. At the same time, 
not-yet-professions are trying their utmost to reflect the image of the traditional profes-
sions: Even car dealers now have an official code of ethics, and so do moving companies. 
Regardless the undeniable links between the struggle for societal status and power in 
which different occupations are involved on the one hand, and the ongoing debate about 
the feasibility of a professional ethic on the other, the latter merits close attention in a 
study on clinical ethics if it were only because our understanding of bioethics as a form of 
professional ethic bears heavily on any attempt to develop a more clinically oriented 
bioethics. If it were, for instance, to be concluded that bioethics qualifies as a profession-
al ethic, and if »professionalism« implies that non-professionals have no way of knowing 
anything about the practice of professionals, its status as a form of ethics becomes dubious 
because it is only to the extent that clinical-ethical discourse is open to critical examination 
that it can be characterized as ethical discourse. Such critical examination excludes 
appeals to purely subjective opinion - De gustibus non est disputandum -, but also group-
related »immunization« strategies. It is one thing to argue that professionals are guided 
by, and should be judged in reference to a moral code that is so distinct from common 
morality that it can be said to be a separate morality (see p. 76); it is quite another thing 
to argue that nothing more can be said about that morality in layman's terms if only 
because the same laymen are directly affected by it [see, e.g., Bayles 1989, p. 21]. 
If, on the other hand, it were to be shown that the qualification »professional« 
connotes the kind of internal consistency between praxis and morality which characterizes 
the »trifacetted« practice described by Jensen, then a careful analysis of the internal ethic 
becomes of vital importance for the present study. 
Before we embark on an examination of theories of professional ethic, a final remark 
should be made concerning what a professional ethic is not: It is not a matter of voluntary 
commitments. The question is not whether physicians (and maybe other health care 
workers) traditionally have assumed duties (and rights) above or beyond those they already 
have as human beings. Actually, this is undeniably the case given such longstanding 
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historical traditions as the swearing of the Hippocratic Oath during graduation. Having 
promised to do or not to do certain practices, one is bound by one's own promise. But 
such obligations are self-imposed, or at any rate, taken for granted by the applicant who 
wants to become a member of this association which requires the swearing of the Oath. 
The professions consider the rights and duties listed in its oaths and codes (such as 
the Hippocratic Oath) to be indispensable for professional practitioners. Medicine, for 
example, cannot be practiced well in the eyes of »hippocratic« physicians, if the practitio-
ner performs surgeries or engages in abortions. But two different reasons could be given 
by the hippocratic physicians: (1) Medicine can be practiced well without assuming such 
special obligations, but hippocratic physicians want to do even more than practicing good 
medicine; or (2) the practice of medicine, being a physician, in and by itself brings about 
these duties. In the first case, the duties are not essential for the practice of medicine; 
they are self-assumed, holding only for those who swear the Oath. In the second case, the 
duties exist even for a physician who has never sworn the Oath; swearing the Oath is 
merely a »public demonstration« by the new physician of his awareness of the obligations 
that come with being a physician. When we are asking the question whether a profession-
al ethics exists, we are referring to the latter kind of obligations. 
Professional Expertise 
In 1985, Sieghart started a debate in the Journal of Medical Ethics on the existence of a 
distinct, professional ethic. He maintained that physicians have a special duty not to harm 
other people, whereas non-professionals (such as businessmen) do not have this duty. 
Sieghart explained that this difference is associated with and justified by the "gross 
inequality of power" between the professional and the client [Sieghart 1985, p. 118]. 
This commonly asserted claim about professionals is met by the equally common objection 
that the presumed gross inequality between a professional and a layman exists just as well 
between the layman and a »tradesman«, such as a car mechanic [see Downie 1986a, p. 
64]. We may even add that in many an instance there is probably an even greater 
inequality between the car mechanic and his client than between the doctor and his patient. 
The patient has some utterly portentous knowledge of the problem; after all, he is the 
person who is directly suffering from the problem, he feels it, sometimes can locate it, 
knows when it started, when it becomes worse, and whether the suggested treatment was 
indeed beneficial. On the other hand, when the average client (certainly the writer of this 
study) has to call in the help of a mechanic, that usually means, he is totally at a loss. He 
has not the faintest idea what is wrong: The red light in the dashboard, saying STOP 
ENGINE IMMEDIATELY went on, but that is all he knows. Moreover, his annoyance 
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and anger about the car trouble is of no relevance whatsoever to the car mechanic's 
diagnosis of the problem. 
Downie adds to this the observation that professional musicians may have more skills 
than their clients, the listeners, but the latter, certainly do not have a significant degree of 
vulnerability in any sense towards the musicians. However, this observation, though true, 
is not without problems, for it is not at all clear whether musicians can be said to 
constitute, as a group, a profession. Downie claims that if anything is a profession, music 
is, but that remains to be proven [see Downie 1986a, p. 641. 
Downie's claim does touch, however, on a crucial problem: If any comparison is to 
be made between professions and other trades in order to prove that there exist specific 
moral duties for professionals, professions must be defined such that they can be clearly 
distinguished from other trades. And this definition, obviously, cannot rely on a per-
ceived difference in moral status. All too often professions are defined in terms of the 
specific duties towards clients and society which they entail, such as are written down in 
so called ethics codes or handed down through tradition. But such a definition is liable to 
generate a circular argument: A physician has unique duties and rights because he is a 
professional, and he is a professional because he has unique duties and rights. 
If the acquisition of expert knowledge cannot, in and by itself, provide sufficient 
explanation - let alone justification - for the existence of a professional ethic, that is not to 
say that such knowledge is irrelevant in that regard. If we agree with Jensen that the 
internal morality of a practice is intrinsically linked with the body of knowledge typical 
for that practice, the two must be interrelated. At the same time, the very distinction 
between actions, knowledge and morality signifies the relative independence of the three 
and precludes a reduction of any one to another. Like actual practice cannot provide a 
measure of »truth« for the acquisition of knowledge, nor the standard for moral merit; like 
a complete understanding of the values internal to the practice does not suffice to explain 
either the nature of the actual care, or the truthfulness of the clinical knowledge; likewise 
clinical know-how is neither the sole guide of how care is undertaken, nor what care is of 
value. The particular »identity« of a professional-clinical ethic must be found at the 
ethical level itself. 
Altruism as the Pivot of Professionalism 
Although Sieghart starts out his defense of a distinct professional ethic by emphasizing the 
professional obligation not-to-harm (which he relates to the expertise/power difference 
between professionals and laymen), he continues arguing that "... the outstanding 
characteristic of all professions is that their members are bound - without exception or 
qualification - to [behave altruistically] . . . . The cardinal sin of any professional, and the 
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prime ground for expulsion from the profession, is to prefer his own interest to that of his 
patient or client" [Sieghart 1985, ρ 119] Sieghart's main proof for this assumed 
difference between professions and what he denotes as trades or occupations, is the 
following analogical argument (which I quote in full because it is an argument quite 
commonly advanced)36 
"Jones is Dr Smith's patient He has an enemy called Evans who makes his life so 
uncomfortable that Jones' health is imperilled Jones asks Dr Smith to supply him 
with something to put into Evans' drinking water, which will make Evans feel so ill 
that he will stop troubling Jones 
If Evans is also Dr Smith's patient, the problem resolves itself quite simply 
Dr Smith has duties to each of Jones and Evans to use his professional skills in 
order to maintain their respective healths, and he would be m grave breach of 
that duty if he used his professional skills in such a way as to imperil the health 
of Evans But suppose that Evans is not Dr Smith's patient, indeed that Dr 
Smith does not even know him, or know anything about him, so that there is no 
direct relationship at all between them Clearly, we would still say that Dr 
Smith must not accede to Jones' request because he has a duty not to use his 
professional skill to undermine the health of any other human being, even if no 
professional relationship or other relationship subsists between them 
Now this conclusion is not nearly as obvious as it looks at first site Take, 
for instance, a parallel case m the business world, where no professional duties 
are involved Suppose that Jones and Smith knew perfectly well that by 
engaging in a business transaction to their mutual profit they would rum Evans 
Most businessmen will tell you that in a society based on free markets they owe 
36 It is interesting to notice that Sieghart towards the end of his article tries to bring about 
additional proof for his position by referring to various international codes of medical ethics, 
which, Sieghart claims, confirm his position Unfortunately, from an ethical perspective 
(contrary to a legal perspective — Sieghart is a lawyer) in and by itself correspondence (if we 
assume such correspondence does indeed exist) between his theory and some or even all 
international codes does not establish proof, but at best is an indication that Sieghart's 
position may be correct Furthermore, when Sieghart continues with an example, he in 
effect contradicts his own position He argues that a physician can refuse a military order to 
participate m torture (which action, obviously, would run contrary to the duty to behave 
beneficently to patients) and justify his refusal by referring to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which 
prohibit torture without exception But being a non-physician does not justify an exception 
to these Declarations either Certainly, a physician is not allowed to participate in torture, 
but not because he is a physician, but simply because nobody, physician, businessman, or 
even unemployed layman, is allowed to do so The very declarations Sieghart is referring to 
are general human rights declarations, binding all human beings as human beings 
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no moral duty to their competitors to ensure that these remain in business. If 
Evans goes bankrupt, that just means that he was not as competent and efficient 
as Smith and Jones, and since the market is designed to encourage competence 
and efficiency and to discourage their opposites, the disappearance of Evans 
from the market is to be viewed as a good thing for everyone else in it" 
[Sieghart 1985, p. 119]. 
Sieghart concludes that the difference between the two analogical examples can be 
explained only by assuming that professionals have a unique moral obligation not to harm 
others out of self-interest; more generally, to behave altruistically. Before turning to the 
first response in the Journal of Medical Ethics to Sieghart's conclusion, two remarks about 
his analogical argument must be made. 
Firstly, there is the empirical element. Sieghart's line of arguments is severely 
weakened by the fact that it relies on the claim that "Most businessmen will tell you that 
in a society based on free markets they owe no moral duty to their competitors to ensure 
that these remain in business". This empirical claim is not in any way backed by data or 
even a reference. And more importantly, even if it could be statistically proven that most 
businessmen will tell us this, they may be wrong: Either businessmen may have such 
moral duty (even if they think they don't) or a society based on free markets is immoral to 
start out with. 
Secondly, Sieghart's final conclusion can be easily undermined by arguing that 
businessmen are obligated not to inflict diseases on their clients or competitors either, 
even if such harm will profit their business. In other words, Sieghart's analogy fails the 
test of relevant similarity: The case of the physician and his clients differs in relevant 
aspects from the case of the businessman. Consequently, the conclusion that a profession, 
as opposed to a trade or occupation, involves specific duties (in this case, the duty not to 
harm, or, more generally, the duty to be altruistic) stands to be proven. 
In his 1986 article in the Journal of Medical Ethics Downie adds that non-profession-
al tradesmen or businessmen are not typical egoists. A mechanic's actions are first of all 
directed towards repairing cars, not to making a big profit. Even a businessman's actions 
are intended to trade goods, though obviously with a profit, for that is what good business 
is all about: He needs the profits to stay in business. On the other hand, businessmen, 
mechanics, and physicians alike need to stay alive, feed a family, and pay taxes: All need 
to earn a living by making profit or earning fees (which is essentially the same). When 
making profits, neither physicians, nor mechanics or businessmen ought to be unduly self-
interested. Every human being is bound by the general social duty to balance egoism with 
altruism and in that regard, Downie maintains, all men are equal: "... [M]oral duties are 
one and the same for all of us" [Downie 1986a, p. 65]. 
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Sieghart defends himself against Downie by asserting that " the public expects true 
'professionals' to behave less selfishly than others within their professional relationships, 
and is chary of granting recognition of that status to the members of any trade or 
occupation, however hard they press for it, if they will not accept such an exceptionally 
high standard of conduct in return" [Sieghart 1986] This quote suggests that society 
expects altruistic behavior as a kind of »pay-back« of granted status But that would mean 
that society tries to »buy« altruistic behavior, which, according to Downie, society does 
indeed by paying professionals relatively high salaries [see Downie 1986", ρ 196], but 
which, consequently, cannot seriously be called »altruistic« any longer 37 
The same defense of professional ethic is given by Gillon, author of the fourth article 
in the series on a professional ethic [see Gillon 1986, ρ 59-60] Though Gillon's defense 
of a professional ethic is limited to self-imposed duties (which, according to our defini­
tion, do not count as professional duties), his arguments are noteworthy in that they could 
be brought forward in defense of non-self-imposed professional duties as well Gillon 
maintains that society expects extraordinary altruistic behavior from physicians, lawyers 
and other traditional professions, but not from the mechanic, baker, or the farmer He 
grants his opponents that this is an empirical claim and that there are professionals that do 
not meet the public's expectations, but in general, the facts verify the claim Downie may 
contend that one could say farmers serve just as noble a cause as physicians, but as a 
matter of fact, people don't think they do Similarly, one may maintain that a mechanic 
ought to get out of bed in the middle of the night to rescue a snowed-in car m the middle 
of nowhere, but as a matter of fact, society does not expect such behavior Consequently, 
society does not grant these kinds of occupations the status of professions, whereas it does 
grant such status to physicians, lawyers, and other traditional professions [see Gillon 
1986, ρ 60] 
This defense is correct, but the question remains, whether society is correct m its 
distinction That is to say, it may be the case, for example, that mechanics in general do 
get out of bed when needed in an emergency, unfortunately, such altruistic behavior 
usually goes unnoticed, is not dramatized in soap operas and trashy novels, and conse­
quently is less sensational More importantly, people may be expecting from the 
traditional professions extraordinary behavior, but those professions in reality do not meet 
those expectations and therefore do not deserve the status they are granted The reality of 
medical practice, as a whole, may be much less heroic and altruistic then people think 
The public's perspective may have been biased following a long-lasting and sensationally 
positive depiction in literature and movies According to Downie it " is a myth left 
37 Actually, Downie in his response to Sieghart's and Gillon's articles claims that " when a 
person carries out his well-paid employment (whatever that is) he cannot be called 'altruistic' 
or 'benevolent' for so doing" [1986b, ρ 195] 
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over from an earlier period that doctors do a lot of unpaid work ..." [Downie 1986\ p. 
195]. The status of profession, then, is not deserved at all. 
One could try to argue that, irrespective any commonly held beliefs, the work of 
professions is of more value to mankind than that of other laborers: The healing of 
diseased and suffering people or the defending of unjustly accused political prisoners is 
more noble a cause than fixing cars or trading stocks. The persuasive nature of such a 
claim, however, still is due - at least in part - to biased and largely sentimental preconcep-
tions: Physicians are in fact spending much of their time calming down overly worried 
clients, diagnosing common »colds« and other untreatable dis-eases, prescribing over-the-
counter drugs, and completing lots of paperwork — among others, bills. Similarly, 
lawyers rarely defend, in the name of justice, innocent scapegoats, but usually deal with 
civil suits, traffic violations, state bureaucracy, and common criminals. If the latter 
depiction is exaggerated - and it is of course -, then this is only to show that it is not at all 
self-evident that the work of so-called professionals is of more value to society than that 
of businessmen who are responsible for maintaining the delicate balances in the world of 
trade, thereby ensuring the well-being of every citizen, notably by securing the necessary 
finances to provide for medical, legal, and other »professional« services. 
Naturally, this is not to argue that health care providers are not altruistic, let alone 
egoistic. It merely shows that a convincing argument has yet to be provided justifying a 
professional ethic implying exceptional altruism. Paradoxically, the thesis that profession-
als are egoists may provide that very basis. Machan has tried to argue that outright 
egoism must underlie professional altruism if such altruism is to be a genuine obligation 
rather than a charitable disposition. Professional obligations, he contends, are primarily 
obligations towards oneself in that the choice one makes for a certain occupation must be 
considered an autonomous choice about one's own happiness. Thus, behaving unprofes-
sionally essentially is betraying oneself [see Machan 1983, p. 337-348]. A less radical but 
essentially similar approach has been defended more recently by Devettere, who empha-
sizes the importance of physician happiness as the principle goal of clinical ethics [see 
Devettere 1993, p. 71-89]. And in more general terms, Fletcher quotes Christ's com-
mand to love one's neighbor as oneself, to underscore the idea that agapistic love is not in 
contradiction with self-love, thus making it insightful that the Christian norm of neighbor-
love is not contradictory to the quite (or even more) persuasive ancient norm of self-
realization [see Fletcher 1966, p. 110-114]. 
Convincing as this egoism-based thesis may sound to those who already embark 
»wholeheartedly« on their professional tasks, it is difficult to see how this foundational 
theory of professional obligations can convince obstinate members. For it presumes (a) 
that an essential element of human happiness is moral consistency in life; but this thesis, 
even in its »thinnest« (e.g., Sartrian-existentialist) form, may not seduce the egoist (in the 
common sense of the word) who basically could care less about morality. More impor-
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tantly, Machan's theory assumes (b) an understanding of medical practice as one of 
altruistic service. That is to say, if the professional's original commitment to the practice 
of medicine is to entail special moral obligations, the practice of medicine itself must 
suggest such service. Again, this contention may sound convincing to those who feel 
called to the practice of medicine; but those who do not, have good reason to consider 
Machan's theory an oratio pro domo — if not simply a circular argument. 
Before we turn to the next defense of a professional ethic, we should again soften 
our harsh criticism of the »altruism thesis«. For as we already mentioned in the introduc-
tion to this chapter, in addition to a common horizon of moral meaning and the ability to 
gauge the moral significance of particular events and situations, the health care provider 
must be »open« to moral meaning. The »call« that the suffering, handicapped, sick or 
dying person »emits« can be heard by only those human beings who are willing to hear 
such calls. If there is little indication that (all) health care providers actually are more 
willing to devote part of their life to the needs of their fellow human beings than those 
engaged in other, non-professional trades, that observation in no sense reduces the ideal 
significance of health care professionals' altruistic disposition. 
The Separatist Thesis 
If professionals do not meet the standards of public expectations that would have merited 
professional »status«, does that finding settle the question about the existence of a 
professional ethic? If Gillon's argument for an affirmation of professional ethic were the 
last possible argument, it would. But even if public expectations are not met, we may 
wonder whether these expectations are based only on unrealistic doctor's novels and 
hospital-based soap operas. Why is medicine such a suitable, »catchy« topic for trash 
novels and soap operas? The media are responding to an existing, though ideal concep-
tion of health care, and we ought to wonder whether such ideal makes sense. This brings 
us once more back to our original question: Is a professional ethic a feasible concept; is it 
reasonably possible to think of binding rights and duties over and beyond those of non-
professionals? 
The previous attempts to make a case for a professional ethic all are characterized by 
claims that professionals are more altruistic, have more power, more expertise. In sum, a 
professional ethic concerns more-of-the-ordinary, not the extraordinary (Lat.: outside the 
ordinary). A more radical understanding of the notion of professional ethic is summarized 
in the »separatist thesis«: The actions of professionals are guided by, and to be judged in 
reference to, a moral code that is genuinely distinct from common morality to the extent 
that it can be said to be a particularized, separate morality. 
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The notion of a distinct professional ethic tends not to engender much public 
criticism when professions claim they have altruistic duties beyond those that lay men 
have towards other human beings (although it may be difficult for the leaders of profes-
sions to convince recalcitrant fellow professionals of their weighty moral obligations). 
Criticism arises when the separatist thesis is invoked to justify the right or even the 
professional duty to infringe or violate commonly upheld rights of others, such as they are 
reflected in human rights declarations or positive laws. 
A most telling example of such separatism can be found in contemporary Dutch 
euthanasia debates. We have already pointed out that opponents of euthanasia have been 
arguing that euthanasia may be a moral intervention for non-physicians, but definitely not 
for physicians. This pro-life argument could be interpreted as a separatist argument, but 
it need not be. It could be explained, for example, in terms of the availability of medical 
euthanasia undermining the trust in physicians which is of essential importance to health 
care. Thus, in balancing various commonly underwritten values, the value of trust is 
found to carry more weight in medicine than it would outside that area. On the other 
hand, the argument of some advocates of euthanasia that killing human beings is an 
immoral and illegal act, except when committed by physicians, clearly is a separatist 
thesis. This pro-euthanasia argument has been discussed and criticized in detail elsewhere 
[Welie 1992], but a few summary remarks may clarify the nature of the separatist thesis. 
One of the boldest and most controversial defenses of euthanasia was brought 
forward in a famous 1983 case. In dealing with a family physician who had euthanasized 
a 96-year-old patient at her explicit request, the District Court of Alkmaar argued that 
assisting in suicide formally constitutes a violation of the Criminal Code but nonetheless 
may not be illegal if and only in so far as such an action from a legal perspective cannot 
be considered undesirable. The court dismissed the physician. However, the High Court 
of Amsterdam, that in 1984 dealt with the Alkmaar case in appeal, objected to the District 
Court's verdict by arguing that it is not up to the judge to define the legal status of 
particular actions. This is the task of the legislature and the latter has defined killing, 
including killing on the victim's request, as a crime. 
Not so according to Enschedé [1985, 1986; see also Langemeijer e.a. 1986, 1987]. 
Enschedé agrees that it is not up to the judge to define the legal status of civilians' 
actions. But the criminal law, also called penal law, does not tell which actions are legal 
and which are not; it only describes for which illegal actions punishment (Lat. : poena) can 
be imposed. The criminal code lists all actions that are punishable and presumably, those 
actions are illegal. But from the mere fact that some action is defined by the criminal 
code as punishable, it does not necessarily follow that it is always an illegal action. 
Actually, the criminal code itself defines various grounds for punishment exclusion. One 
such ground is the order of a legal authority to do something that, according to the code, 
is punishable (e.g., driving on the left lane of a Dutch street). Since 1916, the Supreme 
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Court has also allowed for unwritten punishment-exclusion grounds, one of which being 
excusable error. 
Enschedé contends that there exists another unwritten punishment exclusion ground, 
the »medical exception«. He reminds us that in 1880, when reviewing the paragraphs on 
abortion in the former Criminal Code, a member of the Dutch parliament asked the 
Minister of Justice whether it were not necessary to explicitly exclude from punishment 
those abortions that are performed to save the life of the mother. The Minister vehement-
ly denied such need: A physician who acts according to the professional standards of care, 
whether performing surgery, a circumcision, or an abortion do not fall under the range of 
the criminal law. It is up to the medical profession and the medical profession only, not 
to the lawyers with their limited legal tools, to set the standards of professional medical 
practice. Parliament agreed and no exclusive paragraph was added to the articles on 
abortion in the new criminal code from 1886 (which is also the current Dutch code). 
Abortion to save the mother's life did not need a special excluding paragraph in the 
criminal law. Likewise, Enschedé maintains, the legislature did not feel the need to make 
an explicit exclusion in the Criminal Code to account for euthanasia committed according 
to the standards of good professional medical practice. The task to decide what is and 
what is not good medicine has been assigned to the medical profession and it is up to the 
medical disciplinary boards to rule in arbitrary cases. If a physician appears to have acted 
according to the standards set by the medical profession, criminal courts should not 
impose punishment. 
In deciding about a psychiatrist who had euthanized her 73-year-old patient suffering 
from multiple sclerosis, the District Court of Groningen in 1984 argued that it is possible 
not to find some criminal deed liable to punishment, if (i) such a deed is a medical action, 
if (ii) it is necessary for medical reasons or of critical importance for adequate medical 
care, and if (iii) all prudence is applied which medical science and practice require. A 
new legal door had been opened for physicians to commit euthanasia and not to be found 
liable to punishment. 
But this door advocated by Enschedé and opened by the District Court of Groningen 
did not remain open very long. In the same year, The High Court of Leeuwarden, 
dealing with the Groningen case in appeal, argued that the mere fact it is a physician who 
commits an act in accordance with the guidelines of the medical profession, does not 
exclude the offender from punishment. According to the High Court, medical interven-
tions certainly do not fall under the criminal law, but only if they are genuine medical 
interventions. To remove an inflamed appendix the surgeon has to cut the patient, but 
such an incision has never been thought of as a form of battery, not by physicians, neither 
by society, nor by legislators or judges. Even abortion to save the life of the mother 
hardly ever has been thought of as a crime to be punished with imprisonment. But 
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euthanasia is not generally considered standard medicine; many physicians, including 
Dutch physicians, still vehemently oppose euthanasia. 
The Supreme Court of The Netherlands which in 1987 decided on the same case, 
upheld the High Court's verdict. But it also stated that the judges of the High Court had 
not properly examined whether, according to scientific medical knowledge and medical 
ethical norms, the psychiatrist had been compelled by »overmacht« (Du.: force majeure, 
overpowering force) to commit euthanasia. 
According to article 40 of the Code, any offender who has been compelled to 
commit a crime by force majeure (e.g., a conflict of duties) is not liable to punishment. 
The offender might have felt that, in spite of his duty to act in accordance with the law, 
he also had the duty to foster other interests, and that the latter duty in the case at hand 
overshadowed the legal duty. Not to be held liable to punishment, the offender has to 
show that anybody else in similar circumstances, having to balance the various interests at 
stake, reasonably could have chosen to protect the same interest he chose to protect, even 
if that required violation of the criminal law that protects some other interest. Conscience 
typically is not shared by »anybody else« and cannot be verified and for that reason the 
courts have rejected an appeal to conscience.38. The offender has to show it is reason-
able to presume that anybody else might have acted similarly under similar circumstances. 
Van Veen, legal commentator to the 1987 verdict of the Supreme Court, aptly 
noticed that on the one hand, the Supreme Court in its decision in the Groningen case 
rejected the medical exception, but on the other hand introduced a new kind of medical 
exception, hidden »behind the veil« of article 40. As explained, somebody making an 
appeal to force majeure as a punishment exclusion ground has to show that anybody else 
might have acted similarly under similar circumstances. But according to the Supreme 
Court, it is sufficient if any other member of the medical profession might have acted 
similarly. 
Why a physician? Why is it that a physician goes unpunished if any other member 
of the medical profession might have acted similarly. Because he is the only one who can 
judge whether the patient is incurable, whether there are alternatives, and whether the 
request is not a hidden signal for help? But if that is the case, then the criterion of being 
a physician is superfluous for all the additional criteria of cautiousness that must be 
fulfilled to go unpunished already guarantee this. Is anybody being a physician automati-
cally a moral human being whose judgments in matters of life and death always are just? 
If not, there must be two categories of »just« actions: Those that do not match any act 
described in the criminal code and those that match the standards of the medical profes-
sion. This, obviously, is a clear example of the separatist thesis. 
38. As for euthanasia, the District Court of Utrecht already rejected an appeal to conscience in 
1952. 
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Gewirth has argued that the separatist thesis can be defended only if those people 
whose rights are infringed upon by professionals have indirectly agreed to this infringe-
ment, that is, they (a) have consented to the goals of medicine, (b) knowing that to obtain 
these goals, medical professionals necessarily must employ means that themselves violate 
patient rights [see Gewirth 1986, p. 282-300]. In one sense, this is no longer a separatist 
thesis but more a matter of self-imposed paternalism. It all depends, however, on the 
nature of the internal and hence unavoidable relationship between the goals and means of 
medical practice. The question arises whether the understanding of this relationship is the 
same among professionals and the public, for otherwise, patients' consent to such self-
imposed paternalism is not a genuine consent and the separatist thesis would reemerge. 
Gewirth draws a parallel with the institution of criminal justice and law enforcement. 
But this very example clarifies that the indirect-consent-construction cannot provide 
sufficient justification of the infringements upon the rights of those subjected to the 
institution. Indeed, most of us deliberately consent to the limitations placed upon us by 
the criminal justice system as a means to realize the desirable goals of peace, protection 
and welfare. But many a criminal may not agree at all to the view that a system of 
criminal justice is the best, let alone the single necessary means to obtain welfare. We all 
tend to agree that a long life with physical and psychological well-being is a desirable goal 
to be obtained by medicine; but do we all agree that our physician should withhold 
information about a condition that may kill us any moment yet for which there is no 
treatment? 
As mentioned, Gewirth's theory of indirect justification can hold up under scrutiny 
only if everybody whose rights are infringed upon voluntarily agrees to such institutional 
paternalism. But this ideal could (virtually) never be realized in real life. Hence, we are 
left with the alternative that Gewirth's theory of indirect justification is not a theory of 
self-imposed paternalism, but of beneficent paternalism: Institutional violations of rights 
are essentially justified by the fact that, again, the means are necessary to obtain the goals 
(about which we all tend to agree), but it is not the consent to the goals that justifies using 
the means, but the beneficial nature of those goals. The very same argument, then, also 
justifies employing certain means that are necessary to obtain those beneficial goals 
(assuming the injurious aspects of the means do not outweigh the benefits to be obtained). 
As laymen we often cannot fully comprehend the relationship between the goals and the 
means - which is exactly what being a layman is all about. We have to rely on the 
expertise as well as the professional responsibility of the physician to assess all positive 
and negative aspects of different means and select the most beneficial. Obviously, the 
problematic aspect of this interpretation of Gewirth's theory is the latter part: The 
physician's ability to select a course of action which will be most beneficial to his patient. 
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I will soon return to this most crucial of issues, but first another problematic aspect 
of the separatist thesis must be dealt with The shift it implies from personal responsibility 
to role-related ethics 
Professional Roles 
If we grant Gewirth that the profession of medicine has obtained the consent of any and 
all patients to realize certain desired goals (such as a long and pain-free life), which 
consent implies the use of any and all means necessary to implement those goals, who is 
to be held responsible for the interventions undertaken by individual health care providers'' 
Wieland argues that every moral judgment of an act at the same time constitutes a 
moral judgment of the person who acts [see Wieland 1986, ρ 41] After all, a moral 
judgment makes sense only if the event could have not occurred, which holds only for acts 
committed by persons, human beings who have a certain amount of freedom that allows 
them to act otherwise Granted, one can evaluate the act of abortion m general and 
conclude that it is immoral In doing so, no particular human being has yet been judged 
But in deeming the act of abortion immoral, one at the same time has passed a judgment 
on all those individuals who will commit abortion It is their act, which is deemed 
immoral 
That is not to say that the person committing abortion is »immoral« As mentioned 
earlier, the qualification »(îm)moral« pertains to the whole act(or) Certain aspects of an 
act, when viewed individually, may seem moral and others immoral, but as a whole, an 
act cannot be unmoral and moral at the same time Similarly, when committing abortion, 
the person is immoral in so far as he is committing that abortion To pass a judgment on 
the person as a whole requires considerably more insight in that person (maybe more 
insight than fellow human beings can ever bring about) 
For an event to be qualified as (îm)moral there must always be a person who can be 
held responsible (who has to respond to the question why he acted the way he did instead 
of choosing another course of action) It is a "necessary condition" of an action's being 
suitable for moral judgment that it is performed by a person [Downie 1982, ρ 44] 3 9 
When no person can be held responsible, the event simply is amoral, such as a volcano 
eruption or the murder committed by a mentally fully incompetent human being *° 
39 Obviously, here »person« is understood in the contemporary sense of the word rather than 
the classical Latin meaning of »persona«, that is, role (see Chapter 6 for a more elaborate 
discussion of personhood) 
40 Institutions such as banks, a hospital, or the American Medical Association, can righteously 
act as well But unlike a volcano, such an institution can be held responsible too With 
(continued ) 
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So what about the act that is committed by an identifiable individual who was acting 
the way he did because of the role he (had to) fulfill(ed)9 Can he be held responsible for 
such role-related behavior"' One can evaluate the moral quality of particular roles But 
once the patterns of behavior that together form a role have been deemed moral and 
accepted as such, and once it is decided that certain people are obligated to behave in 
accordance with that role, those people are no longer to be held responsible for particular 
actions performed in accordance with the prescribed role They are merely responsible 
for acting in accordance with the role as such For example, as a Dutchman I am 
obligated to perform military service If I do so, I cannot be asked to justify actions 
performed in accordance with that role, such as destroying heather lands by driving a tank 
through it As a resident of the United States, I am obligated to pay certain American 
taxes In doing so, I cannot be asked to justify why I support, by paying taxes, the use of 
the death penalty 
Obviously, I can be asked to justify why at all I chose to reside in the US, why I did 
not give up my Dutch nationality Furthermore, the Dutch nation as a whole can be asked 
to justify the imposition of military service, which includes exercises in areas of natural 
value The United States - at least some member states - can be asked to justify imposing 
taxes for financing of the death penalty But my destruction of heather lands (when 
committed as a member of the military) and my support of the death penalty (when 
rendered indirectly through paying due taxes) are лолтогаі events In a sense, I am not 
the one who is acting, but those who devised and imposed the role I am playing 
Lawful behavior in general is role-related behavior Though many lawyers will 
argue that the law requires the paying of taxes and prohibits manslaughter because the 
former is moral and the latter is immoral, these obligations are binding only for human 
beings who fall under the particular law As a Dutch national, as a resident of the 
Netherlands, as a traveller on a Dutch plane, as a human being falling under the auspices 
of Dutch law, and only as such, I am required to obey the obligations of the Dutch law 
This line of reasoning is not new Actually, in Plato's dialogue Cnto [1980a] 
Socrates develops a similar argument There, as well as here, a powerful if troublesome 
objection suggests itself Some laws seem to be so utterly immoral that they must be 
disobeyed If we were to agree that there exists a duty to be civilly disobedient, it 
presupposes that legal obligations and prohibitions are not per definition to be followed 
Apparently there can be obligations contrary to, yet overriding those outlined in the law 
If this is the case, the question arises whether only the nation as a whole should be held 
40 ( continued) 
good reason such legally acknowledged institutions are called »rechtspersonen« (legal 
persons) in Dutch civil law Downie goes even one step further in acknowledging the 
possibility of legal responsibility of a corporate person, but not moral responsibility The 
latter always is borne by individuals [see Downie 1971, ρ 93] 
CLINICAL ETHICS AS PROFESSIONAL ETHIC 83 
responsible for issuing a law or whether the individual person acting in accordance with 
the laws must also justify his actions, even though they are in accordance with the law 
One reason against personal responsibility and in favor of role responsibility in the 
area of laws is the enforceable nature of laws Trespassing laws usually leads to quite 
severe punishment The seventy of the punishment which the trespasser has to bear for 
violating an unjust - since contrary to some overriding moral duty - law must be taken 
into account when assigmng personal responsibility for legal behavior This reason 
clarifies as well why behavior according to etiquette rules cannot easily be considered 
role-related, »nonindividual« behavior For the punishment of trespassing such rules 
usually is minor The very difference between etiquette and law is, after all, that the 
latter is but the former is not enforceable 
If lawful behavior is a prototype of role-related behavior, it is not the only example 
of role-related behavior Downie [1971] has characterized the physician's duty to keep 
confidentiality as a role related duty In reference to Downie, Bowie gives the following 
example Mister A is injured m a car accident and brought to the hospital where doctor X 
treats him To recover damages, A sues driver В who caused the accident However, as 
he confesses to doctor X, some of the injuries, though part of the lawsuit, already existed 
prior to the car accident Should doctor X inform the lawyer of driver В about mister A's 
dishonesty7 Bowie concludes that the apparent ethical dilemma between a patient's right 
to privacy and serving the cause of justice evaporates when one realizes that doctor X, 
being a physician, has a role-related responsibility to keep confidentiality [see Bowie 
1982, ρ 59] 
Undeniably when acting in accordance with and on the basis of a role, in a sense one 
is not acting strictly as an individual It is not (solely) the individual physician, doctor X, 
who chooses to withhold the information from the lawyer of driver B, it is the profession 
of medicine which does this The group of physicians as a whole requires individual 
physicians to always keep confidentiality (except in a small number of extreme cases) 
The »nonindividual« act of withholding information from the lawyer has already been 
deemed moral by the medical profession (among others because the value of the trust in 
any physician which any patient must be able to entertain outweighs possible benefits in 
single cases such as the one at hand), and it is the profession which bears the responsibili­
ty for assigning such significance to confidentiality 41 
Although those who bear a particular role, such as physicians, may be assumed to 
understand the importance of the good at stake, they may not be expected to verify that 
41 The collective responsibility meant here differs of course from collective responsibility where 
the collective consist of a number of people with different skills and knowledge who all 
contribute a little piece to the final project (e g , the bombing of Hiroshima) In our case, it 
is the community of professionals with similar skills who together regulate their responsibility 
and are as such responsible for the behavior in accordance with those rules 
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importance before acting in accordance with his role. The idea of role responsibility 
makes sense only if it shifts responsibility for the final decision and consequent action 
from the individual to the community that devised and imposed the role. Requiring the 
individual role-bearer to first verify the moral validity of the imposed role before acting in 
accordance with it and to only thus act if the role passes this test, would move the 
responsibility back to the individual. In that case, a role provides at best a suggestion for 
a course of action, but certainly not a trustworthy guideline. 
To be trustworthy, a role must stem from an authoritative source. And, here too, 
moral roles are at a disadvantage when compared with legal rules. For laws are devised 
and imposed by official legislators, who (in democratic countries) are voted in office by 
the public at large in accordance with a strict formal election system, and are assisted by a 
staff of trained lawyers. The passed laws are written down in publicly available codes, 
they are tested and applied by independent judges, and enforced by one more independent 
enforcement agency. Though all these formal requirements cannot guarantee that every 
single law is just, the system does grant laws a fair amount of authoritative trustworthi-
ness. 
This cannot be said with equal pertinence about moral roles, such as those imposed 
on physicians. For it is the same physicians who are voters, legislators, judges and 
enforcers. There is no division of powers to guard against all too human egoism or 
dangerous corruption. The codes specifying the role and rules often are more a matter of 
etiquette than morality, and if they do pertain to ethical issues, they are mostly vague, 
trivial or even self-contradictory. For example, the famous Hippocratic Oath requires the 
physician to swear: "What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even 
outside of the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread 
abroad, I will keep to myself holding such things shameful to be spoken about" [as 
translated by Edelstein 1943, p. 3]. It is rather trivial that one should hold to oneself and 
not talk about what should not be spread and talked about, and it is obvious that talking 
about what ought not be talked about, is a shameful thing to do. But what exactly a 
physician may and what he may not talk about remains totally vague and apparently up to 
the physician to ponder about and to decide. 
It may be objected that these arguments against ethical role responsibility, though 
true, are empirical in nature. Consequently, they could lose their validity if the medical 
profession were to change its »haphazard« manner of devising and imposing rules for 
physicians. The question is, however, whether a similar authority to that of the law can 
be created, without becoming law itself. No doubt, traditional medico-moral codes could 
be revised by a forum of legislators, voted into office by both public and professionals, 
drafted with great care and precision, and applied and enforced by an independent agency. 
But that would simply be a legalization of the physician's role. In a way this is paradoxi-
cally what is currently happening. And the - much regretted - impotence of the medical 
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profession to provide a better alternative, suggests that laws not only are prototypical of 
role responsibility; they might very well be the sole sound, justifiable roles possible. 
Now, even if the latter conclusion were to be found incorrect in that health care 
providers would manage to come up with a method for issuing authoritative and trustwor-
thy guidelines of professional moral conduct that would bring medico-moral guidelines on 
par with laws without simply becoming laws, that still would not yield a sufficient 
argument in favor of the idea of a professional ethic. For unlike laws that pertain to 
everybody, the rights and duties of professional ethical roles by definition should only 
pertain to those fulfilling the role. Do they do so? 
Take again the earlier example of confidentiality in medical practice. Bowie explains 
that the physician's duty to keep confidentiality stems from the insight that "[h]is role as 
physician excludes the public good from consideration" [Bowie 1982, p. 59]. If this were 
the reason for physician confidentiality, indeed, his role related responsibility would be a 
form of professional ethic. But it is not. For it is the very public good that requires 
physician confidentiality. To guarantee that any and all members of society, which is the 
public, when in need of medical care, can trust any physician, physicians are required to 
keep confidentiality. Mr. A from the case described certainly does not have the right as 
an individual to physician confidentiality, for he is dishonest. But for the sake of the 
public at large, Dr. X nonetheless has to keep confidentiality. Furthermore, Dr. X's duty 
to confidentiality is not based in his role as a physician per se; it is based in the value of 
trust. It is this value which is so important for mankind that it surpasses many other 
values. 
In all human relationships, professional as well as nonprofessional, where trust plays 
an essential role, all participants in that relationship have an obligation to protect this 
trust, among others through confidentiality.42 There are many professional relationships 
where trust plays an important role, such as the ministry, nursing, law, and social work. 
But the two best examples of such relationships are not professional relationships, but 
friendship and love relationships. It would seem to me that it is not because spouses are 
expected to lie that in many legal systems they cannot be required to testify against one 
another. After all, they are under oath as well. It is because the trust between spouses, 
which is one of the cornerstones of marriage, would be at stake. Similarly, it seems that 
there would be something wrong when a person would report to the police a minor crime 
committed by his best friend. People have an obligation to report crimes, but if the crime 
is minor and an old valuable friendship is at stake, the obligation to foster the latter may 
override the former obligation.43 
42. In fact, Dutch criminal law (art. 272) defines breaching confidentiality as a punishable act. 
43. Obviously, if the crime were a murder to be committed, the balance would change; but this 
would also be the exception to the physician's duty to keep confidentiality. Furthermore, a 
case could be made that the friendship can only last if they sort out among one another this 
issue, with as a possible consequence the trespasser admitting to the crime voluntarily. 
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The very same applies to the value of help in situations of emergency. As men-
tioned earlier in this chapter, physicians have the obligation to provide emergency medical 
care in emergency situations, even if that would require them to leave a party or get out 
of bed in the middle of the night. However, nonphysicians have the very same duty to 
provide emergency care. Downie summarizes this point aptly: "... [T]here is a moral 
duty on anyone to help in an emergency if he/she can, and if off-duty doctors or police-
men are more likely to be called on than some others (philosophers or lawyers), it is 
because they have especially relevant skills, not because they have a special moral duty 
which the rest of us do not have" [Downie 1986b, p. 195]. 
Like the physician is not required to provide emergency assistance to a car snow-
bound in the middle of the night, a mechanic or tow-truck owner is not obligated to 
provide medical assistance, for the simple reason that both miss the capabilities to do the 
other's job properly. The duty to help one's fellow human being in emergent need holds 
for every human being, in so far as he is technically capable and reasonably able to 
provide such help. 
In sum, a moral role is not a set of unique rights and duties that hold only for those 
who incumbent the role. A moral role is a set of paradigmatic answers - that are 
acknowledged as such - to morally troublesome situations in which people with a 
particular occupation tend to get involved. Paradigmatic answers can be pre-given if the 
situations themselves are paradigmatic. 
In fact, Wieland has argued that medical practice constitutes exactly the opposite of a 
unique, distinct, and separate practice but the prototype of human actions: Normative 
aspects of common human actions are represented in a pure, clear, paradigmatic manner 
by the actions of a physician. Being prototypical medical practice could be used in the 
history of ethics as an example for common moral dilemmas [see Wieland 1986, p. 42-
44]. It is the same prototypical nature of medical practice, that makes it possible to give 
standard answers for a number of moral dilemmas, which combined, yield a role. 
Although roles do not prescribe rights and duties which hold for certain professionals 
only, this is not to say that moral roles may apply to only those situations in which every 
human being factually gets involved at least once in his life. Nor is it necessary that any 
and all human beings theoretically could get involved in those situations. In fact, it is not 
even necessary that anybody else but a certain subgroup of professionals with highly 
specialized skills gets involved in those situations. Hardly any other physician but a 
surgeon or anesthesiologist will ever be faced with the dilemma whether to give blood to 
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an anesthetized Jehovah Witness who is about to die on the operating table but whom he 
promised not to give blood. The situation is unique to physicians and in that sense 
provides a »professional ethical dilemma«. But the duties, rights and values involved are 
not unique. The duty to honor one's promise, the right to refuse medical treatment, and 
the value of trust hold for all human beings. And everybody may encounter dilemmas 
where the same values, rights and duties are at stake — less paradigmatic situations, but 
relevantly similar nonetheless. 
If a professional role entails a set of paradigmatic answers to dilemmas in which 
common human moral rights and duties are involved (but tailored to a »region« of 
situations that laymen commonly do not get involved in), that does not imply that these 
answers are specific and explicit: The uniqueness of situations and the inevitable unpre-
dictability of actions and events precludes such detailed ethical guidelines. This, in turn, 
is not a sudden defense of the vagueness, triviality and contradictions found in many 
traditional professional codes of ethics. Nor is it a plea for contentless proceduralism as 
is found in many laws. It reflects the acknowledgement that morality in the end is always 
a matter of personal responsibility. Ethics as the evaluative science of moral behavior will 
never be able to penetrate into the core of morality; morality escapes such reduction to 
generality — for otherwise the notion of personal responsibility would vanish. Ethics can 
only attempt to understand the interplay between the ever changing moral appeal which 
the situational reality of human (co)existence »emits« and the personal answer of the 
individual who acknowledges that call. 
Professional Practice and Professional Ethic 
If clinical ethics proceeds from an in-depth understanding of the clinical context in which 
the essence of professional morality is located, a careful examination of the health care 
practice is indicated. This is not to contradict my contention in the introductory para-
graphs to this chapter, that it goes without saying that the health care context involves 
special and at times exceptional or unusual kinds of labor and relationships, which may 
require a professional ethic in the sense that professionals, because of this peculiar 
context, have obligations which laymen do not (simply because the latter never face the 
dilemmas specific for those professions). Rather, the health care context requires a 
careful examination because any context would require a careful examination if one is to 
reach a practical ethics pertaining to that context. 
To make the same point in different terms: It is not that the unusual situations, in 
which professionals (unlike laymen) tend to find themselves, turn out to be of prime 
ethical importance after all; undoubtedly they, too, are of importance but not because of 
their exceptionality. The health care situation, whether exceptional or quite common, is 
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ethically relevant because a practical ethics develops out of the situation The practice of 
health care requires an in-depth ethical examination, because the practice of health care, 
like any human practice, is inherently moral M 
The Danish philosopher Jensen [1987] has argued that the practice of health care has 
three interrelated aspects: The actions that are undertaken, the particular values reflected 
by those actions, and the epistemological methods warranting those actions constitute a 
consistent program. In this subsection I will reexamine Jensen's theory of practice in 
terms of its illuminative power for our topic. At the outset, however, it should be 
emphasized that for the following line of argumentation, rather than accurately describing 
Jensen's theory, I have merely (and quite eclectically) »borrowed« his notion of a practice. 
Jensen concludes that all health care provided cannot be understood as a single 
practice. For example, the type of interventions typically provided by surgeons, their 
moral practice standards and their scientific approaches differ to such an extent from those 
in psychosomatic medicine that surgery must be considered (part of) a different practice 
than psychosomatic medicine (respectively, disease oriented- and situation-oriented 
practices) According to Jensen, there is not one medical practice but three different 
practices: The disease-oriented practice, the situation-oriented practice, and the communi­
ty-oriented practice. 
For example, surgical and psychosomatic medicine qualify as (part of) two distinct 
practices. But that is not to say that they must be practiced by two distinct practitioners. 
A surgeon may at times combine surgery with some psychosomatic therapeutical »tools«, 
and justifiably so, because the various practices are complementary But in doing this, the 
surgeon actually is mixing two exclusive, incompatible practices. For a practice, 
according to Jensen, requires an integral unity of actions, values and methods. Surgical 
procedures differ too much from psychosomatic ones, and cannot be understood adequate­
ly against the background of values and methods underlying psychosomatic medicine, to 
be considered part of one and the same practice. 
It would appear to me, however, that in spite of modern medicine being divided up 
m different sections (in terms of practitioners, institutions, payment systems, etc.), with 
each section representing different (sub)practices, actual medical care seldom if ever fits a 
single practice. The orthopedic surgeon, the oncologist, the child psychiatrist, let alone 
the family practitioner all combine diagnostic and therapeutic procedures from different 
practices in their daily provision of medical care. No wonder that medicine is faced with 
fierce methodological as well as ethical debates For (in Jensen's scheme) there is no 
single method available (neither presently nor historically) to scientifically underpin, for 
instance, a combined disease and situation oriented practice, and likewise, there is no 
single method to evaluate and (counter)balance the different values involved. 
44 Moral as opposed to nonmoral - see Chapter 1 ot this book, ρ 18, note 13 
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In Jensen's system, the answer to the moral (and epistemological) »identity« crisis 
probably would be that there is no solution to it other than to acknowledge and resign.45 
If the existing contemporary professional practices both explain and justify certain moral 
standards, relativism seems inescapable: The individual practitioner, recognizing that his 
interventions fit different practices, nonetheless will be unable to balance the various 
values reflected by those interventions in order to chose between them. But this conclu-
sion follows only if Jensen's theory of three historically developed and currently present 
distinct medical practices is accepted; it does not follow if it could be shown that a fourth 
kind of practice can (at least in theory) come about comprising elements from all other 
three; it certainly does not follow if Jensen's division of health care in three distinct 
practices were found to be seriously flawed. 
In fact, physicians, whether they be general practitioners, surgeons with an eye for 
psychosomatic health care, or family therapists with an interest in neuropsychology, seem 
to constantly balance (explicitly or implicitly) elements from different »Jensian« practices 
in their caring for individual patients. This act of integrative, case-oriented balancing is 
exactly what makes clinical medicine differ from biomedical sciences. But it also points 
to the existence of an evaluative »scheme« that covers different »Jensian« practices and 
allows for such integrative balancing. This commonly employed but seldom explicated 
»scheme« is the very individual patient himself. Rather than statistics, it is the individual 
patient's condition and his well-being and interests that decide which treatment is 
indicated. 
The thesis that physicians (and notably general or family practitioners who historical-
ly as well as presently probably exemplify the ideal physicians) do in fact balance 
elements from different »Jensian« practices is not based on careful observation of actual 
health care provision by different practitioners in different institutions and contexts — nor 
is Jensen's account, for that matter. Such empirical qualitative research is badly needed. 
Here, I must limit myself to assuming that such a process of integrative balancing takes 
place — which assumption in turn raises the question how that balancing can at all take 
place, why, in other words, the physician is able to interpret the patient's individual 
interests? 
45. There is one alternative, which is to simply chose on external grounds for one of the various 
practices; Jensen seems to prefer (on social-political grounds?) the community-oriented 
practice as the overreaching standard. 
90 CHAPTER 3 
Insight, Agape and Ethos 
The previous subsection's final question brings us back to the original question in five 
parts, raised in the introductory subsection to this chapter; more precisely, to the latter 
three sub-questions: Is the complex and ongoing process of clinical ethics such that (1) the 
horizon of moral meaning is a restricted horizon, shared by health care providers (and 
patients?) only, in that (2) the »ethos« of health care providers is unlike any other 
professional commitment, and in that (3) the kind of practical wisdom required for the 
process of clinical ethics to take place is the prerogative of physicians (or health care 
providers more in general)? 
In the third subsection of this chapter on professional expertise, I have tried to argue 
that physicians - and health care providers more generally - obviously have expert 
knowledge, but the argumentative link between such knowledge and a professional ethics 
is not clear. Moreover, the previous discussion of Jensen's theory of different health care 
practices seems to suggest that such expert knowledge (in so far as it is theoretical 
knowledge) comes in at least three different sorts, each of which is part of one of three 
complementary, but exclusive practices. If this knowledge is to be applied by the 
individual physician in his clinical practice - which is what the third of the subquestions 
entails - a problem emerges: The physician must appeal to some kind of knowledge (i.e., 
knowledge about the nature of the individual patient), which typically is not the kind of 
expert knowledge that health care providers obtain during their many years of scientific 
education. It is a different kind of »insight« that cannot be found in medical textbooks and 
articles in scientific journals. It is the kind of practical wisdom hailed by many authors, 
but explained by few. 
Furthermore, what is the relationship between this kind of provider-expertise, and 
the patient's own expertise? Physicians may have a tremendous amount of scientific 
knowledge about medicine, but patients have expert knowledge as well in that only 
patients experience the disease, sickness, pain, fear and suffering; and only patients can e-
valu(e)-ate the success of the therapy provided. Unlike the physician's scientific exper-
tise, this knowledge pertains directly to the individual patient and thus is highly relevant in 
an ethical perspective. In fact, it is this kind of »sympathetic« (Gr.: syn-pathos = 
suffering together) knowledge that the attending physician must obtain if he is to apply his 
theoretical knowledge in practice. But, so it must be asked again, is a physician at all 
able to gain such insight about his patient? Merely claiming that physicians have that 
ability is the first step on the reduction of professional ethics to subjective relativism. 
Physicians, so it was already argued in the fourth section of this chapter, (must) have 
a caring »disposition« and should be genuinely willing to employ their own knowledge and 
skills to the well-being of their patients. This thesis has met with severe criticism from 
different authors, notably in terms of its degree of realism. But even if we consider it an 
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ideal, to be promoted and stimulated, it should be asked whether the ideal is at all 
feasible. If the thesis is essentially to imply that physicians should be altruistic, it cannot 
provide a foundation for a professional ethic, because it is the latter that should clarify 
that it is inherent in the profession of medicine to behave altruistically. If, on the other 
hand, the thesis is to explain just that, the question remains what »triggers« such »compas-
sionate« (Lat.: con-passio = suffering together) behavior. For again, the agapistic 
altruism of the physician cannot be grounded solely in the person of the physician if 
relativism is to be prevented. The physician's agape must be the necessary response to a 
call for such altruistic behavior, which call obviously must stem from the patient in her 
situational context. 
The »ethos« of the physician - so we could maintain - constitutes this »agapistic 
responsiveness to the health care needs of a fellow human being as they are opened up to 
the physician through his professional insight«. Clinical ethics, then, would be a 
professional ethic in that it takes place at the health care stage which is set by the patient's 
needs, the provider's competence, and responsive relationship between the two. But is 
such responsiveness the prerogative of the health care provider? We must postpone 
answering this question, for it presumes a positive answer to the more fundamental 
question which we have raised various times earlier: If there is such a phenomenon as the 
physician's ethos, it presumes physicians are able to adequately assess the individual needs 
of their patients; but are they? 
Summary Assessment 
In the former chapter, I have argued that the cogency of a clinical-ethical discourse is 
warranted first and foremost by the contents of the advanced arguments. This requires a 
keen interpretation of the elements of the case at hand, which in turn underscores the 
significance of moral discernment and the practical wisdom of the participants in the 
debate, notably the patient and care provider. To account for the obliging ability of 
physicians to »tune in« their practice to the individual patient's needs and interests, 
traditionally the existence of a »professional ethic« has been assumed. 
In this chapter, I have shown that the practical wisdom that is to provide the 
foundation for a professional medical ethic is not the kind of knowledge about the nature 
of the individual patient that physicians obtain during their many years of scientific 
education. It is a matter of »sympathy«: An insight into the patient's personal sickness, 
fear and suffering, as well as his sense of happiness, life-plans, interests and values, 
sufficient to tailor the diversity of complementary yet exclusive diagnostic and therapeutic 
strategies to the individual patient's benefit. 
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Such sympathically obtained insight presumes that physicians are in fact able to 
adequately gauge the individual needs and interests of their patients. However, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, the very hypothesis underlying much of contemporary 
bioethics, notably Engelhardt's well-known The Foundations of Bioethics [1986], holds 
that physicians - third persons more in general - are principally unable to uncover the 
individual patient's personal needs and interests. This understanding of man as a »black 
box« will be criticized and an alternative anthropology will be developed in Chapters 5 
and 6. It will only be in Chapter 7 that we can return to the question as to whether the 
physician's ethos can be considered the physician's prerogative, thereby justifying the 
qualification of clinical ethics as a professional ethic. 
CHAPTER 4 
MORAL STRANGERS 
Friends, I said, but only in principle. 
Friends I no longer have, 
... only accomplices. 
Camus 1962, p. 1511 
Introduction 
In the second chapter, I have argued that the cogency of clinical-ethical discourse is 
provided first and foremost by the contents of the advanced arguments and only to a 
limited extent by its formal structure. In order to build such a conductive argument, one 
must ferret out the ethically relevant elements of the case, which presumes a keen 
observation, interpretation, and appreciation of the situation. But the latter, in turn, 
underscore the significance of moral discernment and the practical wisdom of the 
participants in the debate, notably the patient and the care provider. This discretionary 
ability of the physician escapes a theoretical analysis and description for it is linked to the 
person of the care provider. It is a »disposition« rather than factual knowledge which, 
consequently, cannot be reduced to logical theorems. The »ethos« of the physician is 
involved. 
Thus, in the third chapter, we examined this »ethos« in order to further clarify the 
structure of clinical-ethical discourse. Physicians have often tried to make the argument 
that medical ethics is of a peculiar nature, that separates it from conventional ethics: 
Medical-clinical ethics is a »professional ethic«. This thesis could imply that the nature of 
the practical wisdom of physicians fully escapes a critical examination, except when it can 
be shown why such an understanding of clinical-medical ethics is feasible, that is to say, 
unless the possibility-conditions of such a »regionalized«, professional ethic can be 
elucidated. I have argued that this elucidation entails a clarification of the possibility-
conditions of »sympathy«, of gaining insight into the patient's subjective sickness, fear and 
suffering, as well as his sense of happiness, life-plans, interests and values. 
The notion of »sympathy«, however, is under siege in contemporary pluralistic 
Western societies. The assumption that modern society is pluralistic involves the thesis 
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that individuals are »moral strangers« to one another: They each adopt their personal 
framework of moral relevance, which is a strictly »private« framework in the dual 
meaning of that term.46 Firstly, morality is a private issue in that it is (almost) purely a 
matter of personal preference. Nowadays there exists a plurality of commonly adhered to 
different moral convictions, many of which are incompatible, but all of which are equally 
true; there is no justifiable method to evaluate and decide between them. Secondly, 
morality is private in that a person's preferences, his intrasubjective moral framework is 
inaccessible to third persons. Individuals are the single (and thus best) judges of their 
own good. Consequently, there is but one moral principle that emerges out of this 
plurality of private moralities as binding for all members of society: Autonomy. The sole 
way to behave beneficently towards another is to acknowledge and respect the self-
determination of each and every individual ~ obviously, within the limits of their not 
disproportionately harming the self-determination of others. To guarantee this, procedures 
must be established. The same holds for the relationship between health care providers 
and patients: It is guided primarily by the principle of respect for another's autonomy and 
procedural justice. 
Clearly, this perspective on bioethics - and even more so its (unspoken) presupposi-
tions - is of prime interest to this project in that it frustrates, even undermines the 
possibility of clinical ethics. Since it is quite common a perspective, many different 
authors have developed it into a more nuanced theory. In this chapter, I will discuss but a 
few of them, taking as my point of departure the theory developed by the contemporary 
leading bioethicist Engelhardt in his book The Foundations of Bioethics [Engelhardt 
1986].47 My reasons for doing so are not primarily to provide a detailed insight in the 
philosophy of Engelhardt. To do justice to his extensive work, it would be unfair to limit 
the examination to a single book. Rather, it is the line of arguments set out in that book 
which is of particular interest to my study, since it represents one of the most thorough 
examples of this widespread thinking about morality in the health care setting. 
Having discussed a more procedural understanding of bioethics - such as is defended 
by Engelhardt (and in a modified form by Veatch) -, I will discuss two more substantive 
approaches. First, I will look the work of such authors as Beauchamp, Childress, Faden, 
McCullough and Miller who all underwrite the primacy of the principle of autonomy but 
advocate a less procedural interpretation of this principle. In reference to a clinical case 
of a patient refusing life-sustaining dialysis, four different interpretations are examined. It 
46. "To be a moral stranger to another is not to share enough of a concrete morality to allow the 
common discovery of the basis for the correct resolution of a moral controversy" [Engel-
hardt 1991, p. xiv]. 
47. Unless indicated otherwise, all page numbers referring to Engelhardt's writings pertain to his 
The Foundations of Bioethics [1986]. 
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is concluded, however, that each of these versions fails to provide a genuine alternative to 
Engelhardt's libertarian interpretation, because all four assume - what I take to be a 
fundamental misconception - that patients and care providers are moral strangers to 
another, lacking insight into one another's good. 
I will then move to the second approach, that is Pellegrino and Thomasma's defence 
of provider beneficence for the patient's good. I will argue that in emphasizing the 
patient's good rather than his decision-making freedom Pellegrino and Thomasma are 
moving in the right direction, but nonetheless fail to get where they (and I) want to get. 
However, examining their approach will yield a more precise diagnosis of the causes of 
that failure and better prepare us to develop a third approach in the second half of this 
study. 
Procedural Ethics as Last Resort 
Engelhardt's starting point is the pluralist thesis outlined in the former subsection. Argues 
Engelhardt: "Insofar as the justification of ... answers [to ethical questions] does not 
require achieving a divine (absolute) viewpoint, such answers will disclose the deliveran-
ces of particular finite reasoners with varying finite (relative) viewpoints and goals. 
Senses of fairness and of correctness will then vary, at least in part, from community to 
community, or more precisely, from moral sense to moral sense" [p. 20]. At the same 
time, Engelhardt explicitly states that a theory of bioethics must adopt a non-relativist 
perspective. The pluralist nature of modern society entails severe roadblocks to the 
development of an intersubjective ethics, yet "[t]o speak of truth [including moral truth -
JW\ as a 'private truth' is at best a bastard usage. ... [M]orality must be a potentially 
intersubjective endeavor if it is to provide a basis for moral agents being held to have 
acted wrongly or in a blameworthy fashion" [p. 28]. 
Since 1517, the year in which Luther nailed his ninety-five theses to the church 
doors in Wittenberg, the door has been closed according to Engelhardt for the develop-
ment of a substantial bioethics: One can no longer "... hope to live in a society that could 
aspire to a single moral viewpoint governed by a single supreme moral authority" [p. 3]. 
Since the late Middle Ages, moral life has been characterized by two tiers: One tier that is 
located in the small (religious) communities that share a particular substantial moral point 
of view, and a second (secular) tier that spans the divergent moral perspectives [see p. 
54]. The latter is the genuinely ethical tier. 
Engelhardt's explication of that ethical tier in terms of a procedural, minimalist 
ethics - as will be discussed hereunder -, does not solely hinge on this interpretation of 
western history. After examining different methods of establishing substantive moral 
precepts he concludes that only negotiated agreement qualifies as a viable candidate. If 
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authoritative, moral precepts are to be obtained that do not commit anybody to some 
concrete but contested moral view of the good life, one must resort to precepts that 
peaceable negotiators have all agreed to accept [see p. 41]. The authoritative power of 
negotiated agreement according to Engelhardt is warranted by the principle of mutual 
respect as a minimum and necessary condition for the very possibility of ethics. Respect 
of freedom requires only an interest in resolving issues without recourse to force [see p. 
45, 69]. The function of bioethics, then, is to establish the formal constraints of such a 
process of free, negotiated agreement by designing procedures that guarantee a fair 
process of negotiation. 
Both lines of reasoning leading up to this libertarian conclusion - on the one hand, 
pluralism as an inescapable aspect of contemporary society, and on the other hand, the 
thesis that only one strategy to establish moral precepts is admissible - are not beyond 
critique. In the following sections, I will examine these arguments in more detail. 
Pluralism: Descriptive or Normative? 
Engelhardt's assertion that since 1517, the feasibility of developing a substantial ethics is 
virtually nil, unfortunately remains without further explanation. It may be correct, as 
Engelhardt maintains, that with the Pax Westphalica of 1648, the chance ever to cement 
Europe in one Christian vision had become very small [see p. 3]. But that observation 
constitutes merely an empirical fact, an observation, by the way, post factum. Undeni-
ably, the "... Copernican revolution was one of those changes in ideas that would leave us 
devoid of a sense of absolute or final perspective ..." [p. 3]. But that, too, is an 
empirical observation, a description of an actual situation rather than an argument setting 
a norm. The very fact that there will exist a plurality of moral convictions in any 
community of human beings larger than the Greek polis [see p. 4] - or for that matter, 
larger than a handful of people - does not constitute evidence of the impossibility of a 
single moral perspective, much less justification of normative pluralism and a decisive 
argument against the hope to discover a single moral perspective as Engelhardt would 
have it (see p. 95). Many philosophers have hoped and tried to establish such a view-
point. Spinoza tried, Kant tried, and actually Engelhardt's own attempt to lay the 
foundations for a single libertarian ethics proves that there is still hope. 
Engelhardt correctly argues that even if there is only one God who consequently 
holds the single possible vantage point on the single absolute truth, human beings are not 
able to share that vantage point, precisely because they are human beings [see p. 19]. 
Even if God has revealed Himself, then that revelation can only be partial and not 
verifiable. Human factual knowledge, because of its empirical character, is always 
provisional and therefore a very weak basis for any ethical theory as well [see p. 18]. 
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Finally, the possibilities of human rationality are very limited as Engelhardt stresses over 
and over again [see, e.g., p. 11-12] and as the analyses in the second chapter have forced 
us to concede nolens volens. 
When Engelhardt goes on to defend what he calls the »polytheistic presumption« - I 
would rather use the term »relativist presumption« - that is, there are better reasons to 
presume the existence of various equally correct ethical theories (each relative to some 
other non-moral factor) as opposed to a single authoritative account of ethics provided by 
an ideal, impartial observer [see p. 20], he is also correct, but merely in so far as these 
differences are the result of the limited character of the human, rational mind. Not only 
is there the empirical-historical fact that nowadays different people have, and always have 
had, moral beliefs that differ to such a degree that moral agreement seems impossible 
even in small communities; a single meta-ethics seems just as impossible. That is, it is 
impossible to look at this pluralism from a single vantage point and presume »polytheism« 
is the only right answer. Like the different moral opinions, the different ethical theories 
are all equally true, but only provisionally: Provided, namely, that reasons have yet to be 
found to consider one theory closer to the truth, provided that each stands unchal-
lenged.48 
Indeed, "... [b]ioethics is a philosophical undertaking ... without an imposed 
orthodoxy" [p. 9] in that true philosophical undertakings are not to be preceded by a 
preestablished orthodoxy, whether religious or legal. But the ethical analysis itself 
obviously does constitute an orthodoxy, that is, a righteous instruction. For the truth 
leaves no room for other opinions to the contrary. Any philosopher who is serious about 
his work believes he is the single supreme authority (in so far as he thinks he is right). 
There is little doubt that Spinoza, Kant, as well as Engelhardt all believe(d) to be this 
authority. In so far as Engelhardt considers his own rational secular theory of ethics to be 
correct, to be sincere, he must defend his theory as the sole true theory. 
As mentioned earlier, Engelhardt's libertarian approach is not solely based on his 
interpretation of the history of Christianity. His main argument consists of a rejection of 
all but one method of establishing substantial ethical propositions. It is not possible to 
start an ethical discussion from scratch. Engelhardt correctly states that "... intellectual 
undertakings [such as ethics must - JW\ have concrete roots that touch us in our everyday 
lives" [p. 7]; certain moral49 accounts must be considered beyond ethical criticism for an 
ethical analysis to at all be possible50. What can grant an assertion such »dogmatic« 
character? Revelation, empirical experience, and rational argument all fail. But Engel-
48. See Chapter 2 (p. 58) for a discussion of this understanding of truth as »standing unchal-
lenged«. 
49. As opposed to nonmoral. 
50. See Chapter 2 of this study, p. 20. 
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hardt distinguishes three more methods, (1) force, (2) conversion, and (3) negotiated 
agreement, of which only the latter in the end will be accepted by Engelhardt. We now 
turn to a critical discussion of Engelhardt's discussion of these three methods. 
The Use of Force 
Force is denounced by Engelhardt as an unacceptable decision-making strategy. He takes 
for granted that "unconsented-to force against the innocent" [p. 41] is not an acceptable 
strategy. Is it not? Why not use force? We are faced with a controversy here - whether 
or not to use force - which is in need of a solution. Certainly, most people would 
immediately agree that force is not an acceptable controversy solving method - which 
probably is the very reason why Engelhardt does not give any reason for his assumption. 
However, it has not been decided yet whether agreement is an acceptable method of 
establishing moral principles. Thus, for the time being, force cannot be simply ruled out 
as an acceptable method of decision-making. Granted, "... force carries no intellectual 
authority ..." [p. 43, emphasis added - JW], but from where is this sudden need for an 
intellectual authority? Why is it necessary that the decision reached is intellectual -
whatever that means? After all, human rationality has already been ruled out as a 
consensus strategy because of its inherent weaknesses. 
Engelhardt wonders "... (i) under what circumstances there could ever be a peace-
able union of the peoples of the earth, save through acquiescing in the policy that persons 
may do with themselves and consenting others whatever they wish, despite what others 
may think or feel in the matter, (ii) The risk to humanity from war and brutal repression 
in the name of religious and ideological rectitude far outweighs the harms likely to come 
from tolerating such evils as self-determination, abortion, and infanticide" [p. 13; numbers 
in parentheses added - JW]. First, it should be noted that in this statement, no genuine 
arguments are presented, but only exclamations. Engelhardt simply claims that "... [t]he 
risk to humanity from war ... far outweighs the harms likely to come from tolerating such 
evils as self-determination, abortion and infanticide" [p. 13; emphasis added - JW]. But 
does it? This is the very question about which Engelhardt and his opponents are still 
debating. It does not help Engelhardt to ironically call self-determination - which he 
obviously considers to be a good - an evil, nor does it strengthen his position to combine 
a purely individual act (self-determination), with two acts that involve other beings 
(abortion and infanticide) — as if this difference is insignificant. Such cover-ups lack 
argumentative authority, but they do reveal the presupposed value judgments underlying 
Engelhardt's secular ethics (which will be discussed at greater length later in this chapter). 
If we are to give Engelhardt the benefit of the doubt and attempt to answer his first 
(i) rhetorical question, the concept of peace must be defined. If peace is defined as 
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freedom from war and civil strife, from public disturbance and disorder [Webster 1983, 
dictionary definitions 1 & 3], that is, a situation in which people are neither harmed nor 
harassed but simply "left alone" [Engelhardt 1986, p. 42; see also p. 264-266], then 
obviously such a situation can only come about if, indeed, people are left alone; or in 
Engelhardt's words, if "... persons may do with themselves and consenting others 
whatever they wish ..." [p. 13]. But this definition would turn Engelhardt's argument 
into a circular argument. 
Assuming this is not Engelhardt's intention, peace must mean something else. Now 
if it means "harmony, concord, serenity, tranquility, an undisturbed state of mind and 
freedom from disagreement" [Webster 1983, dictionary definitions 4, 5 & 6], one starts 
wondering under what circumstances such peace could come about, for surely allowing 
people to do with themselves and consenting to others whatever they wish is not going to 
bring about such a state of being. People may end up being equally left alone as 
Robinson Crusoe was, but equally lonely as well. A peaceful family is not a gathering of 
people who simply leave another alone, nor is a peaceful fraternity, a peaceful association, 
a peaceful society, a peaceful nation, a peaceful world. In a world in which people leave 
one another nicely alone, yet at the same time think of their fellow human beings as 
despicable persons or feel deeply hurt by their behavior, one can hardly speak of a 
situation of harmony, concord, serenity, tranquility, an undisturbed state of mind and 
freedom from disagreement, a world, that is, of peace. 
Engelhardt's reason (ii) to back up his rhetorical question reveals that he has a very 
particular kind of peace in mind, which actually is even more limited than the first of the 
two definitions already discussed. Not everybody should be left alone; only some people 
have this privilege. The unborn apparently do not have to be left alone and neither do 
infants. The peaceful society Engelhardt drafts is a peaceful society of the powerful, of 
those with whom one better agrees for they may start a war or brutally repress other 
human beings. The powerless may be sacrificed for the freedom of the powerful. 
Engelhardt may rebut that negotiation rather than force is the only route to a nonviolent 
resolution of moral disputes [p. 41]. But then again, fetuses and infants have nothing to 
bargain with. 
As mentioned earlier (see p. 96), rather than deducing from a theory of ethics 
reasons to denounce force, Engelhardt takes nonviolence, that is mutual respect, to be a 
transcendental condition for any ethics: "This view of ethics [rather, of respect for 
freedom as the precondition of ethics as a conflict resolving strategy - JW\ should not be 
grounded on a conditional concern for peacefulness. ... It should, instead, be recognized 
as a disclosure ... of a transcendental condition, ... of the minimum grammar involved in 
speaking rationally of blame and praise, other than through force" [p. 42; emphasis added 
- JW]. This is of little controversy if one assumes that (1) ethics is a nonviolent means to 
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conflict resolution, and that (2) nonviolence is the practical translation of respect for 
freedom. Both assumptions, however, are problematic.51 
(1) Since ethics is a purely theoretical endeavor, in principle it cannot be »violent« in 
the strict sense of the word. As the English proverb says: 'Sticks and stones may break 
my bones, but words shall never hurt me.' However, Engelhardt does not interpret force 
and violence in such a limited, physical sense of the terms. And with good reason: A 
written insult can harm as much as the clap of a whip; an oral command of an authorita-
tive person is not without force; and the verbal instigation to physical violence is justly 
considered by many penal codes a criminal act as well. Consequently, if a theory is 
violent on an emotional level or it is the (in)direct cause of violence, it cannot truly be 
considered nonviolent. But if violence is understood in this wider sense of the terms, 
many an ethical theory is violent. Plato's Republic [198011], suggesting the forceful 
separation of citizens in three different classes, is a clear example of an ethical theory that 
encourages force; Macchiavelli's II Principe [Machiavelli 1969], allowing leaders to lie 
for the sake of a peaceful community, is but another of many examples in the history of 
ethics supporting the use of violence. Most modern state legal systems are no less 
examples of ethical theories justifying the use of force in the form of police force, 
monetary penalties, forced labor, imprisonment, even death. This raises a new question: 
Is any form of force to be refuted? If not, then what is the criterion for the (injustice of 
force? This brings us to the second assumption. 
(2) Is nonviolence the only practical translation of respect of freedom and is it a 
correct translation in any kind of context? Does not respect for freedom at times require 
the use of force in order to protect the freedom of people? If Engelhardt wants to 
maintain absolute nonviolence as the criterion of morality and justice, respect for freedom 
of individual persons is not a necessary, that is, a transcendental precondition of ethics. 
On the other hand, if Engelhardt's goal is not primarily nonviolence, but respect for 
individual freedom, then the question arises what exactly respect for freedom entails, since 
it may require both nonviolence and violence. 
Obviously, the object of this study in not to examine such fundamental questions 
about the justifiability of force and violence. Rather, these questions were raised to reveal 
that Engelhardt's rejection of force is a mere presupposition to his theory and not a self-
evident precondition for any theory of ethics. Consequently, his third decision-making 
strategy (to which we will turn later), that is, agreement, cannot simply be accepted as the 
»default« alternative (with any further positive arguments providing surplus support). 
51. Having changed status from a value to be maximized and safeguarded into a transcendental 
condition of ethics as such, it must be assumed that freedom is ontologically grounded in an 
understanding of man as being free. Man does not have the right to be free, man essentially 
is free. This third assumption will be addressed in Chapter 7. 
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Conversion 
What about the second method of settling moral disputes, conversion?52 Engelhardt 
interprets conversion as authoritative decision-making by the highest church officials, m 
particular the pope [p 39] But this seems to be a rather unusual, if not conspicuously 
erroneous interpretation As Engelhardt correctly concludes, such authoritative decision­
making requires force as well Genuine conversion, on the other hand, does not 
Engelhardt does not discuss the latter kind of conversion but since this »strategy« in 
establishing mutual understanding on moral principles will play a key role m the develop­
ment of my own theory, a few more words should be said about it at this place 
The identification of conversion with force is very much against the traditional 
interpretation of the word conversion Elsewhere Engelhardt uses a more traditional, be it 
very limited interpretation of conversion, that is, change of mind through "grace" [p 43] 
Engelhardt fails to indicate exactly to what grace he is referring, but the context makes 
clear it is a divine grace, a God-given insight Engelhardt provides little convincing proof 
for the thesis that »graceful« conversion is an " unlikely (at least in a large society) 
example of resolution " [Engelhardt 1986, ρ 43] Yet the history of mankind shows 
that conversion at a rather massive scale did not at all cease to exist with the Reformation 
In fact, the Reformation should probably be considered one such massive conversion 
That is not to say that universal or "common" conversion as Engelhardt calls it [p 
44] is possible in a post-reformation era But was it ever truly universal before7 If any 
era makes a chance of developing universal conversion it is probably this very era, the 
20th century with its culmination of worldwide communication media never seen before 
Granted, these communication networks have created a maelstrom of information as well, 
all too often confusing, obscuring, contradicting, in sum, suggesting universal dissensus 
But the Reformation did not come out of the blue either, nor did the much earlier schism 
between the Roman and the Orthodox Catholic Church, the Nicene crisis, or for that 
matter, the dispute between St Peter and St Paul about circumcision The suggestion 
that prior to the Reformation western society was peacefully united in a single common 
Christian belief is as ahistoric as the suggestion that since the Reformation, the world has 
only known dissensus 
52 In an earlier publication, Engelhardt does not even mention the possibility of conversion In 
addition to force, rational argument and negotiation, he talks about "[a]η appeal to a set 
of commonly held moral beliefs, even if these are not amenable to general rational justifica­
tion When physicians and patients meet as strangers, they meet under circumstances 
where such appeals will not succeed" [1983, ρ 256-257] Irrespective the circular nature of 
the final sentence - the very definition of being a stranger is not sharing a set of commonly 
held beliefs - an appeal to such a set is by no means the same as attempting to convert 
another person to the same set of moral beliefs 
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Rather than the role of divine grace in conversions, rather than the scale at which 
conversions could nowadays occur - in fact, since God's love is unlimited and indis-
criminative, God's grace warrants a much larger scale than any sheer human means of 
reaching consensus could ever bring about -, the most serious problem of conversion as a 
means of establishing moral consensus is that God's grace usually is thought not to 
suffice, not even when the conversion concerns man's faith in God. As Congar [1958] 
points out: "... [I]f Catholic theology strongly underscores the primacy and the decisive 
role of grace, which precedes any merit on man's part in such a way that the very 
beginning of conversion is in fact the fruit of grace, it also underscores the reality and the 
role of human liberty" [p. 12]. A religious conversion implies "an element of positive 
intellectual conviction", not on the level of rigorous proof, but as a "practical choice" [p. 
5, 15]. Thus, the aspect of free choice is not the prerogative of negotiated agreement. 
Both negotiation and conversion allow for individual dissensus and thus complicate the 
process of reaching moral consensus. 
What makes conversion a plausible model of reaching intersubjective moral under-
standing? Even if many disqualifying features tum out to be of less significance and/or 
shared by other strategies, the fact remains that conversion seems an implausible model 
from the very start. For unlike revelation, empirical experience, rational argument, force 
and negotiated agreement, conversion traditionally is understood to imply a complete 
change in a person's life, a radical redirection following an existential crisis, definite 
disequilibrium and inner insecurity [Congar 1958, p. 9]. The conversion of a St. 
Augustine, a St. Francis or Mother Theresa did not concern an isolated topic of dissensus; 
their lives were completely redirected due to their conversions. 
Nonetheless, I would contend that conversion in a more general sense could provide 
us with a suitable model. Literally, the Latin verb »conversare« means »to turn around«, 
and as such, it could apply to many areas and phenomena of a smaller scale than man's 
complete life. Indeed, Lonergan [1971] speaks of intellectual conversion and moral 
conversion in addition to religious conversion. As Boyle points out, "... conversion for 
Lonergan is not an event within theology"; rather, "it is within the horizons established by 
the conversions that the theologizing subject operates" [Boyle 1973, p. 589, note 3]. In 
all these instances, the person converted has been (i) affected, causing a disequilibrium in 
his naive understanding, and a (ii) process of change has been set in motion that has 
resulted in inspiring a genuine (iii) sincere modification of views. This trifacetted 
structure, I contend, is the basis of all genuine insights, whether rational (such as in the 
discernment of a correct argument), aesthetical (such as in the appreciation of a great 
piece of art or a beautiful sun set), moral (such as in the recognition of one's obligation to 
provide help to the needy), or religious (such as in the awareness of God's supportive 
presence in one's suffering). 
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Whereas the last kind of conversion is first and foremost a matter of God's direct 
relationship with each human personally, and as such only indirectly sharable among men, 
the first three concern man in his relationship to the outer world that is equally accessible 
for (if not always equally interpreted by) all men. Thus, a particular logical argument 
will yield similar rational conversions in different humans; a piece of art may invoke 
similar aesthetical conversions; and the sight of a human in need should instigate all men 
to provide help. The conversions may not be exactly the same, for each human being is a 
different individual who will be affected differently and will interpret the affection 
differently. But the person radically denying the truth of a logical argument probably is 
mentally insane; the person with no appreciation of a great work of art or the beauty of 
nature similarly has an apathetic relationship with the world; and likewise the Lévite, who 
met the battered traveller, noticed his wounds yet passed by on the other side, clearly 
behaved immorally in willfully disregarding the obvious obligation conferred onto him. 
So how could the Lévite pass by when he was converted by the sight of the wounded 
traveller on the side of the road? Naturally, he was not converted in the more traditional 
sense of the word, that is to say, he did not actually change his practice. But he can only 
be blamed for passing by if it is assumed that the obligation to provide assistance must 
have been clear to him. Only the person who should be able to acknowledge the truth of 
a logical argument but does not do so can be considered stubborn or stupid; the person 
who is unable to differentiate between truth and falsity is beyond rationality, he is 
mentally insane. Only the person who becomes enthralled by what is obviously ugly can 
be said to have a bad taste. Only the person who does not act in accordance with his 
apparent obligations is behaving immorally. 
In other words, conversion does not affect a person's free will whether or not to 
respond to the newly gained insights ~ which is exactly why it is not a matter of force. 
And neither does conversion imply the kind of »passively being moved« by one's 
emotions. To be converted, one must »acknowledge« the morale of the »disturbing« view 
of a sacked traveller or »reproduce« the »conductive« argument presented (see p. 63). On 
the other hand, conversion is not (yet) an act of free will either (such as actually respond-
ing to the newly gained insights would). It »precedes« any such voluntary actions, and in 
that sense constitutes a phenomenon sui generis [Spiegelberg 1965].5Э 
53. Spiegelberg, actually, does not present this insight in respect to conversion but to approval. 
The latter term better reflects the »active« character of acknowledgement, but it gives no clue 
as to why the approving person should in fact come to approve. In fact, Spiegelberg 
explicitly emphasizes that "acknowledging approval" - unlike "sanctioning approval" which 
confers on the object to be approved "a certain type of validity" - "... assumes that the 
approved is already 'valid' in its own right ..." [p. 185-186]. The object of approval "... 
presents itself for possible approval" [p. 193; emphasis altered - JW\. This aspect of 
something »inspiring« acknowledgement is exactly what the notion of conversion connotes. 
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Conversion, then, is a possibility-condition of voluntary actions and, consequently, 
of ethical accountability In this sense, the Lévite passing by the wounded traveller must 
be considered to have been converted From the very fact that we hold him accountable 
for his overlooking the stranger in need, it follows that we apparently take for granted that 
he must have been converted to the ethical insight that he was morally obligated to offer 
help 54 
Negotiated Agreement 
As mentioned earlier, Engelhardt completely neglects to carefully examine the function of 
conversion in the process of establishing moral consensus Consequently, he is quick to 
conclude that the only strategy left is negotiated agreement But is if Why is negotiated 
agreement preferable to force'' As we saw earlier (see ρ 98), Engelhardt tends to assume 
that his choice is self-evident His noncntical stance probably is due (in part) to the fact 
that the main political, economic and societal events of the 20th century have already 
converted almost everybody to the belief that negotiation is the best decision-making 
method The many wars, military invasions and revolutions, terrorist attacks, and other 
forms of violence have seldom resolved controversies On the other hand, many 
memorable bright moments m our century were characterized by negotiations The 
establishment of the United Nations, the drafting of many international human rights 
declarations, weapon reduction treaties, the formation ot a European Union, etc 
Most of us are already convinced, that is, converted to the prerational (though not 
irrational) belief that negotiation rather than violence is the method to be preferred Had 
Engelhardt been writing m the era of the crusades or the days of the Inquisition, many of 
his readers might have preferred violence to negotiation as the method of decision-makmg 
For the spirit of religious fundamentalism had converted many contemporaries to true 
believers in christening through sword and flames Had Engelhardt been writing m the 
18th century, many of his readers, particularly the philosophers among them, might have 
preferred neither force nor negotiation, but rational arguments For the spirit of Enlight­
enment had converted many contemporaries to true believers in the human ratio But 
54 The argument that the Lévite may not have been converted because he intentionally - for 
expecting »trouble« - kept his eyes off the sacked traveller from the very moment that the 
latter first came in sight, that he therefore never truly became aware of the stranger's needs 
looked not of his moral obligation to provide assistance, and that, consequently, he cannot be 
held accountable for passing by, fails That is, it fails in as much as it intends to completely 
acquit the Lévite He may, indeed, have been able to »immunize« himself against the sight 
of a fellow-man in need, but he obviously was well aware of the trouble awaiting him 
MORAL STRANGERS 105 
Engelhardt is writing in the 20th century, which explains his conversion to the prerational 
belief that negotiation is the preferred method of establishing moral consensus. 
However, that historical explanation does not suffice as a justification for taking 
negotiated agreement to be the evident method to reach consensus. We may, of course, 
agree with Engelhardt that agreement is an acceptable method of decision-making, but that 
would induce a circular argument. So what else can we bring forward in favor of 
Engelhardt's definition of ethics as "... the canons of proper action that could be peace-
ably established on the basis of principles commonly discovered, or chosen by common 
agreement" [p. 26]. As convincing as this proposal may sound on first sight, its accept-
ability as an alternative to a substantive ethics (e.g., a religiously grounded ethics), hinges 
on Engelhardt's interpretation of the word »common«. 
According to Engelhardt, a »common« understanding and/or agreement on moral 
rules, does not require that every human being (who is sound in mind) can understand and 
agree, but only a section of society. Engelhardt's analogy with the process of decision-
making in the natural sciences is illustrative. Engelhardt is well aware of the develop-
ments in philosophy of science and naturally does not hold that in science, absolute, 
unbiased truths are discovered and established which enjoy common, that is, universal, 
ever-lasting agreement. Thus, Engelhardt cautiously specifies that the natural sciences 
have the advantage that they operate from a "... sufficiently common understanding of 
what is at stake" [p. 21; emphasis added - JW\. The term »sufficiently« indicates that, 
according to Engelhardt, there are indeed different levels of »common« understanding. 
Only a section of society has to be able to understand. In the area of the sciences this 
section encompasses the scientists themselves, and increasingly only a very small 
subsection of those scientists that are initiated in the particular science. Furthermore, the 
common understanding apparently is not the result of the scientific analysis, but a 
presupposition for any scientific endeavor. But if this is the case, then there is little 
difference between the natural sciences and a religiously grounded ethics. As long as 
there exists a common understanding of what is at stake, that is, of what is valuable, both 
the natural sciences and moral theology can flourish. As soon as this common ground 
disappears, both dwindle. 
Obviously, the historical eras in which the natural sciences, respectively moral 
theology flourish, will differ, since the values presumed by the respective ontologies 
usually differ considerably. Thus, in the Middle Ages, the ontology presupposed by 
moral theology prevailed, whereas the ontology presupposed by the natural sciences has 
prevailed since the 16th century. The 20th century seems to be the culmination of the 
latter ontology, but there are clear signs that the sciences are struggling with decreasing 
agreement as to what is at stake. The rapid rise of the number of environmental protec-
tion groups is but one such sign. In the area of the biomedical sciences, the rapid rise in 
the number of bioethicists points to a similar development. In the (biomedical) sciences 
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there exists no longer common understanding as to what exactly is at stake. Since most of 
this disagreement still is located outside of the circle of the scientists, the effects of the 
decreasing common understanding on the practice of science and its successes remain 
small. In addition, over the last 400 years the sciences have developed into such an 
intricate system of interscientific connections, that many doubts can be dealt with, even if 
they concern the very foundations of one of those sciences. 
An example in the area of medicine may explain what is meant here. Among the lay 
public there is increasing doubt about the value of life-support for patients in persistent 
vegetative state (PVS) or with other serious diseases that seem to substantially limit the 
patients' quality of life. Medicine, however, is unable to »understand« such doubts. 
Notice that it is not said that physicians are unable to understand such doubts; they, too, 
are lay-men once they have taken leave of their white coat. But the science of medicine 
cannot understand these doubts, that is, it is unable to account for these doubts within its 
own framework of thought. A pneumonia is not any more »normal« in a patient in PVS 
as it is in an otherwise healthy person. Doubts as to whether antibiotics should be given 
to the former patient, therefore, are foreign to medicine as a science. Various biomedical 
sciences related to medicine, such as microbiology, pharmacology, and pathology, confirm 
that these doubts are indeed irrational and that antibiotics are indicated. 
Faced with resistance from the lay public (i.e., patients, their families, and health 
care providers crossing the boundaries of biomedical science), medicine is forced to seek a 
solution. Actually, a solution is forced upon medicine. Given the fundamental impossi-
bility to deduce such a solution from within medicine, it is found outside medicine, that 
is, in law. Patients are given the right to choose their therapy even if medicine has found 
it to be less than optimal when it comes to restoring normal health. Patients are given the 
right to refuse treatment, even if such treatment is indicated according to the standards of 
proper medicine. 
These »ad hoc« solutions leave the system of medicine untouched while at the same 
time providing enough room for patient doubts and unorthodox requests. Ongoing 
debates, however, indicate remaining friction. The concept of normality in medicine 
seems outdated; the »stake« (in the sense of 'what is at stake') underlying this concept, 
that is, the protection of life, lacks sufficient common understanding to be taken as a self-
evident presumption. Many, including physicians, are willing to reconsider this »stake«. 
But the consequences of such a reconsideration of this most fundamental presupposition of 
medicine and the biomedical sciences are too enormous to even be noticed. For without 
general acceptance of this stake, it is no longer evident what is normal and what is not. 
Thus, it is no longer clear what blood pressure - to give just one example - is pathological 
and requires treatment. The empirical fact that, say, a sustained systolic pressure of 150 
or more implies a 15% increase in the chance to have a cardiac attack before the age of 
71 is no longer a sufficient reason to interpret a systolic pressure of 150 as abnormal and 
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an indication for treatment. If the traditional stake of the protection of life were to be 
replaced by, for example, optimal functionality, maybe death at the age of 71 or soon 
thereafter would be acceptable to the category of patients who have a tendency to develop 
vascular problems and consequently face a host of function-decreasing conditions such as 
tiredness, poor physical stamina, eye problems, pain in the legs, headaches, and strokes. 
Consequently, a systolic blood pressure of 150 would be very normal indeed. Blood 
pressure is but one example. Similar changes would occur with many, if not all estab-
lished normal values in medicine, which in tum would lead to a revolution in clinical 
medicine as well as the basic sciences. 
There is an even more serious problem. In the blood pressure example it was 
assumed that it is possible to replace the traditional stake by a single new stake. It would 
cause a considerable quake and it would take a lot of time and effort to recalculate all 
normal values and to redefine treatment indications and scientific standards. But the 
construction of biomedicine would not totally collapse. What if, on the other hand, it 
appears to be impossible to agree on a single new stake? What if different groups of 
people, or even worse, different individuals appear to have a different understanding of 
what is at stake? What if one group thinks a life free of any discomforts, short as it may 
turn out to be, is the most valuable, whereas another group prefers life to be as long as 
possible? Two kinds of medicine would need to be developed, one to foster the prefer-
ences of the first group, one to foster the preferences of the second group. After all, to 
find out even such a relatively simple thing as the normal range of systolic pressure, one 
will need to do two different research projects. One research population will contain 
patients who prefer a short but comfortable life. In this population the correlation 
between blood pressure and any kind of physical discomfort is assessed which in turn will 
be an indication for the establishment of a normal range for blood pressure. The other 
research population will contain patients who prefer a long life while taking some 
complaints for granted. In this population the correlation between blood pressures and 
life-threatening diseases must be assessed, which information will lead to a normal range. 
It is therefore not unlikely and certainly cannot be excluded prior to the research itself, 
that these normal ranges will differ, and so will many other normal values. Consequently, 
for any patient group with different values, a different set of biosciences and clinical 
medicine will have to be developed. 
This, obviously, would undermine the sciences. It would undermine the sciences in 
the same way as it has moral theology. The success of medieval moral theology was not 
some reassuring certainty derived from unshakable authority, but the simple acceptance of 
(that is, conversion to the belief that) a number of presuppositions as »objective«. There 
was »sufficiently« common understanding as to what was at stake, as to what was in 
essence the purpose of earthly human life. Undoubtedly, an increasing plurality of ideas 
as to that purpose has led to a multiplicity in moral theologies, thereby slowly diminishing 
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the »objectivity« of moral theology. That could happen with the biomedical sciences as 
well when its fundament is as seriously eroded as has been the fundament of moral 
theology. 
Granted, it will not happen as rapidly in biomedical science as in mora] theology. 
This is because what is at stake in medicine is of a much more limited scope. Not man's 
total well-being, spiritual and physical, both on earth and after life is at stake, but only his 
health. It is easier to reach and maintain consensus about such a reduced stake. That 
explains the overwhelming success of basic sciences such as physics and chemistry in the 
first place. The reality that is at stake has first been reduced to an absolute minimum of 
simple time and space dimensions, elementary particles, energy, and forces. This 
reduction does not make these sciences any easier to master, on the contrary. The more 
abstract the explanatory material, the more difficult to grasp explanations of the diversity 
of phenomena. But it does make it easier to reach consensus on the necessarily unproven 
presuppositions that underlie the science. It is not very difficult to join the club of those 
who believe (that is, who are converted to the belief that) there is a so called »objective« 
material reality which can be known by man using his five senses. It is more of a 
problem, that is, it has become more of a problem, to join the club of those who believe 
health is the same as staying alive as long as possible. And the club of believers in the 
basic presuppositions of moral theology such as the existence of God, heaven, the soul, 
resurrection and eternal life, certainly no longer has enough members to reach that 
sufficiently common understanding needed to develop an authoritative moral theology. 
Negotiation versus Force 
Having made this long excursion into the history of communalities, leading up to the 
conclusion that it is all but clear what constitutes »sufficiently common agreement« in the 
sciences, we have to look for new arguments that could support agreement as the 
preferred method for establishing moral principles. Since this question is itself not a 
question about moral issues, but a meta-question about how to go about establishing moral 
principles, Engelhardt's prior objections against rational argument as a controversy-solving 
strategy do not seem to apply. The discussion about how to reach consensus does not 
seem to presuppose some kind of sense of the moral good. Indeed, Engelhardt's own 
book is built on rational arguments. But this would be overlooking one important fact. 
What Engelhardt is trying to prove is that agreement is a good strategy for reaching 
consensus on moral matters, actually the only good strategy. What is the standard for 
»goodness« in this case? To take an analogical example: Biologists face the problem that 
it is not always clear which living beings are animals and which are plants. Consequent-
ly, they need to come up with a good method to decide every possible case. A good 
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method, obviously, is one which allows them to make correct distinctions. But this is 
possible only if it is clear what exactly the difference is between a plant and an animal. 
Similarly, to prove that agreement is a good method to decide between moral and immoral 
actions, between actions to be allowed and actions to be prohibited, it must be clear what 
is the essential difference between a moral and an immoral action. Arguing that any 
action is immoral simply if we agree that it should be prohibited would induce a circle. 
Some presupposed sense of moral goodness is required to prove that agreement is the best 
method to settle ethical disputes. If this conclusion is correct, it follows that Engelhardt's 
Foundations [Engelhardt 1986] must presuppose some sense of moral goodness as well. It 
proves that a substantive ethics is underlying Engelhardt's procedural ethics [see, e.g., 
Ten Have 1994a]. 
The presence of an underlying substantive ethics can be revealed even if we were to 
simply grant Engelhardt that agreement provides ethical duties and prohibitions their 
universally binding character. For the question remains how to respond to behavior about 
which there is no agreement? What if no agreement can be reached about the permissibil-
ity of abortion, the death penalty, or even simple murder? Engelhardt apparently foresees 
the risk that agreement may not be sufficiently common - let alone universal - universal 
about certain issues, among them abortion. There may be people who think abortions are 
moral and that we should not prohibit them, and there may be others who think abortions 
are wrong and that we should prohibit them. 
Engelhardt suggests a move to a meta-level. When agreement cannot be reached 
about every single act taken by itself, there is the possibility that indirect agreement can 
be reached. It may be possible to reach consensus about certain categories of actions. He 
therefore argues that procedures for such agreement need to be developed that are 
"commonly accepted" [p. 41]. But this argument fails since it will automatically induce 
either a circular or an infinite argument. For what could be the basis of the common 
acceptance of these procedures? 
Engelhardt claims that unlike advocates of a right to abortion, opponents are refusing 
to participate in the negotiations, and that, therefore, force against them is allowed [see, 
p. 41]. But what reason does Engelhardt have to consider them »refusers« as opposed to 
the "peaceable negotiators" whose agreed-upon precepts do carry authority [p. 41]? Are 
those who refuse, who do not agree and accept, necessarily not peaceful? But that would 
make the claim a mere analytical claim. The agreement would no longer be of any 
importance, but merely the peacefulness - whatever that may be. Surely, the fact that the 
opinion of the pro-lifers differs from the opinion of the advocates of a right to abortion is 
no reason to call them nonpacifist refusers, and neither is the fact that they want some 
action to be prohibited. For that would imply that if we agree that murder is to be 
prohibited and we actually prohibit it, we suddenly have become refusers to the negotia-
tions with the murderers. 
по 
CHAPTER 4 
Though Engelhardt wants us to believe the contrary, neither the kind nor the source 
of the arguments that anti-abortionists may bring to the fore to forbid abortions bears on 
the matter. Whether God has revealed to them that abortion is wrong, whether their 
»guts« tell them, the pastor of the church, or some kind of logical analysis, is of no 
importance. Having ruled out revelation as well as reason as decision-making strategies, 
of importance is merely whether or not agreement can be reached, not the private reasons 
of the individuals who (dis)agree. 
The question, therefore, remains, what to do if agreement about any particular action 
(such as abortion) cannot be reached? Are these actions going to be allowed? That 
answer would fit the very purpose of Engelhardt's Foundations, which is to allow for as 
much diversity in moral convictions as possible. But the logical consequence would be 
that even such actions as murder should be allowed when no agreement about a prohibi­
tion can be reached. If agreement is the only possible standard to make a decision about 
prohibitions, to be an acceptable ethical theory, Engelhardt's agreement-reaching-model 
must encompass every possible (im)moral action, either directly, or indirectly (that is, as 
the logical consequence of a prior agreement about some other action leading to the action 
at hand, or about a particular category of actions encompassing the action at hand). 
Calling dissidents to the majority opinion, or for that matter, to Engelhardt's private 
opinion, »refusers« against whom force may therefore be used, is not a very fair solution. 
It is, in fact, a rather violent move. 
Foreseeing that it may not be possible to always reach agreement, and foreseeing the 
logical consequence that all not-agreed-upon actions must be allowed, Engelhardt tries to 
prevent the allowance of such actions as murder by allowing people to perform any not-
agreed-upon action as long as such action "... does not involve the use of unconsented-to 
force against the innocent ..." [p. 41]. Again, why no force? What is the justification of 
this limit? Remember, that Engelhardt did indeed rale out force as an acceptable strategy, 
but »forgot« to provide sound reasons. We granted Engelhardt the ruling out of force 
since most people would agree force is not acceptable, assuming that Engelhardt would be 
able to prove that agreement is indeed an acceptable strategy. However, at this point we 
seem to have gotten caught in a circular argument: In order to conclude that agreement is 
the preferred controversy-solving strategy, we must assume that force is not an acceptable 
strategy; but to back-up this assumption, we must assume that agreement is an acceptable 
strategy. 
Engelhardt may reply that he did not rule out force in general, but merely unconsen­
ted-to force. The question now becomes how this specification should be understood. 
One possibility is to interpret »unconsented-to« as »unconsented-to by the individual 
against whom the action is directed«. But in that case unconsented-to is synonymous with 
forced-upon. The alternative is to interpret »unconsented-to« as »unconsented-to by the 
full community of people«, that is, as synonymous with not-agreed-upon. In that case, it 
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is quite obvious that unconsented-to force is a limit since agreed-upon force fulfills the 
minimum condition of agreement. 
The limit to not-agreed-upon actions, therefore, must simply be »force against the 
innocent«. Except for force against the innocent, any action about which there is no 
agreement should be allowed, including not-agreed-upon force against the guilty. The 
problem with this specification is twofold. Firstly, the term »innocent« has not yet been 
defined. Obviously, we are expected to interpret innocent in the everyday meaning of the 
word, as something like »not having done anything wrong«. But we do not know yet what 
is right and what is wrong. Remember that we arrived at this point only because 
Engelhardt claimed (with good reasons) that it is not possible to define what is morally 
right and wrong behavior. If we want to prevent a war of all against all, it is necessary to 
find a method for resolving moral controversies, for establishing some guidelines as to 
what from this moment on is going to be considered right and what wrong. At this point, 
however, we are still debating which method for the development of such guidelines 
should be taken. Since those guidelines do not yet exist, the term »innocent« has no 
meaning. The only way out is to temporarily accept the emptiness of the term innocent. 
Consequently, actions are only wrong if there is agreement about their wrongness. Any 
other action will leave the actor innocent. 
But this conclusion would imply that if agreement can be reached about the wrong-
ness of murder, unconsented-to force against the murderer is allowed, any kind of force, 
including torture. After all, the murderer is not innocent and consequently, any action, 
even if not-agreed-upon, is now allowed. If, on the other hand, no agreement can be 
reached about the moral status of murder, then a murderer is not guilty. That would 
mean one can murder the murderer, but one is not allowed to use unconsented-to force 
against the murderer. 
The conclusions are confusing - to say the least - for intuitively murder is a clear 
form of force. This brings us to the second problem with Engelhardt's last reply that the 
limit to non-agreed-upon actions is force against the innocent. Why this limit? Replying 
that only force against the innocent should not be allowed, even if there is no agreement 
about such force, does not answer the question why this limit should be set. Engelhardt 
explains that "[o]ne can see why one may not use unconsented-to force against the 
innocent ... [because - JW\ such actions would be without moral authority and all 
interested in moral discourse, in resolving moral controversy in ways not fundamentally 
grounded in force, could justifiably employ defensive force ..." [p. 45]. The mere 
statement that force against the innocent is without moral authority obviously is a petitio 
principii: Engelhardt still has to prove that force against the innocent is without moral 
authority. As to the second part of his justification, it is undoubtedly correct that others 
could employ defensive force (if the use of force is not forbidden by agreement) for the 
simple reason that Engelhardt only ruled out the use of force against the innocent, not 
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defensive force. But what is the differentiating principle to distinguish between »funda-
mental« force and other kinds of force such that the former is not allowed but the latter is? 
The introduction of the term »fundamental« merely begs the question. 
It is clear that Engelhardt interprets force as any kind of infringement on behavior he 
has already deemed moral on grounds other than agreement. He first states, quite 
correctly, that acceptance of agreement as one's decision-making model implies that all 
participants should agree and not merely a majority, be it a three-fourths majority, "... 
unless all can be presumed to have agreed in advance to such procedures" [p. 46]. In 
other words, only if all agree that in case of future controversies, a three-fourths majority 
is sufficient to settle the issues, such a less than unanimous agreement constitutes just 
authority. So far so good. However, Engelhardt continues with an example that should 
prove that a three-fourths majority in and by itself does not constitute just authority: 
"Laws forbidding such [things as contraceptives, abortions, hallucinogens, suicide - JW], 
even if enacted by a majority of three-fourths of the populace, are not simply of dubious 
authority, but may properly seen to be attempts to use unconsented-to force against the 
innocent" [p. 46]. This conclusion does not follow, for Engelhardt has not clarified 
whether or not the whole populace would agree to three-fourths majority decision-making 
procedure. If the populace were to have required a unanimous vote, Engelhardt would 
have been correct. But Engelhardt's conclusion does not follow if the populace has settled 
for a smaller majority, which is currently the case in most democracies (only two-thirds 
majority for constitutional and other momentous legislative matters and a mere 50%+ 1 
for all common political decisions). And for good reasons. After all, the unlikelihood of 
unanimous consensus on moral matters was the very reason to opt for negotiated agree-
ment. 
There seems to be only one way out of this catch-22: Rather than trying to prove 
why agreement is a proper method to reach consensus on moral matters (which would 
presume some underlying sense of the moral good) one should consider agreement itself a 
moral good. Or more precisely, the negotiative process of trying to reach agreement is 
itself a good. That would automatically turn force into an evil, but also any unwillingness 
to join the party of negotiators, for example the principlist position of anti-abortionist who 
sees no use in deliberations since his source of truth is revelation. Whereas an under-
standing of agreement as a process towards defining moral goodness would imply 
acceptance of any stance, including a principlist stance, understanding negotiation as a 
good, as the only good, justifies violent reactions to such obstinate »refusers« to the 
debate. 
Now that agreement through negotiation has changed status from a method to a 
substantive good, the question arises what makes negotiation a good? Now that the array 
of choices has increased from three methods (force, conversion or negotiated agreement) 
to the manifold substantial moral principles defended in the history of ethics, why 
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negotiation? Why would engaging in a »negotiative« conversation for the sake of 
conversation (rather than for a yet to be negotiated good) be itself of any good, of even 
»minimal« good [see Callahan 1981]? In Chapter 2 (see p. 61), I have argued that such a 
»conversation ethics« [Zwart 1993a] resembles the proverb of barking dogs that don't bite: 
Deliberation tends to yield as end-result very watered-down, non-principlist practical 
policies that suit many people by allowing for as much as possible. The comparison with 
the legislative process suggests itself, and correctly so, for as we will see later in this 
chapter, Engelhardt considers the drafting of health care policies to be the very purpose of 
biomedical ethics. But does such policy-development still qualify as ethics? 
Disagreement on Methods - Agreement on Outcomes 
In his Theory of Medical Ethics, Veatch [1981] proposes a quite ingenious solution to the 
kind of foundational problem Engelhardt is facing. Like the latter, Veatch embraces a 
kind of »contractual« model, but unlike Engelhardt, he understands the general societal 
contract as well as a second ranked contract between society and the health profession to 
precede and confine the third contract between the individual health care provider and his 
patient (rather than taking the latter as the starting point for the construction of the former 
two). Veatch, however, is well aware of the foundational problems that his theory faces. 
Those adhering to some kind of natural law, teleological ethics, or moral theology are all 
unlikely to agree to any ethical models that understand morality as a social construct 
among contractants. But, says Veatch, that is of no importance because advocates of such 
theories tend to argue along lines very similar to the contract model. For they will agree 
that the laws of nature, man or God are seldom revealed completely and in detail to any 
particular human being. Each and every individual tends to be biased. Consequently, the 
discovery of the encompassing, unbiased truth is only possible if the community of those 
in favor of such a theory will join in the process of discovery. Each participant will be 
asked to present his ideas but also to open up for those of his fellow men, and to finally 
agree to the truth discovered by the community. And that process is exactly alike to the 
process of moral construction as used by social contract theorists. The background 
ontology may be different, but the process of understanding, and consequently the 
outcome, is likely to be the same. 
Even if we concede to Veatch that advocates of ethical discovery rather that ethical 
construction would agree to his description of their working method, there are two severe 
problems with Veatch's solution. 
1. If Veatch's model were correct, how could the contemporary widespread and 
vehement disagreement on moral issues be explained. For surely, the upheaval would be 
considerably less if the disagreement only concerned the background philosophies but not 
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the final outcomes. The many representatives signing the United Nations Declaration on 
Human Rights definitely did not share the same background philosophy, but they all 
agreed and nobody made a big deal out of that paradox. Most disagreement, however, 
concerns the outcome itself, which proves that the methodology used by different 
participants in the debate does not neutralize their divergent background philosophies. 
2. If it is the case that no individual can by himself discover or construct the moral 
truth, since he is biased (epistemologically or socially respectively), bioethicists must limit 
their theorizing to the analysis of the formal structures of the debate and - with great 
caution - the possibility-conditions of the debate. Thus, Veatch is justified in attempting 
to describe the contractual model and even to deduce the importance of respect for 
individual opinions. But when Veatch sets in scene a moral debate among hypothetical 
participants, claiming that as an ethicist he can represent all the different moral view 
points, he at the same time contradicts the tenets of his own general theory. For such a 
hypothetical debate among imaginary participants is little different from the traditional 
philosophical methodology of critically evaluating one's own arguments, always doubting 
what seems self-evident. If Veatch's solution is to preserve its ingenuity, he must 
maintain that ethicists are limited to the analysis of the structure of the debate. Hospital 
ethics committees, institutional review boards, national committees for bioethical issues, 
international consensus conferences, all obtain their presumed authority from the assump-
tion that only a cluster of human beings is able to develop (whether via discovery or 
construction) moral guidelines. 
If Veatch seems unwilling to accept these consequences, advocates of one or another 
version of »conversation ethics« (see p. 61) have done so. But conversation ethicists are 
conspicuously silent on the question as to how conversation can yield consensus. 
Certainly, by engaging in an ethical debate one implicitly agrees to the moral connotations 
that are inherent in the discourse language of the debate. But do those who disagree about 
certain moral principles (such as the presumed right to abortion) share the same discourse 
language? If language and morality are inextricably linked, is it not more probable that 
differences in moral ideas result in, or are the result of a difference in discourse language? 
And if that is the case, how are the various members of a hospital ethics committee, who 
are selected on the very basis of their divergent moral ideas, going to engage in a 
meaningful debate? Will such a debate not be more like the contention of the workers on 
the tower of Babel? 
I agree with Zwart that the differences of opinion among advocates and opponents in 
moral matters seldom are a matter of limited information, of mere "misunderstandings" 
[Zwart 1993a, p. 255]. It is not the case that opponents will settle their differences if only 
they engage in a serious and open discussion, willing to correct any misunderstandings. If 
the solution to moral disagreement could be solved that easily, we would not need all 
those committees. A single bioethicist with an open mind and a keen eye for the seeming 
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plurality of moral opinions in contemporary society should be able to simulate such a 
debate and provide an agreeable solution, much like Veatch tries to do. The "all-partial" 
perspective that encompasses the views of all parties involved and that should result from 
what has been called sound "moral management" [CELAZ 1993, p. 47; see also Van 
Willigenburg e.a. 1991] is either new jargon for the more traditional yet abhorred 
»impartial observer« and his single authoritative account of the good, or a return to 
Engelhardt's minimalist ethics and its foundational problems. 
It is only when all participants in the debate share certain substantial moral beliefs 
and ipso facto share a common moral language, that ethical discourse is likely to progress 
towards genuine consensus rather than negotiated agreement. Indeed, Veatch himself 
takes for granted that those involved in the debate will share what he calls "the moral 
point of view", the idea that "... other people's welfare is considered on the same scale as 
one's own ..." [Veatch 1981, p. 137]. For Veatch is well aware that without such a 
presumption, some of the advocates of a constructivist view on morality may take a very 
egoistic stance and violate the precontractual »contract« of promise-keeping (even if that 
may be imprudent in the long run) [see p. 118-119 and 180-181]. 
Without underwriting Veatch's particular definition of the moral point of view, I 
underwrite his view that humans cannot be considered moral strangers to one another who 
share no substantial moral beliefs nor a common moral language. It follows, then, that 
the absence of social interaction is not the best kind of social interaction. This conclusion 
casts doubt on the justifiability of the prime role of the principle of »patient autonomy« in 
much of contemporary minimalist bioethical theory. In fact, upon closer examination it 
turns out that the concept of autonomy owes much of its primacy to the ambiguous and 
equivocal use of that concept. And more importantly, the more precise and explicit the 
definition of the concept, the less it seems to fit a minimalist, procedural approach to 
bioethics. A more detailed discussion of the notion of autonomy in the work of American 
bioethicists such as Beauchamp, Childress, Faden, McCuIlough and Miller, will reveal 
that a convincing account of the moral ideal of patient autonomy requires a more 
substantive approach to bioethics. 
Towards a Non-Procedural Ethics: Alternative Conceptions of Patient Autonomy 
Beauchamp and Childress in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics (2nd edition) provide a 
concise definition of autonomy as the individual's "... governance in the absence of 
controlling constraints ...", that is, the individual's ability "... to legislate norms of 
conduct (Kant) and ... voluntarily fix a course of action (Mill)" [Beauchamp and Childress 
1983, p. 61]. The authors' reference to historical philosophers may be questionable 
(notably in the case of Kant); what matters is their interpretation of those philosophers, 
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which strongly emphasizes the individual's right to determine his own course of life: The 
"right of noninterference" [p. 62]. According to Beauchamp and Childress, this does not 
imply that the only kind of authority compatible with the right to autonomy is authority 
grounded in some sort of delegation or other kind of voluntary acceptance, and based on 
reasonability (notably state authority). In a sense, such authority is not really a limitation 
to autonomy simply because it is not authority in the genuine sense of the word (but self-
imposed paternalism). On the other hand, parental authority, compulsory treatment for 
the mentally handicapped, or overriding patients' treatment refusals, constitute clear 
examples of non-delegated autonomy. It is in this area that advocates of autonomy as a 
right to noninterference commonly reach the limits of their system, for few are willing to 
defend an absolute right to noninterference for suicidal children or depressive adults on 
long-term kidney dialysis. 
Apparently, noninterference, self-determination, and freedom of choice are not as 
absolute and primary values as libertarian theories imply. The patient's wishes are 
followed without questioning if they concur (for the most part) with those of the health 
care providers; no surgeon will examine whether the wish of a patient, suffering from an 
acute appendicitis, to undergo an appendectomy as indicated by standard medical practice, 
is really autonomous. On the other hand, the patient's wishes are being questioned when 
they do not concur. Moreover, it is up to the patient to show that his decisions are, 
indeed, autonomous if their content appears quite awkward. That is to say, decisions and 
actions of patients do not have to meet the particular criteria of a good life as defended by 
physicians and other third persons; but those decisions and actions must fall within a 
certain realm that is deemed potentially valuable according to the (medical) society. A 
case may clarify the problem at hand. 
The Case of Mr. Jones 
Mr. Jones was a single man who had been suffering from Bechterew 's disease since he 
turned 31. In order to be able to continue his work as principal at a primary school, he 
used high doses of phenacetin pain-killers. At the age of 57, he was diagnosed with 
irreversible nephropathy due to the analgesics, which, after the age of 65, required 
hemodialysis. But the treatment was taken well and except for two shunt surgeries, no 
problems occurred. Mr. Jones was always in a good mood and in the first years, he was 
offered support from former students who every now and then helped him to commute 
between home and the hospital. 
At the age of 70, after 5 years of dialysis, Mr. Jones was brought to the hospital 
because of bronchopneumonia and pleuritis. Treatment with antibiotics caused a rapid 
improvement, but at the end of the week, a pericarditis was diagnosed. Since the 
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treatment of uremic pericarditis consists of intensive dialysis, Mr. Jones was informed 
about the need to increase the frequency of his dialysis. 
To everybody's amazement, however, Mr. Jones refused any and all dialysis. During 
a conversation with his attending physician, Mr. Jones told the nephrologist that he had 
decided a couple of months earlier that he would terminate dialysis when complications 
were to emerge. In this conversation, Mr. Jones was fully lucid, not depressive and very 
pertinent in his decision. A talk with his minister, with whom he had always had a good 
relationship, could not make him chance his mind [Case adapted with permission from 
Nieuwkerk e.a 1990]. 
Withholding and withdrawing treatment because of a patient's refusal of such treatment, is 
rather common. Applebaum and Roth [1983] have calculated that the incidence is 4.6 per 
100 patient days. Of all dialysis patients that die, approximately 9% pass away after 
dialysis is voluntarily withdrawn [Neu and Kjellstrand 1986; Nieuwkerk e.a 1990; Hirsch 
1989; Port e.a. 1989]. Remarkably, some authors report they have never been faced with 
such a refusal [Fisher e.a. 1986]. Although Fisher does not explain his conclusion in that 
way, often the issue of treatment refusal is translated in terms of patient compliance. 
Compliance is often understood in psychosocial terms as the adherence to required 
therapy. Treatment refusal then is the end result of "psychological failure" [Schrier and 
Gottschalk 1988]. There is no doubt, that such perspective on the issue can help to clarify 
the psychosocial aspects of the refusal, but it does not solve the ethical dilemma. 
Moreover, a very paternalistic position is taken for granted when psychological failure at 
the same time acquires a moral meaning — as, in fact, it clearly has [see Haynes e.a. 
1979, p. 2]. As the term suggests (It.: complire = to satisfy55), the concept of noncom-
pliance implies that the patient is not »faithful« to the therapy, he is not doing what he 
»ought« to do according to the attending physician, medical science or common opinion, 
he does not »obey« the instruction of his doctor [Walton and Beeson 1986; see also Holm 
1993].56 
Libertarian bioethics with its heavy reliance on the principle of autonomy would 
address the case at hand along the following (or very similar) lines. Prime questions 
would be: Should the health care provider grant the patient her wish, should he try to 
55. The etymology of the verb to comply is not fully clear. Most scholars have it come from the 
Italian complire, and thus from the Latin compiere [e.g., Klein 1966; Simpson and Weiner 
1989]. Some speculate there may be a connection with the Italian verb compiacere and the 
Latin compiacere (to please) [e.g., Bailey 1969; Skinner 1970]. Finally, it is assumed that 
the modern English meaning of the term has been influenced by the root to ply, in French 
plier and in Latin piteare: to bend [e.g., Skeat 1909; Simpson and Weiner 1989]. 
56. The Dutch translation of therapy compliance, therapietrouw (Du.: therapy faithfulness), even 
better expresses that connotation. 
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persuade her to do otherwise, should he try to keep her from doing so, or should he even 
exert some kind of physical restraint? The dilemma would be translated in terms of 
decision-making power, and the solution would be constructed accordingly (see Figure III, 
p. 118). 
Figure III: A Decision-Making Tree. 
Patient Refusal 
Competent to make deci-
sions 
Earnest and thoughtful 
decision 
1 
Incompetent to make decisions 
Temporarily incompetent 
(ad hoc decision) 
Grant wish 
Permanently in-
competent 
Minimum paternalistic interference 
in order to restore competency 
Seek proxy con-
sent 
As the decision-making tree in Figure III shows, the course of action depends on the 
determination of the patient's actual autonomy that is, his competency, his ability to make 
the kind of decisions that qualify as the kind of autonomous decisions that ought to be 
respected under the principle of respect for autonomy. If the patient is competent, his 
decisions, regardless their content, must be assumed to be autonomous and be respected. 
Obviously, what makes somebody competent to make autonomous decisions depends on 
the definition of an autonomous decision. And it is at this point that the libertarian 
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Figure Г : Deñnitions of Autonomy 
Faden ά Beauchamp Miller 
approach to such clinical dilemmas faces a serious problem, because it is not at all clear 
what counts as an autonomous decision " 
If not the most recent, extensive and thorough overview of the various uses of the 
concept of autonomy, Miller's 1981 summary article in the Hastings Center Report 
provides a useful scheme that adequately points out the main distinctions Miller suggests 
four different categories, but in line with the more simple and frequent two-division [see 
Faden and Beauchamp 1986, ρ 237], I suggest to reorganize Miller's four categories into 
two categories, each with two subcategories (see Figure IV, ρ 119)58 
According to Miller, 
(1 a) autonomy as free ^ ^ " ^ ^ ™ " • " • ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ^ 
action implies that the 
decision and the con­
sequent practice have 
not been influenced by 
any kind of force or 
compulsion and corre­
spond with the inten­
tions of the actor 
The ability or compe- ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ™ " " " " ^ ™ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
tency to make such 
autonomous decisions exists in the negative ability of being free from any physical duress 
or mental compulsion and outside force 
Whether somebody is competent can be assessed m a procedural manner External 
force can be excluded by carefully checking the situation of the patient (e g , whether his 
children are living off his pension, or his town's minister is coercing him into not 
accepting a blood transfusion) Physical duress, such as pain, discomfort, and nausea, can 
never be assessed completely, but the methods employed by normal medical practice to 
decide (for instance, about the dosage of pain killers), should provide an adequate 
procedure to assess such internal force Finally, mental compulsion can be assessed with 
common psychiatric methods for the diagnosis of such disorders as (manic) depression or 
obsessive-compulsive behavior Voluntariness, m other words, can be assessed without 
1 Freedom model 
2 Authenticity model 
1 a Autonomy as free action 
1 b Autonomy as effective deliberation 
2 a Autonomy as moral reflection 
2 b Autonomy as authenticity 
57 
58 
The problems will become even more serious once a patient has been deemed incompetent 
and a third person (whether the care provider or a family member) will have to make some 
kind of substituted judgment on the patient's best interests If it is considered extremely 
difficult to judge the competent patient's interests, it must be even more difficult to attain a 
substituted judgment about an incompetent patient's best interests 
Not only does Miller devise four separate, rather than two subdivided categories, the order 
of these four categories also differs in Miller's article However, Miller does not seem to 
rank order them, as I am doing, according to degree of »materiality« or »contentfulness« 
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the need of any more insight in the constitution of this particular patient than common 
medical practice requires. Standard medical procedures should suffice. 
If libertarians would accept any and all patient decisions that are autonomous in this 
sense of the word, their approach would be consistent (in this regard). But free decisions 
can be rather impulsive. They can be the result of sudden emotions, an acute attack of 
pain, a temporary set-back. Few physicians would be willing to terminate dialysis merely 
on the basis of such impulsive wishes. Hence, according to most libertarians, a patient 
decision, in order to be granted, should be free and the result of (l.b.) effective delibera-
tion, which requires that the decision is based on relevant knowledge and rational 
considerations. 
Probably, however, the competency to make such decisions can be sufficiently 
assessed in a procedural manner as well. For a decision is informed and rational if any 
other sensible person could have reached a relevantly similar decision. Such »marginal« 
assessment is procedural in that it compares the individual with a general and external 
standard (the average human being), rather than with knowledge about the unique 
constitution of this individual. Marginal assessment is rather common in the area of 
administrative law. Since administration is itself largely outside of the realm of the law in 
that a judge often may not be able to evaluate the actual content of the administrative 
decision, he must and may limit himself to a judgment on whether the administrator could 
have reasonably reached this particular decision. Similarly, a medical disciplinary court, 
rather than evaluating the actual decision made by a physician, often will have to limit 
itself to a judgment on whether the physician could have reasonably reached the decision 
he made. Even in criminal law, I would argue, such marginal judgments take place when 
the intentions of an accused murderer must be assessed. Since one cannot (easily) look in 
the killer's head to gauge his knowledge and intentions, it is commonly (though not 
explicitly) hypothesized that the killer, given the nature of his deed and his apparent 
eagerness to go ahead anyway, must have knowingly and willingly killed, that is, 
murdered. For any normal person surely would be abhorred by such a deed or at least 
shown adequate restraint. 
The criminal case, however, is not completely analogous to the former two cases and 
the differences are significant in the framework of our discussion, because they are similar 
to the problems one encounters when defining in detail the nature of patient autonomy. 
Marginal evaluation of both the administrator and the physician is based on the logical 
conclusions that the average rational person (obviously, with comparable professional 
background) would be able to draw from the available facts. Similarly, one could 
examine empirically the answer that any rational person would logically give when asked: 
'What happens when you pass a school where children may be playing and where the 
speed limit therefore is 20 miles per hour, but you drive 70 miles per hour?' If the 
average person answers: 'I am endangering the life of children', it may be concluded that 
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the accused reckless driver killing a child has knowingly done so. But did he willingly 
kill? What would one ask the population of average people? 'Do you intend to kill 
children when you drive 70 miles per hour through a school zone?' One may hope most 
people will say that they never intend to kill children, but this answer provides no 
indication about the intentions of the accused. 
The only way to employ the obtained empirical data is to say that, since people do 
not want the death of children, the accused must have wanted it: He knew the danger, but 
apparently was willing to go ahead anyway. Such a line of argument, however, reduces 
the two criteria for murder, that is, to act willingly and knowingly, to one. Knowledge of 
the potential consequences of one's behavior suffices. And if the accused reckless driver 
keeps stressing that he really did not know that he was endangering children when 
speeding, society is likely to respond that he simply should have known. 
Here, a further catch becomes visible: If the average person would not under any 
circumstances want to endanger a child's life, any person driving 70 miles per hour 
through a school zone, thereby killing a child, can be found guilty of murder for he ought 
to have known that such speeding is dangerous, and since he went ahead anyway, he must 
have intended harm. But it is the same abhorrence shared by most citizens that provides 
the justification for a penal difference between murder and manslaughter: The criterion to 
have »knowingly and willingly« killed no longer can be objectively proved but is reduced 
to society's abhorrence of killing. Anybody who commits a crime that is sufficiently 
abhorred by society will be presumed to have done so intentionally. A value judgment is 
inserted into, even becomes the foundation of, the criterion of intention which was meant 
to be procedural. 
The same »switch« often occurs in arguments against the possibility of an autono-
mous suicide: Since normal people do not desire to die, anybody intending suicide must be 
depressed or otherwise incompetent. The decision to kill oneself by definition cannot be 
the result of an effective deliberation. 
In his definition of autonomy as »effective deliberation« Miller tries to prevent such 
circular conclusions by defining a »rational« decision as one that (a) does not stem from 
ignorance of the alternatives which the patient may never before have experienced; (b) is 
not ad hoc and transient; and (c) consistent with other values cherished by the patient. 
Although this definition does not contain references to particular societal values, the value 
of freedom no longer is the single value granted a primary status. All three criteria seem 
to suggest that a bizarre, outlandish, sudden decision (while fully voluntary in the sense of 
being unrestrained) would not be autonomous. Take the example given by Beauchamp 
and Childress in the third edition of their Principles of Biomedical Ethics: "An autono-
mous person who signs a consent form without reading ... the form is qualified to give an 
informed consent but has nonetheless failed to do so because of a failure to act autono-
mously" [Beauchamp and Childress 1983, p. 68]. Ignorance, even if willful, limits 
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autonomy. A decision in favor of a course of action that is not optimal in the eyes of the 
health care provider is to be respected, because individuals are the best judges of their 
own good. But the respect does not concern the personal freedom as such: It concerns the 
patient's well-being which he can judge best but only when he makes an effort to do so. 
A freak decision is not in his well-being and therefore not autonomous in the sense of 
»deserving respect«. 
Similarly, the latter two criteria (b and c) restrict the value of pure noninterference 
by the value inherent in the uniqueness of the individual patient's life, and, as such, do 
not allow for a purely procedural assessment of competency. Whether ignorance possibly 
hampers the autonomy of the patient could in theory be assessed by questioning a large 
group of similarly diagnosed patients, about, for example, their understanding of the 
consequences of radiotherapy. If most have clearly a sufficient understanding, it is not 
unlikely that the patient refusing such radiotherapy has the same understanding and cannot 
be considered incompetent out of ignorance. Whether his decision is persistent and 
consistent with other values cherished by him, however, cannot be assessed with a similar 
empirical survey. His refusal must be compared with his own unique life history and 
attitudes. 
How is the physician to examine that unique and personal subjectivity of his patient? 
A history of repeated requests to be allowed to die when the chances of recovery were to 
become very poor, or a written living-will may provide formal proof about the persistence 
of the wish, and thereby indirectly about her attitude. But what about the many patients 
who do not have such a testament? Surely, one may not assume they are incompetent and 
their decisions not autonomous. At most, one could conclude that no evidence either pro 
or con exists. But if, as most advocates - some gladly, some grudgingly - admit, a 
decision cannot be deemed autonomous merely and only when and because it is voluntary 
and based on effective deliberation, if, that is, something like »moral reflection« and/or 
»authenticity« are (also) required for an autonomous decision, procedures no longer suffice 
to assess competency. 
A decision reveals (2.a) moral reflection if the values underlying the decision are 
underwritten by the patient. The patient not only is aware of those values (as effective 
deliberation requires); he accepts them and construes his life on that basis. A decision, 
according to Miller, is authentic when it is consistent with the actor's personal values, 
dispositions, attitudes, and intentions. The patient is acting in character. Whereas the 
criterion of moral reflection seems to be first and foremost a matter of moral psychology, 
(2.b) authenticity seems to pertain to the ontology of moral choice.59 
59. As mentioned before (see footnote 58), Miller takes »moral reflection« to be the deepest and 
most demanding version of autonomy, rather than »authenticity«. Yet he also acknowledges 
that »moral reflection« determines whether the person's decision is (in)authentic. 
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Unfortunately, Miller provides few references about the users of the fourth concept 
of autonomy. But it takes little time to find a hand-full of famous (bio)ethicists employing 
the concept of authenticity (which in many a case turns out to be defined as moral 
reflection in Miller's sense). The common reference to this concept in American bioethics 
probably is due to the significance contributed to this notion by various well-known 
European philosophers such as Sartre and Heidegger. A discussion of the existentialists' 
use of the concept of authenticity must wait until the next chapter, but it will soon turn out 
that American bioethicists such as Childress, Beauchamp, Faden and McCullough either 
fail to notice the radical revisions which such a concept force on traditional bioethics, or 
disregard the peculiar nature of the concept in order to include it in their theories (only to 
throw it out again as a useless operationalization of autonomy60). 
Beauchamp and McCullough write that "[a]uthenticity generally connotes something 
authoritative, genuine, and true". Authentic choices differ from those "... motivated by 
desires and aversions of a momentary, brief, or fleeting duration" [Beauchamp and 
McCullough 1984, p. 113]. Faden and Beauchamp denote actions as being authentic 
when they are consistent with "... a person's reflectively accepted values and behavior 
...". Autonomy as authenticity would require actions to "... faithfully represent the 
values, attitudes, motivations, and life plans that the individual personally accepts upon 
due consideration of the way he or she wishes to live" [Faden and Beauchamp 1986, p. 
263]. Again, the question emerges how a physician is to assess the patient's values, 
attitudes, motivations, and life plans in a procedural, empirical manner? As Beauchamp 
and Childress contend, "... once the criteria for determining incompetence have been 
established, it is in principle an empirical question whether someone is competent or 
incompetent under those criteria" [Beauchamp and Childress 1983, p. 73]. But are 
nonvaluative criteria for competence available? 
One operationalization of authenticity is suggested by Beauchamp and McCullough: 
"... [T]he patient's expressed preferences or behaviors are authentic only if the person is 
acting in character by making choices that are consistent with what would reasonably be 
expected based on past performance" [Beauchamp and McCullough 1984, p. 113; 
emphasis added - JW\. This operationalization explains why the authors end up refuting 
authenticity as an acceptable definition of autonomy: Authenticity (understood as consis-
tence with past performances) is bound too much to the past. While the past is never 
perfect (in the grammatical sense of that term), in that attitudes and values shaped in the 
past influence the present and future, man sometimes has to cope with radical changes in 
life that (seem to) constitute a radical break with the past and its values. Serious disease, 
60. It is indicative that unlike the 2nd edition, the considerably revised chapter 3 on autonomy in 
the 3rd edition of Beauchamp and Childress' textbook Principles of Biomedical Ethics from 
1989, no longer contains a reference to the concept of authenticity. 
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chronic disorders, new handicaps all may force the person to reorient his life. It is 
because of the radical changes that disease may force upon us, that Beauchamp and 
McCullough disapprove of autonomy as authenticity: "Once we ascertain the person's 
reasons [for his unusual decision - JW], it may turn out that behavior and choices 
seemingly out of character are genuinely autonomous" [Beauchamp and McCullough 
1984, p. 114]. 
Fearing paternalistic compulsion, Childress warns us that we only tend to wonder 
about the level of autonomy when decisions are "... not consistent with what we know 
about the person (e.g., a sudden and unexpected decision to discontinue dialysis by a man 
who has displayed considerable courage and zest for life despite his years of disability)" 
[Childress 1982, p. 64]. Rather than revealing incompetence to make autonomous 
decisions, the »suddenness« of the decision may reveal the lack of knowledge and insight 
in the patient's subjective values. Notice, however, that this objection does not refute the 
need of an autonomous decision to be in line with the values of the patient. It merely 
refutes the ability of third persons to obtain accurate knowledge of those values. 
Remarkably, Miller's four definitions of autonomy have yielded four refutations, 
which forces us to reexamine our prior understanding of autonomy that enabled the very 
examination. Apparently, there is a kind of quite common decision which deserves the 
respect of third persons. The nature of that decision has connotations with freedom but its 
respectability does not merely stem from the fact that it is a free, non-compelled decision. 
The decision ought to benefit the patient's well-being as well. But according to minimalist 
ethics, that well-being cannot be assessed by a third person. Given the assumption that 
the patient is able to assess his own interests if he makes an effort, autonomy thus implies 
the requirement of the patient to understand the context and consequences. This demon-
strates that the good of the patient is assumed to be the result of, or at any rate best 
assessed via a set of informed, rational decisions (rather than, e.g., the instantaneous 
intuitions, imitation, life experience, or faith). 
The patient's decision may come quite unexpected for the outsider and may seem to 
be out of character. Values change; people may undergo conversions or be forced to alter 
their basic outlook on life. And since the subjectivity of another human being cannot be 
known except via the utterances (in word or act) by the other person, the physician is 
likely to be unaware of sudden changes in patient values. But again, the refutation of 
authenticity as a criterion of autonomous decisions does not imply a refutation of 
authenticity itself, that is, when it is understood to encompass both past and present 
patient values. The refutation is merely based in the assumed inability of the physician to 
understand the subjective values of his patient. 
In sum, the well-being of the patient, his best interests, his personal values, the 
quality of life he appreciates, his »good« is at stake, and neither first nor foremost the 
patient's freedom. Paternalistic beneficence, that is, doing what is good for the patient on 
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his behalf, is overridden by autonomy as non-compelled, informed, rational self-determi-
nation only because it is assumed that the good of the patient cannot be better known by a 
health care provider than by the patient himself. Autonomy, thus, turns out to be the 
primary moral principle by default. The question remains, whether this default is a 
necessary default. Is it really impossible to gain insight in the best interests of individual 
human beings? Are physicians and patients moral strangers to one another? 
For the Patient's Good 
In the previous subsection, I concluded that the principle of autonomy reigns by default, 
on the unproven presumption, that is, that patients and physicians are moral strangers to 
one another and that the good of the patient is inaccessible to the physician. This 
assumption, however, is not taken for granted by all American bioethicists. As the title of 
their 1988 For the Patient's Good: The Restoration of Beneficence in Health Care 
indicates, Pellegrino and Thomasma undertake an attempt to counter minimalist ethics in 
search of »The Good« of the patient. The authors set out to reestablish »beneficence«, that 
is »doing good«, as the founding principle of health care. While acknowledging that 
health care providers historically may have been too paternalistic in their practice, too 
rapidly forcing their professional values on the patients without the patients' consent, 
Pellegrino and Thomasma refuse to base their theory of bioethics solely on the principle 
of autonomy. 
The authors assert that in a beneficence-based model, no preset hierarchy of ranked 
values is presupposed. Unlike the autonomy-model, where autonomy is the single most 
important value that seldom if never can be overridden by other values, the ethical 
evaluation of each case must be handled individually for the benefits of each patient may 
(to some extent) differ: "No ethical stance, other than acting for the patient's best interest, 
is applied beforehand" [p. 33]. However, the authors hurry to emphasize that "[t]his is 
not to say ... that general ethical axioms applied to more than one patient are invalid" [p. 
33]. They list four so-called »axioms« that the physician (but not the patient ?) should 
employ in his evaluation of each individual case: (1) The interaction should warrant full 
freedom of patient and doctor to make informed decisions and to engage in as well as to 
withdraw from the relationship; (2) physicians have greater responsibility because they 
have more information and power; (3) physicians must respect and comprehend moral 
ambiguity yet not abandon the search for what it right and good in each decision; and (4) 
physicians must have personal moral integrity. 
Whereas the second of these axioms points to the seductive dangers inherent in any 
kind of power, even if exerted with good intentions, the third to the dangers inherent in 
powerlessness, and the fourth to the consequent need of moral integrity and prudential 
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decision-making - whatever that exactly may be -, whereas, in sum, the latter three 
criteria all concern the kind of disposition that is necessary for the patient's good to be 
discovered, the first axiom is of a different order: It concerns concrete actions rather than 
attitudes. This focus on actions deserves further analysis for it leads Pellegrino and 
Thomasma's theory in a particular direction that will turn out to be rather problematic. 
Some quotes from their second chapter, entitled Limitations of Autonomy and 
Paternalism: Towards a Model of Beneficence, may further illustrate this point. Having 
criticized both radical autonomy (abandoning the patient) and radical paternalism (coercing 
the patient into what may not be in his benefit), from the very beginning they define their 
theory as an action theory, "A Model for Medical Decisions", as the title of the first 
paragraph devoted specifically to beneficence is entitled [p. 25; emphasis added - JW]. 
And in accordance with its title, the paragraph starts out mentioning various »levels« of 
beneficence: Not doing harm, preventing harm, promoting the patient's best interest, all 
examples of actions. In and by itself, there is nothing wrong with defining beneficence as 
an action theory. After all, the term literally means: Doing good. But doing good 
assumes knowing what is good. Focussing on the pragmatic aspects of beneficence prior 
to analyzing what the good of the patient is all about - and doing so without any indication 
to the reader of their awareness of this reverse order -, suggests that the good of the 
patient is already known, self-evident, or not in need of an in-depth analysis. This is 
playing into the hands of libertarian autonomy-advocates who not only claim that the good 
of the patient is not known and cannot be known, but actually have a number of rather 
strong arguments in favor of their position. 
What is even more, by jumping to the issue of decision-making without first 
explaining what exactly the good of the patient is - not in their eyes, not in the eyes of the 
health care provider, not according to the subjective unreflected opinion of any person 
other than the patient herself, but what it is for the patient -, they confirm the very 
critique of libertarians: Any theory of beneficence is nothing more than a form of 
unjustified coercion, paternalism of the worst kind. For fair paternalism must assume as a 
minimum condition of justifiability that the health care provider (in relevant situations) 
knows what is good for the patient, at least, knows it better than anybody else, including 
the patient. Simply contending - as Pellegrino and Thomasma do - that their beneficence 
model differs from the paternalism model in linking the best interests of the patient with 
his preferences as opposed to with the physician's preferences [see p. 29], is a strawman 
fallacy. For in a fair paternalistic model, it is not claimed that the physician should act 
according to his own preferences, his own "intellectual convictions or emotional impuls-
es" [p. 32], but in accordance with the patient's best interests as they are assessed with as 
much objectivity as possible. 
If it is possible to discern what is good for the patient better than the patient himself, 
that is not sufficient reason to force this insight upon the patient by treating him without 
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his consent. On the other hand, the assumption that the patient generally or even always 
knows best what is good for him is not sufficient reason to grant him all decision-making 
power. In other words, the question of decision-making power and the question of the 
good are two related but essentially different questions. The question to be solved first is 
not who decides but what is the right decision. Assuming (1) that every physician is 
obligated to act in the best interest of his patient (an assumption which is true for both the 
autonomy-based and the paternalistic models); and assuming (2) that every patient prefers 
the treatment which is in his best interest (an assumption that even holds in the case of the 
masochist or the suicidal person who think pain and respectively death is in their best 
interest), the question is how the patient's best interests - being equal to his preferences -
can be identified. 
Autonomy-based theories usually assume that the patient's verbal expressions are the 
most reliable indication of his interests. They grant that the patient's verbal expressions 
are not always correct, but there is no other way to establish the patient's preferences 
more accurately. The patient is a »black-box« (in the sense of a »camera obscura«): If 
what he truly thinks, feels, wants, desires, appreciates, and values can be known to 
anybody at all, then only to the patient himself. The practical consequence of this 
hypothesis is that the attending physician should always act in accordance with the 
patient's verbally expressed preferences (assuming, furthermore, that it is better to give a 
self-deceiving patient his way than to act contrary to the preferences - being equal to his 
interests - of an awkwardly speaking yet competent patient61). 
Paternalistic theories, on the other hand, maintain that an outsider (someone outside 
of the person's subjective self such as the physician), sometimes is able to know what the 
patient really prefers (that is, what is in her best interest), even more accurately than the 
patient herself. The patient is like the child who must be guarded by his parent(s). From 
this it follows that the physician should not always abide by the patient's verbally 
expressed preferences, particularly not when the physician is convinced that the patient is 
deceiving herself in her verbally expressed preferences. 
Elsewhere, Pellegrino and Thomasma correctly maintain that those ethicists "... who 
defend the absoluteness of patient autonomy on moral grounds neglect the fact that 
'decision making' among humans is an interpersonal transaction. Thus they downgrade 
the bilaterality of the physician-patient relationship" [p. 14]. Whereas it is true that most 
of these ethicists downgrade the doctor-patient relationship - one may even say, annihilate 
that relationship - this is not the direct result of placing the decision-making power fully in 
the hands of the patient nor does absolute patient autonomy necessarily imply such a 
breakdown of the doctor-patient relationship. That both tend to occur in one and the same 
theory of bioethics, for instance in Engelhardt's Foundations, is due to the particular 
61. This assumption will be further examined in the Chapter 7. 
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assumption underlying such theories which gives way to both a breakdown of the 
relationship and full patient autonomy. It is the assumption that no non-contractual 
agreement can be reached about the good of the patient which makes a genuine, that is, 
precontractual relationship impossible. When agreeing to this assumption one is forced to 
grant the patient, being the only judge of his own good, full autonomy. Patient autono­
my, however, can also be justified without making such a minimalistic assumption. 
Maybe the patient should be granted full autonomy, because not doing so is denying him 
responsibility over his own course of life. If the physician has correct knowledge of the 
good of the patient, he may try to convince the patient, but not force that course of action 
upon her, for that would be taking away his fellow human being's freedom and responsi­
bility. 
In Chapter 7, I will in fact defend a kind of »blend« of the paternalism and autonomy 
models. The difference between Pellegrino and Thomasma's blend and my blend, is that 
they accept the black-box assumption underlying the autonomy-model yet advocate a 
paternalistic action-theory, whereas I will try to verify the hypothesis underlying the 
paternalism model, yet argue that an autonomy-based model nonetheless ought to be 
chosen as action theory. Pellegrino and Thomasma assert that "[pjatient autonomy 
models often have their origins in the civil and human rights movement rather than in an 
ontology of relations specific to medicine and healing" [p. 15]. Correct as this may be in 
a historic perspective, what the authors are rather trying to assert, namely that an ontology 
of healing excludes a theory of rights, is not true. Without an ontology of healing, 
granting the patient an absolute right to autonomy seems the only justifiable course of 
action. But knowledge of the good of the patient based in an ontology of healing, in and 
by itself is not sufficient justification to reduce the patient's right to final decision-making. 
If my theory is to be labelled, I would opt for something along the lines of »benevolence 
based in a personalist medical anthropology«. Note the difference: Bene-volence, wanting 
the good of the patient, as opposed to Ъепе-ficence, acting in accordance with the good of 
the patient. 
But let us return for another moment to Pellegrino and Thomasma's beneficence 
model. Their model is the expression of the authors' dissatisfaction with both the 
autonomist and the paternalist models without, however, being able to develop a consistent 
new model. The authors clearly tend towards the practical consequences of the paternalist 
model, but have great difficulty in proving the truth of the assumption underlying the 
paternalist model. They fail to outline a theory of the patient's good. In fact, they 
explicitly admit that they cannot address the question "... whether particular interpreta­
tions of patient good are metaphysically sound. Rather, the focus is on the need for 
physicians, patients, and families to make decisions together, even though widely 
divergent interpretations do occur, and the need for dealing with conflicts, when they 
occur, in a morally defensible way" [p. 77]. The patient essentially remains the black-box 
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of the autonomy-based model The authors sole justification for behaving paternahstically 
lies m the presumed decision-making incompetence of the patient Like autonomists, they 
maintain that the verbal wishes of a patient who is incompetent may be disregarded, they 
only differ from »autonomists« in that they take more patients to be incompetent 
Pellegrino and Thomasma stress that " people who are incapacitated by disease or 
trauma should not be abandoned to their autonomy " [p 17] Having stressed the need 
for "an ontology of relations specific to medicine and healing" [p 15], the authors 
continue with a paragraph entitled Philosophical Critique of Autonomy [see ρ 16-18] 
However, in this paragraph they do not outline what kind of an ontology of medicine they 
have in mind, they do not outline what it means to be diseased (Gr ontos = being, logos 
= thought, reason) Instead, they try to show that disease in many patients limits their 
ability to make rational decisions In an existential subsection specifically devoted to "The 
Fact of Illness", the authors explain "To 'be' sick is to be subject to the pathophysiologi­
cal effects of illness, pain, and fear, and to the special professional and institutional 
environment m which decisions occur Self-direction is marred by the way disease may 
disrupt the unity of the self, ego, and body Life plans are threatened by the fimtude of 
human life revealed in illness Deliberation and application are impeded by the distrac­
tions of pain and fear, or by the process of institutionalization" [p 17] Notice how the 
authors jump from ontology via psychology to the question of decision-making Since few 
defenders of patient autonomy will deny that in exceptional circumstances, the enactment 
of the right to autonomy may have to be suspended, Pellegrino and Thomasma underline 
their view once more by concluding this paragraph with the statement - a mere assertion, 
m fact - that "[t]he extent to which the operations of autonomy can be impeded by 
becoming and being a patient is impressive" [p 17, emphasis added - JW)62 "A patient 
m the state oí 'wounded humanity" that illness implies is not capable of totally free, 
informed consent or autonomy Disease and accidents disrupt the personal integration 
normally enjoyed by the patient and in its place, cause anxiety, fear, pain, dread, and a 
host of other impediments to acts that are full, free and voluntary" [p 106] "Simply 
62 The authors give one more argument in favor of their view, namely that a 1985 Medline 
search " produced eighty-six articles directly related to the impact of disease on autonomy 
and life adjustments " (emphasis by the authors) However, Pellegrino and Thomasma fail 
to explain (1) how the search was done, (2) what "directly related" means, (3) why 86 is 
such an impressive number (after all, the total number of articles in the Medline 1985 year 
that pertain to ethics when searching with the exploded keyword ethics, is 1384), (4) why the 
authors are convinced that the 86 articles do not all pertain to a very small number of 
diseases, and finally (5), why the authors are convinced that "the impact of disease on 
autonomy" is significant and not negligible according to those 86 articles The conclusion 
from this empirical fact, namely that "the data strongly suggest that autonomy is limited by 
illness and disease, and that any model of the doctor-patient relationship must take this 
limitation into account", obviously does not follow [Pellegrino and Thomasma 1988, ρ 18] 
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being hospitalized causes stress and anxiety ... . Illness, therefore, always distorts 
competence to make decisions in one's own interest" [p. 145; emphasis added - JW\. 
However, Pellegrino and Thomasma hurry to add that "[o]f course, the autonomy of 
most patients is only mildly incapacitated by disease. ... On the whole, patients' choices 
can and should be accepted" [p. 17]. "... [UJnless the patient is incompetent, the 
physician is obligated to act for the good conceived by the patient and to support the 
patient's goals" [p. 76]. Both quotes imply that it is all primarily a matter of the degree 
of decision-making (in)competence. The authors explicitly reject this interpretation of 
their theory: It unjustly narrows the essence of the doctor-patient relationship [see p. 18]. 
The relationship, so they defend, is shaped around the patient's good, which has many 
components: (1) The biomedical good, the patient's (2a) best interests under the circum-
stances as well as his (2b) ultimate good, and (3) the good of the patient as a human 
person [see p. 76-77].M 
(1) Thomasma and Pellegrino correctly stress that the biomedical good is »instrumen-
tal« in that it provides the »technical« means to realize the patient's good. A treatment 
that is not indicated, that does not adequately bring about the desired effect, is not good. 
But the desired good itself is not and cannot be established by biomedical science, if only 
because it is patient-specific whereas science (by definition) is generalist [see p. 78-79]. 
(2a) The patient's best interests, given the circumstances, according to the authors 
are the "... aims, plans, and preferences peculiar to him and chosen by him at a particular 
time. ... The good in this sense is equatable with anything that is an object of interest for 
this patient. ... We cannot know what this is until we ask the patient" [p. 80]. This quote 
suggests one more confirmation of the black-box theory, but Pellegrino and Thomasma 
immediately continue that accepting the patient's decision does not imply agreement. In 
what sense, we may wonder? Surely, the physician may have a different opinion about 
the interests of the patient, but if the patient's interests are genuinely subjective, and if 
there is no other more objective test, what relevance does such disagreement have (other 
than providing the physician an argument to autonomously refuse the treatment that would 
match the patient's own views of her best interests)? 
The authors argue that "[i]t is no revelation that we may know the good but do not 
infallibly choose it" [p. 80]. Although this certainly is not self-evident - Socrates already 
claimed exactly the opposite in Plato's Protagoras [1980*, §345d-e] -, again the question 
arises what this means if there is no objective test of the patient's best interests? That 
Pellegrino and Thomasma do not accept such a subjectivist stance is revealed by another 
sentence in the very same paragraph: "The physician must give the most serious weight to 
the patient's judgment of his own interests in making decisions" [p. 80; emphasis added -
63. Thomasma and Pellegrino list the components in a different order. 
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JW]. Weighing presumes an objective scale that supersedes the patient's subjective 
judgment and, obviously, also the physician's subjective opinions. 
(2b) In any event, that measure of objectivity is not the patient's ultimate good, his 
"... telos of human life as it is perceived by the patient, his or her view of the meaning 
and destiny of human existence" [p. 81]. For that, according to the authors, may be 
interpreted differently by different persons as well. Moreover, Pellegrino and Thomasma 
conclude their analysis of the patient's ultimate good arguing that "[w]hen conflicts arise 
in making clinical decisions with moral overtones, this final concept is the most pervasive, 
[but also - JW\ the least negotiable, and often the least explicit presupposition" [p. 78]. 
In line with their skipping the development of a metaphysical theory of the good, they 
limit their remarks about this last point to the observation that there exist many incompati-
ble ideas and theories about the ultimate good. 
(3) Thus we are left with the good of the patient as a human person, which 
Pellegrino and Thomasma consider to be beyond subjective or otherwise relativist 
interpretation. But it immediately rums out to be a very formal good as well: The good to 
make decisions, whatever kind of decisions [see p. 80-81]. The assumed primacy of this 
third component of the patient's good provides the foundation for Pellegrino and Thomas-
ma's emphasis on the importance of patient self-determination. Indeed, all throughout the 
book there seem to be but two alternatives: Either the patient is competent to make his 
own valuative decisions, upon which the physician (in principle) should act; or the patient 
is no longer competent, in which case a procedural solution is indicated (along the lines of 
former patient expressions, living wills, proxy consents, hospital ethics committee 
resolution, and finally legal recourse). It is only when no information whatsoever can be 
obtained about the patient's values that the physician should base treatment decisions 
solely on medical indications [see p. 97], and thus, on the generalist values implied in 
medical science (such as the value of life, pain freeness and comfort). A physician 
treating an incompetent patient should honor her personhood, Pellegrino and Thomasma 
conclude, "... by deciding what is in ... her best interest on the basis on what other 
patients like her, under similar conditions but competent, have tended to choose" [p. 146; 
emphasis added - JW]. 
It thus must be concluded that in spite of many keen observations by the authors 
about the dangers of an autonomy-based model of medical ethics, in spite of their plea 
against patient abandonment, the individual patient remains a black-box who can only 
open-up himself but cannot be opened up. Medical ethics, as it is understood by Pelleg-
rino and Thomasma, focusses on the question who at some moment knows best, not what 
is best for the patient. 
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Ethics and the Resolution of Controversies 
In order to understand the lay-out of much of contemporary clinical ethical thinking we 
had to work our way down to its anthropological groundwork. It is there that we ran into 
the widespread conviction that the human being is essentially a black-box. Obviously, it 
is at that level that the development of an alternative approach to clinical ethics must begin 
as well. The second half of this study, therefore, will start with an examination of the 
notion of »sympathy« as a possible alternative to the black-box hypothesis, followed by a 
chapter on the relationship between ethics and anthropology more generally. But prior to 
concluding this first critical half of the book, there is one important question left to 
answer: How come so many bioethicists focus on the question who at some moment 
knows best, rather than what is best for the patient? Why is much of bioethical thinking 
at all preoccupied with decision-making? If we are to develop a plausible alternative 
approach to some of the prominent clinical ethical theories not only do we need to 
understand their peculiar focus and underlying presuppositions but also what has motivated 
this focus on decision-making issues. 
Granted, health care needs tend to require decisions; physicians in many an instance 
do not have the luxury of calm reflection, extensive conversations with their patients, and 
consultation with colleagues, nurses, ministers, family, etc. But this is certainly not the 
case in all instances. In fact, in most instances of patient care, lack of time probably 
сагшог justify such proceduralism. Even more so, if there is increasingly less time, it 
does not mean that this deplorable development should simply be condoned and in a sense 
sanctioned with procedural remedies. Adopting a legal paradigm, that is, the right to self-
determination and freedom of third-person interference, which is based (at least in theory) 
on distrust - distrust in the good intentions of other human beings, and distrust in their 
ability (in spite of good intentions) not to harm others - does not foster the beneficence-in­
trust which Pellegrino and Thomasma correctly take to be the core of the doctor-patient 
relationship. 
Naturally, regardless the amount of time available to physician and patient to 
establish a relationship of trust, regardless the extent of the patient and physician's efforts 
to discover the patient's good as their guide in deciding on a course of action, moral 
uncertainty will remain. The individuality of the patient precludes absolute certainty, in 
both the medical-technical64 and moral respect. Careful conductive arguing may yield 
64. In the past decades, clinical medicine has increasingly attempted to develop therapy protocols 
based on the consensus of experts. This standardization is a very fortunate development but 
not because it makes physician decision-making any more easy. Clinical protocols do not 
reflect a minimalist consensus among physicians that results from removing any item about 
which there is no agreement. Rather, such protocols present the »state of the art«, the 
(continued...) 
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conversion, but no certainty. But why is that lack of certainty, that »aporia« [Wieland 
1989], and the consequent possibility of dissensus so problematic? If we are living in a 
pluralistic world, and if pluralism not only is a necessary evil but maybe even something 
to be cherished, wherefrom this eagerness to rid the world of dissensus by imposing on it 
a tight network of decision-making rules and procedures? Why are bioethicists so willing 
and eager to settle moral disputes between care providers and their patients? 
Engelhardt provides a simple answer. Bioethics is not a theory of the good in the 
context of health care, but "a means for resolving controversies regarding proper conduct" 
[Engelhardt 1986, p. 39], a foundation for health care policy. This understanding of the 
nature of bioethics is already clear in the Preface to his Foundations where he says: 
"Though the volume offers no legal advice, it does offer points of departure for reassess-
ing both law and public policy" [p. ix]. Even more radically, in his Bioethics and Secular 
Humanism from 1991 Engelhardt contends: "... [M]orality is tied to power..., moral 
discussions must inevitably consider under what circumstances who should conform to 
whose moral vision. ... To articulate a moral theory is in the end to select a political 
structure. ... The lineaments of permissible political action are central to a secular 
bioethics which must indicate what moral views may be imposed on whom, by whom, and 
in what circumstances" [p. xii]. 
A reasonable and authoritative delineation of the conditions for the forceful yet 
justifiable imposition of particular »moral visions« on the benefits of health care is a 
necessary condition for a health policy and system of health law. But is health care ethics 
bound by the same condition? Is health care ethics meant to provide the foundation of 
health policy as Engelhardt claims? Is such ethics still ethics? As mentioned, Engelhardt 
defines ethics as a nonviolent means for resolving moral disputes. Ethics, consequently, 
is a mere »instrument«, possibly one among many nonviolent instruments to solve 
disputes. Three questions thus arise: (1) Firstly, why at all should one try to solve moral 
disputes; (2) secondly, why is ethics preferable to any other method; (3) thirdly and most 
importantly, is ethics itself really non-violent? 
(1) The first question cannot be addressed prior to having answered the question 
what constitutes a controversy about moral issues, or in Engelhardt's vocabulary, about 
64. (...continued) 
treatment modules that in particular, specified circumstances yield the best results according 
to the latest solid research data. The presence of a protocol impedes physicians from too 
quickly justifying their actions in terms of their so called professional (that is, subjective) 
judgments. Deviating from the standard requires explicit justification. But at the same time, 
protocols are not drafted to treat every patient in a routine manner. The physician is 
required to assess to what extent an individual patient meets the conditions specified by the 
protocol. Uncertainty, therefore, will always remain in this process, and continued 
observation and evaluation remains important. 
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proper conduct? Controversies, when pertaining to practice rather than theory, always 
regard the question what should be done, what is proper conduct. Whether to deploy 
United Nations military, to lower national interest rates, to shut down a nuclear plant, or 
to take another X-ray, are all questions about conduct and they could all be matters of 
controversy. If the controversy in combination with the need to act one way or another 
explains as well as justifies the emphasis on decision-making, what distinguishes a moral 
controversy from any other practical controversy? Or to formulate the question even 
sharper: Even if a difference could be detected, why would any such difference be 
relevant? It could be the case that the relevance is to be located in the method of 
resolution: Moral controversies require a peculiar method of decision-making. Why 
ethics? This leads us to the second question. 
(2) It goes without saying that a substantive bioethics is of little use as a foundation 
of health policy. Given the empirical fact of a plurality of moral convictions, any policy 
based on a particular substantial ethics is bound not to yield sufficient nodders to be 
implemented and to thus resolve all or even most controversies. What, then, is the main 
advantage of a procedural ethics to other methods of conflict resolution? Why, for 
instance, not simply opting for the proven method of politics? 
Unlike other, perhaps more swift means of controversy resolution such as force, 
information manipulation, counseling, etc., politics - and I am thinking of democratic 
politics - seems to be a golden mean between effectiveness and freedom. It seems to 
function fine when resolving economic, military, environmental and other social disputes. 
So what makes disputes about moral matters so special that they require a different 
method? In fact, many medical moral issues are already being handled via politics. 
Many countries have legalized abortion, others have explicitly prohibited it by law; some 
nations have legislated or are in the process of legislating transplantation, human experi-
mentation, manipulation of embryos, euthanasia, informed consent, living wills, etc. The 
neat thing of legislation is that the question regarding what is the right thing to do need 
not be answered; it suffices that a majority shares the same opinion as to what is right. 
Moreover, a law can be revised, changed, even reversed, and to do so, there is no need to 
first prove that the opinion leading up to the original law was in some sense mistaken and 
the law immoral. One merely needs to find another majority. 
At the institutional level one could organize similar elections for the hospital »ethics« 
committee, and by means of majority vote, establish policies on institutional »moral« 
matters. But this example reveals that so-called »ethical« methods of conflict resolution 
are not exactly similar to political methods. Although some hospital ethics committees 
have accepted majority voting as final means of conflict resolution, their members are 
seldom if ever elected by the institution. They tend to be carefully selected and appointed 
(either by the hospital board or medical staff). The net result of that selective process is 
that some people cannot become chairperson (e.g., if the chairperson must be a physician) 
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while other people working in the institution cannot obtain membership at all, notably 
when they hold quite principled view-points and, hence, cannot "tolerate substantial 
ambiguity" [Ross e.a. 1986, p. 37] Whereas the former discrimination (only physicians 
as chairs) is usually justified in terms of the authority of the committee in the hospital, 
that is, in purely political terms, the latter form of discrimination (no "inflexible and 
judgmental" members serving as a "lobbyist for special interests" such as the right-to-life) 
is justified because it would hinder the process of consensus [Rues and Weaver 1989, p. 
129]. But why consensus? Why is majority agreement insufficient? 
This phenomenon, so it seems, can only be adequately explained by retaining some 
difference between politics and ethics in the sense of the distinction already made in the 
second chapter, that certain things may be prudential to do but they may not be moral. 
The recognition that something should (not) be done underlies politics; the recognition that 
something ought (not) be done underlies ethics (see p. 21). Hospital ethics committees, 
then, should aim at consensus rather than majority vote, because genuine consensus, that 
is, shared understanding rather than negotiated agreement, implies that all members of the 
committee accede that X or Y ought (not) be done in the clinic. A negotiated deal, let 
alone majority voting, is hardly a guarantee that the course of action agreed upon is of 
more moral quality that just any option, including the kind of option that many, even the 
majority would go for. Obviously, if we were to ask, next, how consensus is to be 
reached given the plurality of moral opinions in western societies, including health care 
institutions, we are right back to the core question of this chapter. At this place, 
however, another peculiar phenomenon becomes visible. 
(3) If it is the case that (i) so called »moral« controversies require not just any 
resolution but one that guarantees moral quality, and if therefore (ii) not any kind of 
agreement will do, but only the kind of agreement that results from a process where 
minority opinions are not simply voted out but incorporated in the consensus, the 
exclusion of principled members from ethics committees and the like is highly problemat-
ic. The importance of involving many different moral opinions is professed, yet particular 
moral opinions are intentionally banned. This can be justified only if in the end the fact 
of a decision is more important than the content of the decision. But politics under the 
flag of ethics is »managing« morality (see also p. 115), the administration of good and 
evil. We would have to conclude that the answer to the third question is clearly negative: 
Ethics is quite violent. If this is the price to be paid for the solution of moral dilemmas 
one starts wondering whether the first question raised should not be answered negatively; 
maybe solving moral dilemmas should not be a primary goal of ethics at all. 
If the danger of such sophisticated political violence is one of the dangers inherent in 
a preoccupation with resolving moral dilemmas between care providers and patients, 
additional dangers can be discerned. In its attempt to solve moral dilemmas by orchestrat-
ing the formation of moral consensus, bioethics is showing alarmingly many similarities 
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with technology [Ten Have 1985, Van Tongeren 1992a] Three mam aspects of common 
bioethical approaches reveal the similarity with technological approaches 
Firstly, whereas fundamental science is driven by a desire to obtain knowledge and 
insight in the structures of our world, technology owes its existence to the concurrent 
desire of mankind to manipulate the way things are to meet man's own purposes 
Likewise, there is the strong and one-sided emphasis on problem-solving in bioethics and 
the tendency of bioethicists to only get involved once problems arise This, we may add, 
is aptly illustrated by the history of the whole bioethics movement, as well as much of the 
practice of so called clinical bioethics Rather than a philosophical or theological 
enterprise (which it ought to be according to Van Tongeren), bioethics tends to become 
something like "ethical engineering" [Van Tongeren 1992\ ρ 1379], a term already used 
by Caplan [Caplan 1983, see also Ten Have and Kimsma 1987] a 
Secondly, there is the methodology employed Bioethicists address such problems by 
laying out in detail the current dilemma, preferably by means of some kind of model, 
diagram or checklist, which is to yield an orderly and clear-cut overview in terms of 
standardized and operationahzeable vocabulary This, m tum, is necessary to enable a 
comparison between the various »values« that are at stake Since values tend to be 
subjective, a common, universal denominator is needed which is found in quantification 
However, as Engelhardt has himself admitted, the fundamental difficulty in establishing an 
objective moral system is comparing the interests of one group of people versus other 
involved groups "How does one [for example - JW] balance interests in treating a 
pregnant woman with a drug to control a not immediately fatal but serious disease, with 
the risk of the drug's damaging the fetus she is carrying''" [Engelhardt 1986, ρ 33] In 
order to balance these interests it must be presumed, among others, that two more 
fundamental questions have been answered What exactly are the interests of the woman, 
and what exactly are those of the unborn fetus If we are to take serious the adage of a 
casuistic, situational, clinical ethics, someone's interests cannot be adequately established 
without already taking into account the local and historical context Thus, to establish the 
interests of the pregnant woman one must from the outset take into account her being 
pregnant with a child that is her own flesh and blood as well as her being seriously 
diseased, her love of her unborn child as well as her desire to live, the unbom child's 
right to protection against damaging drugs as well as the limited nature of any right But 
the presumed impossibility of such a substantive assessment of values and interests was 
the very justification of a procedural ethics and comparison and balancing 
65 Van Willigenburg has objected - and correctly so - that this pejorative use of the »engineer­
ing« metaphor does not do justice to the practice of engineering [see 1993, ρ 189] He 
does, however, wholeheartedly underwrite the idea that bioethics should be geared towards 
the resolution of concrete problems by offering decision-making models and strategies 
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Obviously, such procedural retreats to different levels of decision-making cannot 
continue ad infinitum. Sooner or later, the procedural construct must be anchored in a set 
of substantial convictions. And here the third danger emerges. Bioethics as problem-
solving strategy runs the risk of becoming part of the very technological drift it tries to 
critically evaluate. Though motivated by a desire to guard the morality of the care to 
patients, when rushing from problem to problem, never reaching any depth, and, worse, 
never getting behind those very problems, ethicists tum into a supplement to modern 
technology. Bioethics glues the small cracks that surface when the structure of technolog-
ical innovations at times is erected just a little bit too fast. But in the end, they confirm 
and sanction those innovations. 
What is more, finally, in one and the same move bioethics sanctions technological 
developments and immunizes them for any future ethical critique. As pointed out in the 
second chapter (see p. 17), a necessary condition for the meaningfulness of morality is the 
phenomenon of responsibility. There is no sense in raising the question what is the good 
when nobody can be held respons-Me for his actions in light of that question (not even 
the person towards himself in regards of his own good life). By reconstructing moral 
questions in terms of dilemmas in need of a procedural solution, the procedure becomes 
the source of justification: 'An ethics committee has examined and approved it, so it must 
be OK.' But procedure is always anonymous. Even if an identifiable ethics committee 
drafted the policy, no single member of the committee can be held responsible. Siegler 
and Singer [Siegler and Singer 1988] justifiably worry that the mere presence of bioethi-
cists (and, a fortiori, hospital ethics committees) in clinical settings may compel physi-
cians (by fear of liability or peer pressure), to seek and slavishly concur with the opinion 
of the bioethicist (or committee), or - even worse - to entice physicians to delegate and 
abdicate their responsibility to bioethicists. Indeed, an increasing number of publications 
is devoted to the tort liability of hospital ethics committees [see, e.g., Merritt 1988; 
Merritt 1987; Staubach 1989; Cantrell 1984] 
Paradoxically then, the "ethicalization of the sciences" may have led to a "technicali-
zation of ethics" [Mieth 1977, p. 21]. By focussing on the resolution of controversies in 
the area of health care, the bioethics movement may have ended up fostering what it tried 
to undo, that is, the disinterest of the medical profession to take up the ethical challenges 
presented by the ever more urgent moral dilemmas in health care. 
Ethics versus Law 
Does the preceding critique imply that bioethics must turn away from any and all 
decision-making issues, from the quandaries of every day medical practice? We have 
already seen Sidgwick arguing that a more complete detachment of ethics as the theoreti-
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cal study of right conduct from its practical application may be desired (see p. 6). Van 
Tongeren, though for different reasons, also doubts that the proper task of ethics is to 
provide practical directives for concrete situations [see Van Tongeren 1988, p. 119]. 
While underwriting the anxieties of these ethicists, I find the solution too radical. The 
ideal of a clinical ethics - even if highly problematic and even perilous - is too important 
not to be explored. But great caution and restraint is indicated, particularly in terms of 
decision-making issues and policy development. 
The question what is to be done should not precede the question what is the moral 
course of action. Clinical ethics should not attempt to outline what moral views may be 
imposed on whom, by whom, and in what circumstances, but outline how physician and 
patient can discover what is a moral perspective on the case at hand. It is only when 
doctor and patient cannot agree on the course of action that the decision to be made 
becomes a matter of controversy and conflict. It is only in this second stage, which in 
many, if not most clinical instances never even occurs (or needs to occur), that the 
question arises what moral views may be imposed on whom, by whom, and in what 
circumstances. 
It is also - and only - at this second stage that the notion of autonomy plays a key 
role. Moreover, we should not lose sight of the fact that "... the core idea of personal 
autonomy is an extension of political self-rule to self-government by the individual ..." 
[Beauchamp and Childress 1989, p. 68]. Autonomy (certainly as it functions in contem-
porary bioethics) is first and foremost a political concept. It cannot be denied that 
libertarianism with its emphasis on autonomy has greatly benefitted societal life. While 
this is not the place to provide the necessary arguments, I would assume that a justified 
political and legal approach to a societal order, including the health care scene, must 
cherish the principle of respect for autonomy. But that is not to say that libertarianism is 
the only justifiable perspective on society, and more particularly, the world of health care. 
Problems in the relationship between patients and providers sometimes concern the limits 
to the right to self-determination and freedom of decision; but the relationship between 
patient and provider is much richer than the contractual perspective implies. The fact that 
the patient is autonomous, that is, has a right to decide about his own life, is no reason 
not to reflect (with the patient) about the good of the patient. 
The differences between bioethics and health law will be further examined in Chapter 
7. But in the light of the topic of this chapter, it should be pointed out once more that 
laws obtain their authority from the consensus on which they are based, but knowledge 
and insights do not. As many a philosopher of science has argued, knowledge is sound if, 
and only if it can be falsified. The inherent possibility of critique and even refutation is a 
necessary condition, rather than consensus. This, I would argue, applies to the biomedical 
sciences as well as to the philosophical discipline of bioethics. Doubts about the good of 
the patient do not endanger the doctor-patient relationship; too many laws and policies do. 
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For lawyers and, even more so, for politicians, Engelhardt's conclusions merit close 
attention. In fact, the foundations of a modern biomedical policy have been laid out 
clearly and convincingly. But the foundations of bioethics remain to be laid. 
Summary Assessment 
I started out this chapter with the quite commonly held assumption that, nowadays, 
patients and care providers are »moral strangers« to another who do not "... share enough 
of a concrete morality to allow the common discovery of the basis for the correct 
resolution of a moral controversy" [Engelhardt 1991, p. xiv]. Next I addressed the 
various answers formulated to the problems that arise if one assumes that physicians and 
patients are moral strangers to another. This led me to conclude, contrary to Engelhardt, 
that it is possible to find common moral ground by other means than coercion or force. 
What is needed is a voluntary yet eager change of mind, a certain enthusiasm (Gr.: God 
in us), a conversion. 
Actually, regardless which of the decision-methods listed by Engelhardt one were to 
choose, each choice, even the choice of force, can only come about after a conversion to 
the conviction that that is the right choice. As soon as one would ask why this choice, 
and not another, thereby inducing controversy which calls for resolution, it would become 
evident that each choice is a matter of belief as opposed to intelligent understanding. 
Force, as Engelhardt correctly remarks repeatedly, misses every intelligence and therefore 
can never be made an understandable choice; one can merely believe in it. Rational 
argument cannot prove the intelligibility of itself either, since any attempt to do so will 
induce either an infinite or a circular argument, both of which are unintelligible in the true 
sense of the word. And as to agreement - the method hailed by Engelhardt - why would 
one agree to agreement when it is clear that agreement is a sensible method of controversy 
resolving? 
Whether or not conversion is an acceptable method, is a question of which the 
answer is absolutely unimportant. For conversion either happens or it does not. It may 
be the result of a sudden insight, bestowed by the Holy Ghost, impressed by a piece of 
art, inspired by a brilliant deduction. It may be the result of a long process of subtle but 
in essence violent conditioning, or a series of similar compromises generating a particular 
habit. In any case, conversion is not the result of a willful decision; conversion precedes 
any willful decision, including the decision to choose agreement as the method of 
resolving controversies. 
There is, then, no need to explain why conversion makes sense. In fact, it may well 
be impossible to provide an explanation that is neither circular nor infinite. However, 
there remains the need to explicate the possibility-conditions of conversion — which is 
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exactly where many bioethicists (notwithstanding their significantly different views) go 
astray. It is the black-box hypothesis that I am unwilling to accept. 
Genuine conversations (as opposed to discourse) are always aimed at conversion 
through conductive arguing. But conduction will only yield conversion if the content of 
the arguments reflect a sense of the good that the person to be converted can underwrite. 
This, in turn, presumes shared moral view points but even more so, sympathy: If 
physician and patient are expected to reach consensus in the sense of mutual conversion 
(rather than negotiated agreement) a genuine perception of the good of the other is 
required. Any theory of clinical ethics, then, must assume the feasibility of intersubjec-
tive sympathy. In next chapter, therefore, the feasibility of human sympathy will be 
examined. 
PART II 
TOWARDS A CLINICAL ETHICS 
BASED IN INTERSUBJECTIVE SYMPATHY 
BETWEEN PATIENT AND CARE PROVIDER 
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CHAPTER 5 
ON SYMPATHY 
And likewise a Lévite, when he was at 
the place, came and looked on him, 
and passed by on the other side. 
Gospel according to St. Luke, 10:32 
Introduction 
In the former chapter, I have tried to show that many contemporary theories of bioethics 
arrive at a procedural ethics with free decision-making as the single most important value 
»by default«. In fact, Engelhardt in the Preface to his The Foundations of Bioethics 
»admits« that to his "dismay and sorrow" he has been unable to establish by reason a 
particular, more substantive and authoritative view of the good life [1986, p. viti]. 
Humans are moral strangers to another. Nonviolent co-existence - the closest thing to a 
»peaceful society« - is feasible only on the basis of respect for personal autonomy on the 
one hand, and a procedural social organization on the other. As we have seen, this 
conclusion is biased by two assumptions: (1) The equation of bioethics and (a philosophy 
of) health policy - this equation will be examined more at length in Chapter 7; and (2) the 
radical negation of the possibility of sympathy. For many leading bioethicists, the human 
being is like a »black box«, inaccessible to any third person. Except via explicit utterings, 
the benefits of other people (such as patients) cannot be traced. Engelhardt does not back 
up this second assumption; obviously, our uncovering and explication of the assumption in 
and by itself does not provide any proof to the contrary. If we are to make more 
plausible a different theory of bioethics, which is to be based on a different anthropology, 
the latter must be backed up positively. Thus, in this chapter, the question of the 
feasibility of intersubjective sympathy will be examined.66 
66. I use the term »sympathy« in the rather literal sense of »feeling together«, »feeling along« 
with another human being, »sharing« a particular awareness or experience, etc.. This 
»philosophical« understanding of sympathy, then, has less of an emotional or moral connota-
tion than would be common in English (as in saying to the widow of a recently deceased 
(continued...) 
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As Scheler remarks in his 1926 book on sympathy, the topic of the other as other, 
that is to say, the problem how it is possible to be aware of the other in his otherness, is 
one of the fundamental themes in philosophical anthropology [see Scheler 1973, p. 13-14]. 
It would be impossible in the framework of this study to provide even a summary of the 
available analyses. Moreover, this study not only must address the feasibility of intersub-
jectivity as an alternative to »black-box anthropology«, but also contribute to answering 
the more specific question already phrased at the end of Chapter 3 whether the physician's 
ethos is his prerogative, and whether, therefore, clinical ethics is a professional ethics. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the notion of »sympathy« has been suggested as a 
solution to the problem of intersubjectivity. Sympathy has a long history, dating back at 
least to Greek philosophy. Although the particular context of the ancient notion of 
sympathy - sympathy figured first and foremost as a cosmological-anthropological rather 
than ethical principle - seems to justify omitting the ancient period and jumping directly to 
the 18th century, I will devote a subsection to Plotinus. For our subsequent discussion of 
the 18th century British Moralists and Max Scheler's ethics of sympathy will in fact lead 
us back to the anthropological foundations of sympathy. 
The second half of this chapter, however, will not be devoted to these anthropologi-
cal foundations proper. They are the topic of the next chapter. Instead, in the second 
half of this chapter we will further continue the debate about the ethical significance of 
sympathy. Whereas Scheler had argued that an ethics based on sympathy is circular 
(notwithstanding the importance of sympathy for ethics), Lévinas has advocated the 
opposite thesis that in »facing« our fellow human being a normative element is immediately 
present; that is, my fellow-man sets a cogent norm. Lévinas' thesis and some of the 
challenging but intricate consequences will be discussed. It will become clear that 
Lévinas' thesis of primary and immediate normative cogency will have to be supplemented 
with a layer of secondary explanation and interpretation for sympathy to yield not only 
normative cogency but practical direction as well. 
Intersubjectivity through Common-Sense 
A first avenue to provide more positive evidence for the thesis that humans are not moral 
strangers to another would be to point to the fact that knowledge of any kind is possible 
66. (...continued) 
person 'Please, accept my sympathy') as well as other languages (e.g., in Dutch »sympathie« 
means »positive affection« while a »sympathie« person is a cordial person). For the same 
reason, I have chosen not to use the literal Latin translation of sympathy, i.e., compassion. 
Finally, I will reserve the adjective »sympathie« (as opposed to »sympathetic«) when 
referring to this emotionally and morally more neutral sense of sympathy. 
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only against the background of a wider horizon that is never one's own, but always a 
socially, historically, and culturally determined horizon of significance. It is only against 
such a background that data (Lat.: what is given) acquire meaning and become genuine 
knowledge. Knowledge of oneself is no exception to this dialectic process: The human 
being can only genuinely know his own self, his own being can only appear as meaningful 
to him against a wider horizon of significance that necessarily surpasses his own being. 
Thus, instead of strangers, humans are mutual acquaintances in at least two manners. 
First, they share a »common-sense« in that the horizon of significance that transcends 
their subjective sense is to a large extent shared by the community, allowing a common 
understanding of the world. This community is not the community of those sharing a 
similar religious faith or philosophy of life, freely established by mutual agreement. 
Rather, it is the community that precedes any such agreement, that enables any kind of 
agreements in the first place. 
Second, humans not only share a common understanding of the world, but also an 
understanding of one another as subjects. Since self-knowledge is qualified by the 
transcendent horizon of significance, and since that horizon is shared by one's fellow men, 
the latter share in the individual's self-understanding. This »intersubjectivity«, however, is 
limited to self-understanding in so far as self-understanding is socially qualified. 
Running ahead of this chapter toward the seventh chapter on the patient-provider 
relationship, it may be objected that this kind of intersubjectivity exists for everyday 
phenomena, but the worlds in which patients live is so radically different from the world 
of healthy people (such as care providers), that their interpretative horizons are fundamen-
tally different. Even if humans can only perceive themselves "... to be located in an 
intersubjective world ...", even if "... one's unique biographical situation is to some 
extent a shared situation ..." because men share a horizon of interpretation, "... a certain 
taken-for-granted congruence in the ... interpretational schemes of the communicators", 
can there be such congruence between a healthy and a sick person? — so Toombs wonders 
in her The Meaning of Illness: A Phenomenological Account of Different Perspectives of 
Physician and Patient [1992, p. 7, 8, 9; emphasis altered - JW\. 
In this book Toombs examines the possibilities of such congruence. She starts out 
with the thesis that, indeed, there exists "a fundamental disagreement" between doctor and 
patient that concerns the nature of illness: "... [I]llness represents two quite distinct 
realities - the meaning of one being significantly and distinctively different from the 
meaning of the other" [p. xi]. This sentence makes clear that Toombs understands the 
disagreement to be radical (Lat.: radix = root). It is not simply a matter of assigning 
more importance to one versus another aspect of illness — which difference could easily 
be settled in a sensitive conversation. Nor is it the case that the physician is concerned 
with the objective facts and the patient with her subjective experience. Phrased phenome-
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nologically: The physician's and the patient's accounts are equally objective and equally 
subjective. Doctor and patient are living in two different worlds. 
Given this "decisive gap" [p. xv], how is intersubjective communication possible so 
that physician and patient have access to one another's worlds? "... [Reflection upon the 
manner in which the body is apprehended in everyday life can provide the basis for 
empathie understanding of the 'givenness' of illness" [p. xvi]. There is a significant 
difference between the healthy person's and the patient's experience of their bodies.67 
The difference is related to such elements as experience of temporality, vulnerability, 
posture, and foremost man's body sensation which in the case of the patient becomes 
"uncanny", even "alien" [see, e.g., p. 33-37, 58-62]. But this experience of the "body-
as-object" (which both physician and patient have, though each in a radically different 
manner) does not preclude a shared world of meaning. "This is the case because ... 
under normal circumstances the body is apprehended as an object in ways that point 
towards its apprehension as body-as-object in illness. From time to time, in everyday 
occurrences, one becomes aware of one's body as a material, physical entity, as a physical 
encumbrance, and as a physiological organism" [p. 87]. Thus, even sick and healthy 
people share a sufficiently congruent horizon of meaning to establish a level of intersub-
jectivity and mutual understanding. Literary biographies about doctors and patients and 
clinical narratives can facilitate the establishment of such congruence. 
The previous line of reasoning in favor of intersubjectivity is grounded in the 
negative argument that there cannoi be purely subjective knowledge. Thus, indirectly, 
intersubjectivity is warranted by man's ability to gain knowledge. The question arises 
whether not a much stronger, that is, positive case can be made for man's ability to know 
his fellow-man, an argument in favor of direct intersubjectivity. Is it not the case that we 
recognize the happiness and the suffering of our fellow-men as their happiness or 
suffering, rather than as an example of the generic human conditions of happiness and 
suffering? If »clinical ethics« is characterized by »practical wisdom« (see Chapter 2), 
which presumes the existence of a »professional ethos«, which in tum presumes that 
physicians are able to adequately assess the individual needs of their patients (see Chapter 
3), we need an anthropology of inter-ii/tyeci-ivity. 
Toombs argues that "clinical narratives" could also provide "... insights into the 
lived experience of illness and particularly into the meaning that illness has for a particu-
lar patient" [p. 103; emphasis added - JW\. This requires one to go "... beyond 
objective, quantifiable, clinical data and elicit the patient's illness story" [p. 106]. That 
one should not stick with tradition clinical patient histories seems obvious, but it is less 
clear what should be done. How, exactly, is one to gain insight in the particular 
experience of a unique patient? 
67. Toombs limits her account to somatic illness. 
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Toombs' answer seems to lead us back to the level of indirect intersubjectivity: "The 
clinical narratives provide important information with regard to the patient's biographical 
situation, and, particularly, with regard to the meanings ... [that] determine the manner in 
which the patient construes illness ..." [p. 109]. Thus, via commonly accessible situation-
al information the physician can reconstruct (in part) the particular experience of the 
patient. As mentioned, this seems to lead us back to the model of indirect intersubjecti-
vity, but in the previous quotation, one important detail was left out. At the place of the 
dots, Toombs text reads: " - both personal and cultural -" [emphasis added - JW]. But 
how do I have access to the personal meanings of the patient? 
The answer cannot simply be: Because the patient himself provides the information, 
because the patient tells the doctor. The starting point of Toombs' project was the insight 
that patient and doctor are living in radically different worlds; such fundamental disagree-
ment cannot simply be overcome via a sensitive conversation. We are thus left with the 
question how a care provider can come to understand the particular personal meanings of 
his patient. What is lacking is genuine »inter-subject-ivity«, of an element of »connective-
ness« in spite of radical differences. 
Sympathy as Principle of Connectiveness 
The understanding of sympathy as principle of connectiveness is already present in the 
work of ancient philosophers, notably representatives of the Stoa. The basis of the 
concept was laid by Plato in his The Laws [1980e], Phaedrus [1980e], and Timaeus [19801] 
[see Graeser 1972, p. 71]. Emilsson speculates that by the time of Plotinus (205-270), 
»sympatheia« has become a "household word" in all the philosophical schools [Emilsson 
1988, p. 158, note 28]. Although the philosophical context in which sympathy acquired 
this connotation was different - being metaphysical rather than ethical - the similarity with 
the problem at hand (i.e., connectiveness in spite of radical differences) justifies a 
summary examination of the solutions suggested by the well-known ancient supporter of 
sympathy, Plotinus. 
The Stoics take sympathy to be the connective principle between a variety of separate 
particles such that it functions as a whole. While only a single part may be affected, by 
means of sympathy that affection can be passed on to the whole. Since the Stoics 
conceive not only living beings (notably the human being) to be organic wholes, but the 
cosmos as well, sympathy figures both as an anthropological and a cosmic principle. 
Sympathy fulfills a similar dual function in Plotinus' Enneads [1962]. On the one 
hand it is part of his cosmology and philosophy of nature where it concerns the relation 
between parts and the universe. On the other hand, it pertains to the relationship between 
different human beings (souls). These two levels are not entirely detached because 
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sympathy is the bonding force of the complete living universe. But Plotinus' sympathy is 
not the materialistic all-pervasive pneuma of the Stoics. While standing in this stoic 
tradition, Plotinus is clearly concerned to preserve the individual character of beings 
(without ending up in a theory of pure monads) [see Emilsson 1988; Gürtler 1984]. 
In Plotinus' Enneads, sympathy stands for any kind of non-physical contact, whether 
between two celestial bodies, two souls, or a soul and a material body (such as in sense 
experience). Although he nowhere provides a clear explanation of the working of 
sympathy (except in the case of sight in Ennead IV,5 - see hereunder), the general 
principle is one of similarity or commun(icat)ion (Gr. : syn- = Lat. : com-) of a particular 
pathos among relevantly similar beings. Thus, in case of vision, due to the internal light 
of the eye (which Plotinus, like Plato, presumes to exist) it can be sympathically affected 
by the visible, lighted object (even though no such thing like physical light rays pass 
between the two). 
Plotinus understanding of the kind of similarity that is required for sympathie 
affection between two relevantly similar souls, is illustrated by a much quoted, but 
problematic example in his Ennead on sight. Plotinus argues that some solid mass that 
would be located beyond the heavenly system could not be visible even if there would be 
no other masses impeding vision [see Ennead IV,5,8]. The explanation should not be 
sought in the extreme distance, but in the fact that such a »foreign« mass is located outside 
the range of the living universe of which the human observer is part, and thus beyond the 
range of apprehension. 
Similarly, apprehension of one's fellow human being (e.g., suffering at the sight of 
pain) is possible only on the basis of a sympathie relatedness between humans. Radical 
individuality would preclude such compassion. But a total unity of all souls (let alone the 
complete universe) would just as well preclude compassion. For in the latter case, I 
would not suffer at the sight of someone else's pain; I would suffer his pain. In fact, "... 
the very universe itself would feel whatever I felt" [Ennead IV-9-1, p. 365]. 
So how does such non-physical transmission take place? Plotinus is well aware of 
the fact that a non-transparent object located between the spectator and the object to be 
viewed blocks vision. As mentioned, according to Plotinus, sympathy does not function 
by transmitting material particles or rays. But blockage is understandable only if 
something passes. Plotinus argues that »form« (instead of matter) is passed from the 
object (e.g., a red apple), via the air to the eye as color. In the red apple, the redness 
obviously is linked to the matter, but it is not in the air [see Emilsson 1988, p. 56]. 
Plotinus solution is particularly interesting for a modern reader who tends to think 
about all causality in terms of something having to pass between the cause and the affected 
object. In case of sound, vibrating air particles make the tympanum vibrate; in the case 
of sight, it is electromagnetic »particles« affecting the retina; and in case of a »sixth sense« 
for direction, geomagnetic waves seem to influence iron particles in the nose. The 
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problem how to account for communication when no such (pseudo)material thing seems to 
be communicated we will encounter again in the next subsection where we will find Hume 
and Smith straggling to explain concordance in the passions of a patient and a spectator, 
given the presumption that humans are not part of some primordial community, a "quasi-
organic unity" [Craemer-Ruegenberg 1992, p. 49] but are »black-boxes« instead. 
The problem with Plotinus' solution is that in the context of the hulymorphistic 
ontologies of his time and age, matter tended to be understood as the individuating 
principles, whereas the form »represented« generality. Thus, Socrates »manhood« is due 
to his form, whereas his »Socrates-ness« is due to the material aspect of his being. 
Plotinus' solution is valuable in as much as it underscores the importance of thinking in 
terms of an íníersubjective world, but it fails to solve the problem of intersM¿yecíivity, of 
how Xanthippe could have possibly »sympathized« with Socrates' highly unusual need to 
philosophize incessantly. Lacking proof of the possibility of such intersubjectivity it 
seems unfair that Xanthippe has made history as the ultimate shrew. 
David Hume and Adam Smith on Sympathy 
Interestingly, the first philosophers to devote special attention to sympathy as a key notion 
in ethics seem to have been the British Moralists of the 18th century - Hippie even speaks 
of "the school of sympathy" [Hippie 1956, p. 50] - , some of whom have been instrumen-
tal in the development of the individualistic libertarianism that pervades contemporary 
bioethical thought. Notable examples are Joseph Butler who devoted the fifth of his 
Fifteen Sermons, first published in 1726, to compassion, and David Hume's An Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals, which first appeared in 1751. And maybe the most 
unlikely candidate of an ethics of sympathy is Adam Smith, known first and foremost by 
his An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations from 1776 in which 
the philosophical basis of free-market economy was laid. In that work self-interest is the 
driving force behind general welfare. Indeed, the notion of sympathy is not mentioned in 
it. But in his earlier The Theory of Moral Sentiments, first published in 1759, sympathy 
plays a prominent role. 
It should be emphasized that neither Butler (1692-1752), Hume (1711-1776), nor 
Smith (1723-1790) have tried to justify the phenomenon of sympathy in terms of some 
kind of self-interested pseudo-altruism. Their British predecessor Hobbes (1588-1679) had 
argued that man is essentially moved by self-interest. If a human being experiences grief 
for the calamity, according to Hobbes such pity ".. ariseth from the imagination that the 
like calamity may befall himselfe; and therefore is called also compassion, and in the 
phrase of this present time a fellow-feeling ...". And since calamities result from great 
wickedness, "... the best men have the least pity ..." [Hobbes 1987, p. 126]. Some form 
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of social cooperation (a social contract) may rationally be preferable to completely 
unrestrained freedom, but egoism still provides the foundation to such cooperation.68 
However, Butler, Hume and Smith emphasize that man is to some extent social in nature. 
In his Fifth Sermon, Butler explicitly rejects Hobbes' account. He admits that there 
is a relationship between egoism and compassion, but egoism is not the source of 
compassion: "There are often three distinct perceptions or inward feelings upon sight of 
persons in distress: Real sorrow and concern for the misery of our fellow-creatures; some 
degree of satisfaction from a consciousness of our freedom from that misery; and, as the 
mind passes on from one thing to another, it is not unnatural from such an occasion to 
reflect upon our liableness to the same or other calamities. The two last frequently 
accompany the first, but it is the first only which is properly compassion ... and which 
directly carries us with calmness and thought to their assistance." [Butler 1969, p. 363, 
footnote; emphasis altered - JW\. 
Similarly, in his An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals Hume takes it to 
be an α priori condition of ethics that it is impossible for a human being "... to be totally 
indifferent to the well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures, and not readily, of himself, to 
pronounce ... that what promotes their happiness is good, what tends to their misery is 
evil ..." [Hume 1983, p. 49].m. Smith starts his Theory of Moral Sentiments with the 
observation that "[h]ow selfish man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles 
in his nature, which interest him in the future of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him ..." [Smith 1976, p. 9]. Egoism, self-love, even man's common need of 
assistance are not the primary sources of such social sentiment. Man is interested in his 
fellow-man well-being, "... though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of 
seeing it" [p. 9]. 
Both Hume and Smith explain this intersubjectivity in terms of sympathy, but the 
precise status of such sympathy remains unclear. Is it to be thought of as a virtue or as 
the condition for any kind of virtuous behavior? Hume seems to suggest that such 
sympathy is a virtue. A person's "humanity" increases to the degree that his sympathy 
increases [Hume 1983, p. 50]. It is only "the more generous minds" who are really 
affected by their sympathie feelings, whereas "[w]ith men of narrow and ungenerous 
spirits, this sympathy goes not beyond a slight feeling of the imagination, which serves 
68. Spencer (1820-1903) would later maintain that sympathy is an evolutionary trait, resulting 
from the recognition that surviving is eased by human cooperation. Man is essentially 
egoistic, but has acquired sympathy and learned to behave altruistically as a strategy to 
promote self-interest [see Spencer 1987]. 
69. Schrader, however, has pointed out that Hume can only explain how I come to sympathize 
with somebody else by assuming that 1 am interested in my fellow man's feelings, that is to 
say, because those feelings are of interest to me, which in tum presumes self-interest 
[Schrader 1984, p. 164]. 
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only to excite sentiments of complacency or censure ..." [p. 52; footnote 26]. If the 
mentioned traits (humane, narrow, (un)generous) would only have a psychological 
meaning, describing the degree of openness to other person's passions, the claims would 
turn into analytical tautologies, providing but a definition of sympathy. The choice of 
terms, however, suggests otherwise: The sympathie person is a person of high moral 
standing, a virtuous person. 
On the other hand, Hume also takes judgments about the virtuousness of others to 
presume a sympathie relationship between the judge and the judged (see hereunder). 
Smith leaves no doubt about the fact that sympathy itself is not a moral act. One cannot 
tell another person that he ought to be sympathie to his fellow-men. Taking sympathy to 
be a condition of virtuous behavior also undermines criticism such as Sprague's that Smith 
fails to account for the possibility of sympathizing with the "wrong" affections [Sprague 
1972, p. 462]. Churchill stresses that "Smith's account of our moral sentiments is not 
intended ... to claim that our sentiments are incorrigible, or always morally correct ...". 
It is not meant to provide "a principle of sympathy" [Churchill 1987, p. 65]. It is meant 
to explain that and how we pass moral judgments. But as we will see in a moment, this 
correct rebuttal of Sprague's critique at the same time lays bare the inadequacy of Smith's 
sympathy, that is, its inadequacy as »apex stone« in a foundational theory of clinical 
ethics. 
Smith explains the »working« of sympathy in terms of imagination. He holds that 
humans have no "... immediate experience of what other men feel . . . . Our senses will 
never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can carry us beyond our 
own person ...". This implies that "... we can form no idea of the manner in which they 
are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation" [Smith 
1976, p. 9]. The particular kind of discernment by which a human acquires sentiments 
(whether painful or enjoyable) that correspond to the sentiments of another human being, 
Smith calls "sympathy" [p. 10]. 
Smith's analysis is similar to Hobbes' theory of pity but differs in one significant 
regard. As quoted already, in his Leviathan from 1651 Hobbes had argued that "[g]rief, 
for the calamity of another, is pity; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity 
may befall himselfe ..." [Hobbes 1987, p. 126]. In other words, I imagine the catastro-
phe that has befallen the other person to befall me. Smith, on the other hand, assumes 
that in a sympathie relationship I imagine myself to be that other person in his misery [see 
Kerkhof 1992, p. 86-87]. 
At first sight. Smith's view resembles the phenomenon of conduction, reproduction 
and conversion as outlined in the second and fourth chapters of this study. In his Enquiry, 
Hume is less clear about the way sympathy works. He gives the example of the actors on 
the stage whose sentiments are communicated to the spectators "as it were by magic" 
[Hume 1983, p. 44]. But his explanatory analysis also suggests a close parallel with 
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conductive conversion: "... [N]o passion, when well represented, can be entirely 
indifferent to us; because there is none, of which every man has not, within him, at least 
the seeds and first principles" [p. 45]. So on the one hand, it is necessary for sympathie 
communication that the other person (e.g., the poet) "... bring[s] every affection near to 
us by lively imaginary and representation ..."; and on the other hand, that our own 
"imagination" is stimulated [p. 46]. 
Moreover, both Hume and Smith take sympathie sentiments to be the basis of moral 
judgments. In Hume's view, sympathy is a "calm feeling" (as opposed to the more 
hunger or anger) that allows for a general moral judgment (much like reason allows for an 
epistemological judgment of truth or falsehood). According to Smith, someone else's 
passions can be judged as proper or improper (given the situation), by the degree to which 
"... we entirely sympathize with them" [Smith 1976, p. 16]. Smith does not use the 
plural pronoun »we« to suggest that a plurality of opinions against a single divergent one 
is needed to pass that judgment.70 Rather, he is explaining how psychologically such a 
judgment is passed: "If the same arguments which convince you convince me likewise, I 
necessarily approve of your conviction; and if they do not, I necessarily disapprove of it. 
... But this is equally the case with regard to our approbation or disapprobation of the 
sentiments or passions of others" [1976, p. 17].71. 
There is, however, a subtle difference between Hume's and Smith's approaches on 
the one hand and the process of conductive conversion on the other, which has far-
reaching consequences. A conductive argument is likely to be successful only if the 
person arguing (e.g., the physician) has gained insight in the experience of the person to 
be converted (e.g., the patient). Sympathy is supposed to be the »apex stone« of the 
foundation of clinical ethics in that it should enable such intersubjective insight. The 
conductive process thus presumes a physician having gained insight in the interests of his 
patient given her condition and situation. Smith, however, takes such insight to be 
impossible because our senses can never carry us beyond our own person. Consequently, 
to secure correspondence between the sentiments of the two experiencing persons, Smith 
must assume a process of »imagination«. 
This process has two phases. Upon the first rather "imperfect" sympathy, which 
originates at the sight of someone else's grief or joy, and which invokes a kind of 
"curiosity", I will, in second phase, inquire about his situation and consequently develop a 
70. Later in his Theory, Smith introduces the concept of the "impartial spectator" to warrant the 
non-subjectivity of moral judgments. 
71. As Harrison concludes, in his first Appendix to the Enquiry Hume leaves little doubt that a 
virtue (or vice) is defined by what arouses (dis)approbation in the human mind more 
generally, and that which qualities are virtues (or vices) is settled by an empirical enquiry 
into which qualities do in fact arouse (dis)approbation [see Harrison 1976, p. 103]. 
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more genuine form of sympathy [Smith 1976, ρ 10] 7 2 That is, if I am in fact able to 
imagine myself m his situation For I may also develop a quite different sentiment While 
the other is acting rudely, I may blush at that sight Conversely, I may experience 
sadness at the sight of a mentally handicapped person, while the latter is completely 
unaware of his own misery and singing and laughing In fact, I can sympathize with the 
dead who no longer have any sentiments of their own [see ρ 11-12] 
Smith's explanation of sympathy in terms of imagination shows that his theory fails 
to provide the kind of sympathy we are seeking Smith's sympathy presumes that the 
sympathie person has already (that is, prior to his sympathie relationship with the other 
person) knowledge of what is in the best interest of that other person, even though the 
latter may not be aware of it and even hold a completely opposite view But such prior 
knowledge can only be general knowledge that does not result from sympathy and fails to 
address the individuality of the other human being in his umque situation73 
Hume is even more radical when he claims that "[s]ympathy is much fainter than 
our concern for ourselves " If we are to pass "calm judgments" on the characters of 
other men, we have to " render our sentiments more public and social" [1983, ρ 49] 
All individuating features of the particular case are to be neglected, leaving only its 
general aspects [see MacNabb 1972, ρ 85] 7 4 
72 This two-step model should not be equated with Hume's distinction between "limited 
sympathy" and "extensive sympathy" The latter arises when emotive sympathy is paralleled 
by a cognitively experienced proximity (e g , the person is an acquaintance or family 
member) [see Manenschijn 1979, ρ 161-163] 
73 The only other possibility is to assume that it is possible to discover the »real« feelings of 
another human through some other means than sympathy But this is exactly what Smith had 
denied in the first place He does presume that it is possible on the basis of - what seems to 
be - an analogical inference from the external behavior of my fellow-man, via what I know 
about my own external behavior and its relationship to my own internal processes, to a 
conclusion about my fellow-man's internal processes But this analogy is flawed (see ρ 166) 
[see also Campbell 1971, ρ 97] 
74 Ferreira has provided a rather different interpretation of Hume's insistence on the importance 
of a more »public« understanding of interests Rather than reaching this public level by 
abstracting from the individuals' peculiarities - which would in indeed preclude genuine 
ínteríKb/ecíivity - Ferreira argues that " Hume is claiming that there is an interest which is 
not simply self-interest nor simply other-interest — there is an interest which is 'not our own 
only'" [1994, ρ 48] "Hume truly sees 'interest' in the strict sense of what is inter-esse, 
between us - not on one side or the other On this view, self-interest is embedded in 
common interest, by being extended, self-interest is no longer simply 'private' ('not our own 
only')" [p 48] Keep in mind, however, that Humes' move to the more public level is 
motivated by his worry that sympathie judgments will be misinterpreted as ego-centric 
judgments In order to retain the essential element of otherness that sympathie judgments are 
supposed to provide, while adhering to his theory of reconstructive imagination, Hume 
suggests to interpret interests in this less private manner "The imaginative appropriation 
(continued ) 
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Thus, both Smith and Hume fail to provide a criterion for the moral »correctness« of 
the general knowledge of the sympathie spectator In that sense Sprague was correct 
when he worried about the possibility of sympathizing with »wrong« affections (see ρ 
151) Furthermore, given the primacy of the sympathizing person's imagination, it is also 
possible that the spectator may not sympathize with the »right« affections The self-
evidence with which Smith presents his example on the negligibility of the mentally 
handicapped person's joy provides clear testimony to that avail 
Smith and Hume fail to provide a model for genuine intersubjectivity But before we 
turn our attention to other theories of sympathy, one more element in their theories 
deserves a brief examination - if only because it provides additional insight how we should 
not understand sympathy -, that is, the possibility of discordance between the passions of 
the spectator and those of his fellow-men Both authors were well aware of the paradoxi­
cal phenomenon of experiencing pleasure from seeing suffering In 1757, Hume pub­
lished a separate publication about the topic, entitled On Tragedy Smith, in response to a 
letter from Hume dated 28 July 1759, added a footnote about this issue to the second 
edition of his The Theory of Moral Sentiments which appeared m 1761 
The discordance between the spectators' and the actors' passions is different from the 
discordance described earlier between the grief that a healthy person experiences when 
watching a mentally handicapped person laughing and singing The joyful passion of the 
mentally handicapped person is considered »inappropriate« given his constitution, whereas 
the actor's grief is »appropriate« given the tragic circumstances Nonetheless, the 
spectator may experience a sense of pleasure from viewing the tragedy on stage 
In his letter to Smith, Hume had concluded that " if all Sympathy was agreeable 
. an Hospital woud be a more entertaining Place than a Ball" [Hume 1969, ρ 313] In 
his second edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith responds in a footnote that 
the spectator of a tragic theater play will first experience a sense of tragedy due to his 
sympathie report, if he consequently notices the perfect comcidence between these two 
passions he may experience a delightful sentiment of approbation [see Smith 1976, ρ 46, 
footnote] Smith's footnote makes clear that the judgment itself consists of a different 
kind of emotion than the sympathie emotion If fact, it is not a primary emotion, one that 
naturally emerges from the situation, but one that follows upon comparing both primary 
74 ( continued) 
which constitutes interestedness expresses Hume's recognition that imagination is 'more 
affected by what is particular, than by what is general' [Hume 1978, ρ 579, as quoted by 
Ferreira - JW] For Hume, we abstract in order to concretize — or more precisely, a 
particular kind of concretizing (of another) de facto abstract you (from your own private 
situation)" [Ferreira 1994, ρ 49, 52] The question remains, however, to what extent this 
abstraction not only prevents ego-centncity but also provides genuine insight in the otherness 
of the other person and his interests 
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emotions. But how could that comparison take place? After all, the only way of knowing 
about the other person's passions is through sympathy, that is, by imagining myself to be 
in the same situation. According to Smith, I cannot have a direct insight in the passions 
of others.75 Smith's explanation shows once more that the sympathie experience of 
someone else's passions is first and foremost - if not solely - my imagined sentiment. 
Even if I were able to know my fellow-man's passions in a non-sympathic manner, 
Smith's problem is not solved. His account could be read as follows: 'I am aware 
(through my normal senses) of my fellow-man's condition and situation; I then sympathi-
cally imagine myself to be in that situation and experience a certain passion. At the same 
time I may notice some external behavior of my fellow-man (such as laughter or crying) 
that I rationally know not to match his condition and/or situation, and conclude that he has 
inappropriate passions.' In both instances, however, it is still my reconstruction (one 
sympathie, one rational) of my fellow-man's presumed passion.76 
And even if we assume that Smith could solve the problem of comparing what is 
known with the unknown, it cannot provide a model for genuine intersubjective sympathy. 
Not only is it possible that my own »sympathie« sentiment be opposite to that of my 
fellow-man's, my (dis)approbation of that sentiment - by far more important for a theory 
of ethics that is supposed to provide a directive for man's undertakings - seems to be of 
quite a different nature than my sympathie sentiment. If the latter is already a product of 
my imagination, the former, being a »meta-sentiment«, by definition can have no immedi-
ate affinity with the passions of my fellow-man. 
Hume manages to escape this notorious epistemological trap of comparing the known 
with the unknown by taking sympathy to be a »calm feeling« which itself is judgmental. 
But it leaves him with the problem of pleasure from tragedy. Since Hume understands the 
problem primarily as one of differentiating between a real-life situation (in which there 
could not be such apparent discordance) and artistic representation, he finds the solution in 
separating the artistic form from the content. Not only do the pleasurable sentiments 
(invoked by the quality of the artistic representation) counterbalance the painful sentiments 
(invoked by the tragedy depicted), the former actually "convert" the latter, or "... at least 
tincture them so strongly as totally to alter their nature" [Hume 1964, p. 261]. Hume 
acknowledges, however, that the painful sentiments may be excessively horrible, preclud-
ing »conversion«. He complains that "[t]he English theater abounds too much with such 
shocking images." In fact, "[m]ost painters have chiefly represented such horrible 
75. As was mentioned earlier (see p. 152), the expressions of my fellow-man's feelings may 
provoke in me certain emotions, but such provoked emotions do not qualify as genuine 
sympathy [see also Brugmans 1989, p. 10, 12]. 
76. This rather »rationalist« reading of Smith's sympathy is itself questionable in that Smith's 
theory is rather anti-rationalist more in general [see Kerkhof 1992, p. 69]. 
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subjects as crucifixions and martyrdoms, where nothing appears but tortures, wounds, 
executions, and passive suffering, without any action or affection" [p. 265J. 
Remarkably, Hume does not limit his solution to »pleasures of tragedy« as they are 
invoked by art. There are "... other instances, where the subordinate movement is 
converted into the predominant, and gives force to it, though of different, and even 
sometimes though of a contrary nature" [p. 262]. Among the examples mentioned is that 
of parental love: "Parents commonly love that child most, whose sickly infirm frame of 
body has occasioned them the greatest pains, trouble, and anxiety in rearing him. The 
agreeable sentiment of affection here acquires force from sentiments of uneasiness" [p. 
263]. On the other hand, "[r]aise so the subordinate passion that it becomes the predomi-
nant, it swallows up that affection which it before nourished and increased. ... Too much 
difficulty renders us indifferent: Too much sickness and infirmity disgusts a selfish and 
unkind parent" [p. 265]. 
It is one thing, to argue that artistic representations of suffering can be pleasurable — 
after all, there is always the certainty in the spectators' mind that it is but a representation 
(in fact, as soon as people seriously think it is for real, it suddenly is no longer fun). It is 
quite another to argue that real suffering can be pleasurable. Hume, too, must have been 
uncomfortable about the latter, given his complaints about all too horrible plays and 
paintings. There would be something wrong with a person enjoying such gruesome 
depictions. In a person of moral character, there should be a limit to conversion of 
sentiments. But this implies that an act of altruism cannot be explained in terms of 
sympathie feelings only: Genuine altruism presumes a prior evaluation of the sympathical-
ly invoked feelings and conversions. This evaluation itself cannot be explained in terms 
of sympathy. 
That becomes even the more clear from Hume's final example of the parents and 
their ill child. One would expect Hume to agree that such extreme sickness and infirmity 
would, or at any rate should block conversion. But instead, Hume claims that only selfish 
and unkind parents would not convert their painful sympathie sentiments. Being a parent, 
thus, implies that their should be no limit to conversion of painful sympathie sentiments 
towards one's child. Apparently, vices like masochism, and virtues like parental devotion 
set limits to sympathically invoked moral feelings, rather than being the result of such 
sympathy. 
It shall be clear that the problem of pleasure from tragedy only arises in an explana-
tory system that precludes direct insight in the other person's suffering. It is only when 
sympathy is thought of as my suffering that it becomes a paradox that I can experience 
pleasure at the same time. For how can I come to suffer and rejoice about one and the 
same situation (re)created in my own imagination? 
The only solution to these paradoxes could be that it is my pleasure, but it is the 
suffering of the actor on the stage, the crucified Christ on the painting, the sick child in 
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his cradle. Naturally, I am aware of the other's suffering, but I do not suffer his 
suffering. Similarly, when facing a hungry beggar I may sympathize with him, even be 
aware of his particular needs (that is, his hunger), without however becoming hungry 
myself. But how can I be aware of someone else's suffering and its causes without 
making it my own? In the next section, six kinds of »fellow-feeling« will be examined as 
possible answers to this question. 
Sympathy and Fellow-Feeling 
As concluded earlier, if sympathy is to enable genuine intersubjectivity, it cannot be a 
purely rational experience such as the kind of common-sense and shared horizon of 
meaning discussed in the second subsection of this chapter. By definition, such common-
sense is general and fails to provide the connectiveness that enables 'mtersubjecnvity. On 
the other hand, our examination of the British Moralists has shown that an analysis in 
terms of presumably sympathie feelings or emotions fails as well when such experiences 
are thought to be purely private, thus precluding iniersubjectivity. Thus, if sympathy is to 
enable genuine intersubjectivity, it can neither be a matter of public reason nor a matter of 
private emotions. 
Not unlikely, Hume and Smith were already themselves aware of the peculiar nature 
of sympathy (in spite of their tendency to think in terms of a black-box anthropology). 
Hume's »calm passions« or »calm feelings« suggest a category of experiences distinct from 
both genuine reason and genuine emotions [see Ferreira 1994, p. 49]. Similarly, Smith 
may have intentionally chosen to employ the term »sentiment« because it used to connote 
both opinion and emotion [see Streminger 1989, p. 139, note 53]. And as we will see in 
a moment, Butler also concluded that the "affection" called "compassion" was of a 
peculiar nature when compared with pain, hunger as well as love and good-will [Butler 
1969, p. 363]. 
In his Sympathy and Ethics [Mercer 1972], Mercer sets out to examine various forms 
of »fellow-feelings« as candidates for a meaningful definition of sympathy. In reference to 
Scheler's Wesen und Formen der Sympathie [Scheler 1973] - which will be discussed more 
at length hereunder - , Mercer first discusses three forms of pure, that is, non-cognitive 
felIow-/<?e/i'rtg: (1) »Emotional infection or contagion« (Scheler: Gefiihlsansteckung), that 
is, "... the tendency to adopt, or at least be affected by, the mood of our immediate 
neighbours" [Mercer 1972, p. 13]. Familiar examples would be the emotional infection 
that occurs at a nice party where everybody automatically becomes good-humored. (2) 
»Emotional identification« (Scheler: Einsfühlung), in which case an individual "immerses" 
himself in the emotional personality of somebody else. Examples would be the young 
child's emotional identification with his mother or the audience's identification with a film 
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character [p. 14]. And (3) »community of feeling« (Scheler: Mit-einander fühlen), in 
which case two people (e.g., the parents of a sick child) may both experience the same 
feeling of anxiety without there being a communication of feelings between them. 
Neither of these three forms of fellow-feelings, however, qualifies as genuine 
intersubjectivity. In the first instance, the person infected does not gain access to the 
feelings of another human being; rather, his own feelings are transformed into those of the 
»crowd«, those of anybody and nobody. In the second instance, there is an identifiable 
other human being with whom I identify, but now it is me who is unaware of the 
identification. As Mercer remarks, "[i]t is only to an observer that it makes sense to say 
that there is fellow-feeling ..." [Mercer 1972, p. 14]. In the last instance, the community 
of feeling is accidental in that both parents need not even be aware that they feel the same 
way. 
Mercer, therefore, concludes that non-cognitive fellow-feeling cannot be considered 
genuine sympathy. In fact, the two are exclusive because sympathy (in Mercer's view) 
includes an active aspect: Sympathizing with another human being implies acting upon that 
sympathie feeling. As we saw earlier, Butler has also laid an immediate connection 
between the compassionate awareness of the misery of fellow human-beings, and coming 
to their assistance. In fact, Butler goes as far as to argue that compassion is limited to 
awareness of the misery of others rather than their pleasures, because our noticing of the 
latter does not require action on our part: "When a man has obtained any particular 
advantage or felicity, his end is gained; and he does not in that particular want the 
assistance of another ..." [Butler 1969, Vth Sermon, p. 363]. Thus, we do notice the 
happiness of others, but no special perceptional faculty is needed to do so, whereas the 
pity of others does require us to also undertake action. Scheman is even more radical and 
claims that the kind of sympathy one expects from a professional such as a doctor, nurse 
or social worker has nothing whatsoever to do with sympathy (in the philosophical sense 
of the term). The patient expects a certain »attitude« of his physician, he expects her to 
be an attentive listener, willing to spend time, following up on their promises etc. [see 
Scheman 1979, p. 322]. 
If we are to agree - on principle - with Butler, Mercer, and Scheman, that sympathy 
requires an active element, not knowing that one shares feelings with another human being 
precludes such "active sympathy" [Mercer 1972, p. 17]. What we need, then, is a more 
cognitive concept of fellow-feeling. 
Mercer goes on to distinguish three kinds of cognitive fellow-feeling: (1) »Knowing 
how somebody else is feeling«, (2) »agreement«, and (3) »pity« or »feeling sorry«. The 
first, Mercer considers a necessary condition of sympathy, but it does not constitute in full 
what sympathy connotes. After all, "[t]he callous man knows full well that another 
person is suffering but he refuses to realize the other person's experience in his own 
imagination and is consequently indifferent to it" [Mercer 1972, p. 17]. Agreement, 
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Mercer contends, is the kind of »sympathizing« of a member of parliament with his 
constituents, without however being willing to follow up on their wishes (e.g., because at 
the present time he considers that politically imprudent). Such agreement is merely a 
matter of opinion, there is again no emotional part to it. Finally, there is pity. But, says 
Mercer, while eating a pork chop I may pity the pig, "... but it would be odd or whimsi-
cal to say that I 'sympathized' with the animal" [p. 19]. Again, I cannot really claim to 
be concerned for the pig's welfare while eating him. 
Does this failure of all six definitions of sympathy imply the end of sympathy? 
Mercer, at any rate, does not seem to think so because he immediately goes on to say that 
genuine sympathy must be "sharply distinguished" from both cognitive and non-cognitive 
kinds of fellow-feeling. What kind of sympathy could this be? Unfortunately, rather than 
answering this question, Mercer continues with a listing of four necessary conditions that 
have to be fulfilled for there to be such sympathy: 
(i) The sympathizing person (e.g., a physician) must be "aware" of his fellow human 
being (e.g., the patient) as a "sentient subject"; 
(ii) The physician must "know" the patient's "state of mind"77; 
(iii) There must be a "fellow-feeling" between physician and patient such that "through 
his imagination", the physician is able to "realize" the patient's "state of mind"; and 
(iv) The physician is altruistically concerned about the patient's welfare [Mercer 1972, p. 
19] 
However, each of Mercer's conditions is rather problematic. To start with the fourth (iv) 
condition, this reflects Mercer's insistence that sympathy is a »practical« concept. The 
idea that genuine sympathy implies an altruistic attitude, may coincide with a »common« 
understanding; various contemporary scholars underwrite that such an "urge to take 
action" is part of the definition of sympathizing [Natsoulas 1988, p. 170; see also Wispé 
1986]; and I, too, will argue in favor of a similar connection in a later subsection of this 
chapter. But the connection between the two is not self-evident. In fact, one of the major 
problems with Hume's approach that we have not yet discussed, but one that Mercer has 
not failed to notice, is this link between sympathie affection by my fellow-man's suffering 
and benevolent care for his well-being [see also Chismar 1989]. The question may sound 
trivial, but why should I feel urged by my newly gained insights in the suffering of my 
fellow-man to relieve his suffering? Presuming that anybody who is suffering will try to 
relieve himself of that suffering, at most Hume's analysis would explain that upon the 
77. Mercer, actually, contends that it is sufficient if the physician believes to know the patient's 
state of mind. However, if it were indeed the case that a physician is unable to distinguish 
between »true« insights in his patient's best interests, and mere beliefs on his part, physi-
cians' judgments about their patients' best interests would be quite unreliable, the danger of 
maleficent paternalism considerable, and the only way for clinical ethics to go, therefore, 
would be to reinstate the primacy of the principle of patient autonomy. 
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sight of a suffering fellow-man and having imagined to suffer myself, I will try to rid 
myself of that suffering, but to do so, I do not necessarily have to alleviate his suffering, I 
may walk on and forget about him 
I will return to this poignant question in a later subsection For it can be raised - let 
alone answered - only after it has been concluded that mtersubjective sympathy is at all 
possible, that is to say, that one can at all become conscious of the subjective experiences 
of one's fellow-man — which brings us back to the remaining three of Mercer's condi­
tions In and by themselves, the (1) first and (n) second conditions are not problematic 
In fact, hereunder we will find Scheler arguing along similar lines But in combination 
with the (in) third condition - itself highly problematic - the first and second become 
problematic as well As the third condition makes clear, Mercer, adopts the framework of 
a »sympathy ethics« based on imaginative reconstruction In doing so, he inherits all the 
problems discussed earlier in reference to Hume and Smith, among others the problem 
how to »know« (second assumption) another person's state of mind if not via imagination 
In fact, as will be explained in more detail hereunder (see ρ 166), in such a framework it 
is not even possible to conclude that the »being« with whom I am sympathizing is a 
sentient fellow-man like me 
But is the framework as provided by the British Moralists the only feasible one9 In 
spite of his leaning towards a sympathy ethics based on imaginative reconstruction, 
Mercer is rather critical about Hume's analysis Yet he seems unable to discern a better 
definition of sympathy among the many alternatives that he examines Mercer may, 
however, have been »misled« by the analytical method adopted Instead of thinking 
sympathy as a single kind of fellow-feeling or -cognition, we should view it as a process 
Rather than viewing, for example, »awareness« of my fellow being and »knowledge« of his 
state of mind as »conditions« for sympathy - which leaves us wondering about its nature -
such phenomena may be understood as »aspects« of sympathy This is, in fact, what the 
approach taken by the German philosopher Scheler in his comprehensive work on human 
sympathy 
Six Forms of Sympathy 
In spite of the suggestive title, the core concept of Scheler's Wesen und Formen der 
Sympathy [Scheler 1973]78 is not sympathy, but love and hatred He starts out with an 
extensive analysis of sympathy because - so he explains - many ethicists (notably the 
British advocates of an ethics of sympathy) take sympathy to be more fundamental than 
78 All page numbers in this and the next two subsections on Scheler refer to his Wesen und 
Formen der Sympathy [1973] unless indicated otherwise 
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love and hatred. Scheler argues that an ethics which takes sympathy (in the sense of 
fellow-feeling) to be its foundational principle is circular in nature. A sympathie feeling 
is not by definition moral: If, upon watching a sadist torturer at work, I feel equally 
pleased as the torturer, that does not make my feelings moral — let alone his actions. 
Indeed, as we have seen earlier, both Hume and Smith are forced to presume a capacity 
for »meta-sympathic« e-va/ii(e)-ations of sympathically experienced fellow-feelings — 
which induces an ad infinitum argument or a circle (see p. 155). 
Scheler's rejection of a sympathy ethics in the style of Hume or Smith, does not 
imply a rejection of the notion of sympathy altogether. Rather, Scheler provides an in-
depth analysis of the functional significance for a theory of ethics of the human capacity 
of sympathy — a multifaceted capacity, as a matter of fact. As will be shown later, the 
many forms of fellow-feeling listed by Scheler, some of which will turn out not to provide 
genuine insight into the otherness of the other, nonetheless all contribute in their own 
manner to the realization of sympathie intersubjectivity. »Emotional identification« 
enables (Ger.: fundiert) »feeling along«, which in turn enables »fellow-feeling« in one of 
its two forms (»community of feeling« and »feeling for somebody else's feelings«). 
»Fellow-feeling« enables general »love of mankind«, and that, finally, enables genuine 
»love of persons« and »love of God«. 
Scheler starts out distinguishing genuine fellow feeling from two kinds of »semi-
fellow-feeling«.79 (1.1) First, there is the »awareness of the feelings of others« (or in 
Mercer's vocabulary »knowing how somebody else is feeling«) (Ger.: Auffassen, 
Verständnis). Such awareness, Scheler contends, must be presupposed by any theory of 
fellow-feeling and thus cannot be itself a form of fellow-feeling. I must be aware of 
somebody else's suffering, I must know a child's crying to be an expression of pain, if I 
am to sympathize with such suffering [see Scheler 1973, p. 19]. 
(1.2) In fact, I may even be able to »feel along« (Ger.: Nachfühlen, Nach(er)leben) 
with somebody else (in Mercer's vocabulary, »agree« with that person's feelings). The 
novelist or dramatist must have the capacity to »feel-along« with, even »relive« some-
body's feelings, but there is no need for him to sympathize. The artist »knows« about the 
other person's feelings, he actually »experiences« their quality; but he does not »partici-
pate« in the other person's feelings, he has no part in them. In fact, he could »care less« 
about the person's portrayed. In and by themselves, such feelings are therefore morally 
irrelevant [see p. 20] (but we will see in a moment that Scheler does take »feeling along« 
to be a conditio sine qua non for veritable fellow-feeling. 
79. The term »rcmi-fellow-feeling« (which is not employed by Scheler himself) I have introduced 
because these two forms of »fellow-feeling« do not invoke in us a feeling like our fellow-
man's feeling, yet they do »inform« us about his feelings. In fact, such being »informed« 
about the nature of our fellow-man's feelings according to Scheler is a necessary precondi-
tion to develop genuine fellow-feeling. 
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Having disqualified these two versions of »semi-fellow-feeling« as inroads into the 
otherness of the other human being, Scheler goes on to discuss two other forms of fellow-
feeling m Unlike the first two, these two do qualify as fellow-feeling in that they invoke 
a feeling in us similar to that of our fellow-man But they, too, turn out not to qualify as 
genuine fellow-feeling either Fellow-feehng presumes that I feel what he is feeling, but 
m each of these forms of »pseudo-fellow-feeling« the disparity between me and him is 
lost81 
(2 1) First, there is »emotional infection or contagion« (Ger Gefuhlsansteckung) In 
this instance, I come to experience the same kind of feeling of my fellow-man, but only 
because he has »infected« me (e g , I come to laugh because of his contagious laughing) 
My feeling, however, is strictly my feeling rather than fellow-feeling with his feelmg My 
memness may have been generated (causa efficiens) by his laughter but is not based 
(causa matenahs) m his memness K Thus, emotional infection does not imply genuine 
fellow-feeling with the other person's feelings 
(2 2) Identifying feeling, a feeling of one-ness (Ger Einsfuhlung, in Mercer's 
vocabulary Emotional identification) This second form of »pseudo-fellow-feeling«, in a 
sense is an extreme version of the former I identify with the other person completely and 
in loosing my own selfhood obviously also my capacity to experience fellow-feeling with 
his feelings goes lost "Compassion, so we saw, is the suffering for the suffering of 
another being as this other being This »as the other being« must be part of the phenome-
nological base Genuine fellow-feeling manifests itself by the very fact that the nature 
and existence of the other being as well as his individuality are included [Moreover -
JW], in »genuine« compassion there is no state of suffering of the compassionate 
person himself' [Scheler 1973, ρ 48, 50, 561 To the extent that I am actually suffering, 
that is, to the extent that I am »infected« with the suffering of my fellow-human being, I 
am not genuinely compassionate but suffering my own suffering 
Although such extreme identification precludes genuine /e//o>v-feeling, unlike 
Mercer, Scheler grants this form of fellow-feeling its own significance in the structure of 
sympathie intersubjectivity more in general He concludes that any kind of awareness of 
another living being presumes a "minimum of nonspecific identifying feeling" [Scheler 
1973, ρ 42] As we have seen, Plotinus had already maintained that any kind of 
80 Scheler uses another order (2 1), (2 2), (1 1) and (1 2) I have followed the order 
employed by Mercer as discussed earlier in this chapter 
81 Again, Scheler does not use the term »/weHi/o-feeling-feeling«, but he leaves no doubt about 
these two forms of fellow-feeling failing to provide insight in the otherness of my fellow-
man 
82 It should be emphasized that the use of the Aristotelian distinction between various causes is 
not Scheler's but my own 
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awareness of another being, including non-human things, presumes some kind of »cosmo-
logical community« with that object Like Plotmus'83, Scheler's insistence on nonspecif­
ic identifying feeling as a condition for any kind of awareness of another human being, 
leaves the claim standing that genuine sympathy requires more than such minimal 
identifying fellow-feeling In fact, any ethical theory construed around the notion of 
fellow-feeling must at the same time account of the individuality of each and every person 
(including the person experiencing fellow-feeling and the person whose feelings invoke 
such fellow-feelings), because morality - Scheler claims - is essentially a matter of 
personhood Genuine sympathy presupposes the essential differentiation of human beings, 
their individual personhood (as opposed to some kind of supra-individual identity among 
all human beings as Schopenhauer had argued) Genuine sympathy implies that we can 
never completely grasp another human being's deepest, personal feelings [see Scheler 
1973, ρ 76-77] 
We will return to this claim hereunder because it seems to invoke a paradox How 
can I sympathize with another human being to the degree that I actually get a grasp of his 
otherness, when that other human being's uniqueness, his personhood escapes complete 
sympathy' But first we have to examine m what sense the remaining two forms of 
fellow-feeling, the only two that according to Scheler qualify as genuine forms of fellow-
feeling, enable mtersubjectivity 
(3 1) The first of the only two forms of genuine fellow-feeling is »community of 
feeling« (Mit-einander fühlen) Scheler specifies that the crucial point is not (as Mercer 
seems to suggest) that I experience the same feeling as my fellow-human being merely 
because we (accidently) focus on the same object, without the two of us even being aware 
of each other's feelings Thus, Scheler's example of two parents who together experience 
a community of feeling towards their beloved child that just died, who feel as if they are 
one person, seems not at all accidental For the essence of this most intense form of 
fellow-feeling is that both people not only share the contents of the experience of 
suffering, that is, m its »moral« aspects (in this case, the experience of disvalue, even evil 
over the loss of their child), but they also share in the experience as a »psychological« 
function It is not the case that the mother suffers and the father sympathizes with her, 
83 In his Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, Scheler does not mention Plotinus explicitly, but he 
does discuss the commonly adhered to Greek theorem of the impossibility of dissimilar 
beings to relate to another and of an encompassing »world soul« According to Scheler, the 
surplus value of this Greek theory (over Indian philosophy as well as Schopenhauer's) is its 
non-totalitarian character (see also ρ 148), thus allowing for genuine sympathy Scheler 
takes the emotional identification (Ger Einsmhlung) of the Orphean mysteries to be a 
romantic countermovement against the more moderate original theorem [see Scheler 1973, ρ 
93-94] 
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his suffering is not a reaction to her suffering ~ which is what we usually take sympathy 
to be (see hereunder); rather, they are suffering the same grief together. 
(3.2) So far, the various forms of fellow-feeling discussed had already been 
encountered in the discussion of Mercer who rejects them on the similar grounds as 
Scheler (to whom he refers explicitly). This last form, »feeling for somebody else's 
feelings« (Ger.: das Mitgefühl an oder mit dem Gefühl eines anderen), Mercer for 
unknown reasons does not discuss. Yet according to Scheler, it is the most common form 
of veritable fellow-feeling. The object of such fellow-feeling is not the other person's 
feelings but the »relived« feelings. It differs from the previous kind of fellow-feeling in 
that it is essentially a »reaction« to somebody else's feeling. Overlooking the two-step 
nature of fellow-feeling, would cause great theoretical difficulties, notably when it comes 
to explaining pain from pleasure.84 Indeed, as we have seen, Hume was forced to 
introduce the faculty of »conversion« to account for the fact that a sympathically felt pain 
ended-up as pleasure.85 But such a model based on conversion, Scheler would argue, 
still misses the point: The language of »conversions« suggests that one feeling - that of 
pain - is transformed, changed into another - namely pleasure; that would imply that the 
pain is no longer experienced; but the typical thing of tragic theater plays is that we 
remain aware of the suffering but experience pleasure nonetheless. Similarly, Scheler 
argues, a cruel person is somebody who is well aware of the suffering of his fellow-man, 
but experiences joy about it nonetheless; if he would be unaware of the suffering we might 
call him insensitive but not cruel. The essence of genuine fellow-feeling is that the 
disparity is not lost between me (as the person feeling for somebody else's feelings) and 
him (as the person whose feelings I am feeling for). 
However, Scheler's own emphasis on the »reactionary« character of genuine fellow-
feeling leads us back to the question to what extent such fellow-feeling can still be said to 
yield insight in the otherness of the other. Genuine fellow-feeling, Scheler argues, is a 
reaction to »relived« feelings of somebody else. Such »feeling along« will provide 
»knowledge« of the other person's feelings, as well as »experience« of the quality of those 
feelings. But in no sense will I have »part« in them. This »having part in« has to be 
brought about by »feeling for somebody else's feelings«. But how is that possible if such 
fellow-feeling in essence is a matter of my reaction to relived feelings? How can such an 
84. Scheler [1973, p. 25; note 1] blames his German contemporary Lipps (in the latter's theory 
of »empathy« (Ger.: Einfühlungstheorie) [see, e.g., Lipps 1909]) for overlooking this 
difference. 
85. Scheler explicitly rejects a third explanation of pleasure from pain, that is, to grant suffering 
itself positive value [see Scheler 1973, p. 61-66]. The fact that some commentators have 
protested against Scheler attributing this explanation to Schopenhauer and argued that 
Schopenhauer's views are in fact quite close to Scheler's, obviously, is of less importance in 
this context [see, e.g., Cartwright 1981]. 
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inírasubjective response engender genuine intersubjectivity? Does not the reactionary 
character of fellow-feeling by necessity preclude intersubjectivity? 
Surprisingly, Scheler's answer to this most pressing question is as simple as 
profound: The question itself is faulty and therefore needs no answer. The question is not 
how mtersubjectivity can be established, but how mfrasubjectivity can be realized. 
Intersubjectivity as Foundation of Sympathy 
As mentioned in the introductory paragraphs to the subsection on the British Moralists, in 
spite of their emphasis on the importance of sympathy, some members of the »school« of 
sympathy-ethics have been instrumental in the development of the individualistic libertari-
anism that pervades contemporary bioethical thought (see p. 149). We are now in a 
position to better illustrate this seeming paradox. The British moralists invoked the notion 
of sympathy to explain the apparent intersubjectivity that exists among men, but they did 
so on the presumption that this intersubjectivity needed explanation. It is only because 
they considered human beings to be - what I have called - »black boxes« that they felt the 
need to turn to the notion of sympathy and to even make it the foundational principle of 
ethics. They presumed that feelings are private; I can assess my own feelings but not the 
private feelings of others. Scheler now wants to turn this order around - or rather, to 
reestablish the order that was mistakenly turned around by the British Moralists: Intersub-
jectivity is the foundation of sympathy, rather than vice versa. The question, then, is not 
how I can assess someone else's feelings, but my own: I am aware of everybody's 
feelings, of feelings as they are present in the intersubjective world of men, but how can I 
distinguish which are genuinely my own? 
To elucidate this thesis, Scheler starts out proving the untenability of the opposite 
position. Earlier, it was already shown that a theory such as Hume's or Smith's based on 
»reconstructive imagination«, in order to function as an ethical theory (as opposed to mere 
psychological theory), must presume an е- а/и (elative meta-sympathic faculty which 
invokes an ad infinitum argument or a circle (see p. 155, 161). But Scheler now adds the 
question: How am I at all able to reconstruct someone else's feelings? What are the 
»pieces« to be reconstructed into a »complete« imagined feeling? We have already seen 
that Smith thinks it possible to conclude on the basis of another person's situation and/or 
condition that he must be sad, yet at the same time know (in some other manner) that he 
is happy (see p. 153). But how can I conclude that he is happy? If I cannot directly 
experience his private feelings, I can only go by the visible bodily expressions. But what 
justifies inducing from his red cheeks, open eyes, loud noises, and vivace movements that 
the person is happy? Neither of these physical phenomena entails happiness. For 
example, the redness of his cheeks could also mean anger. I may not conclude that it 
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cannot be anger, simply because, the person is neither screaming nor frowning at the same 
time. For what would allow me to induce anger rather than amazement from frowning? 
If, on the other hand, I am able as a matter of fact to read »meaning« into the totality 
of another person's expressions, that is, if I can see happiness, it can only be because that 
judgment of happiness precedes the Reconstruction of his totality of expressions into 
separate qualities (such as redness, vivacity, etc.). In fact, such a deconstructive analysis 
(Gr.: analysis = dissolution into parts) can only occur when I have come to doubt my 
first judgment of happiness (e.g., because the situation suggests sadness). Such a doubt 
presumes both a judgment of the person as being happy and the situation as being 
depressive. 
A model such as Hume's and Smith's precludes such a comparison. But for exactly 
the same reasons, Scheler goes on to argue, in such a model it would be equally impossi-
ble to pass a judgment on material entities (as opposed to feelings). To conclude that 
there is a human body on the operation table would be equally subjective as a judgment on 
somebody else's happiness, because none of the »parts« that together make up the stream 
of sense data coming from that external body implies »human bodiness«. It would be my 
reconstructive imagination that yields the conclusion: Human body on operation table. 
The physician's »anatomical« gaze (Gr.: ana-temnein = to cut apart) is deconstructive and 
secondary to an original understanding of the human body as a whole. Any deconstruc-
tion, whether in terms of feelings versus expressions, or of expressions versus bodily 
qualities, is "artificial" [Scheler 1973, p. 21]. I am first and foremost aware of meaning-
ful entities: I do not first see another person's eyes, I see him looking at me; in fact, I 
may notice that he is trying to hide his looking at me [see p. 254-255]. 
Notice that the problem of interpreting »otherness« cannot be solved by assuming a 
process of analogical reasoning of the kind of 'I know myself to become vivace when 
being happy so the other person's vivacity must mean happiness'. Any such analogy, 
even the most subtle one will in the end run into the fallacy of quaternio terminorum (a 
syllogism with one too many variables). It is logically incorrect, Scheler argues, to first 
assume that I only know myself as an animated being; next to recognize that some other 
being presents the kind of expressions that I recognize to resemble my own emotions; and 
from there to conclude that there must be another animated being out there. I may 
conclude that I myself apparently am out there once more as well, or at most, that a being 
exactly like me is out there, but not mother being [see Scheler 1973, p. 234]. And this is 
exactly what we have already seen Smith concluding (see p. 151). 
One may even wonder whether the proposed analogy allows for the conclusion that 
there is a being like me out there. The analogy requires me to interpret the movements, 
noises etc. produced by that being out there as »expressions«. But the term »expression«, 
which implies a correlation between the external phenomenon and some internal psycho-
logical process, presumes I already know about the existence of that internal process. 
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presumes that I know that something internal is being ex-pressed [see Scheler 1973, p. 
235]. Why not conclude that there is a machine, a being without an internal structure out 
there? The analogy does not provide any proof of the existence of other subjects like me, 
let alone about other subjects [see also Luijpen 1964, p. 199] 
Thus, it cannot be the case that I infer the existence of another human being from the 
fact that linked to some body, there is an »I« out there. Conversely, to become aware of 
another »I«, I do not even need to be aware of his body. Human beings leave many traces 
that point to their existence. This study, for example, is an unmistakable testimony of the 
existence of me as the writer as opposed to you as the reader. 
The latter example is but one more example of a phenomenologically evident fact 
that other human beings are always »given« (Ger.: gegeben) to me like any other kind of 
»data« (Lat.: data = the things given) prior to my deconstructive analysis in terms of 
separate qualities. But the same example also shows that another person's thoughts are 
not necessarily his and his alone. It is evident that in as much as you, as a reader of this 
study, are reading these sentences, they are your thoughts. But in terms of their contents, 
they remain mine. 
It should be emphasized at this point that Scheler is not arguing in terms of some 
kind of spatial identification, a merger between different persons. When becoming aware 
of another person's ideas, happiness, distress, suffering, etc., I do not »enter« into that 
person, let alone, »become« that person. Rather, we feel together.86 
Scheler contends that such sharing of thoughts and feelings actually is a very 
common phenomenon. For example, we distinguish repeatedly between our will and the 
will we merely obey, our feelings and those with which we sympathize with those of 
others. Apparently, the world in which we live is a world of thoughts, volitions, feelings, 
etc., each of which is necessarily the thought, volition or feeling of somebody, but not 
necessarily his private thought, etc. In fact, many a time I may find myself wondering 
whether some thought is really mine, that is, whether I can underwrite it; whether my 
decision is really mine or the result of external persuasion; whether what I am feeling is 
typically me or am I swept along by the emotions of the crowd surrounding me. All such 
86. This I take to also be an argument in favor of the term »sympathy« over »empathy«. 
Different authors such as Wyschogrod [1981], Wispé [1986], Chismar [1988] and Natsoulas 
[1988] suggest keeping both terms. However, their various definitions of the terms - which 
anyway do not coincide - leave standing the suggestive nature of the literal meanings of the 
terms (notwithstanding Wilmer [1968] claiming exactly the opposite. In his view sympathy 
is feeling together with the sufferer as if the pain were both of ours, whereas empathy is 
entering into the sufferer and feeling from within but only as if the pain were ours; in 
empathy the pain remains his and his only). Scheler [1973] does not use the term »empa-
thy«, but he rejects all models that are based on »Einfühlung« (such as Lipps' theory from 
1909) for being guilty of a faulty analogy (see p. 166), as well as the explanation of fellow-
feeling in terms of »Einsfühlung« (see p. 162). 
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wondering presumes that I am aware of the thoughts, volitions and feelings of others (even 
if I cannot pinpoint down whose exactly) The awareness of »other-ness« enables 
awareness of »me-ness« and vice versa "It is, after all, one and the same act of distinc­
tion in an - originally quite indistinct - aggregate by which simultaneously me-ness and 
other-ness become clear and evident" [Scheler 1973, ρ 244, emphasis altered - JW] m 
As mentioned, virtually all spiritual phenomena are intersubjective Scheler discerns 
two limits to sympathie intersubjectivity (1) The »personhood« of another being, and (2) 
physical emotions The first is most problematic, for as we wondered earlier (see ρ 
163), how can I sympathize with another human being to the degree that I actually get a 
grasp of his otherness, when that other human being's uniqueness, his personhood escapes 
sympathy completely 
At first sight, it seems that Scheler's theory of sympathy has indeed run into serious 
problems, even more so since he goes on to argue that this first limit cannot be surpassed 
either by an act of love - the highest form of intersubjectivity [see Scheler 1973, ρ 
215]88 The »person«, which Scheler takes to be the individually experienced unitary 
substance of all acts, the »self«89 that is implied by all of man's realizations, the »struc­
tural order« of his acts (Ger Aufbauordnung) [ρ 219], is necessarily unrecognizable for 
others in that it cannot become an »object« of knowledge [see ρ 168] Another »person« 
can only be »given« to me in an act of »co-realization« (Ger nut- or nac/ivollziehen) [p 
168, 215] The way another person lives his life, his »existence« (Ger Dasein90) сап 
only become »given« to me in the act of »following« him (Ger Gefolgschaft) Scheler 
gives the example of Christ whose way of life can be grasped only by those who become 
his followers [see ρ 168-169] The »essence« of another person, the kind of person he is 
(Ger Sosein), I can become aware of in the act of »understanding« (Ger Verstehen) 
Rather than ana-lyzing and re-ducing (Lat to bring back) the other person to known 
entities, I comprehend him as an irreducible in-dividual (Lat not divisible) In such dual 
87 A similar conclusion is reached by the French existentialist Gabriel Marcel " [C]ontrary 
to those who would want to invoke analogical reasoning to account for belief in the existence 
of others, it must be said that I only constitute myself as inferiority inasmuch as I take 
cognizance of the reality of those other" [Marcel 1959, ρ 169, as translated by O'Malley 
1966, ρ 84] 
88 In the light of contemporary informed consent models, it may be of interest to notice that 
Scheler contends that this first limit cannot be surpassed either by the other person's own 
statements 
89 This term is not used by Scheler who at times uses this term for the man's uniqueness in as 
much as it is still »objectifiable« and therefore »knowable« (unlike the person) [see, e g , ρ 
169] 
90 Scheler does not use the pair of terms »existence« and »essence«, but stripped from their 
particular philosophical tradition the terms may illustrate the distinction between Scheler's 
Dasein and Sosein 
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co-realization through »following« and through »understanding« I have »part« in the 
otherness of the other human being. In the act of »following« I share in his way of life; 
in the act of »understanding«, I experience "exactly the same" - not just "similar" -
thoughts, volitions, feelings, etc. [p. 252]. 
Our confidence in the existence of other human beings is deeper and primal to our 
knowledge of ourselves. As children, we do not have to learn who is our mother (and 
father), but who we are ourselves. Moreover, we have to leam which beings are not 
human rather than which are ~ a process of de-animation (Ger. : Ent-seelung) rather than 
of animation (Ger.: Be-seelung) [see p. 233]. The problem, so it seems, is not how to 
find out about others, but about ourselves. Man is not just part of the community, but the 
community is part of man. »US« is not just a gathering of many »MEs«, but it is an 
essential aspect of »MEness«. 
All of this is not to say, however, that the intersubjectivity between men is inescap-
able. It is primal by nature, but an equally essential aspect of being human is freedom. 
Man is free and able to close himself off from such interpersonal fellowship [see p. 220]. 
This also brings us to the second limit to sympathie intersubjectivity: Physical emotions 
and the like. This limit follows from Scheler's emphasis on the spiritual nature of 
intersubjective sympathy. Thoughts, volitions, and feelings are sharable (i) in spite of 
their being someone's and as to that extent also physical, and (ii) in as much as they are 
not physical but spiritual. Conversely, bodily feelings and sensual emotions that are 
purely physical in nature cannot be shared. Suffering, for example, can be shared, but 
pain cannot; I can sympathize with happiness but not with lust [see p. 251]. 
Preliminary Assessment 
Scheler's account of the nature of sympathy raises many questions, some of which we will 
address momentarily. But one conclusion stands out: Intersubjectivity, becoming aware of 
the feelings, interests, and values of one's fellow-man not only is possible; it requires an 
act of distinction not to take part in the intersubjective human world. The implications for 
a theory of clinical ethics are obvious: Physicians and other health care providers may be 
able to discern what is in the best interests of their patients. Even if they may not be able 
to always sympathize entirely with their patients - for a patient may willfully close off 
himself from the intersubjective world, and purely physical feelings will always remain 
private - at least care providers can feel and think with their patients; rather than sitting 
across from the table, they can join the patient in his search for »healing«. 
This conclusion is bound to meet severe opposition. Despite considerable evidence 
for its occurrence, we are culturally conditioned to doubt the existence of such intersubjec-
tivity, regrets Cassell [see 1991, p. 27]. Indeed, Cherry bluntly qualifies the quest for 
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direct intersubjectivity as "philosophical alchemy": "This hope, alas, is on all-fours with 
the hope that in the end base metals will be transmuted into gold ..." [Cherry 1980, p. 
137]. And yet, "[t]he disclosedness, the direct presences of the other as the other ..." is 
never doubted in everyday life; in fact, "... [ejvery attempt to add to the acceptability of 
the presence of the other as the other turns out to presuppose that the other is already 
present to me" [Luijpen 1964, p. 201; emphasis added - JW]. 
But Scheler's own explanation of the »workings« of sympathy raises the question to 
what extent genuine fellow-feeling is relevant - let alone necessary - for a theory of 
(bio)ethics. To act in the best interests of another human being it is necessary to be 
»aware« of his best interests, but is it necessary to sympathize? Would it not be sufficient 
if the physician, much like the novelist, is able to »feel along« with his patient's feelings 
(which he is able to do given the intersubjective nature of the human world)? Is there any 
need to sympathize in the sense of »feeling for« his patient's feelings? Says Natsoulas: 
"... [A] physician who wishes to alleviate a patient's suffering may need to be intensely 
aware of the suffering in order to determine its nature and source, yet the physician need 
not be engaged in sympathizing"; that is, the patient's suffering may not have to "move" 
the physician "... to want to help the other..., the physician's intense awareness of the 
suffering of an other may be no more affective than the physician's awareness of street 
directions to a medical conference" [Natsoulas 1988, p. 171]. 
So why, then, should the physician want to help? Scheler's novelist presumably 
writes novels about the feelings, thoughts and emotions of fellow human beings because 
he is paid for the book, not because he is moved by those feelings, thoughts and emotions. 
Similarly, Natsoulas' physician is going to the conference because of some external 
reason. But what about a health care provider helping his patient? As I have argued in 
the second and third chapters, the cogency of the clinical-ethical situation must be 
grounded in the situation itself. Contrary to Natsoulas, therefore, I would maintain the 
physician will provide proper, beneficent care precisely because and only in as much as he 
is moved by his patient's needs to do so. That is to say, in as much as his attitude 
towards the patient is one of genuine sympathy.91 
What, then, makes mere »feeling along« turn into genuine »fellow-feeling«? We have 
seen that Scheler takes a minimum of nonspecific identifying feeling to be the basis of all 
human intersubjectivity (see p. 162). We live in a world that is full of thoughts, emo-
tions, ideas, and feelings that we share, often without being aware of their origin. 
Obviously, such »spiritual« phenomena do not wander about as pure spirits; they are 
always present is some material form. Thus, my thoughts first were embodied in my 
mind; they became embodied in this study; and now they are embodied in the minds of 
91. Contrary to Scheler, I would maintain that a good novel can only be written by a sympathie 
novelist rather than by one who is merely feeing along. 
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the readers. As mentioned before, in as much as they are physical, they now are yours 
and yours only; but in contents they remain mine. And I could have decided not to share 
them. Conversely, I cannot share my headache with you. 
On the basis of such minimally shared feeling, two different processes may take 
place. (1) It may be that there is so much excitement in my environment that my being 
aware of its source and meaning, I become excited as well. The external source of my 
excitement not only may »infect« me, I may become so excited that I completely identify 
with the outside source. In both instances, however, the disparity between me (as the 
person feeling for somebody else's feelings) and him (as the person whose feelings I am 
feeling for) is lost - thus precluding insight in the otherness of the other. 
As Mercer has pointed out, genuine sympathy requires an element of cognitive 
awareness. Scheler, thus, discerns a second process. (2) Given the intersubjective 
character of the human world, I may come to »know« about my fellow-man's feelings, 
even »feel along«. We thereby »comprehend« (Ger.: erfassen) the quality of those 
feelings. But in no sense will we have »part« in them. This, now, is brought about by 
genuine fellow-feeling. In the act of genuine sympathy, I am no longer "indifferent" 
(Ger.: gleichgültig) to my fellow-man's feelings, I »take part« in it. 
Unfortunately, Scheler is not very clear about the extent of this »involvement«. 
While denying that sympathy can be a foundational principle for a theory of ethics (see p. 
161), he does assign a certain degree of "ethical value" to genuine fellow-feeling [Scheler 
1973, p. 144]. If we assume that Scheler understands this involvement to be the kind of 
»active concern« that both Butler and Mercer mention (see p. 150, 158), the question 
arises what causes indifferent »feeling-along« to become concemful »fellow-feeling«. 
What could be the origin of such a concern if not the physician's intense awareness of the 
suffering of his patient itself? 
While intended to prove the opposite, Natsoulas' comparison of patients and road 
signs example actually illustrates the necessity of genuine sympathy guiding the patient-
provider relationship. Road signs are paradigmatic examples of information that immedi-
ately affects people. Conversely, they remain unnoticed unless one is concerned about 
finding one's way. Patients are the providers' road signs. Sympathie awareness is at the 
same time cogent awareness. In the next subsections, this thesis will be worked out in 
more detail. 
Sympathy and Cogency 
Human knowledge is seldom - if ever - purely subjective, private knowledge. Genuine 
knowledge always implies interpretation; interpretation implies subjectivity as well as a 
horizon of meaning against the background of which such interpretation can take place. 
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Although there is no such thing as a single »objective« world beyond interpretation, 
although there are as many worlds as there are interpreters, my own interpretation always 
is determined in part by an external source of meaning which is shared by those living in 
the same historical, geographical, cultural, social, and biological situation 
All these and similar phenomenological observations leave standing, however, that 
any interpretation is always the interpretation of a particular interpreter This would 
imply that each individual in some sense is master over the world Each and every other 
being is assigned a place in my world by me So how could it be that my interpretation of 
somebody else's needs presents a cogent call to act upon the perceived needs? Any sense 
of obligation in essence would be a self-imposed sense of obligation But if that is the 
case, it does not make much sense to talk in terms of cogency about such experiences 
There is, however, one being that according to Lévinas resists such a categorization 
into my world order The other human being The Other " cannot be rank ordered 
among the other items that I use as property, in my work, or for enjoyment He cannot 
be interpreted as one phenomenon in addition to, or among other phenomena against the 
background of an all-encompassing horizon The Other, therefore, is not a phenome-
non of which I would have to discover the nucleus, the essence [via interpretation - JW\" 
[Peperzak 1969, ρ 9] In reference to the vocabulary of Aristotelian metaphysics, 
Lévinas contends that man in his intentional and interpretative relationship with the world 
of objects provides those objects with their "form" The world is an "informed reality", 
that is, a known reality, fixed in a network of meaning-providing relations After all, 
knowledge of the individual object in its individuality is not possible The other human 
being, however, does not obtain its meamngfulness via its relatedness to other parts of this 
network, it is meaningful from without itself The other human being, his »face«92 - a 
key term in Lévinas' philosophy - so to say is »naked« When I see hun, I see him 
immediately as he is (that is, without the mediating process of interpretation) My 
understanding of the other human being is given in the very moment that he »faces« me 
The human face is not a mask behind which the real human being is to be dis-covered m a 
92 We should take this term rather literally in that the crux of Lévinas' model is that it concerns 
persons (rather than abstract discourses) meeting one another As Wellmer has pointed out, 
it is precisely the impossibility of deducing person-relevant moral norms out of person-
neutral rational discourse that constitutes one of the most serious problems for any discourse 
ethics (as, for example, Habermas and Apel have stnved to develop) [see Wellmer 1986, ρ 
108, see also Rentsch 1990, ρ 13-29] Wellmer's observation also illustrates why the 
personal relationship between patients and providers can virtually never be narrated 
adequately - let alone completely - in a case description, not even a so-called »thick« case 
Such »personal« narrations remain the prerogative of the literary genius, the genuine novelist 
(see also note 91) 
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process of interpretation; the human face is immediate "expression" of itself [Lévinas 
1969, p. 102-103]. 
His otherness is so radical that it not only resists any reduction to the »first person« 
(I, Me, My) but also to the »second person« (You). Without denying the insights of such 
anthropologists as Buber, Scheler and Marcel, and their emphasis on the social nature of 
human being, Lévinas insists that my fellow man always remains maximal otherness, a 
»third person«, a He (rather than You or even Thou) [see Lévinas 1969, p. 34]. His 
»nakedness« forces me to accept him as radically different from me. He presents a "gap" 
in my own horizon [p. 94]. His appearance shatters my totalitarian project of reducing 
each and every being according to my interpretative insight. In »facing« me, he refuses to 
be categorized and thus reduced to »MEness« (rather than otherness). This is because 
"[t]he epiphany of the face is ethical" (rather than real). If it were real, "... we would 
have a perception of it, with all that reverts to the subjective in perception" [Lévinas 
1992, p. 199]. In facing me, the other always affects me in the imperative rather than 
indicative mode [see Lévinas 1969, p. 104] The face of the other presents itself as "... 
ethical resistance that paralyses my powers ..." [Lévinas 1992, p. 199]. His presence 
implies heteronomy: I can no longer set my own norm (autonomy) but am forced to 
accept that there is another norm: The other human being.93 
The idea that sympathy is "гpractical concept", that "... we cannot sympathize with 
someone yet remain indifferent to him" we have already encountered in Mercer's critique 
of Hume [Mercer 1972, p. 10-11]. Mercer deems Hume's analysis of moral behavior in 
terms of sympathie feelings insufficient because Hume has great trouble explaining why I 
feel obligated to assist a beggar. If to sympathize with another is merely to have the same 
feeling as he has - which is what Hume claims - it seems more logical that I would try to 
evade the sight of the beggar by quickly passing him. For Hume "... it is necessary to 
appeal to something more than the mere fact of sympathy in order to explain why we 
should want to alleviate misery and distress instead of passing by on the other side" 
[Mercer 1972, p. 82]. 
However, shortly afterwards Mercer himself causes a similar need for a meta-theory 
of morality when he limits the "conative" aspect of sympathy to its invoking an altruistic 
»disposition«: Sympathizing with someone else's needs implies being concerned about him, 
but if actual assistance would harm my own interests, I have reason not to undertake such 
action. The final decision, whether or not to act, requires a weighing of the various 
93. Obviously, Lévinas heteronomy stands opposite from libertarian autonomy, not Kant's 
version of autonomy. If we were to merge Kant's basic formulation of the categorical 
imperative as the law that sets itself, with the second subformulation of the same imperative 
that each person always must be regarded as a goal in itself, and never as a mere means 
towards some other goal, a rather Levinassian imperative would emerge: The Law that each 
and every individual person represents [see Kant 1974]. 
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interests involved [see Mercer 1972, p. 84]. But such weighing requires a moral scale 
which cannot be external to me such that I would sympathically know it — for that would 
invoke a circle; consequently, it must be me who makes the final balancing of various 
interests. That is: Autonomy as final moral principle. 
Against such autonomy, Lévinas posits the heteronomy of the »other«. The heteron-
omous imperative implied by the sympathie report to my fellow human being is »absolute« 
(Lat.: ab-solutus = loosened from) in that it is completely independent from me. It is not 
first and foremost that the other is a human - like me - and shares in a set of human rights 
that he and I have agreed upon; it is not a matter of me owing him out of past promises. 
The other always "takes me by surprise" [Peperzak 1986, p. 152]. In fact, I am a 
"hostage" of my fellow man [Lévinas 1969, p. 34]. The norm that he presents is 
absolute, moreover, in that the nakedness of his face is loosened from the manifold 
determinants already mentioned (history, culture, social structures, etc.). The heteronomy 
is not grounded in and relative to the intersubjective horizon of meaning we all share, let 
alone in some anthropological understanding of what it means to be human [see Lévinas 
1992, p. 194]. It is solely given with and grounded in my fellow man, and any reduction 
of his otherness to sameness or »equality« would be an injustice to him [see Peperzak 
1987, p. 140]. 
Lévinas explicitly adds that this heteronomy is not grounded in »love«. Love is blind 
and as such unjust towards any and all third persons. Yet the otherness of my fellow 
human being is normative precisely because he is that third person. Love precludes 
genuine respect which I owe my fellow human beings. In this sense, the law of justice 
precedes the law of loving my neighbor [see Lévinas 1969, p. 118-119]. I am responsible 
not only for those who I meet, let alone for those who I want or like to meet. I carry 
responsibility for any and all others. 
But how can this be possible? Is this not too excessive a task for humans? I 
remember visiting Auschwitz. In startling contrast with the peaceful rustle of the softly 
green poplars outside the reddish brick buildings, the pictures inside - silent, black and 
white, momentary representations of a dark protracted ordeal - sufficed to yield an 
undeniable verdict of immorality. But this verdict not only concerned those who did it 
all. It also hit me, and I had to leave. Not because the pictures were so painful, but 
because they shattered my self-righteousness. One cannot watch it and remain unmoved: 
One either moves into it (which, given the historicity of the event, is no longer possible), 
or one moves out of it. And so I did. 
If the Auschwitz example is an extreme illustration of Lévinas' staunch thesis, it is 
not difficult to think of more everyday examples. The world, including the rich Western 
world, is filled with beggars. Having plenty myself, I can easily argue that I cannot be 
held responsible for all that poverty, but I cannot sincerely say that to the beggar who 
looks up and stretches out his hand for a small gift. Nor can I acknowledge the beggar. 
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recognize his needs, even admit that something ought to be done, yet respond that there 
are others who will take care of him. I either face the beggar, reach in my pocket and 
give generously, or look the other way, accelerate my pace, and move on to next 
distraction ~ as I almost always find myself doing. 
The Auschwitz and beggar examples illustrate what I take to be Lévinas' point when 
he argues that my fellow man sets a norm: Not only is the thesis that humans are moral 
strangers to one another mistaken; not only is it utterly clear to the rich person what the 
beggar needs; it is equally clear that the beggar should be assisted in his needs. The 
experience of the presence of the other provides both insight and obligation. 
A similar argument is made by Schillebeeckx [1968] when he argues that the basis of 
morality is a so called »contrast-experience«: The very moment that one sees a child being 
tortured, one knows that this ought not to happen. The experience is shocking. The 
contrast between this event and the scope of acceptable events is too extreme. There is no 
further analysis needed to yield certainty about the immorality of that event. The 
experience of contrast provides that evidence. Further analysis might be needed as to 
what exactly ought to happen now, but the obligation to try to undo the contrasting event 
is undeniable. 
Although Schillebeeckx's example illustrates quite well the point we are trying to 
make, two comments must be made. First, Schillebeeckx focuses on negative contrasts: 
They occur only when certain events present themselves as utterly immoral, as di'jvalue. 
He argues that the human world is in constant change, and so historically and culturally 
contingent that a positive account of what ought to happen cannot be presented with the 
same self-evidence. This argument, however, seems to confuse two different senses of 
self-evidence. The contrast-experience of the child being tortured does not obtain its self-
evidence from its non-relativity, its ab-soluteness from any and all contingent cultural and 
historical determinants. It is the contrast itself that, by shattering my self-righteousness, 
evidently reveals a norm different from my autonomy, that imposes on me the obligation 
to overlook myself and be there for the other. 
An ethos of care is invoked by the recognition of need, the negative contrast 
experience as described by Schillebeeckx. But such an ethos must also be guided by the 
recognition of what could be of help. It may be possible to develop an "ethos of 
negation" out of contrast experiences, but such experience cannot be the basis of a 
genuine "ethics", Mieth contends. Ethics cannot do without an innovative approach, an 
approach in which genuinely new options are opened, rather than mere negations of the 
negative [see Mieth 1977, p. 102]. 
Obviously, horrendous events such as the torturing of a child shake our comfortable 
life and move us. But so can positive contrasts. We can be moved as well by the bright 
laughter of a happy child, the intense admiration of nature radiating from Van Gogh's 
sunflowers, the courage of Ghandi or Martin Luther King. These events, too, can shatter 
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our self-righteousness and point to the many gaps in our own horizon. Such positive 
contrasts may provide less clear an indication as to what the norm set by their otherness 
implies than the negative contrasts presented by horrendous events. But they do set a 
norm. Without some positive guidance, without some thin appeal as from a distant 
positively charged »magnet«, the »electron« that man is in the large cosmos would bounce 
randomly between the manifold negative magnets presented by the world. Man's life is 
not a continuous tacking between two bad alternatives. And even if it were, some sense 
of positiveness, of morality (as opposed to immorality) would be required to pick the 
»best« of two bad alternatives. Thus, I would contend that both disvalues (which repulse 
us) and values (which attract us) present themselves through contrast experiences, appear 
as gaps in our private horizon, challenge our autonomy, and set another norm, the norm 
of the other, the other as norm. 
A second comment concerns the extremity of Schillebeeckx's examples. Even if we 
complement his theory of negative contrast experiences by assuming the existence of 
positive contrast experience, his theory would imply a model of moral life in which man 
nears the good by major bounds and leaps. Repelled by one negative contrast after 
another, bouncing towards yonder values, he would be like a little boat caught in a raging 
storm in the middle of a vast ocean with no more than a small compass on which to sail. 
Although some persons, indeed, lead a stormy life, being radically converted from a life 
of corruption or boredom to one of utmost altruism and service, most of us tend to lead a 
more quite life, taking one small step at a time, hopefully in the right direction. Indeed 
»hope«-fully in the right direction, for we too are guided by hope for and on the move 
towards a better world. This presumes the presence of many more beacons on which to 
sail through the everydayness of common human life than the few extremes that, so to 
say, can either completely convert or completely corrupt man. Man's horizon, then, 
would not be pierced with but a few big and very black holes, but resemble a veil of 
Belgium lace with sparse large apertures, many smaller ones, and thousands of little, 
barely visible punctures. Each of these little punctures is normative, either as value or as 
disvalue, not because they can be shown through interpretation and analysis to be so, but 
because they show themselves to be so. The others speak before they can be spoken 
about [see Lévinas 1969, p. 122]. 
Sympathy and Cogency: A Circle? 
In the previous subsection, I have tried to argue in reference to such authors as Lévinas 
and Schillebeeckx that man's sympathie awareness of his fellow human being is not ad 
libitum: It provides insight but at the same time sets a duty. Not only is it clearly a good 
thing to feed the hungry, one is also obligated to do so. The self-evidential nature of the 
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heteronomy implied by the presence of the other does not constitute a (psychological) 
explanation of man's actual undertakings in accordance with that norm. It explains why 
man should act as such, not that he acts as such — for if it would, man no longer would 
be free. In fact, even the most horrendous of events that present extreme contrast 
experiences do happen, over and over again. However, the thesis that there exists a 
congruence between what is taken to be the good of my fellow man and what ought to be 
done is itself not beyond doubt. 
Now that sympathy has turned from a mere condition of moral behavior into a guide 
for moral behavior, concerns like Sprague's about »wrong« sympathies seems to have 
regained validity (see p. 151, 154). With good reason Scheler maintained that sympathie 
experiences are not by definition moral experiences (see p. 161). But how can I know 
that the sympathically revealed norm is »correct«? How can I know that what I take to be 
the good is indeed the good? 
Scheler has argued that an ethics which takes sympathy to be its foundational 
principle is circular. But this conclusion only follows if one fails to see the incorrectness 
of such questions as 'how can I know that the sympathically revealed norm is correct?'. 
This question can only be asked if the reason is forgotten for our »digging up« the lost 
notion of sympathy: The claim of libertarian bioethicists such as Engelhardt that it is 
impossible to know what is the good of fellow-human beings, for example, one's patients. 
To assume that there should still be a way to verify sympathically revealed insights in the 
good, a test that is completely external to sympathy, is inducing a circle. To ask, now, 
how I can know that what I sympathically take to be the good is indeed the good, suggests 
that sympathy cannot provide a sufficiently reliable insight in the good of my fellow-man, 
and that, for want of any other means to gain a better insight, libertarian approaches to 
bioethics still have more explanatory power.94 
But surely it is possible that people sincerely assume they know what is in the best 
interests of their fellow-men, and yet it is not. After all, it was such benevolent but 
maleficent paternalism that invoked the development of libertarian bioethics. To claim 
that there is no other, at least not a more reliable way to gain insight in the good of 
others, that could function as an independent test of sympathy, is not to argue that 
sympathie revelations should not and cannot be assessed. But such an assessment must 
take place within the context of situational sympathie concern. The final principle of 
verification, the »objective« standard can only be the call of one's fellow-man. Without 
the cogent appeal of the other (of which we can only be aware given intersubjective 
sympathy), without heteronomy, there would be nothing to answer to and thus, there 
elings to coincide with the other person's. However, he appears to be unable to show convincing-
ly how we do get an idea of the other person's feelings — if not through sympathy (see also 
footnote 73). 
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could not be something like respons(e)-ibility. Consequently, there could not be account-
ability — for what could be the »objective« standard that would allow a third person to 
judge his fellow man's behavior? 
One may conclude that ethics, then, becomes a matter of force, of attaining the 
power rather than the wisdom to judge. Though in essence correct, this objection can 
undermine any theory of ethics. It is not possible to ever agree on a theory of ethics if 
one cannot find a single point of agreement at the level of moral experience. Neverthe-
less, the objection deserves further attention because there are at least two levels (in my 
theory of ethics) that are liable to arbitrariness. There is (1) the level of facts, and (2) the 
level of moral awareness. There are people who continue doing horrendous things in the 
face of the tremendous suffering they cause. If some such person were to claim that he 
neither knew that his victims were suffering, nor that he should have withdrawn from 
torturing; that, in other words, the norm applied by his judges is wrong rather than his 
own sympathically revealed norm which allows or even prescribes such torture — his 
judges will simply disregard that claim. The nazi camp guards explanation, 'Wir haben es 
nicht gewußt', 'We did not know', is plainly unbelievable. But what if we asked the 
priest and the Lévite from Jesus' parable why they passed the sacked traveller, and (1) the 
priest answered that he simply did not think that the traveller was in any serious need? 
What if (2) the Lévite responded that he did notice his suffering, but really and sincerely 
felt no moral obligation to assist the traveller? 
1. There are plenty of historical examples that show that certain behaviors -
nowadays considered immoral - were acceptable because the facts (rather than the moral 
evaluation) were assessed differently. For thousands of years slaves were simply thought 
of as objects of property or as subhuman beings. Women suspected of being a witch were 
first weighed to assess whether they really were witches. And nowadays we talk about 
pre-embryos and post-persons to express that the newly conceived human being and the 
patient in persistent vegetative state are ontologically different from genuine mankind. 
Any sympathie sense of moral obligation towards them, suggesting to treat them in a 
normal, humane manner, is simply mistaken for based on incorrect facts. 
Although the question about the factual basis of our moral obligations is an important 
one, it is not typical for the kind of ethics espoused in this chapter. As Prichard has 
noted in a well-known article on Duty and the Ignorance of Fact [1949], any ethical 
theory faces this problem. Should the deontologist walking across a bridge and hearing a 
loud splash only react when in fact somebody has fallen in the water who, moreover, is 
drowning? How is a utilitarian able to assess the consequences of various alternatives 
with certainty when the future is, by definition, never certain? Prichard concludes that 
our "... obligation depends on our being in a certain attitude of mind towards the situation 
in respect of knowledge, thought, or opinion. This ... can be described as the subjective 
view of the basis of an obligation, not in the sense that no acts are really right or wrong, 
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but in the sense of the view that the ground of an obligation lies in some state of the 
man's own mind" [p. 25]. 
So what about the person who provides a different assessment of the facts? We may 
try to change his view on the facts. Granted, that still would be a matter of changing his 
view on the facts. But more we cannot do, Prichard argues: "... [W]hen our attempt to 
change his opinion about the facts is over, then, whether we have or have not succeeded, 
the question whether he is bound to do the action will turn on the nature of his opinion 
about the facts. Thus we think that, provided the would-be torturer remained, in spite of 
all we have said, in a very high degree confident that torturing, and torturing only, would 
save the heretic, he would be bound to inflict the torture. No doubt we also think that we 
should take steps to prevent him; but here there is no inconsistency. And, in fact, we not 
infrequently think ourselves to do some action which will prevent someone else doing 
something which he is bound to do. Indeed, if this were not so, few would fight 
conscientiously for their country" [30-31]. 
Hence, we must conclude that if the parable's priest was genuinely convinced that 
the sacked traveller was not in any serious need, he did not act immoral in passing by. 
But then, the point of the parable is not to teach us how to find out who is not a needy 
neighbor, but what it is to act like a neighbor [see Winch 1987, p. 156; Mieth 1977, p. 
89-90]. The moral thing to do was to help the sacked traveller given his real needs. The 
priest may nonetheless remain beyond reproach if he sincerely did not recognize those 
needs. 
2. So what about the Lévite who (in my version of the parable) responded that he 
was well aware of the needs but felt no need to provide assistance. Does every awareness 
of one's fellow-man's suffering necessarily imply a call to undo it or at least, withdraw 
from causing it? Surely, the pictures in Auschwitz are in such contrast with our common 
moral sense of what ought to be the case, that those images invoke an undeniable response 
to undo such suffering or at least, withdraw from causing it. But there are at least two 
serious objections that could be brought forward against my more general equation of the 
awareness of suffering on the one hand with, and an obliging call to act in a particular 
manner on the other. 
2.1. The first objection concerns the problem we already encountered in our 
discussion of the British Moralists, that is, the problem of pleasure from pain (and the 
reverse). It may be the case that, generally, the view of suffering and pain disturbs and 
shocks us, but there are also situations where we are well aware of the presence of 
suffering and yet experience pleasure. I may watch a horror movie and have a lot of fun 
doing so, notwithstanding the horrendous things being depicted or - even more so -
because of the horrendous things being depicted. However, once the movie ends, and so 
its spell, I am likely to conclude it was fun to watch it, but at the same time have a bad 
feeling about the events depicted and the director's manner of depicting them. On the 
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basis of the latter awareness I may consider it to be an immoral movie, in spite of the fun 
I experienced watching it. 
Feagin [1983] calls such an evaluative verdict a meta-response. That characteriza-
tion, obviously, would induce another circle. However, it is also possible to analyze the 
event differently. The primary arousal in watching the movie results from the director's 
ability to completely grasp my attention such that I lose my ability to distantial evaluation. 
In Scheler's vocabulary, it would be a case of »emotional identification«. It is only when 
the identification is broken at the end of the movie, that I regain my ability to differenti-
ate. I then notice that a new situation has emerged, namely one of visitors in a cinema 
(myself included), having fun about events that are really horrendous. Not only do I 
admit - in final analysis - that the events depicted were really horrendous and not funny at 
all, thus confirming their being in contrast with what ought to be the case. I may also 
come to judge my own pleasure differently: Perceiving pleasure, a crude, momentary 
thrill without any lasting moral lesson to it (the kind of lesson theatrical tragedies intend 
to provide), is in such a sharp contrast with the fact of suffering, that it ought not to 
occur. 
2.2. The second objection is more fundamental in that it concerns the possibility of 
more than one sincerely sympathie moral response to the needs of a fellow-man. Winch 
has argued that the Samaritan in Jesus' parable "... responds to what he sees as a 
necessity generated by the presence of the injured man" [Winch 1987, p. 157]. Phillips 
has objected to Winch that we cannot take for granted that the situation will always 
generate a particular morally necessary perspective. "Winch does not emphasise that the 
response to suffering he is discussing is one moral response among others. When 
Callicles said 'Suffering does not happen to a man', he was not being indifferent to 
suffering, but responding to it morally in a way very different from the response of the 
Samaritan" [Philips 1989, p. 126-127]. Phillips' own example, however, puts into 
question his objection. Could there have been another morally appropriate response to the 
needs of the sacked traveller than the Samaritan's?95 
Maybe the Samaritan's parable does not allow for another interpretation. But that, 
of course, does not sufficiently counter Phillips' objection. Let's review my own beggar 
example discussed earlier (see p. 174). Some months ago, I visited Venice and was 
fortunate to have a hotel with a view overlooking a beautiful canal. But in order to see all 
that splendid wealth, I also had to face a beggar who would be sitting slightly below me, 
in a corner of the bridge from the early morning till the late evening, day in and day out. 
Though eager to fully enjoy the view of the canal, I found myself »peeking« out, hoping 
he would not look up. One day a couple of well-to-do tourists walked by. When the 
95. Phillips has indeed confirmed (in an oral communication - JW) that he did not want to 
suggest another moral response is reasonaly feasible to the sacked traveller. 
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woman reached for her wallet, her husband remarked that donating to a beggar only 
fosters laziness. 
While some people arguing along these lines may be soothing their troubled 
conscience, others seem to be very sincere in their belief that a beggar is better off not 
being given money. On what grounds may I conclude that the woman's response was 
morally proper and her husband's was not? Surely the fact that I, too, felt embarrassed 
by my luxuries contrasting with the beggar's poverty does not suffice. Neither does it 
matter very much that many people passing the beggar on the bridge seemed not in the 
least embarrassed by him. 
I would expect, however, that if we were to ask all these persons who »nonchalantly« 
passed the beggar, whether they had at least noticed him and become aware of his needs, 
most would all answer affirmatively. In fact, the Venetian tourist's argument that 
donations only stimulate begging was neither intended to deny the beggar's poverty, nor 
the moral obligation of the rich to do something about it. The remark only concerned his 
wife's particular practical response to those needs (i.e., giving money rather than 
stimulating employment). Similarly, the argument that begging is offensive and that, 
therefore, society cannot condone begging, does not concern the fact of the beggars' needs 
nor the moral duty of society to seek a solution, but only the beggars' particular way of 
trying to solve their problem, that is, by public begging.96 
But again, would it not be possible that one of those people »nonchalantly« passing 
the beggar would acknowledge the fact of the beggar suffering but not conclude that at 
least something ought to be done to relieve the suffering (whether by simply donating 
money or by encouraging him to find work)? What about Père Paneloux' sermon to the 
citizens of the plague stricken town of Oran: "My brethren, you are in a state of suffer-
ing, my brethren, you have merited it" [Camus 1947, p. 91]. What about Callicles in 
Plato's Gorgias who argued that the whole debate about suffering, in particular about 
suffering injustice, is an invention of slaves and other impotent people to their own 
advantage [see Plato 1980\ pp. 144-145, § 483]? 
Although the possibility of more than one moral response to the sympathically 
perceived suffering of my fellow-man cannot be excluded a priori, the examples about 
Paneloux and Callicles seem to suggest otherwise. Granted, I have only provided two 
examples, too few to draw any kind of general conclusion from it. But then, within the 
ethical framework I am trying to defend, a general rule of the kind that there is always 
only one moral response possible to the sympathically established fact, simply could not 
be discovered. For the point I am trying to make is that it is only in our sympathie 
96. Notwithstanding its liberal image, the Dutch Penal Code still contains an article prohibiting 
public begging (art. 432). 
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awareness that the moral obligation can be established; never in any kind of generic rule. 
In order to prove a priori that in any kind of particular situation only one moral response 
can emerge, I would need a non-situational moral principle — in finding it, I would at the 
same time prove myself wrong.97 
It is the situations that speak; more precisely, it is in the face of my fellow-man's 
suffering that it becomes clear to me what I ought to do. That is not to say that my moral 
obligation are not prima facie in the sense of »obvious at first sight«. I may be puzzled, 
uncertain how exactly I should assist the beggar. As I will argue in more detail hereun-
der, the heteronomy which the other is, is not always and immediately established in full; 
it often will require a conscious effort on my part to learn more about my fellow-man, to 
nurture our relationship. But any attempt to prove externally, i.e., external to the case) 
that I ought to assist him given his apparent needs must fail. At the very moment of 
presenting his point of view, Père Paneloux proves himself to be wrong. So does 
Callicles. And likewise all the Nazis - notwithstanding their sincerity - who denied their 
moral obligations in the face of the suffering they caused. Jesus, on the other hand, in 
answering the lawyer's linguistic question 'who is my neighbor' with a story rather than a 
rational definition, proves himself right. 
How do I know? I just know. Or maybe it would be more correct to respond that I 
simply cannot answer this question - if I were to try, I could only prove myself wrong. 
In that sense, my answer to the second objection is nothing more than an admission of, 
and even plea for, an element of arbitrariness (Lat.: arbitrarius = decided by one's own 
discretion or judgment); or in the vocabulary of Chapter 4, conversion. If it were 
possible to prove the point that one holds on the basis conversion, there would be no point 
in using the term conversion. 
But then, no theory of ethics can provide a final answer to the question 'why 
something ought (not) to happen'. The very notion of respons(e)-ibility suggests there is 
97. It could be objected that the kind of argument I am now using in favor of my own position, I 
have used earlier against the skeptic (see p. 20). In order to prove his own theory, that is, 
that the truth of all propositions is doubtful, the skeptic would have to prove at least one 
proposition to be true beyond doubt, that is the proposition that the truth of all propositions 
is doubtful — thereby undermining his own theory. There is, however, one essential 
difference between my ethical position and the skeptic's epistemological position: The skeptic 
is making an epistemological claim (rather than a moral one), and must remain consistent 
within the epistemological domain. My point is that moral sympathy, because of its peculiar 
contents, goes beyond the domain of epistemology. An epistemological argument against 
sympathy therefore cannot settle the issue completely. "... [I]t is important to recognize that 
here [i.e., in our bafflement, incomprehension as well as horror in the face of such a 
phenomenon as the Holocaust in Nazi Germany] there is something which in a sense is not to 
be 'understood', if we are to retain our sense of what human life is. ... Retention of that 
sense requires a quite different sort of response from that which seeks explanation ..." 
[Winch 1987, p. 164]. 
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someone to answer to, someone who will judge, someone who, therefore, holds the moral 
standard. Now God, by definition, knows this standard. But if there is any sense in 
talking about responsibility of men towards men, we must assume that the matter of 
judging is a human matter as well. In that sense, 'homo mensura est', man - with all of 
his limitations - is the measure of all things, as the Greek sophist Protagoras already has 
defended [see Plato 1980', § 152 A; see also Verhoeven 1987]. 
In as much as the suggested link between sympathy and cogency is circular, we 
should not forget that a circular argument is not invalid in the logical sense of the term. 
We may wonder how much the argument adds to our understanding, what is clarifies 
(Lat.: arguere = to clarify). But then again, there is a circular element in all of ethics as 
Aristotle already admitted in his Nicomachean Ethics [see Aristotle 1981, p. 5, 1094b-
1095a]. It is a category mistake to look for a non-circular theory of ethics, for it is only 
in our practical undertakings that the final answer as to why one ought (not) to act in a 
particular manner can be found. 
Sympathy and Cogency: Three More Objections 
I have argued that, notwithstanding possible digressions between my primary sympathie 
awareness and what, in final analysis I find to be morally obligated, a more careful and 
distantial assessment of such sympathie insights in the context in which they emerge, 
confirms that there exists a congruence between what I take to be the needs and goods of 
my fellow man and what ought to be done. Sprague's quest for an independent, presum-
ably more »objective« method of moral discernment is flawed because it induces a circle — 
or more precisely, it turns the circularity that is inherent in any theory of ethics into a 
epistemological problem. In fact, the conclusion that sympathie insights are unreliable as 
a moral guide is neither valid nor convincing for want of examples where we know on the 
basis of sympathy what is the good, but on other grounds conclude that exactly the 
opposite ought to happen. 
But is the congruence between what we sympathically know to be the good and what 
ought to happen complete? Three objections could be raised that question this complete 
congruence from a different perspective: The issues of (1) supererogatoriness, (2) 
motivation, and (3) conflicts of duty. 
1. The first kinds of actions that place in doubt the congruence thesis are those 
actions that are moral beyond any doubt, yet obviously not obligatory. They are good 
but, as Dancy puts it, "... above and beyond the call of duty, ... actions which it is not 
wrong of the agent not to do" [Dancy 1993, p. 127]. An example of such a »supereroga-
tory« act would be caring for the sick without any expectation of remuneration. 
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One could bring forward against Dancy that the example does not prove that the 
altruistic care provider himself does not feel obligated by the sympathically experienced 
needs of others. It is only us, bystanders, who do not consider such altruism obligatory. 
The problem, however, is not why the care provider acts as he does, but how it can be 
that we, bystanders, judge his behavior to be moral but not obligatory. Apparently, we, 
too, experience a sympathie rapport to the patient in need and recognize the call for 
assistance (for this is the basis of our judgment of the goodness of providing assistance); 
nonetheless, we do not experience an obligation. It is not that we would make a different 
assessment of the - presumably conflicting - interests involved (those of the patients in 
need versus those of the physician who has to earn a living), leading to a different sense 
of duty (for example, one ought first and foremost to guarantee one's own survival). This 
cannot be the case, because we tend to praise rather than blame the self-sacrificing 
physician. Thus, we, too, take the interests of the needy patients to prevail. But we 
nonetheless consider it not wrong of the sympathie third person not to act accordingly. 
This »schizophrenic« verdict - it is morally good to sacrifice oneself, but not wrong 
not to do so - is understandable only if we differentiate between the first and the second 
verdict. The first concerns the morality of the act, the second the virtuosity of the actor. 
The morality of the act depends on the degree to which the act can be considered an 
adequate response to the call that presents itself (prior to any willful choice on the side of 
the called person to respond). The morality of the actor depends on the degree to which 
the actor's choice, whether or not to act upon the call, can be considered acceptable. 
Sympathizing with concentration camp prisoners, we may conclude that they ought not to 
be treated in such a barbaric manner, as well as find the camp guard's weakness or even 
corruption of will insufficient an excuse not to treat the prisoners more humanely. On the 
other hand, sympathizing with the patient's needs, we may conclude that pure altruistic 
assistance is in order; but being well aware of the weakness of our own will, we may 
withhold a verdict on those care providers who do not provide assistance for free. Thus, 
the problem of supererogation is not one of sympathy teaching what is good but not what 
ought to be done; rather, it is a matter of differentiating between act and actor, between a 
verdict of justifiability and a verdict of culpability. The first verdict necessarily precedes 
the second, and it is with the first that we are concerned with here. 
2. The issue of supererogation may not undermine the presumed congruence between 
the good and the ought, yet there remains the question whether the congruence is at all 
relevant. In reference to Kant's ethics, it could be objected that acting morally is acting 
upon duty and upon duty only [see, e.g., Kant 1974]. It is not sufficient to act out of 
sympathie compassion - which would be a matter of motivation; an act is moral in as 
much as it confirms with the moral law, irrespective the motivation. The Samaritan from 
the biblical parable did well in picking up the sacked traveller, but not because he was 
sympathically moved to do so; it was good, because picking up a sacked traveller in and 
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by itself is good. Even if the Samaritan had been motivated by the hope to receive a 
handsome remuneration later on, he would have still done a good thing. The same would 
be true for the physician who heals the sick in order to become rich. Of course, the point 
is not that a good act can be motivated by greed; what matters is it can be good in spite of 
greed, namely in as much as it confirms with the moral law. 
Thus, contrary to what was concluded in the former subsection, the justifiability of 
the act should not be established via sympathy, but in reference to the moral law. An 
unsympathic Samaritan or a greedy physician may invoke in us a dislike for their 
characters, but their actions are no less moral. The moral law, in turn, can be uncovered 
by rationally examining to what extent the principle of action in the case at hand could be 
generalized into a general law. 
But this objection fails at well. Obviously, this is not the place to examine Kant's 
extensive ethical writings, but at any rate, such a method of generalization itself presumes 
sympathy. As was argued in the second chapter, any method that proceeds inductively via 
analogical cases must presume a method to individually assess the separate cases. If we 
are to examine the consequences of a general law (e.g., physicians in general may practice 
medicine out of greed), we still need to examine the multitude of (hypothetical) cases 
where the law would apply in order to test its general consequences. Each of these 
requires a sympathie verdict. Or to put the same thesis differently: To recognize whether 
the case at hand fits the general law requires a means of detection other than the general 
law: "... [A] certain amount of sympathy is needed if anyone is to even notice that 
someone else is in need of help ..." [Acton 1955, p. 62]. 
It seems unlikely that a greedy physician, indifferent to the suffering of his fellow-
men, would (1) conclude that physicians in general ought not to practice medicine for big 
bucks, as well as (2) restrain his own greediness when visited by a poor patient and help 
him all the same. If his greed is such that it blocks all sympathie concern for the sick, he 
probably would not reach the first conclusion, but certainly not act out of duty altruistical-
ly towards his own patients. If the characterization as greedy has any meaning, it is that a 
person will treat his neighbors poorly; he may even be aware that he can only afford to 
behave greedily if others do not. A physician who claims that doctors should not be 
driven by greed, and treats his own patients with generosity as well, can hardly be 
characterized as greedy. With Mercer, we may thus conclude that "... we cannot be 
considered capable of morally significant acts if we have no capacity for sympathy". 
Sympathy is a »precondition of morality« [Mercer 1972, p. 120]. 
3. However, we have also found Mercer arguing that in spite of my sympathie 
concern about someone else's needs and in spite of my being disposed to act on his 
behalf, I may decide not to do so for other reasons (such as my own interests or overrid-
ing obligations towards third persons) (see p. 174). Even if the action prompted by 
sympathy is "prima facie right and desirable" [Mercer 1972, p. 133], I may be caught by 
186 CHAPTER 5 
two conflicting sympathically experienced appeals as when, in order to save one human 
being (e.g., the pregnant mother), I would have to kill another (the unborn fetus). 
Naturally, this objection cannot undermine the cogency of sympathie concern as 
such, for without it, there could never arise a conflict of duties. It is only because I feel 
obligated to act on behalf of the mother as well as obligated to act on behalf the unborn 
child that I find myself caught in a conflict of duties. The objection does, however, 
question the feasibility of sympathie concern as sole moral directive. 
Given two conflicting duties, one may be tempted (like Mercer) to call for a 
principle or law that allows for a decision between the two. Since our sympathically 
obtained insight in the case does not allow for such a decision, this new rule must be 
located at a »meta«-level. But the design (or uncovering) of such a meta-rule would only 
bring us further away from the particulars of the case. Not unlikely, given the conclu-
sions to the second chapter, it would not imply the collapse of clinical ethics. 
Alternatively, one could address this third objection by questioning the correctness of 
the objection itself. Is the interpretation of the situation at hand - e.g., a pregnant mother 
who suffers from an eclampsia or pregnancy intoxication - in terms of a conflict of duties 
correct? There is a tendency in contemporary clinical ethics to analyze cases in terms of 
conflicting needs, values, rights and duties, which then must be balanced to reach a 
decision: The need of treatment of the AIDS patient versus the protection of the care 
providers' health, the needs of the infertile couple versus the needs of the patient with 
sclerotic coronary arteries, the value of religious freedom of parents versus the need of the 
Jehovah Witnesses' child to receive a transfusion, the right to refuse any kind of experi-
mental therapies versus the value of gaining new scientific knowledge, etc. However, 
would it not be possible by means of a more in-depth interpretation of the complete 
situation to move beyond the first impression of conflict? Granted, there may be a 
dilemma, a situation in which two (di-) or more assumptions (Gr.: lambanein = Lat.: as-
sumere = to take up) regarding the preferable course of action can be discerned. Without 
such a »prima facie« dilemma, there would neither be a moral problem, nor an ethical 
analysis. But the immediate translation of such a dilemma in terms of an irreducible 
conflict seems unwarranted. 
The self-evidential nature of sympathie moral experiences does not imply they can 
stand on their own; they are autonomous, not autartic (Gr.: self-ruling) [see Mieth 1977, 
p. 115]. Human beings are faced with manifold moral experiences; rather than explaining 
away such incompatible experiences as conflict of duties or conflicting values, such 
contrasts demand an in-depth analysis. If a plurality of incompatible moral experiences is 
simply taken for granted, each of those moral experiences loses its autonomy, its cogency, 
and consequently, its moral quality. What is needed, then, is a method of interpretation 
that takes its starting point in the sympathie concern without ever digressing very far from 
that same concern, ethics as »metapraxis«. 
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From Sympathie Awareness to Practical Care: A Dialectical Process 
Although it is by means of a sympathie rapport to my fellow human being that it becomes 
clear to me both what and that I owe him, although it is impossible to ask for a moral 
source beyond that rapport, such a sympathie rapport does not simply overcome me. That 
is to say, it originates in the heteronomy which the other is, but it is not established in its 
practical fullness without a conscious effort on my part to nurture the relationship. Or to 
phrase this point in the language used in an earlier subsection: The other presents itself as 
a perforation of the veil that I lay over the world, my fellow human being is not granted a 
place in my world like all other objects by me, he breaks through my interpretative 
categorizations; but I can only act in response to that heteronomy proceeding from my 
framework of reference. If I am not only to respond to the call from the other, but 
respond in a manner that does him justice, a process of »translation« is needed from the 
»language« of my fellow man into my »language«. 
This process, so it seems, would have at least two phases, covering the two possible 
areas of contention: (1) facts and (2) moral evaluation (see p. 178). In order to appraise 
the facts of the situation, first the sympathie moral experience of one's fellow-man's needs 
must be laid out in an explanatory phase (Lat.: explanare = to lay out). Once the facts 
are appraised, the second interpretative phase must follow, the translation phase proper 
(Lat.: interpres = an agent between two parties, a broker, a translator) in which one's 
own practical obligations become clear. Given this bi-phasic process, two established 
philosophical methods of analysis suggest themselves. The first phase could be realized 
by means of a phenomenological approach, the second via hermeneutics. 
In the tradition of classic (i.e., Husserlian) phenomenology, the phenomenological 
analysis must indeed precede any form of evaluative interpretation. A phenomenological 
analysis requires an act of »epoche«, a suspension of all judgments (Gr.: epoche = 
abstain) in an attempt to first gain insight in the facts as they are given (Lat. : data = what 
is given). But is such epoche possible, notably in the context of morality? 
Heidegger clearly disagrees with Husserl in that he advocates exactly the reverse 
order. Any situation, that is, any meaningful condition, is always an interpreted condi-
tion. Except for an »accident« (Lat.: what befalls one; Ger.: Zufall), a situation is always 
interpreted by the person who knows himself situated in it, and consequently is his own 
position (unlike an accident that might befall anyone) [see Heidegger 1986, p. 299-300]. 
Hence, a genuinely hermeneutical interpretation precludes propositional expression and 
thus cannot follow a phenomenological description. For whenever interpretation is 
explained, whenever the interpreter moves to the »apophantic« level (Gr.: apo-phainesthai 
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= Lat de-clarare = Ger /Du ver-klaren98), he leaves the hermeneutical level of 
immediate understanding into the level of thematized, abstracted and generalized explica­
tion [see Heidegger 1986, ρ 158"] Heidegger readily admits that there are many levels 
in-between primary interpretation and most general description, but the essential point is 
that they all are grounded in the hermeneutical level 
Unfortunately, Heidegger causes additional complications when in his Sein und Zeit 
he not only takes hermeneutics to provide the foundation of phenomenology but also 
defines his own approach as »hermeneutical phenomenology« Examining this peculiar 
qualification, Spiegelberg concludes that - whatever Heidegger might have had in 
mind100 - it implies a departure from phenomenology in the original sense of the word 
Rather than rendering the immediately given, Spiegelberg takes Heidegger's interpretation 
to transcend the manifest data and to extrapolate beyond what is directly present But 
then, Heidegger has also contended paradoxically that the phenomena first and foremost 
do not show themselves, are not given, but remain hidden The function assigned by 
Heidegger to hermeneutics is in fact that of ex-plication (Ger Auslegung) rather than 
mter-pretation [see Spiegelberg 1982, ρ 380-386] 
Rather than trying the impossible and attempt to give definitions of phenomenology 
and hermeneutics that accommodate the grand masters of these philosophical methods, I 
will take the easy way out by claiming that these two modes of understanding should not 
be thought of as consequent events, but rather as a dialectic process Phenomenology, 
then, is characterized by its descriptive nature, by its attempt to get to »the things 
themselves« - as Husserl's adage calls for -, the specific contents of our sympathie 
experience, the nature of my fellow-man's needs To do so, it is necessary to suspend all 
interpretative practical judgments But this does not imply a tum towards abstract 
idealism As Nota emphasizes, one can only describe what is being perceived and 
experienced The »epoche« can never imply a complete loosening from reality, because 
98 The difference in the philosophical meaning of the word »phenomenon« and »apophasis« is 
striking since both have the same root, the Greek verb phainestai to appear, to become 
clear The literature available to the present author does not allow for a definitive explana­
tion of this linguistic puzzle, but one could assume that the prefix apo- in this instance 
connotes perfection (in the sense of completion) to oppose the durative aspect of the root 
verb It is only once an object has appeared to us and its meaning has become clear that we 
can make conclusive propositions about it 
99 The standard English translation of Sein und Zeit is Macquarrie and Robinson's Being and 
Time [Heidegger 1993] In addition to regular page numbers, it provides corresponding 
pages numbers of the German edition which I have used 
100 As Spiegelberg points out, Heidegger would later claim that this qualification was not meant 
to suggest a new direction, but rather a return to the most original form of phenomenology 
[see Spiegelberg 1982, ρ 417, note 81, m reference to Heidegger's Unterwegs zur Sprache 
from 1959] 
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human experience is always experience of reality [Nota 1947, ρ 58-60] The purpose of 
the epoche is to move beyond the accidental to the »core« of the phenomenon Phenome­
nology, then, is an attempt to give a description of that »existential essence« or »essential 
existence« '0 1 
Not only is it impossible to describe »the things themselves« - as Husserl would want 
us to do - when idealistically disregarding the existential aspects, focussing on essences 
only It is equally impossible to provide a completely »unbiased« description Every 
description will reflect the stance of the descnber - object and subject are inseparably 
linked in the description An element of interpretation is unavoidable in any descriptive 
analysis This may be what Heidegger meant when he assigned priority to the hermeneu-
tic perspective The most original interpretation is the pragmatic one, in employing goods 
we assign meaning, we interpret But that is not to say that every description at the same 
time is an explicit interpretation Any such explicit, that is, reflective interpretation is 
always tertiary, following both pragmatic interpretation and phenomenological descrip­
tion 102 
Notably in the clinical context m which there is always the urgency to decide, 
resolute judgments, therefore, cannot be postponed for long, descriptive explication and 
practical interpretation of the condition of the patient in his situation will go »hand m 
hand« For example, a patient will present himself with a compliant of pain, either 
uttered verbally or nonverbally in response to the physician's palpating fingers The 
physician will immediately interpret this datum and communicate her findings back to the 
patient to both provide information and enable verification of her own conclusion The 
patient's response, in turn, will provide new data which, even more so than in the first 
instance, now are given against an interpretative background already m place 1M 
One could say, then, that the interaction between patient and provider is like a 
process of complex molecule formation Catalyzed by the history-taking, physical 
examination and dialogue, from an existing multiplicity of smaller molecules or even 
atoms, a new unit of meaning and significance emerges Or to use the metaphor of text 
writing In an existing context, in an ensemble of many existing and partially overlapping 
stories, a new story is being written with its own plot and morale 
101 In fact, Nota identifies phenomenology with existential philosophy [p 62] 
102 For lack of a more adequate vocabulary, I have introduced the term »pragmatic« as 
opposed to »practical« interpretation to indicate that the first is characterized by a 
primary, nonreflective everydayness, whereas the latter is aimed at a reflective evaluation 
that should yield explicit moral directives Given my claim that we are dealing with a 
dialectical process, obviously, this distinction is first and foremost heuristic 
103 Naturally, even the original datum (the pain of the patient) already occurred against an 
existing interpretative background, namely that of a patient in need going to a trained and 
experienced care provider 
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From »Subjective« Sympathy to »Objective« Narrative 
If - to speak with Nota - any phenomenological description is always of an existential 
nature, and if - to speak with Heidegger - the most original interpretation is the practical 
one, then the »structure« of the phenomenologically and hermeneutically elucidated 
situation is one of a story, a life-story rather than a theory expressing the status-quo. A 
good story does justice to the individuality of the case without becoming completely 
relative to that case. But what stories are good stories? What would allow us to qualify 
one story as more »objective« than another? After all, the same quality of »moral stories« 
that enables them to express individuality without becoming completely subjective puts in 
doubt any attempt to »verify« it. A critical assessment cannot take place in reference to an 
external, pre-established horizon of meaning. But without a certain degree of objectivity, 
sympathie moral experience would remain a matter of nonverifiable subjective taste, or at 
best, private moral intuition. 
Granted, objectivity (a) is not the primary characteristic of any kind of moral 
experience - its cogency is; and (b) in as much as we can speak of moral objectivity, it 
can never be reached through reduction of moral experience to non-moral propositions. 
Such a reduction would invoke a natural fallacy (in that, conversely, the prototypical 
aspect of morality, the very aspect that constitutes its moral nature, would have to be 
added »out of the blue« to deduce a moral command out of a theoretical proposition). 
Moreover, as argued earlier (see p. 58), the prototypical character of theoretical proposi-
tions is its conditionality, which contradicts the unconditionality required by cogency. 
The objective foundation of a moral experience cannot consist in correspondence with a 
taken-for-granted external horizon that provides the standard of truthfulness, that is, 
conditional truthfulness. Its objectivity thus cannot lie outside of the experience itself, and 
in that sense a moral experience is necessarily subjective. But that still does not provide 
an answer to the question in what sense sympathie moral experience is objective. 
Alternatively one could argue that qualifying moral experiences as either subjective 
or objective constitutes a category mistake: These qualifications simply are completely 
meaningless in reference to moral experiences. But that escape seems not to do sufficient 
justice to the common conviction that the concept of »moral truth« makes sense, irrespec-
tive our difficulties in specifying how exactly it does so. For surely, a hermeneutical 
analysis of moral experience yields »objective« insights in that the object of the analysis, 
that is, the moral experience, is »given« as opposed to a subjectively imagined: "We do 
not have to reason our way to Tightness. That which required reading is there" [Carson 
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1990, ρ 55] Though not autarchic, that is, self-sufficient and sovereign, the experience 
is autonomous It is self-evidential [see Mieth 1977, ρ 114] 104 
»Autonomy« here means that the experience reveals itself This is most obvious in 
case of contrast experiences (see ρ 175), but if genuine, positive directives reveal 
themselves as well The evidential nature of moral experiences will vary, however, with 
the intensity of the experience It makes a difference whether the experience is one of 
shocking contrast, implying abhorrence and prohibition, of disappointment, implying the 
necessity of change but not of immediate and irrevocable rejection, or of mere tolerabihty 
And similarly, positive directiveness may vary from a hint to a commandment 
The autonomous nature of moral experiences precludes a reduction of the experience 
to the individual's subjective imagination It suggests itself But - so it could be objected -
the same cogency also hinders an »unbiased« evaluation such as is typical of amoral 
perceptions (e g , microscopy findings) Or in less radical terms Sympathie experiences 
of one's fellow-man's suffering, more than microscopic perceptions of a patient's blood 
cells, change the observer's stance This objection is correct m as much as a genuine 
sympathie experience derives its moral quality from its cogent nature and, by definition, 
cannot leave the experiencing person »unmoved« In that sense, sympathie observations 
and interpretations will be inescapably biased But as Peperzak has argued, there simply 
is no other way " [A] disinterested attitude, that neutralizes the obligatoriness by 
focussing completely on the pure perceptibleness, does not suffice to recognize what is 
actually 'appearing'" [Peperzak 1987, ρ 127] Such an attitude, simply »misses the 
point« 
That is not to say that an »interested« observer's »biased« interpretation is purely 
subjective and beyond critique We are invited by our moral experiences to render an 
interpretation in terms of their meaningfulness In as much as our interpretation meets 
that invitation, it is both successful and »objective«, though clearly in a different sense of 
that word [see Van Tongeren 1991, ρ 22] A successful interpretation, a »good« story 
would be one that is »veritable«, such that the interpretation must be acknowledged by all 
reasonable debaters But what kind of criteria of »truthfulness« exist in reference to moral 
stories7 
Again, by asking this question we come on the verge of asking more from ethics 
than the nature of the matter allows But one criterion would be practical convincingness 
A moral story that fails to be practically relevant, that does not convince people into a 
104 Naturally, what Mieth calls an autonomous experience, Lévinas would call a heterono-
mous one (see ρ 173) But this seeming paradox emerges from their different perspec­
tives Such an experience is autonomous in as much as it is self-evident and beyond 
reduction to other categories But this implies logically that the experience is beyond my 
purely individual interpretation as well, and in that sense it presents a norm other than 
my own, it is heteronomous 
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particular kind of practice, that fails to motivate them and - preferably - invoke a 
conversion of their practical stance, certainly is not a good story.105 In fact, barring 
changes in the situation or new knowledge, a »good« story should continue to challenge 
people over time, rather than becoming sated like an appetite [see e.g., Mieth 1977, p. 
115; Cassell 1991, p. 29]. This, too, seems a proper indicator of the moral »truthfulness« 
of the story (see also p. 25). 
Thus, the answer as to how I know I am on the right track, eventually will be a 
practical one: I full-heartedly act in accordance with it. Asking for a definitive theoretical 
justification is asking beyond the limits of what can be responded. Moreover, for the 
same reason why the final practical resolution is itself beyond the realm of theoretical 
justification, it is also impossible to sufficiently underpin what in last resort invokes the 
practical resolution. In other words, the practical nature of the final resolution precludes 
reasoning backwards into the theoretical domain to provide that domain sufficient 
»objectivity«. 
So what would allow us to qualify a particular story as »objective«, or at any rate as 
more objective than another one? We have seen that there is no »ab-solute« point of 
reference, loosened from the situation itself, that could warrant the objectivity of our 
interpretation of the situation. The horizon of meaning that functions as reference in the 
case of moral experience is neither external nor pre-established. "The experience and its 
preconditions are identical." Applied to the interpretation, this means that "... the rules 
of the explanation set themselves whenever it starts to see structures in a text" [Mieth 
1977, p. 31]. Moreover, in the case of a hermeneutics of moral experience, this 
»circular« movement is »encapsuled« by the demand of practicality which itself remains 
outside the realm of interpretation. 
This raises the question once more what »method« are we to apply to reach a 
»veritable« interpretation? Mieth proposes a »synoptic« or »convergence argument« (see 
also p. 56). If a moral assessment should have an experiential base, which in tum 
requires an »inductive« method of assessment (as opposed to a deductive one in which a 
pre-established external horizon of meaning must be taken for granted to allow for de-
duction), the manifold data gathered, analyzed and interpreted in such a phenomenolo-
gical-hermeneutical manner cannot yet be morally binding by themselves. A »synopsis« is 
needed. All separate bits of information must be run through (Ger.: durchlaufen) to 
»converge« in an anthropological proposition that is itself morally binding [see Mieth 
1977, p. 34]. The critical value of such an analysis lies in its conscientiousness: »Con-
science« stems from the Latin word con-scientia which is in turn a translation of the Greek 
105. See also our earlier discussions of »conduction« in Chapter 2 and »conversion« in Chapter 
4. 
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syn-eidèsis, and both words express the integrative aspect that is needed to pass a 
genuinely conscientious moral judgment [see Mieth 1977, p. 98]. 
When Mieth qualifies such a synoptic convergence argument as »anthropologic« he 
does so with a very particular understanding of the term »anthropological« in mind. He is 
not suggesting that the final integration is to be performed by a philosophical discipline 
other than ethics. Rather, he quotes Habermas' definition of philosophical anthropology: 
"It incorporates the results of all sciences ... that have something to do with the human 
being; but it is itself not a separate science in that sense of the word. ... For its subject is 
something that precludes an immediate objectification: The essence of man" [Habermas 
1958, p. 18]. Whereas the divergence inherent in contrast elicits moral experience, the 
synoptic convergence into a moral anthropology elucidates its meaning [see Mieth 1977, 
p. 212]. Not only does the other appeal to me with a self-evidence (аи/o-nomy) that 
defies denial, it actually makes sense, it is in order (wito-nomos) to act in accordance with 
that appeal. It makes orderly sense, not because moral experiences refer back to a pre-
established, already taken-for-granted scheme; it makes sense because they refer ahead to 
a future that can still be hoped, worked, strived for, a horizon of meaning that still is 
open. "A »closed« experience, stored in and expressed by taboos and conventions, by 
unchangeable rules and dogmas, fosters the very vanishing of that same experience. 
Securing the results of past experiences contributes to their undermining. Consider love, 
trust, hope, faith as possessions, and you have lost them. Experience as wisdom is never 
completed" [Mieth 1977, p. 179]. 
If the meaningfulness of moral experience cannot be secured in apophantic proposi­
tions, ethics cannot be theory in the sense of science: A body of completed knowledge. 
To retain its genuinely philosophical character, ethical theory must stem from a love of 
wisdom in moral matters; the ethicist - that is, every human being trying to sort out the 
right course of action - must continuously be »on the move« (Gr.: theoreo = to go and 
witness), always gathering experience (Indo-Germanic: Erfahren = to leam while 
traveling) in order to become an expert (Lat.: experiri = to find out by trying and 
probing106). 
The meaning of moral experiences as can be revealed in a phenomenological-
hermeneutical analysis is of a »metapractical« nature: It is not immediately given with the 
experience itself, but must be discovered. Not being identical with the experience itself, it 
is also located at sufficient distance from the original experience to allow for a critical 
assessment of the latter (see also p. 57). This distance from the given towards an open 
future transforms the circle, that threatens every hermeneutical analysis, into a spiral: 
Having gone around I do no longer end up at the same old starting point; instead, I find 
106. I am indebted to Mieth [see 1977, p. 170] for pointing out these etymological details. 
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myself having gained some distance, just enough to allow for a different perspective on 
my starting point, just enough to create hope for the next round about 
We may conclude, then, that an ethics as metapraxis, an ethics that »foretells« what 
is the moral course of action, cannot produce true statements — nor false ones, for that 
matter Narrative ethics "is neither true nor false - when taken as apocalypse [Gr 
uncovering, revelation - JW] But it is true as eschatology [Gr eschatos = the furthest -
JW], that is, as anticipation of a future that is still open and has yet to be disclosed 
eventually [Ger ereignishaft - JW], [an anticipation] in which the imperfect tense of the 
story points ahead of itself' [Mieth 1977, ρ 71, emphasis added - JW]107 
Summary Assessment 
In the introductory subsection of this chapter I announced that the need would become 
ever more apparent to examine the anthropological foundations of an ethics of sympathy 
According to Scheler, the notion of sympathy cannot provide a foundation of ethics, 
rather, sympathy is based in intersubjectivity (see ρ 165) This »reversal« presumes an 
understanding of the nature of man in which human fellowship is not secondary but 
primary - or at least, equally original with human selfhood If our understanding of the 
nature of man cannot account for this social aspect of human life, it cannot possibly 
account for the phenomenon of sympathy 
However, Lévinas' line of argumentation suggests otherwise His explication has 
revealed that my fellow-man never appears to me as just any other, but always as a 
particular other human being This insight leads Lévinas to conclude that ethics, rather 
than metaphysics or anthropology, is the prima philosopha And yet, understanding the 
particular otherness of the other individual such that I can respond practically, requires a 
process of hermeneutics, of interpretation Any interpretation of the particular otherness 
of the other, in turn, presumes an interpretive horizon of meaning, a more general 
understanding of otherness Although the horizon of meaning arises in the process of 
interpreting the case at hand, the horizon does not emerge »out of nothing«, nor can it 
emerge from the case only, if there is to be sufficient distance between the unique aspects 
of the case and the horizon of meaning for the interpretation to be a genuine assessment of 
the case The horizon of meaning therefore must be anchored in a pre-existing existential 
awareness, an anthropology - obviously not in the sense of a separate philosophical 
107 Writing in the English language, Mieth's linguistic point may be a little bit difficult to 
understand since their is no such thing as the imperfect tense m English, to be used for a 
past tense that is not yet passed definitely (im perfectum) In fact, English grammar 
prescribes the use of the perfect tense when no specific temporal reference to the past is 
made (e g , 'I have had a nice meal' as opposed to 'yesterday, I had a nice meal') 
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discipline with its own eternal truths, but rather in the Habermasian sense described above 
(see p. 193) - in which the facts of the case can be ordered to yield a meaningful, 
innovative interpretation. 
The crucial significance of the espoused anthropology for ethics can also be 
illustrated when we once again pose the question why one should obey the heteronomy of 
the other human being.108 Even if the appeal stemming from the presence of my fellow-
human being is evident, why should I act in accordance with that call? There are (at 
least) three possible answers to this question. 
(1) The cogency of the appeal is so strong that it is actually a matter of force. A 
morality based on sympathy would be compulsory [see, e.g., Mew 1980]. Obviously, 
stated this radically, an ethics based on sympathy would be self-defeating. The moral 
cogency of an act to be undertaken can never be a limitation of one's own freedom (such 
as is true of externally imposed duties), but appears as "liberation onto one's own 
freedom" [Mieth 1977, p. 40]. This "... 'ruling' ... is the completely forceless power of 
an immediate obligation, [that is], stemming not from a general norm but from this face 
here. ...The existence of the other, not his will, summons me to devotion, but this 
summoning does not give him the right to force me into fulfilling my obligations" 
[Peperzak 1987, p. 143-144]. 
(2) Law exists for the sake of law. In Plato's Crito, Socrates defends his not fleeing 
from the prison (thereby accepting death) by arguing that he would be breaking the laws. 
One either tries to change the laws (according to proper procedure) or one moves to 
another country with different laws before the laws turn out to be less advantageous for 
oneself. Fleeing now that he has been convicted would not only be a betrayal of the laws 
of Athens but also a betrayal of any and all laws, that is »The Laws« [Plato 1980a]. But 
this line of arguments would become circular if we were to ask why one should follow 
»The Laws«. 
Kant, as we saw, also argued that genuine moral behavior is acting out of duty and 
out of duty only (see p. 184). But then, Kant also maintained that such practical rationali-
ty is identical with freedom, which in turn is essential to the human person. In this 
context, it is not necessary to examine the most problematic of these three equations, that 
is, the equation of practical rationality and freedom. What matters first and foremost is 
the equation that emerges out of this line of arguments: Acting out of duty is an essential 
aspect of being human. The necessary junction of anthropology and ethics is resurfacing. 
But Kant's defense is still limited in that it is a negative defense only of acting in 
accordance with the evident call: Freedom as freedom from the dominations of passions, 
inclinations, needs, etc. 
108. Genetivus explicativus: The heteronomy which the other human being is. 
196 CHAPTER 5 
(3) Asking about the obligatory nature of the call implies an essential misunderstand-
ing of the nature of the call. Asking beyond the call is inducing an infinite regress, and 
thus, inducing moral skepticism. 
But asking the question why I should obey the heteronomy of the other human being, 
can also be understood as a question about the transcendental conditions of this heterono-
my. In other words, what kind of philosophical anthropology could make sense of this 
notion of man in a mutual bound with his fellow-man. That compliance with the call 
stemming from another makes sense in the light of an understanding of my fellow-man is 
rather obvious, but how can it be made understandable that it makes sense for me as the 
responding person as well? We are seeking a positive answer to the question of compli-
ance ~ which brings us to the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 6 
BEYOND THE NATURAL FALLACY 
But for Adam, He did not find a vis-a-vis that fit him 
Genesis 2, 20 
Introduction 
In the fourth chapter we have seen that many contemporary bioethical theories implicitly 
presume a particular anthropology. A key issue in those theories is the idea that man is a 
»black-box«, an individual entity that is closed off from and for the outside. If human 
beings are such black-boxes, they are moral strangers to another as well — not because 
they have different moral convictions, but because their interests, values, and moral 
beliefs are completely hidden for other human beings. It is neither the case that the 
patient lacks expert scientific medical knowledge, nor that the modern physician is 
unwilling or unable to take into account the patient's subjective preferences. Rather, the 
patient's preferences are mere preferences, subjective opinions that lack any and all 
»objectivity«: They are his and can be his only. In the words of Toombs, there is a 
"decisive gap" between the patient's and the physician's expertise [Toombs 1992, p. xv]. 
If, consequently, no »objective« consensus is possible about any particular values, 
bioethics is forced to limit itself to safeguarding the maximum amount of individual 
freedom of the actors on the health care stage. The principle of respect for patient 
autonomy gains primacy. Even bioethicists who advocate The Restoration of Beneficence 
in Health Care, as the subtitle of Pellegrino and Thomasma's 1988 study reads, fail to 
construct a convincing argument in favor of beneficence as a guiding principle. 
The incompatibility between patient's and physician's expertise does not have to lead 
to a situation in which either physician or patient pulls all the strings. Some authors (e.g., 
Ozar [1985] and Árnason [1994]) have suggested an interactive or co-operative model that 
should warrant a practice incorporating both kinds of expertise. Though providing a 
practical solution, such models in effect accept that the problem of incompatible expertise 
is real and insolvable. The patient's and the physician's expertise cannot be united into a 
single epistemological system. Lacking such a common framework of reference, acting 
beneficently is possible only by fostering the interests as determined by the patient 
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himself. The principle of (respect for) autonomy gains primacy as foundational principle 
by default. 
In the fifth chapter, I have argued that a convincing argument can be made against 
the black-box anthropology underlying the primacy of the principle of respect for 
autonomy, and for the notion of intersubjective sympathy. For such a theory of clinical 
ethics based in intersubjective sympathy (see p. 165) to be tenable it must, however, be 
founded on an anthropology that, firstly, can make »sense« of human pain, weakness, age, 
suffering, etc. It is not that pain and suffering, or even age and death, must have positive 
value, let alone be desirable. Rather, it should be possible to assign a particular »mean-
ing« to these phenomena, to describe, analyze, comprehend, evaluate them. In sum, they 
must be situationable in the interpretative horizon of human existence for a theory of 
clinical ethics to be feasible. Without interpretation, the »decisive gap« between those in 
need and those able to provide assistance would remain for lack of »objective« insight into 
the proper care indicated by the patient's suffering. Secondly, such a foundational 
anthropology must be able to make »sense« of the phenomenon of »caring« in the sense of 
»providing care«: Why is it that man notices and acknowledges the call of another human 
being in pain? Why share in someone else's weakened life? Why take his life of such 
importance that it actually sets a norm that outweighs one's own? 
Obviously, such questions should not be understood as an attempt to »prove« that 
sympathically revealed norms are in fact morally correct. As argued in the previous 
chapter, such an attempt would in fact undermine the whole notion of sympathie intersub-
jectivity and normativity (see p. 176). What is at stake is an understanding of the nature 
of man in which human fellowship is not secondary but primary, or at least, equally 
original with human individuality, such that the phenomena of sympathy and care can 
provide the foundation of the doctor-patient relationship and any »contracts« that are issued 
in this context, rather than the reverse. Sympathy may be the »apex stone« in the arch of 
clinical reasoning that binds the care provider on one side and the patient on the other. 
But for such sympathy to be possible, for there to be an arch, the two columns of patient 
and provider must on principle be »archeable«. A possibility condition of sympathy is an 
anthropological notion of man that makes understandable such primordial connectiveness, 
a "quasi-organic unity" in Plotinus' words (see p. 149). 
Undoubtedly, the anthropological foundation of a theory of clinical ethics based in 
sympathy is even more encompassing a topic than the topic addressed in the former 
chapter. It is utterly impossible to even attempt a summary discussion of the many 
writings on the nature of human being - even if limited to those texts with immediate 
relevance to the health care context - and to do justice to those fine analyses. This 
chapter, even more so than the former, will therefore be rather eclectic, borrowing from 
such authors as Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, Marcel, Scheler and Mounier whatever ideas 
seem to foster the advancement of the project of this study. This eagerness to correlate 
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their anthropological insights with my own project will also become evident in the 
periodic (though not necessarily systematic) evaluative references to the clinical context — 
which really is the topic of the next chapter. At times these references will be direct, 
almost confronting, rather than cautious and prudent. Notably in reference to ontological 
works like Heidegger's Sein und Zeit it may be objected that such confrontation does not 
do sufficient justice to the peculiar nature of that book. But then, the point is not to yield 
a fair, let alone complete assessment of Heidegger, but only to see what lesson he and 
other philosophers can teach bioethics.109. 
When in the next subsection we turn to the field of philosophical anthropology, we 
will again take the libertarian tradition in bioethics, such as advocated by Engelhardt, as a 
starting point for two reasons. Firstly, Engelhardt argues against the possibility of a 
commonly agreed upon understanding of the nature of man. As I will try to show, his 
theory of bioethics nevertheless presumes - implicitly but unmistakably - a particular 
understanding of the nature of man, as well as of the diseased human being. It is that 
understanding which in fact provides the foundation of Engelhardt's libertarianism. 
Secondly, even if in the end Engelhardt's anthropological understanding will be found 
lacking in various essential aspects, his theory obviously does have its strong sides. To 
gain plausibility, any alternative theory will have to address those sides. 
The development of such an alternative anthropology that convincingly can serve as a 
foundation of clinical ethics will begin with an analysis of various existentialist anthropol-
ogies that take authenticity rather than autonomous self-sufficiency to be primordial. 
First, the concept of authenticity will be analyzed because the literal meaning of the Greek 
word »aumentes« (being in power, mastering the situation) suggest similarity rather than 
dissimilarity with the libertarian understanding of autonomy. In a second preliminary 
subsection, I will defend existentialist (and subsequent personalist) alternatives against the 
possible charge that they are either too transcendental to be relevant for a theory of 
clinical ethic, or boil down to a so called »natural fallacy«, that is, unjustly concluding 
from what is the case to what ought to be done. I will then continue with a more detailed 
examination of the notion of authenticity in reference to four existentialists (Heidegger, 
Sartre, Camus, and Marcel), or rather, discuss - in a quite summary and coarse manner -
four aspects of the notion of authenticity as discussed by these four authors: Resoluteness, 
absurdity, temporality, and hope. 
It will be shown that an ethics of authenticity, though making more sense when it 
comes to human pain, weakness, handicap, age, suffering, and death, in sum, man's 
fundamental dependence on the care of his fellow-men, cannot make sufficient sense of 
the phenomenon of providing such care. In an existentialist framework of thought, man 
109. Sections of this chapter have been published earlier as part of my article in Theoretical 
Medicine [Welie 1994]. 
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seems to be as lonely as he is in a libertarian framework The kernel for an anthropology 
than can make sense of man's need both to be cared for and to care for others is found m 
Marcel's philosophy of hope But it is only with the introduction of the notion of 
personhood that it becomes possible to make sense of interpersonal care 
Man as a Self-Sufficient Being 
The human being m the libertarian tradition is essentially a free being, empowered to 
determine his own life and able »to make it«, a lonesome cowboy »going west«, a self-
sufficient man In his book Rationing Health Care in America Churchill provides us with 
an excellent discussion of the ethical individualism that pervades libertarian bioethical 
theory In the second chapter, subtitled The solitude of his own heart, Churchill extrapo­
lates Philip Slater's The Pursuit of Loneliness American Culture at the Breaking Point to 
the area of health care Churchill characterizes American ethical thinking as "highly 
individualistic" and built upon an "atomistic anthropology" [Churchill 1987, ρ 20, 21] 
The image of the original pioneer, the lonesome cowboy who is fully self-reliant and able 
to survive on his own, has been deeply ingrained in the American mind and provides for a 
very strong foundation of libertarian bioethics as it has also gained ground m Europe In 
the words of the American bioethicist Spicker " [I]n ideal democratic politics one 
essential constituent is that each individual acquires the intelligence needed, under the 
operation of self-interest, to engage in the marketplace and m political affairs This is 
what Walter Lippmann once called the 'omnicompetent individual' " [Spicker 1992, ρ 
19] 1Ш By doing everything oneself, one prevents any kind of moral indeptness or 
gratitude The "virtue of self-sufficiency" [Churchill 1987, ρ 23] guarantees that any 
social acts will always be a matter of charity or philanthropy, being therefore non-binding 
"The primary image of others is as beings who constrict liberties, impose limits, create 
barriers, or other wise inhibit authentic expressions of selfhood" [p 22] 
Churchill has pointed out that this philosophy has even influenced the Ethics Code of 
the American Medical Association From the first draft in 1847, the Code reflects the 
idea that professional duties are self-imposed by the medical professions, rather than 
inherent in the relationship between physician and patient After the quite radical revision 
in 1957, the Code emphasizes less the »nobility« of medical professionals, but at the same 
tune exphcitizes that a physician may choose whom he will serve This implies that there 
110 The complete lecture of professor Spicker has only been published in Dutch translation 
[Spicker 1993'] An English summary has been published in Health Care Analysis 
[Spicker, 1993b] This version, however, does not contain the fragment quoted 
BEYOND THE NATURAL FALLACY 201 
is no a priori binding force over and beyond the individuals' will and free choice. Again, 
altruism has been turned into a matter of charity [see Churchill 1987, p. 30]. 
Churchill takes the analysis even a step further. It is not the case that »the« 
American does not recognize the idea of obligation and duty. Rather, he is in a sense 
unfamiliar with the notion of compassion. "Compassion means literally 'to feel with', and 
denotes a sense of identification and community. Compassion is not saccharine pity or 
demeaning self-righteousness to the less fortunate; neither is it associated with the 
charisma which forms part of the physician's traditional authority. Indeed, it is precisely 
these misconstruals which are offensive and insulting to the sick. Authentic compassion, 
on the other hand, engages one genuinely and empathetically in the community with 
others" [p. 35]. 
One should not misunderstand Churchill as asserting that American people are 
ruthless egoists, fully unable to care. Rather, the »ideal« or »prototypical« American, the 
image that influences any and all theorizing and system building is one of a lone individu-
al who cannot afford to fall in love for fear of losing his independence, of owing and 
being obligated. In actual life, rather than shaking a distant hand, Americans tend to hug 
their acquaintances very tightly. But in theory, distance from fellow human beings is a 
necessary requirement to survive in a competitive world. Whereas the Dutch translation 
of self-sufficiency (zelfgenoegzaamheid), and even more so the German translation 
(Selbstgefälligkeit) has the pejorative connotation of being too satisfied with oneself, being 
smug, complacent and caring less about the rest of the world, in the context of American 
loneliness-idealism the term has a positive connotation: Self-sufficiency is a virtue. 
The pervasiveness of this loneliness-idealism in American social theory according to 
Churchill has far-reaching consequences. "The key theme of the parable [about the lonely 
man in the Preface of Slater's The Pursuit of Loneliness - JW] is the American's lack of 
self-knowledge. He has no insight into himself or his predicament. This lack of insight 
relates directly to his solitariness. Other people are mirrors for our self-knowledge and 
the man in the parable has no others . . . . Even the most reclusive of hermits usually has 
a divine prattle to count on or orient the self. It is the American's attempt at a sheer, 
radical independence that is so shattering to moral self-awareness" [p. 23-24]. Morality, 
in this view, is something that comes about only when one human being is forced to 
cohabit with another; the thought that human beings essentially exist for and with one 
another is alien to this ideal of loneliness. 
Indeed, Engelhardt has argued that striving to benefit one's fellow human beings is 
not required for the very coherence of the moral world [see Engelhardt 1986, p. 68]. 
Autonomy, rather than community, solidarity or altruism, becomes the backbone of 
morality. But this principle of autonomy no longer is the Kantian principle. Kant's 
original notion of autonomy as the law that categorically sets itself rather than being 
relative to some external purpose, is interpreted to justify the right to self-determination of 
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human beings, a right to be free of outside constraints, and ends up being "a right of 
noninterference" [Beauchamp and Childress 1983, p. 62], a right, that is, to loneliness. 
It will be clear that an understanding of autonomy as freedom of choice and effective 
deliberation, and respecting it through mere noninterference, is very foreign to the world 
of health care, notably the world of chronically diseased, handicapped or elderly patients. 
Granted, the advocate of soft medical paternalism (acting on behalf of his patient only 
when the patient's competency to autonomous decision-making is absent) may argue that 
an acutely diseased patient temporarily has lost his capacity to free and effective delibera-
tion, which in turn justifies such beneficent paternalism, even more so since such 
interference is aimed at restoring the autonomy of the patient. But a chronically ill patient 
usually will not be returned by medical treatment to his former, normal and healthy status. 
An appeal to restoring autonomy lost temporarily will simply fail when it comes to the 
chronically ill or disabled patient. 
The latter fact also affects the common line of argumentation by opponents of such 
soft paternalism. If an acute disorder, such as a bacterial infection or broken leg, could 
be interpreted as external to the self-sufficient person, hindering but not influencing the 
ability to autonomous decision-making, in the case of chronic disorders such a line of 
argumentation is not very convincing. The chronically afflicted person essentially is a 
patient. Of course, his being is not adequately and completely described in this qualifica-
tion of patienthood, but his chronic disorder determines his life to a considerable degree, 
notably when decisions about his very diseased status are concerned. The chronic 
disorder restricts the range of options for choice, affects the deliberation process, and 
generates dependence on other human beings. The chronic patient certainly is not self-
sufficient in the libertarian sense of the word [see also Agich 1993]. 
Diseases reveal that man not only is dependent on his fellow human beings; he is 
also dependent on his own constitution. Traditional bioethics is unable to address this 
internal relationship of the human self to his own body and mind. In its attempt to restore 
the autonomy of the patient, libertarian bioethics has brought back the ghost in the 
machine. Criticizing modern medicine's tendency to forget that patients are not mere 
objects, things to be operated, radiated, and manipulated, libertarian bioethics responded 
to this objectification of man by reintroducing the subject. But it did so literally: The 
subject was reinserted in the inanimate corps of patient as the ghost in the machine [see 
also Zwart 1993"]. 
In this light, paradigmatic libertarian rights such as the right to informed consent are 
not a realization of respect for the »totum humanum«, but for the ghost in the machine. 
The consent may concern a treatment of the body that arguably is disrespectful to the 
BEYOND THE NATURAL FALLACY 203 
human body (e.g., sterilization, blood transfusion, transsexual surgery). Such arguments, 
however, would simply not be considered valid arguments by libertarian bioethics because 
the self is the captain of the ship, and it is the self and only the self that deserves respect, 
not the ship. The same holds a fortiori for interventions to the body that are refused by 
the patient, yet valuated positively by the health care provider (e.g., continuation of 
hemodialysis). Again, the non-consent of the autonomous patient settles the issues; the 
body, the life, the health of the patient do not deserve any respect of its own. 
The same Cartesian dualism that has fostered the development of modern medicine 
turned out to perfectly fit libertarian bioethics, and as such, allows medicine and bioethics 
to coexist as two parallel enterprises. At times, bioethics may hinder the smooth and 
speedy progress in medical science with its emphasis on informed consent; more often, it 
will advance biomedical innovations due to its emphasis on freedom as the only value to 
be respected. Most importantly, bioethics has not forced medicine to evaluate its own 
foundations and to change internally [see Ten Have 1994b]. In that sense, medical 
scientists who envisioned bioethics to be one more annoying hindrance really have little 
reason to complain (see p. 4). 
But the same anthropology also explains (at least in part) the critiques from clinicians 
concerning such libertarian bioethics. Sickness, disease, and handicap constitute the 
clearest examples that man is not (always) a self-sufficient human being. The aging 
process, which in time will hit all of us, casts doubt on the anthropological significance of 
»power«. Even more so, chronic disorders, mental handicaps and physical disabilities 
reveal that many an adult human being will be vulnerable rather than powerful most, or 
even all of his life. 
The Concept of Authenticity: An Alternative to Autonomous Self-Sufficiency? 
A libertarian anthropology of self-sufficiency and autonomy, thus, fails on both accounts 
specified in the introduction to the chapter: It neither addresses in any »meaningful« 
manner the events of disease, handicap and suffering that befall men, nor does it allow for 
an understanding of the nature of interhuman care — agreed-upon professional assistance 
maybe, but not care. As we have seen in Chapter 4, various bioethicists have suggested 
the notion of authenticity as an alternative to self-sufficiency and autonomy (see p. 
119, 123). In fact, authenticity as a moral concept has gained so much popularity that an 
authoritative Dutch language dictionary remarks that authenticity is a core concept of the 
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"newer ethics" [Kmyskamp 1976].'" Taylor even republished his The Malaise of 
Modernity as The Ethics of Authenticity [Taylor 1992]. 
Not unlikely, the concept has gained popularity in our pluralist age because it 
suggests a new starting point for a non-relativist ethics. Heim notices: "Unlike the 
Kantian moral imperative, authenticity does not function as universalizing rationale. But 
like the Kantian self-governing reason, authenticity as moral predicate is formal, that is, 
independent of the specific contents of personal action" [Heim 1983, p. 201]. Authentici-
ty, thus, is supposed to meet Engelhardt's demand of formality as well as Pellegrino and 
Thomasma's quest for moral content. 
The term »authenticity« stems from the Greek »authentès«: Enacting personally, or 
(as noun), the lord or potentate, the person who brings about something by his own 
power, including - notably - suicide. In Christian Greek vocabulary, the term was 
employed to translate the Latin term »auctoritas« (authority, warranty, validity). The 
connotation of might, of mastering the situation suggests the concept is similar to that of 
autonomy. There are, however, two essential differences between libertarian autonomy 
and existentialist authenticity. 
First, unlike libertarianism, existentialism takes for granted that man cannot 
completely master the situation. To a large extent man »is being lived« by life. We have 
seen that Pellegrino and Thomasma - correctly - point out that illness may significantly 
decrease man's ability to determine his own course of life. Heidegger (who will be 
discussed in more detail hereunder) goes one step further. It is not only in illness that 
man is faced with the limits to his power. Any human being is quite limited in his ability 
to determine his own course of life. Man can never cause his own coming into being: He 
is thrown into the world. In fact, man can never »catch up« either; he is constantly 
lagging behind on his own creative efforts. For the most part, he does not live his own 
life but the life of the others, the life anybody lives [see Heidegger 1986]. 
Obviously, libertarians will not deny that there are limits to the individuals' 
undertakings, some of which cannot be overcome. But whereas libertarianism qualifies 
only active mastership positively and worthy of respect and passively letting things be or 
being forced upon one's life negatively, existentialism takes this element of »being-
determined« to be characteristic of human life. It acknowledges that the tension between 
being determined and self-determination is not external to, but idiosyncratic of being 
111. I am indebted to Prof. Struyker Boudier for this reference. Needless to say, an ethics of 
authenticity (such as Sherover's article from 1981 or Bell's 1989 study of Sartre's 
thought) is not so new as to be the invention of the 1980s. Wild published his Authentic 
Existence: A new approach to 'value theory' as early as 1965, and of course all these 
authors rely on existentialist predecessors. But the fact that as late as the 1980s and 
1990s, the concept of authenticity still catches the attention of ethicists is telling. 
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human. Any attempt, so we will find Sartre arguing, to eradicate this tension between 
being-determined and self-determination, between facticity and freedom, is »bad faith«. 
This brings us also to the second difference between the notions of autonomy and 
authenticity. If the power to determine not only is a limited power, but the limitation is 
internal to human life, then the direction in which such power is exerted will also change 
from external to internal. Whereas we found the ideal of libertarianism to be one of 
independence, non-interference from the outside, even loneliness, according to existential-
ism, man has to come to terms with the tensions that are part of his own life. Being 
already thrown into life before having even a chance of acting autonomously, being 
determined irrevocably and unavoidably notwithstanding the power to determine in part 
one's life, the ideal of authenticity is one of finding oneself. 
Man, paradoxically, is the only being that must become what he already is. It is in 
this light that Horvat's identification of authenticity with sincerity should be understood. 
Horvat understands authenticity to reflect the 20th century idea that the transfiguration of 
the person depicted in any self-portrait or autobiography in fact reveals a more essential 
truth than in any correct likeness could, that is, the truth of the self-understanding of the 
author [Horvat 1990, p. 193]. Whereas a »clean« photograph can only show a person in 
his »facticity«, a self-portrait may reveal a person as he has found himself to be. 
Now, my explanation of the second difference between autonomy and authenticity 
may have left some doubt as to whether this difference is really significant — after all, in 
both instances, so it seems, the point is to attain identity, that is, to establish a criterion of 
differentiation between the »anyone« and the self. Granted, according to libertarianism, 
this is mostly a matter of creating distance between oneself and other human beings, 
whereas existentialists emphasize qualitative differentiation. But authenticity does not 
seem to be a more promising concept than autonomy when it comes to explaining the 
phenomenon of caring and fellowmanship. 
As will be explained more in detail in a later subsection, some existentialists (e.g., 
Sartre) indeed seem to offer little in this regard. But that »deficiency« is not prototypical 
for a philosophy of authenticity. It is the consequence of Sartre's emphasis on the 
absurdity of human life. What is even more, it is the consequence of Sartre's peculiar 
response to this absurdity, because his contemporary and intellectual companion Camus 
concludes that the very same absurdity can only be addressed via an attitude of fellowman-
ship and solidarity as opposed to Sartre's solitarity. For Heidegger, fellowmanship, man's 
socialness, is as much an ontological fact as is man's worldliness. And finally, we will 
find Marcel arguing that fellowmanship is the very ideal of life, because it is only in such 
openness to the other that man establishes his own identity. Thus, we may conclude that 
the second difference between the notions of autonomy and authenticity is not merely a 
matter of degree, but a radical one. Whereas the autonomous individual seeks to find 
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identity by closing himself off from others, the authentic individual establishes his identity 
in spite of such closedness (Sartre) or even through openness towards others (Marcel). 
The Relevance of an Anthropology of Authenticity for a Theory of Clinical Ethics 
Before we can begin with a more detailed analysis of Heidegger's anthropological 
insights, a preliminary comment must be made about the nature of his philosophy — more 
specifically, his Sein und Zeit. Heidegger's concept of authenticity functions first and 
foremost as an ontological or anthropological concept (rather than an ethical or even 
epistemologica! concept). That is, it indicates a mode of human existence, the mode that 
will allow a genuine understanding of Being. As such, authenticity is a />re-predicational 
concept [see Heim 1983, p. 204]. When authenticity refers to a particular historically 
»correct« performance of Beethoven's ninth symphony, it predicates a certain quality of a 
thing, notably a performance; similarly, when an act is judged to be authentic, a moral 
predicate is attached to a particular event. Authenticity in Heidegger's philosophy, 
however, refers to the very possibility of such predications, that is, the existential mode 
which man must adopt to genuinely understand the world and to predicate it (e.g., in 
moral terms). 
Thus, in Sein und Zeit Heidegger makes a transcendental point ~ the most transcen-
dental possible. Heidegger sets out to undermine nihilism, that is, the theory that even if 
things exists, all is meaningless. In order to do so, Heidegger cannot go about showing 
that there are meaningful distinctions. If the anti-skeptic wants to undermine skepticism, 
he should not try to prove that some kind of knowledge is certain; rather, he will argue 
that the skeptic must presume that at least the skeptic's own thesis is true. Similarly, the 
anti-relativist ethicist will counter the relativist by arguing that the latter must presume the 
difference between moral and immoral to be meaningful for there to be any kind of ethics, 
whether absolutist or relativist. But the nihilist may grant the existence of both epistemo-
logica! and moral truth, yet contend that knowledge and obligations do not matter: They 
are meaningless. Heidegger in his Sein und Zeit, then, does not prescribe how to live an 
authentic life. Rather, in talking about certain ways of human existence and eliciting an 
acknowledgement of the (in)authenticity of such ways of existence; by showing that man is 
tossed between his ability to fail and flee existence or to face and embrace it; and by 
inferring that, therefore, the difference between inauthenticity and authenticity matters, 
Heidegger is able to undermine the nihilist thesis [see Gelven 1978]. Heidegger does not, 
however, develop a principle to discriminate between different levels of meaningmlness, 
let alone, to differentiate between attitudes, actions, and wishes that do or don't merit the 
respect of others. 
BEYOND THE NATURAL FALLACY 207 
The extremely transcendental nature of Heidegger's project has brought Zwart to 
remark that a more extensive intellectual distance between Sein und Zeit and bioethics 
seems unthinkable Nonetheless, Zwart goes on to show the importance of Heidegger's 
analyses for a better understanding of bioethics by applying Heidegger's critical descrip­
tions of the pervasive human tendency to live life like anyone does, talking like anyone 
does, and dying like anyone does [see Zwart 1993a, ρ 282] In the following paragraphs, 
I will undertake a similar attempt Heidegger's insights underscore (if mostly in a negative 
sense) the preconditional significance of our understanding of human existence for any 
theory of bioethics If Sein und Zeit was never meant to be a theory of ethics and should 
not be read as such, it " may be legitimately read as effectively providing a propadeutic 
to ethics, a propadeutic necessary to the reconstruction of moral philosophy" [Sherover 
1981, ρ 225] 
My claim that there is a necessary connection between our fundamental understand­
ing of the nature of human being and our understanding of the principles of morality, is 
likely to be disposed of as being fallacious, that is, as unjustly concluding from what is 
the case to what ought to be done I do not deny drawing such a conclusion, but I take it 
not to be fallacious Such line of arguments need not be a »natural fallacy«112, or rather, 
a fallacy of quatemio terminorum (slipping in a fourth term, namely the »ought«, into the 
syllogism) Of course, the argument can be valid only if being human - unlike any other 
kind of being - is itself morally qualified The shortest yet most illuminative explanation 
of that thesis has been submitted by the Dutch bioethicist Sporken From an anthropologi­
cal perspective, man is a being that must become what he is, while from an ethical 
perspective, man is a being that must become what he is [see Sporken 1983, ρ 41] m 
112 It is rather unfortunate that this fallacy has become known as the natural fallacy, because 
it being fallacious has nothing to do with nature, but with a formal logic (see also ρ 
190) 
113 It may be objected that any attempt to circumvent the »natural fallacy« by »moralizing« 
ontology, by constructing an understanding of man as essentially a moral being, under­
mines the meaningfulness of ethics as a whole For if man's moral behavior is necessari­
ly linked to his ontological constitution, immoral behavior must be too In other words, 
the purpose of ethics, that is, to gain critical understanding of human behavior (in the 
widest sense of that term) under the aspect of morality, can be realized only by ontologi­
cal anthropology 
But this objection is itself already the consequence of what may be called the »natural 
fallacy in reverse« It presumes that the fundamental notions of any theory of ethics such 
as voluntariness and responsibility require a radical separation of the ontological domain 
of being - which is determined, and the ethical domain of willful decisions - which is 
completely undetermined The objection, thus, presumes a Cartesian kind of dualism and 
to consequently use this presumption against a holistic circumvention of the natural 
fallacy is a circular line of argumentation 
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In reference to Heidegger, one might add that this dual claim assumes that man is 
not yet what has to become, though being able to become what he has to become. 
Heidegger's analysis of this existential human condition of double »guilt« (Ger.: Schuld) in 
the sense of (i) falling short to himself yet (ii) accountable for his own becoming, provides 
the ontological foundation for any anthropologically founded ethics. As Sherover points 
out, "... guilt or responsibility does not result from moral obligations; rather, moral 
obligation only becomes possible on the ground of primordial capacity for taking on guilt 
or responsibility" [Sherover 1981, p. 226]. 
The fact that the concept of authenticity plays a key role in both Heidegger's 
extremely transcendental work and in applied bioethics may historically be accidental and 
a matter of equivocation, or - even worse - a misinterpretation of Heidegger by some 
contemporary bioethicists. Nonetheless, that very similarity also presents a challenging 
opportunity, if not to reduce then at any rate to bridge the considerable philosophical 
»distance« between Heidegger's work and bioethics, in an attempt to enrich the bioethical 
discourse with some of Heidegger's poignant insights. 
Man as Free, Falling and Resolute 
As mentioned before, according to Heidegger, the human being has a twofold relationship 
to himself and the world. On the one hand, there is (1) man's freedom to shape the world 
and his own life. Man's everyday relationship to the world is always directed towards 
some meaningful purpose beyond the mere given, and the world will always appear to 
man as related to the complexity of human purposes. In Sein und Zeit, at least four 
aspects of this relationship can be distinguished, each of which reveal this »intentionality«. 
(a) First, there is our handling of common equipment. Much of our everyday life exists 
in such equipmental dealings, which may be inconspicuous in that we often fail to notice 
the tools as such, but focus ahead towards the ends for which they are used. But our 
equipmental dealings are always essentially concemful and contextual: The items as well 
as our handling them are meaningful only because of our intentions in the context of a 
larger, similarly, that is, intentionally qualified world. Consequently, (b) man's attention 
for the world is always circumspective. Not only our dealings with the world are 
intentional; so is our experience and thinking. We relate to the world, so to say, always 
with the larger purposeful context of that world in the back of our mind. This implies, (c) 
that the space and time dimensions of this world are not objective in the sense of the 
natural sciences, but essentially the result of man's constant distantial ordering of that 
world. A painful ordeal lasts much longer than a pleasant experience, even if both may 
have taken equally much physical time. Similarly, a particular object becomes less far 
away (Ger.: Entfernung) when it becomes part of a concernful relationship with man, 
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even if the physical distance has remained unchanged. And finally, there is (d) man's 
disposition to always project, to press forward into possibilities. Man is able to project 
beyond the given and to shape the world (Ger.: entwerfen), to step outside his current 
being [ex-sistere] and to project ahead to new ways of being. 
On the other hand, there is (2) the facticity of man's existence. The human being is 
(a) »thrown* into life from the very beginning of his conception. And despite his freedom 
and capability to shape his own life, this aspect of »thrownness« (Ger.: Geworfenheit) 
remains an unsurpassable limit to his shaping ability. Not only is there man's particular 
psycho-physical constitution and health status which are »givens« to a large extent; and his 
historical, geographical and social situatedness which, even if changed in the course of 
life, is always exchanged but never undone. There is an even more fundamental thrown-
ness: Whatever free choices man makes, once made they are unchangeable yet existing. 
The irreversibility of time constitutes a significant limit to man's freedom. Our »mood« 
typically reflects this most fundamental form of thrownness in that a depression over 
things gone wrong itself evades conscious and voluntary changes while at the same time 
hinders new attempts to shape life and the world. "We find ourselves carried along, and 
never able to set or plant ourselves in such a way as to determine, once and for all 
ourselves, our own course" [Richardson 1986, p. 132]. 
What is more, time not only limits our freedom in that history cannot be changed; 
Heidegger also notices (b) an element of contingency in the future. There are many 
possibilities open, but only one can be realized. And although we can evaluate various 
alternatives open to us, we can do so only by reference to certain values which we take to 
be constant. But that constancy is itself contingent in that it is related to the current state 
of affairs which itself has resulted from a series of choices that were equally contingent. 
A particular alternative may be more valuable than some other, but only given the existing 
context of value. There is no ultimate reason for preferring one course of action over 
another. 
It is these two limitations to freedom, man's thrownness and the contingency of each 
and every choice, that constitute the temptation to avoid the disclosure of being human in 
all its »anxiety«. Rather than facing the anxious demands of human existence, man tends 
to flee (Ger.: Verfallen) in a preoccupation with concernless curiosity, the constant but 
superficial search for the world without ever genuinely getting involved. The given is 
interpreted according to fully anonymous explications as »anyone« does (Ger.: das Mann). 
Discourse, as the communication of concernful understanding that grounds any and all 
interpretations, is replaced by »idle talk« (Ger.: Gerede). 
Such concernless curiosity is not limited to common interest in »news« and »gossip« 
that is interesting but of no direct importance to our own life: It is typical of everyday 
life. While not being Heidegger's own example, it seems appropriate to invoke the image 
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of modern man's indulgence in »Femenhebe« rather than »Nächstenliebe«114 It is easier 
to be concerned about the hardships of the poor in a village in the Chinese highlands, than 
about the beggar holding up his hand in front of one's face 
In fact, man not only prefers the concernless distance over his wanting neighbors, 
Heidegger goes on to argue that man for the most part is not concerned with his own life 
either Man lives in a world with other human beings and he does so as a social being 
But precisely in as much as man is there for his fellow-тал like as they are there for him, 
he is for the most part not genuinely himself but more so an average person That is to 
say, he is like the others, he is the others, and so are the others As Heidegger explains 
in a lecture presented a few years before the publication of Sein und Zeit "What he [ι e , 
man in everyday life - JW\ is and how he is, that is nobody No one and yet all of them 
together All are not themselves This nobody, by whom we are lived in everydayness, 
is the »anybody«"us [Heidegger 1989, ρ 13] 
Given man's two-fold relationship to the world and his own being, he has essentially 
two choices Either to conceal his own being by identifying himself with worldly interests, 
or be who he already is [see Zimmerman 1984, ρ 233] Authenticity, according to 
Heidegger, is the existential way of being turned-towards rather than fleeing-from 
thrownness and contingency »Eluding the comfortable and secure way of the life of 
»anyone« requires a mode of existence that Heidegger qualifies as resoluteness (Ger 
Entschlossenheit), the mode in which we "most directly and unflinchingly" face our own 
Being [Richardson 1986, ρ 195] 
What, then does such »resoluteness« imply9 It implies a greater awareness and 
acceptance of the temporality of our existence and its inherent contmgencies Although 
we cannot undo our »thrownness«, we can give it a certain »transparency« Rather than 
evading or forgetting it, we can maintain a relationship with our past and by »repeatmg« it 
(Ger Wiederholung), we can recognize and acknowledge its impact on our present Our 
involvement in the present has the character of repetition when we explicitly come to it 
from being who we have been Similarly, the future becomes transparent more so than 
114 The German word game with the prefixes »fern-« (far away) and »nächst-« (nearby) 
disappears in the English translation of the concepts, respectively love of people far away 
versus love of one's neighbors 
115 Different translations occur in the English language of Heidegger's das Man, notably the 
They But this term implies an opposite between me and them, while Heidegger's very 
purpose of the term is to include me Moreover, the plurality of the personal pronoun 
They could suggest that the averageness Heidegger is referring to is created by the great 
number involved, a kind of common if not communitarian practice Though Heidegger's 
Man probably would be meaningless if only one human being existed, the essential 
connotation is not one of cooperation but of assimilation Maybe the image of the sand 
grains making up the beach would apply, or even better, the drops of water making up 
the sea 
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contingent when we reach out from the present towards our final possibility, which, 
according to Heidegger, is death. The certainty of death as our final end, and more so, 
death being the only certainty, precludes us from identifying ourselves with future states 
which we may never realize. Rather than falling into the mode of awaiting not-yet-
actualized-states, rather than supposing we shall find our significance once they are 
attained, we acknowledge their character as possibilities. 
The authentic mode of involvement in the present, then, presumes authentic 
relationships to both past and future in that those extensions set the »situation« within 
which present events occur. A »situation« is not just any historical and spatial »spot« in 
which man accidentally happens to be; it is only when man resolutely faces existence that 
his »being-in-time« and his »being-in-the-world« acquires a situational character in the 
sense of being »situated« in a world of meaningful relationships. And it is only against 
the horizon of »situatedness« that accidents, that is, apparently meaningless events, can at 
all befall a human being [see Heidegger 1986, p. 300]. Thus, we are less likely to be 
seduced into some concern they customarily imply. The unsatisfactoriness of everyday-
ness is not resolved nor fled, but faced and accepted. Authenticity, consequently, is not 
so much a matter of the »content« of a life as it is of the »style« in which one lives one's 
life [see Guignon 1985, p. 334]. 
In sum, living authentically denotes living one's own life as opposed to that of just 
anybody. But what exactly does this imply? When faced, for example, with an extraordi-
nary request of his patient to discontinue effective medical treatment, how is the physician 
to decide whether or not to grant that request? When is such a request authentic? 
Miller has suggested that a patient's decision is autonomous in the sense of being 
free when it has not been influenced by any kind of force or compulsion and corresponds 
with the intentions of the patient himself. That is to say, it has come about in a state of 
noninterference. On the other hand, the decision is authentic only when it is in accor-
dance with the actor's personal values, dispositions, attitudes, and intentions. The patient 
is acting in character. This, in tum, requires that the patient has reflected about his own 
values and consciously underwritten them (see p. 119). It is this emphasis on ethical 
reflection that has prompted Faden and Beauchamp to refute authenticity as an alternative 
to, that is, a richer version of, autonomy: Too many of man's decisions are not based on 
moral reflection, too few would thus qualify as autonomous and, consequently, deserve 
respect from third persons [see Faden and Beauchamp 1986, p. 262-269]. 
With Heidegger we now could respond that, indeed, few moments in man's life are 
genuinely authentic in the sense of resolutely facing the anxious demands of human life. 
But equally few are autonomous in the sense of determining one's own course of life. 
The human being for the most part has lapsed into living the life »anyone« lives and, 
hence, does not qualify as "... a self that can be distinguished from the reigning influences 
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of other persons or alien motives" [Mackhn 1982, ρ 57]116 Man does not have »imme­
diate« self-knowledge arrived at through introspection or reflection, as Descartes had 
argued It only those patient decisions are to be respected that are autonomous, that are 
not influenced by nonvoluntary influence and external interference, very few decisions 
will qualify 
However, this existentialist critique does not imply that such an anonymous life 
deserves any less respect than the autonomous or authentic life If Heidegger's (in)au-
thenticity is a descriptive rather than a prescriptive notion in that it describes how the 
human being does exist rather than how he should exist, there is little reason to employ 
(ïn)authenticity as a measure of respect Heidegger actually emphasizes that the unauthen-
tic life " does not signify any »less« Being or any »lower« degree of Being" [Heidegger 
1986, ρ 43] One may therefore conclude that even if a person's decisions to a large 
extent are common-place decisions, they are still his, and thus have to be respected That 
is, they still may have to be respected 
Heidegger's anthropological analysis shows that the concept of autonomy fails to do 
what it is supposed to according to libertarian bioethics It may be true that we have no 
way to assess a patient's best interests, unless he provides explicit, noncoersed testimony 
to that avail But the idea that such a testimony reflects genuinely subjective, personal 
self-knowledge is mistaken The notion of a uniquely personal life is untenable and thus 
cannot function as a distinctive criterion of to-be-respected patient-decisions 
As mentioned, Heidegger has explicitly argued that his use of the term authenticity is 
morally neutral The unauthentic life in no sense is a lesser kind of life But many a 
reader of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit will not be convinced by the supposedly moral 
neutrality of authenticity »Eigenthchkeit« (the German word for authenticity employed by 
Heidegger), suggests positiveness, even virtuousness, if only because of the contrast with 
116 Macklin's definition of autonomy is also quoted by Faden and Beauchamp in their 
authoritative volume on A History and Theory of Informed Consent [see 1986, ρ 263] 
Whereas I take this definition to aptly reflect the libertarian interpretation of autonomy, 
remarkably these authors associate it with the notion of authenticity This may, however, 
be the result of Macklin's own invoking authenticity, for the complete quote reads "To 
be autonomous in this sense is to have a 'self-legislating will', as Kant described it The 
autonomous agent is one who is self-directed, rather than one who obeys the command of 
others These descriptions of autonomy all presuppose the existence of an authentic self, 
a self that can be distinguished from the reigning influences of other persons or alien 
motives" As the quote makes clear, Mackhn identifies authenticity with "a self that can 
be distinguished from the reigning influences of other persons or alien motives", but such 
identification squares with the existentialists' understanding of authenticity In fact, it 
even seems unwarranted in the light of Miller's as well as Faden and Beauchamp's own 
categorizations (see Chapter 4, ρ 119, 123), in which the libertarian model of autonomy 
is linked to both Kant (irrespective of this being correct) and noninterference of third 
persons in the process of decision-making 
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its negative counterpart »C/neigentlichkeit«. This connotation of positiveness emerges even 
stronger from Sartre's philosophy, where authenticity is the opposite of »bad faith« ~ we 
will turn to him now. 
Authenticity in the Face of the Absurdity of Human Life 
Sartre's ethics stands out as the attempt to salvage morality when values are not a given, 
but constituted by each and every individual. His starting point is remarkably similar to 
the (implicit) starting point of libertarian bioethics: It is because of man being a free being 
(and the only free being) that he can give meaning and value to all other beings and 
events. Says Simone de Beauvoir: "To will oneself moral and to will oneself free, is one 
and the same decision" [Beauvoir 1947, p. 34] Or in the words of Bell: "For Sartre, 
those who will their own freedom and that of others are authentic ...". Bell, however, 
also adds: "... yet he seems to have little to say about such individuals as he develops his 
views of freedom, bad faith, and relations with others" [Bell 1989, p. 16]. 
According to Sartre, the human being is caught in three sets of opposites that defy 
any attempt to unification. Man is a »factual« being, that is to say, he is determined by 
many contingent conditions such as his gender, body, date and place of birth, education, 
but also handicap, illness, age. Man cannot undo these facts, yet he is not fully deter-
mined by them because he can transcend them via his own, free interpretation of those 
conditions. Similarly, in one sense man is but a mere object among the many other 
objects of the world; yet man also constitutes the world by surpassing the given into the 
range of his own possibilities. And finally, man is caught in the dual perspective of 
being-for-itself as well as being-for-others. 
According to Sartre the tensions which these three pairs of opposites invoke cannot 
be resolved, except through lying to oneself (bad faith). Sartre's famous example 
concerns a waiter who tries to overcome the role-aspect of being a waiter. But in playing 
to be a »real« waiter, he ends up being a bit too precise, too rapid, too eager of assistance. 
In doing so, he (unwillingly) reveals that he has yet to acknowledge that (as a free person) 
he is not identical with the factual situation he is in — his role as a waiter. After all, he 
himself decides to continue being a waiter when he could decide otherwise. Failing to 
transcend the facticity of his situation he is in bad faith [see Sartre 1943, p. 98-99]. 
Paradoxically, the literal opposite of bad faith, that is, good faith, according to 
Sartre is just as well bad faith. For example, the sincere person, who freely admits that 
his character or life-style is faulty, constitutes the meaning of his facticity (rather than 
denying it like the waiter); but his admission is aimed at the consequent denial of his 
facticity. Rather than accepting the uneasy tension between his facticity and his free will, 
he, too, strives for a single »identity« by trying to be what he is not. 
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What, then, does the third alternative, authenticity, imply? As Bell points out: 
"Bodily, historical, and social factors affect the range of choices available to any 
individual . . . . [But] these stories remain fluid as long as the individuals are alive. With 
each decision, the individual may drastically alter the story to the extend that it involves 
more than a recounting of brute, uninterpreted, and valueless facts. The interpretation of 
one's past and situation may thereby be changed, although this process leaves standing 
(can never abolish) the events and facts themselves" [Bell 1989, p. 47]. Illness constitutes 
no exception: It is true, Sartre admits, that a disease reduces some of the patient's options, 
but not his options to face that disease. In effect, his new condition provides new options. 
Like any other human being the patient must decide about his situation. "In other words, 
the illness is a condition at the interior of which man is again free and without excuses. 
He must take up the responsibility of his illness" [Sartre 1983, p. 448]. "... [B]eing 
human is being wanting; but one can deny the want as want and affirm it as positive 
existence" [Beauvoir 1947, p. 18]. Being free is not a privilege, but a burdensome 
obligation. 
Authenticity, thus, implies awareness and acceptance of the ambiguity that is basic to 
human life. Bell aptly characterizes this view as an understanding of human life as 
playing the game of loser wins [see Bell 1989, p. 96]: "In winning, authentic individuals 
avoid or overcome the sort of alienation inflicted on themselves by those in bad faith" [p. 
100]. But how could one possibly win by loosing? By being aware of the (logical) 
impossibility of striving for coincidence with my values, without my continued effort to 
reach coincidence loosing its significance as a result of this awareness. 
Because of the emphasis of Sartre (as well as other French existentialists such as 
Camus) on the significance of acquiescing in what is clearly absurd, his ethics has an 
intuitive appeal to bioethics. After all, suffering diseases does not serve any direct 
positive purpose either. But Sartre's explanatory metaphor is one that differs quite 
remarkably from the gravity that characterizes disease and suffering. According to Sartre 
the acknowledgment of the ambiguity that is typical of human life in general and one's 
own life in particular requires living life as if it where a play: "What is play indeed, if not 
an activity of which man is the first origin, of which man himself sets the rules, and 
which can have no consequences except according to the rules posited? As soon as a man 
apprehends himself as free and wishes to use his freedom ..., then his activity is like play: 
He is indeed its first principle; ... he himself sets the value and rules of his actions ..." 
[Sartre 1943, p. 669]. What is even more, life should not be taken as too serious a play. 
Like in any ordinary game, we should accept the lack of coincidence between the apparent 
and the real. "In ordinary play, we may recognize this and nonetheless continue to play 
and enjoy the game. Authentic individuals must act in a similar manner. With the latter, 
however, the emphasis is not on enjoyment but on lucidity, on the awareness that they are 
doing what they can as free, responsible human beings" [Bell 1989, p. 127]. 
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In our modern, interventionist world of health care, it may be good to be reminded 
at times of the need to acquiesce, to accept what is happening by taking some distance 
from it rather than attempting to eradicate the tension one way or another, and even to 
consider it under the aspect of »play«. This ideal of being able to »let things be« may ease 
patients as well as health care providers into accepting the irrevocable. But it also seems 
to throw the human being back onto himself. The authentic human being is as lonesome 
as the self-sufficient human being in that the existential tensions cannot be annulled by a 
third person either. If the libertarian self-sufficient person does not need his fellow men 
because he is omnicompetent himself, the Sartrian individual cannot receive any help from 
his fellow-men because they are even more incompetent than the person himself. At least, 
the Sartrian individual can himself gain authenticity by playing along; third persons (such 
as care providers) cannot because it's not their tensions that are to be resolved. 
Sartre, however, seems unwilling to accept such »solipsist« consequences. He denies 
that radical freedom implies radical individualism. Personal freedom implies the need to 
will the freedom of others; not because of a utilitarian calculus of strategic benefits; and 
neither because of a Kantian imperative. Rather, one's freedom is inextricably connected 
to the freedom of others. One of Sartre's examples pertains to a writer of literature. To 
make the writing of a book a meaningful endeavor, the writer needs other people to read 
it (if only hypothetical). Thus, the novelist must presume the freedom of others if he 
wants to concretize his own freedom. Sartre's analysis of human aid illustrates this 
mutuality even more clearly. 
"A runs towards the bus; B, on the platform, extends his hand ... In grasping it 
as an instrument, [A] contributes to realizing his own project." Yet, A 
becomes instrument for B, since A serves as a means to realizing B's end (in 
this case, that of himself serving as an instrument). A's hand is grasped and 
pulled; and A becomes an object that is seen, appraised, and pulled, a passivity. 
Thus, A "feels himself in question in his own freedom." This does not happen 
against his freedom, however, since he becomes an instrument precisely in 
pursuing his own end. He discovers the other's freedom, not as opposed and 
threatening his freedom; rather, "he discovers it at the heart of his freedom as a 
free movement of accompanying [him] towards his ends... [Each] freedom is 
totally in the other" [Sartre 1983, p. 299; as translated and paraphrased by Bell 
1989, p. 173]. 
In line of what was argued in the former chapter, we could characterize the hand of the 
running person, stretched out to the man on the bus, as presenting an obliging call to the 
man on the bus, a call in the very sense of Lévinas' philosophy. The man on the bus is 
physically free not to grab it, but failing to do so (when that would easily be possible) 
would not merely constitute a nonmoral event, it would qualify as an immoral act. But is 
this example completely in line with Sartre's own analysis of the ambiguity of human 
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existence? The dualities of facticity and transcendence, of being an object and being a 
subject, of being an individual and a social being, all are present, but they are no longer 
concurrent, nor are they equivalent. The free decision to stick out one's hand for help 
precedes the sense of being pulled into the bus like an object; and that sense of objectivity 
does not invoke a tension because it is instrumental in one's attempt to get onto the bus. 
It is only by breaking up the undertaking of having oneself being pulled onto a bus - and 
any undertaking is by necessity stretched out in time - into separate moments that an 
opposition of being a subject and being an object can be discerned. 
As we will see in more detail hereunder, such an analysis (Gr.: dissolution into 
parts) violates a primary existentialist theorem: Human time is duration, not succession of 
moments. If anything, Sartre's example shows that the duality of being subject as well as 
object need not be understood in terms of a radical and unsolvable tension, thereby giving 
human life the character of a fundamental absurdity. It is only because of man's duality, 
man's being a subject as well as an object, that help, assistance, care is at all possible. 
The event of being pulled on the bus illuminates that man's »factual being«, his »object-
ness«, and his »being-for-others« are not necessarily tensile opposites to »freedom«, 
»projection« and »being-for-oneself«, but can also be understood as complementing 
counterparts. Heidegger had already emphasized that the man's »thrownness«, even his 
living a life of the »anyone«, in no sense is of a "less" or "lower" ontological grade than 
authentic life [Heidegger 1986, p. 43]. 
Even more so than Heidegger, Sartre emphasizes that authenticity cannot be a matter 
of »overcoming« one's facticity. Both the flight into the anonymity and the attempt to live 
a completely original life are forms of bad faith. The very idea of an autonomous life as 
summarized by Macklin (see quote on p. 212), is absurd. However, we have also come 
to conclude that - unlike Sartre seems to suggest - the phenomenon of assistance presumes 
that the ideal of authenticity be thought of not so much in terms of transcending the two-
fold nature of man's existence, but as engaging in it. Keeping in mind Sartre's three pairs 
of »opposites«, authenticity then would imply sincerity, hope, and care. 
The first, naturally, should not be understood - as Sartre seems to do - in terms of 
mastering the tension between facticity and freedom by some kind of public confession. 
Rather, it should be understood in the kind of terms we saw Horvat employing, and 
Heidegger too to some extent, that is, as transparency (Lat.: sincerus = unpainted, 
without make-up). 
The second, hope, would be a new element. We will return to this in reference to 
Gabriel Marcel's existentialism. May it suffice at this place to indicate that the notion of 
hope, rather than reflecting projection beyond the given world - which, as Sartre correctly 
notices, would border the impossible and thus the absurd -, reflects projection »back« into 
the world as it is given. 
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Care, finally, signifies the phenomenon of being-oneself by being-for-others, 
whereby the latter may be understood in the active sense of providing care, as well as the 
passive sense of being cared for. This notion, too, will be picked up again later in this 
chapter. 
Authenticity, Moral Consistency, and Temporality 
As already announced, in later subsections of this chapter we will return to the notions of 
hope and care. The notion of sincerity, on the other hand, has been discussed earlier in 
this chapter. But one aspect of sincerity was left unfinished that must be picked up 
again — if only because it is the focal point of much criticism from contemporary applied 
bioethicists on the notion of authenticity. Undeniably, authenticity as sincerity has the 
connotation of moral consistency. As we have seen in the fourth chapter, Beauchamp and 
McCullough have discredited authenticity because of its presumed tendency to overesti­
mate past patient decisions and attitudes, and, moreover, to rally discount future revisions 
in a patient's course of life (see p. 122). 
This critique, however, is certainly unjustified if authenticity is properly, i.e., 
existentially understood. The existentialists' analyses of time and temporality suggest that 
the concept of authenticity - or for that matter, any concept expressing a pivotal under­
standing of human being -, cannot be adequately expressed separately in either past, 
present or future tense. Earlier, I paraphrased Sartre's understanding of the past as 
irrevocable yet »fluid«. Heidegger, too, rejects any understanding of the past in terms of 
passed events: That would be a case of mistakenly thinking the past in terms of the 
present, a present gone by. Such mistake is typical of everyday ness as well as the 
scientific preoccupation with the measurement of time. It completely overlooks that it is 
only because of our past to which we can return, that we are presently able to plan ahead 
into the future. 
In line of Heidegger's refutation of an understanding of the past as passed, we may 
add that the future is not not(hing). The future is real in that it enables choice. Unlike 
chance, choice is not a purely present phenomenon. My decision at a given moment to do 
A rather than В would not be a genuine choice if I had not the slightest certainty about 
what I was going to decide at the very next moment. If my freedom were absolute in that 
the future is always fully open, I cannot plan (for the next moment upon conceiving the 
plan, I might decide something to the contrary). Even if the resistance of the surrounding 
physical world to my manipulations reduces my range of options, even if my own past 
decisions cannot be undone and in that sense determine the present world and affect my 
range of options, that range needs to consist of merely two options to be indeterminate. 
And since human freedom guarantees the continued availability of this minimum of two 
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options (namely, to do A or not to do A), for my free choice not only to be free but to be 
a genuine choice as well I must assume that my behavior in the moments to come will not 
counteract my present decisions. 
A well-known parallel example is a promise to somebody. While making the 
promise freely, and knowing that nothing in the future will physically compel me to abide 
by that promise, making promises only makes sense if, at the moment of promising, I 
freely determine my own future in accordance with the contents of that promise. In a 
sense, every decision I make about my own future (regardless whether other persons are 
involved) has the nature of a promise. Surely, when planning to leave the house for 
work, in the back of my head I know that I may have to immediately return home if, for 
example, it turns out I forgot something important. But I cannot plan to go to work when 
I have not the slightest idea and guarantee as to what I will be doing next. For there to be 
any sense in planning at all, at the moment I plan a future course of action, I must assume 
that in that future, I will not decide to counteract my past plans. For a free choice to be a 
genuine choice, it must entail a consequent determination of the future and thus a 
limitation of my future freedom. Conversely, I must be willing to be determined (in the 
future) by my own past choices. For there to be genuine free choice, I must freely limit 
my own freedom. 
It is this aspect of freedom that distinguishes a genuinely free life from a »freak« life 
style. Even if we allow a person to live such a freak life, to do A today, and exactly the 
opposite tomorrow, without any consistency whatsoever to it, we tend to evaluate such a 
life style negatively. The preceding analysis points to the problem in such a life: It may 
look like the ultimate freedom, but it actually comprises little freedom. When today I 
embark on doing A, only to counteract it tomorrow by doing the opposite, I might as well 
not have done A yesterday. My actions are devalued by my own inconsistency; my 
freedom is reduced to mere chance. 
The »freak« may respond that there is little he gets done this way, but at least, every 
time he does something, he has chosen to do so and has not given in to any kind of ritual 
which the past tends to force upon us. I concede that such a life would, indeed, be the 
ultimate indeterminateness, but indeterminateness is not the same as genuine freedom. 
There is a striking similarity between freedom as loneliness and freedom as indeterminate-
ness in that both are mere negative attitudes with no content to them, and therefore, 
without value. The life of Meursault, the main character in Camus' L'Étranger (FT.: the 
outsider, stranger), is such a lonely and freak life. But I would argue that Meursault's life 
is not estranged because it fails to match the lives of his fellow citizens (who have not yet 
understood the lesson Camus' existentialism teaches us); it is estranged because it rescinds 
freedom rather than confirming it. 
As Heidegger put it in an enigmatic but portentous conclusion: "Dasein ist ... 
Zeitlichkeit", that is, man as he exists in the world, is temporality [Heidegger 1989, p. 
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26]. In fact, it is this very characteristic of human life that warrants man's individuality 
(Lat.: undividedness), his integrity (Lat.: wholesomeness): "... [T]he generating essence 
of the singularity of a Dasein is the unified totality not of its parts, nor of its faculties -
but of its times. For ... time is the internal order or structure of the soul; time is its 
principium individuationis" [Lingis 1978, p. 277]. It is because of the essential unity of 
time, and thus, of temporal being, that man can be an individual, can become what he 
already is, and reach authenticity. 
Whereas in the case of Meursault, society is forced to address his freak life (only to 
reject it) when he commits a murder, health care providers are faced with the trouble-
someness of apparently »freak« patient decisions when a patient's ability to freely 
determine his own future in accordance with past decisions has severely diminished. 
Pathological processes may disable a patient's free will (not to be free) and engender a 
freak attitude. A paradigmatic case is the one discussed by Childress in his Who Should 
Decide? [1982], and which could be read as a possible continuation or accentuation of our 
case discussed in Chapter 4. 
Because of his severely reduced vision, progressive neuropathy and consequent 
inability to walk, a 29-year old diabetic man feels he is too much of a burden to his 
family and has too little quality of life. He requests dialysis to be discontinued (irrespec-
tive a possible consequent uremia, ketoacidosis and built-up of morphine sulfates that 
could cause him to become confused and even request new dialysis). His wife agrees and 
the physician discontinues dialysis and provides the requested pain medication. The 
patient, indeed, wakes up in severe pain and requests to be put back on dialysis. The 
physician and his wife briefly discuss his request but decide to abide by his earlier wish. 
The doctor gives another dose of pain medication and the patient falls asleep again and 
dies [see Childress 1982, p. 224-25]. 
Childress [1990] agrees in principle to the course of action chosen by the physician 
and the patient's wife, although he would have put the patient back on dialysis one more 
time to verify the determinateness of the patient's irreversible request, and let him die the 
second time around. I, too, would agree in principle. But the real justification for 
disregarding the patient's last request to be returned to dialysis cannot be that he currently 
is too confused to make free decisions. This inability allows us to disregard that last 
request in that it is not a free decision. But why should one abide the patient's past wish 
instead (which now, at least, seems no longer to be his desire)? Freedom of choice (in 
this case, to discontinue dialysis) makes sense only if the future (life without dialysis) is 
freely determined by the past (the decision to discontinue). Respecting that freedom of 
choice, thus, is warranted by the patient's own promise to himself; it is a matter of freely 
determining one's future by the past. 
Not only does the past cast its shadow ahead into the future, for what has been 
determined tends to affect what has yet to be decided; the future also casts its shadow 
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backwards into the past, for what has yet to be determined, has in part already been 
decided. This is not to even suggest that the future is as much a given as the past, nor 
that the future has more regulatory impact on the present than the past. It does, however, 
put in question contemporary tendencies to understand the future as unclaimed territory, 
open to any »lonesome cowboy« daring to »go west« and to »make it«. Bougas has 
summarized the changes in metaphysical thought concerning the nature of being and time 
in three main periods: (1) Being as immutable (typical of Parmenides, Plato and most 
other antique philosophers in some form or another); (2) being as development, but a 
development from an originally perfect, yet corrupted beginning back to that same perfect 
beginning at the end of time (typical of Christianity); and (3) present being as instrumental 
in-between towards the open and changeable future: Nowadays, "... the reality of the 
present is in some sense devalued to the advantage of the »irreality« of the future, or more 
exactly, it is valued only and to the degree that it promises and promotes the future." 
Bougas links this "ontological inversion" to the increased ability of modem man to 
actually influence and even manipulate the course of history [Bougas 1983, p. 39]. 
This emphasis of the future entails a Utopian, futuristic idealism in which any and all 
values tend to become merely hypothetical, never realizable (because they are continuous-
ly pushed forward into the future), and therefore, nullified: "The value center is thus 
shifted from the past (as a realm of achieved values) and the present (as realm of values in 
process of being achieved) to the future (of merely abstract value-ideals)" [Kline 1986, p. 
230; emphasis added - JW\. Although Heidegger, in emphasizing that the future produces 
the present by rendering itself past (and must therefore be conferred ontological priority 
over the present), has been blamed to be debet in part to this futurism [see Kline 1986, p. 
218-219], one could also argue in Heideggerian vocabulary that such futurism constitutes a 
flight from the concernful present into a careless future. 
If the past runs ahead of the present, and the future runs behind; if, in other words, 
there is a temporal »zone« in which future and past are »one« (which is the very definition 
of the present), then the present is not a momentary passing but has duration. The length 
of that duration (to use a precarious spatial metaphor) depends on the nature of the 
projects we are undertaking117. When I am engaged in leaving the house for work, that 
present is quite short; but when raising a child, it tends to be much longer. In fact, it can 
be said that my whole life, as it has been and has yet to come, is in the present; or rather, 
that the present comprises my whole life. Obviously, not in all of its particular actions 
(such as going to work on a given day, or even raising my son); rather, the longer lines 
117. This notion can be better expressed by the English language which, unlike, e.g., German 
or Dutch, has a special tense to express duration: The progressive tense (e.g., 'I am 
writing this book'). 
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set out in the past of my life already are running over into the future, and what the future 
holds, is already given in part. 
The opposite - and yet similar - position is taken by Peirce (as he is interpreted by 
Helm) who denies the existence of the present (other than an atemporal zone without 
duration) [Helm 1980]. Instead of the three common time »zones« (past, present and 
future), he distinguishes a remote and near future, and a near and remote past. The 
remote future is the time zone where possibility still applies, whereas the near future is 
determined. Similarly, the remote past is passed, no longer influenceable by human 
actions, whereas the near past is still nascent; actually, the near past is the very existential 
mode of time which we commonly think the present to be [see Helm 1980, p. 382-3]. 
Peirce's replacement of the present by two zones of near past and near future is in line 
with his view that time is not a series of consecutive events, but a coil of rope. The 
continuity of any rope, as Helm explains, is delusive in that none of the individual fibers 
constituting the rope is as long as the rope [see p. 378]. 
Peirce's image of a rope aptly illustrates the idea of a discontinuous continuum. But 
it is not clear what in the rope corresponds to Peirce's four time zones. On the other 
hand, the rope perfectly illustrates the idea that the present has duration, and, even more 
so, that there is a series of concurrent presents, each with different duration. Leaving the 
house for work could be viewed as a short but thick fiber, whereas raising a child would 
be one of the quite thin but long fibers in the rope. 
Keeping the present seems to also better fit common language (which, in spite of all 
kinds of philosophically dubious and inconsistent elements, is one of the most reliable 
reflections of men's everyday yet fundamental existential experience). Rather than going 
into a thorough discussion of the expression of future in language, I limit myself to a few 
observations which have been analyzed at length by linguists (such as Wekker [Wekker 
1974], from whose study, I have borrowed my examples). The future tense in the English 
language (and, as far as my own linguistic knowledge reaches, in some other languages as 
well) is not only used to express events that still have to take place and about which, 
therefore, no certainty exists, but also to express present events about which there is no 
certainty: 'The French will be on holiday today', or 'he will be waiting for us now'. 
While Wekker interprets these examples to show that the linguistic future tense is not 
analogous to actual future time, they also point to another fact: The uncertainty which the 
future holds is not sufficient reason not to talk about it; moreover, the uncertainty which 
qualifies much of the present is talked about in the same terms as the uncertainty which 
qualifies future events, notably in the future tense. 
On the other hand, the use of the future tense in such sentences as 'I will be reading 
this book for another three hours', which Wekker calls "extended present", or "timeless 
truths" such as 'oil will float on water' [p. 2-3], point to the fact that we do not experi-
ence the future as absolute uncertainty, but rather (as in the former example) as segment 
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of the present, and (as in the latter example) as being equally certain as the past or 
present. Or, in the vocabulary of our earlier philosophical analysis of the future: The 
former example expresses the awareness that the present has a certain duration depending 
on the nature of the project, whereas the latter example points to the principal openness of 
the future which I simply must and, in fact, do consider in part determined in order to 
have a stable framework of reference allowing free planning (such as expressed by the 
example about my reading a book). 
Summarizing: The determinateness of the time provides a twofold condition for 
freedom of choices. Firstly, thrownness, as the determinateness of the past, not only 
limits my range of options but also creates a stable framework of choice for future 
decisions. At any given moment my freedom will allow me to make a decision В that 
counteracts the decision made earlier in favor of course A; but if that second choice is to 
be a genuine choice (rather than a matter of chance), if, in other words, there is some 
kind of logic (whether rational, emotional or otherwise) behind it, this logic can be logical 
only in relation to the context in which it is made. And my context tends to change 
slowly, presenting time upon time the very same reasons to continue choosing course A 
rather than its opposite B. Thus, my thrownness provides the condition for my future 
decisions to most likely be in line with my current planning, thereby making that planning 
a meaningful endeavor. Secondly, by letting the future be determined by the past rather 
than being swung around by free but freak inconsistency, I create the conditions for 
genuine choice and, thereby enable myself to become what I already am, that is, to be 
authentic. 
We know hardly anything about the past of the diabetic 29-year old dialysis patient 
from Childress' case, and only little more about the 70-year old man the case described in 
Chapter 4. But both patients may have had the feeling that their rope of life was thinning 
and fraying. Their chronic disease had not kept them from setting out long lines in the 
past, but the incessible progression of their condition no longer allowed them to weave in 
new such fibers in the coil. And the ever more frequent exacerbations caused all shorter 
thick fibers to snap one by one. Rather than their rope of life, life was becoming a 
medical rope. It was physicians weaving in new fibers; short fibers only, spanning but 
the length of different medical treatments. One could argue, then, that in declining 
further hemodialysis, the patients did not decline life but regained it. They regained a 
very short life, but it was again their life. 
Authenticity and Hope 
Our brief analysis of the nature of choice and temporality has revealed one more problem­
atic aspect of the concept of autonomy: Its tendency to focus on the present and to 
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disregard the fact that human existence does not occur in time but is itself temporal. On 
the other hand, the notion of authenticity - if understood in the existentialist sense of the 
word - does reflect this portentous aspect of human being by understanding human choice 
as promise rather than indeterminateness. Thus it seems, authenticity may after all have 
certain positive advantages over the notion of autonomy as a foundational principle of 
bioethics. 
Genuine choice implies making promises to oneself. But what sense could there be 
in making promises if human life is always living in the face of anxiety (Heidegger) and 
absurdity (Sartre)? What sense could there be in trying to move beyond this anxious 
absurdity if there is only absurdity awaiting us'? What could be won? What more than 
resolute cynicism in the face of the absurd anxiety that is inherent in human existence? 
In his novel La Chute (Fr.: the fall), Camus [1962] portrays a man who has lived his 
whole life as a game — he literally admits to this fact. Not only does he consider all of 
life's presumably »cardinal« phenomena such as honesty, friendship, love, and sorrow 
with the »lightness« that is typical of and necessary for playing games; all other human 
beings are to him like the pawns on the board, while he is the king in the double sense of 
the word: The pawns are there to be sacrificed for the survival of the king, and, as player 
of the game, he can also decide how they are to be used. It should be emphasized that 
this main character of the novel is not a criminal; he does not commit a murder like 
Meursault in Camus' L'Étranger; in fact, he is an attorney who ardently fights for justice. 
But this fight is itself a mere game of which he decides the rules. As the criminal's 
attorney, he decides what will happen to his client, without being responsible to anybody. 
Camus' attorney even »plays« with the idea of committing suicide as the way to most 
radically shape his own being, as a final and most definite self-portrayal — the ultimate 
authentic act. But he decides not to commit suicide because people will always »explain« 
such an act in terms of 'the poor man could no longer bear this or that'; they simply 
cannot conceive of the possibility of such sacrificing oneself to the impression that one 
wants to leave of oneself. 
Camus does not underwrite the kind of life of the main character of his novel. He 
has the main character look back on his life at a moment when his life obviously has 
turned against him. Rather than a successful attorney and Don Juan, playing along with 
other members of the Paris »high society«, he now lives in murky parts of Amsterdam, 
spends most of his time in pubs, and earns a living by providing legal advice to art 
thieves. The »turnabout« had occurred when the attorney accidentally witnessed a suicide, 
a poor woman jumping off a bridge. At the time - completely in character - our Parisian 
attorney did not do anything. He heard her fall in the water, remained standing still, but 
did not turn back; he heard her scream a few times, then there was deadly silence; he 
wanted to act, but did not do so; remained standing for a few minutes in the drizzling 
rain; then walked on without even warning anybody else. 
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What is the »moral« of the story - at any rate, the part about the woman falling from 
the bridge? Does Camus want the reader to believe that this man, who for most of his 
life has managed quite successfully to use everybody to his own likings - and most of all 
women - no longer is able to live life as a game because of this confrontation with his 
own failure to come to assistance to a drowning person — notably a woman committing 
suicide? The problem with the novel is that Camus convincingly illustrates both the 
understanding of life as a game in which each individual is completely autonomous and 
categorizes all other beings against his own interpretative horizon, and the radically 
opposite understanding of other human beings as setting a norm that the individual cannot 
simply disregard. As Blank has pointed out, Camus intentionally chose to illustrate the 
immorality of his main character in reference to an act of omission as opposed to 
commission: The attorney does not murder the woman; he »merely« fails to stop her from 
jumping and fails to come to rescue [see Blank 1971, p. 25J. The net result of this 
combining the Sartrian with the Levinassian man in one novel character, however, is quite 
unconvincing. Although the attorney claims that he was well aware of his unforgivable 
negligence, at times even is haunted by the event, his change of behavior is the complete 
opposite of what one might expect. Instead of more, he becomes less caring. Granted, he 
publicly confesses his sins, but only because the confessor has the power to judge others 
[see Blank 1971, p. 20]. 
Like Sartre - who became an active defender of communism - Camus is unwilling to 
accept the logical consequences of his existentialist analysis, that is, the »absurdity« of life 
and the »solitarily« it implies. In his novel La Peste (Fr.: the plague) Camus [1947] 
provides an even more ardent defense of the priority of »solidarity« over »solitarity«.118 
The only convincing answer to the absurdity of the plague epidemic and the consequent 
quarantine that has literally forced the citizens of the North-African city Oran to live life 
together, is joining in the fight against the disease — pointless as such a fight may be in a 
medical sense. Surely, that answer is considerably more convincing than the answer of 
the novel's parish priest Paneloux who interprets the epidemic as a God-sent possibility 
for man to change his ways (see p. 181). But is the priest's alternative really the only 
alternative? In spite of their different responses to the plague epidemic, the practically 
committed physician Rieux and the admonishing Père Paneloux both take the quintessence 
of human existence to be a Heideggerian »anxiety«. It is at this deeper, anthropological 
level that the search for a third, radically (Lat.: radix = root) alternative must be 
located — which brings us to our last existentialist author to be discussed, Gabriel Marcel. 
118. Interestingly, Camus published his La Chute after La Peste; this »breach« with his 
previous advocacy of an ethos of secular sainthood evoked many a negative review of La 
Chute [see Blank 1971]. 
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Instead of »anxiety«, Marcel takes the quintessence of human existence to be »hope«; 
and instead of »being thrown back onto himself«, he suggests a philosophy of »availabili-
ty«. This dual alteration is grounded in a new appreciation of man's creative abilities and 
the openness of time. Both, obviously, had already been emphasized by Heidegger and 
Sartre, but - so Marcel wants to argue - their real significance had remained unrecog-
nized. 
That is not to say that Marcel denies the burdensomeness of the human condition. In 
fact, he compares the human condition with the most desperate of situations, that of 
imprisonment in the concentration camps in World War II. Some prisoners, at last, would 
undertake the impossible attempt to escape. Others would despair, give up, and in a 
sense, stop living. And then there were those who would remain hopeful, in spite of their 
situation, in spite of the certain knowledge that life was »unto death« [see Marcel 1967; 
Marcel and Bloch 1979]. 
But what does the hopeful prisoner hope for? In any event not for some »known«, 
not yet existing but »expected-in-the-future thing«. If we were to think of hope in those 
terms, we would again violate Heidegger's injunction not to reduce the future to the 
present. We would think of the future as the known that is only a certain number of 
present moments ahead of us, as the anticipated. Thus, we would constantly live under 
the "tyranny of the established". Time, in that case, would be thought not to ever bring 
anything new, anything genuinely new. Such an understanding of future automatically 
leads to despair: "In despair, life is 'just one damn thing after another'" [McCown 1978, 
p. 63; see also Marcel 1944, p. 70]. 
It should be emphasized that the kind of hope Marcel is conceiving is not an 
optimistic belief in the miraculous. The miraculous event some prisoners were waiting for 
(e.g., the liberation from the camp) might not have occurred previously and in that sense 
was not established. But the non-reality of the miraculous is only a matter of statistics: It 
is unlikely to occur. It is real, and as such established, in that the event is expected (Lat.: 
to look out for), viewed, seen as one of the options (be it an unlikely one) that the future 
holds. The future, thus, may bring the unlikely, but the future is still not thought to bring 
anything genuinely new. 
A similar objection holds against understanding hope as an illusion. The "... passion 
for the possible is the answer of hope to all Nietzschean love of destiny, to all worship of 
fate, to all Amor fati. The passion for the possible implies no illusion; it knows that all 
resurrection is resurrection from among the dead, that all new creation is in spite of 
death" [Ricoeur 1970, p. 58]. As Bollnow has emphasized, contrary to Bloch (who is 
convinced of the meaningfulness and inevitability of development, and simply does not 
consider the possibility of catastrophe), "... Marcel does consider the possibility of utter 
failure and thus appreciates and grapples with the problems of anxiety and dread before 
the abyss" [Bollnow 1984, p. 194]. 
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On the other hand, Marcel is not advocating an attitude of complacence either In 
that case the future would not so much be reduced to the present but to nothing whatsoev­
er The future would be so radically new and unpredictable, that it becomes irrelevant for 
present life It makes sense to hope, provided hope is not seen as »hoping that «, but 
first and foremost as »hoping« Thus, transparency is not sought in order to view what is 
behind the facticity ot human life, but to simply open up the determinateness of the factual 
situation It is not that something can be won, but that winning becomes at all possible 
again What Marcel is advocating is a sense of »trust« 
Hoping is trusting that the future is for the better, that the future holds a better life 
Now »better« is necessarily »better than «, better in comparison to what preceded it, to 
the present situation But such a comparison presumes similarity as well The better 
future cannot be radically different from the present situation Heaven as the ultimate, best 
world that we may hope for cannot be radically different from earthly life to be at all 
promising Heaven must be heaven on earth Similarly, it must be the present that holds 
the promise for a better future 
This rather abstract idea of the present already being even better than it presently is, 
we encounter also in the notion of authenticity, that is, if we understand authenticity in the 
artistic sense of the term An »authentic performance«"9 of a Bach concerto is neither 
particularly powerful, nor acquiescing, but intended to express the very essence of the 
concerto Rather than adding quality from the outside ( e g , by the use of modern 
instruments), an authentic performance is one that tries to stay as close as possible to the 
concerto itself in an attempt to make it sound better from within That is not a matter of 
academically sticking to the notes (the present), but revealing that those notes can sound 
even better than they already are However, precisely because an authentic performance 
always moves beyond the given, there cannot be »the« authentic performance, the final 
performance that completes the concerto The future is never present-able " [H]ope is 
the availability for the gift of future, which exceeds all expectations and all calculations" 
[Bollnow 1984, ρ 192] 
What, then, could qualify as an authentic moral decision in the sense of Marcel's 
existentialism9 To return to Childress' example, is the patient's decision to refuse dialysis 
authentic7 Should he not, like Marcel's camp prisoners, live his present life as one that 
119 When I employ the qualification »authentic« performance, it is neither meant to refer to 
the use of musical instruments from the days of the composer, nor to a performance as 
close as possible to what we think the composer had in mind, given sources of informa­
tion other than the piece of music itself For an authentic performance we may need 
original instruments, but that would be because the concerto itself »asks« for such 
instruments, and we may conclude »this is really Bach«, but that is because Bach is 
reflected by the concerto itself rather than added to it 
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holds a non-presentable but promising future9 For surely, the life of many a dialysis 
patient is not any more desperate than the life of the concentration camp prisoners 
The answer must be negative — not because the patient's life is more or less 
desperate, but because the analogy itself is flawed Whereas the dialysis patient declines 
the continuation of medical interventions, the escapist camp prisoner declines life itself 
More importantly, however, the question seems itself a »category mistake« Asking what 
decision constitutes an authentic decision would be asking for a presentable future 
Earlier, we already emphasized that the authenticity of human life can only be discerned 
when its temporality is not reduced to a series of present actions Man does not live 
between past and future but from without his past into the future Whereas the future is 
determined by the past in that genuine human freedom is a matter of promising to oneself, 
the past is never completely determined because there is always the hopeful future 
But if it is not for a particular object or event, a »what« or »that «, the camp 
prisoner and likewise the dialysis patient may hope, where may they expect the warrant 
for a better future9 For the future itself has yet to be concretized and to that extent is 
undetermined Thus, there may be little reason to view the future with anxiety, but it 
does not seem to make sense to be hopeful either At least, the perspective of anxiety is 
supported by the absolute certainty of death 12° 
The promise for a better future that the present holds must be fulfillable If hope is 
not essentially »hoping for« or »hoping that« but denotes the direction, the course of life 
more generally and more fundamentally, where does it lead to9 There can be only one 
answer Rather than in a »what« or a »that«, trust must concern a »whom« Marcel draws 
an analogy with believing (in the sense of faith, Fr croire) The essence of faith is not 
expressed in the sentence »I believe that « but »I believe« [see Marcel 1944, ρ 44] 
Perhaps we may add that genuine, religious belief, indeed, does not have an object like 
common conviction ( e g , 'I believe that it is going to rain'), but it is not without 
relationality Genuine belief is always a matter of »believing m « 'I believe in God' ш 
120 Marcel, by the way, denies that there is logical proof that death is final The issue of 
resurrection of the body is a strictly non philosophical question that defies both positive 
and negative logical proof [see O'Malley 1966, ρ 122] 
121 Marcel underwrites the significance of »espérer en «, »placing hope in «, but warns 
against the tendency - which is particularly strong in our times - to "degrade" »placing 
hope in« into »counting on«, and even »revindicating« A philosophy of hope is continu-
ously threatened by our tendency to "replace an initial, both pure and mysterious 
relationship, by subsequent relationships that or certainly more intelligible, but also 
increasingly deficient in terms of their ontological contents" [1944, ρ 75] A paradig­
matic example is Carter who in her Ethical analysis of trust in therapeutic relationships 
argues that a "fiduciary relationship" is "created by the mutual acceptance of patient and 
practitioner to further legitimate interests of both", and that, once created, "both have a 
(continued ) 
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Why this emphasis on relationahty, that qualifies hope, trust and faith7 Because - so 
I would argue - it is only human beings (and God) who have the creative power to make 
changes for the good, it is only persons who can make and hold a promise The camp 
prisoner and likewise the dialysis patient can trust but their fellow-men and God m 
"For Marcel, the great danger of an existentialism based on anxiety is that it plunges 
individuals in a radical isolation that offers no possibility123 of making contact with a 
supporting reality outside themselves, with the result that their lives remain empty and 
meaningless" [Bollnow 1984, ρ 181, emphasis added - JW\ Here, too, lies the limit of 
stoicism The strength of the stoic lies in his ability to accept fate, his weakness in the 
inability to creatively surmount his fateful self [see Marcel 1944, ρ 51], in completely 
overlooking the fact that he has neighbors (Fr prochain), neighbors who care [see 
Bollnow 1984, ρ 189] 
Why Care? 
The preceding analysis has led us to conclude that authenticity is not first and foremost a 
matter of momentary decisions about presentable objects or events, but rather a lasting 
attitude of hope in one's fellow-men, of trust in a better future which the creative abilities 
of human beings promise But why, conversely, should the person who is called to 
respond, actually respond7 Why should the camp guard or the nephrologist be committed 
121 ( continued) 
duty to preserve the trust it embodies" [Carter 1989, ρ 266] While Carter has clearly 
recognized the significance of trust in the patient - care provider relationship, in the final 
analysis she turns foundational principle and subsequent concretization around Trust 
becomes based on mutual agreement, rather than mutual agreement on trust, thereby 
virtually annulling the essence of trust 
122 Since this study is aimed at the discovery of the foundations of clinical ethics, in 
particular as concretized in the patient - provider relationship, I concentrate on the 
creative powers of others (than the patient), notably of a person's fellow-men, as the 
foundation of hope Marcel, on the other hand, emphasizes the indefectible creativity of 
every human being himself, including the camp prisoner and the dialysis patient Hope, 
then, signifies the trust that death is not final As O'Malley summarizes, u[t]here is no 
logical proof that death is final , there is nothing in the human condition that supports 
its extinction" Surpassing death is not merely a matter of surviving in the memory of 
the living "Immortality, for Marcel, means more than mere survival of disembodied 
presence - which, in the full sense he gives the term, is not existing The issue in 
question is the resurrection of the body [But] on this question, philosophy can say, 
for or against, precisely nothing" [O'Malley 1966, ρ 122] 
123 At any rate, no fruitful possibility - JW (for an explanation, see ρ 215) 
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to the cause of their needy fellow-men?124 Why at all care? Or even more bluntly: 
What do they get out of it? 
From a utilitarian perspective, it would only make sense to care if such care is part 
of a larger social contract which benefits me too (e.g., there may come a time that I need 
help and by offering help now, I become entitled to similar care). Of course, such an 
explanation tends to be circular: The contractants must presume that their fellow-men will 
keep their promises — but why should they trust another? If we assume that the care taker 
gets nothing out of his providing assistance, that is, if he is a simple means to the 
patient's end, we violate Kant's deontological imperative never to consider another human 
being solely under the aspect of means. 
The problem with both answers is the implied assumption that the relationship 
between care-provider and care-receiver is a subject-object relationship. It is the same 
assumption that we saw Sartre make in his example of one person helping the other onto 
the bus (see p. 215). Although it is possible to construct - as does Sartre - an explanation 
of care in terms of mutual objectivity (that is, in being called to care, the physician is the 
object; when being cared for, the patient is the object), instrumentalization of human 
beings remains part of the explanation — which engenders questions from both a utilitarian 
and deontological perspective. 
The answer, then, must be that - again - the question itself is flawed. The question 
'Why at all care?' takes for granted Sartre's claim that the being-for-itself is incompatible 
with being-for-others. It is at this point that Sartre's and Marcel's ways part: "[A]vailabi-
lity as a human virtue does not involve being passively and instrumentally used by another 
person; rather, it involves responding in complete freedom ... to an appeal addressed 
directly to me as a person, not as an object" [Bollnow 1984, p. 183]. Availability or 
commitment, then, is the readiness to allow ourselves to be committed by someone else; 
not by the anonymous and anxious demands of human existence as such (Heidegger's 
»Sorge«; see p. 209), but by the concreteness of my fellow-man's needs (Lévinas' »face«; 
see p. 172). 
It is because of the creative abilities of human beings (and God) that the needy will 
place trust in their fellow-men. Conversely, the person called to care is not instrumentali-
zed in that call by the needy, for it is only because of the carer's own, personal and 
original creative powers (as opposed to usefulness by a powerful other) that trust is placed 
in him by the needy. This is the purport of the conclusion already reached in the former 
124. Once again, this question obviously should not be understood as one for explanations in 
terms of »causae efficientes« how a physician can come to respond to the outside 
stimulus, but as one explaining why it makes sense (»causa finalis«) that those able to 
offer help experience a call and feel obligated to care. To disqualify such ontological 
explanations in terms of causae finales as an unacceptable merger of ethics and anthropol-
ogy would itself be a circular argument (see footnote 113). 
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chapter (see p. 195): The moral cogency of an act to be undertaken can never be a 
limitation of one's own freedom (such as is true of externally imposed duties), but appears 
as "liberation onto one's own freedom" [Mieth 1977, p. 40]. 
However, their remains the question in what sense the provision of care is a 
»liberation onto the freedom« of the care-giver, or more plainly, »meaningful« for him. It 
is quite obvious that receiving care is meaningful for the needy. But even if the care-
giver responds freely and from his own creative abilities to the call, to what extent can 
Marcel maintain that hope is always for us. "J'espère en toi pour nous", 'I hope in you 
for us', thus Marcel summarizes the nature of hope of which human fellowship is an 
essential element [Marcel 1944, p. 81]. Yet in what sense is fellowship, being-for-others, 
not only compatible with but constitutive of or even conditional for being-for-oneself? 
If this question, namely in what sense the provision of care is meaningful for the 
care-giver as a person, were to remain unanswered, Sartre's dualism of being-for-itself 
versus being-for-others would prevail after all. Agich has noted that care-givers may be 
meeting the objective needs of their patients properly, but in such a routinized and 
disengaged manner that it is merely the fulfillment of their role. "... [I]t permits them to 
dwell temporally elsewhere,... demanding] less of the self and allowing] the self ... to 
sustain a psychic distance from those ostensible subjects of caregiving" [Agich 1993, p. 
137]. Agich takes for granted that it is possible to provide the kind of care where the 
care-giver is being personally present for the patient as a person. But Sartre's analysis 
would force one to conclude that being-for-others cannot at the same time be being-for-
itself. Any attempt to unite the two would be an act of bad faith, like the waiter trying to 
be a waiter both in role and in person, thereby overdoing it. 
Like Agich, Marcel maintains that fellowship is essential to human existence, but he 
is less clear in explicating why this is so. According to Bollnow Marcel's »disregard« of 
spontaneity is a limit to his philosophical anthropology: "... [W]e remain essentially 
reactive beings, dependent on appeals from the outside" [Bollnow 1984, p. 195]. While 
not being passive in the sense of an object used instrumentally, there remains a sense of 
»being lived« — which is where Bloch, emphasizing a more "militant" hope, departs from 
Marcel [Marcel and Bloch 1979, p. 56]. 
One obvious response to this charge is that genuine care for another human being is 
always acting in his benefit, which in turn implies responding to his needs — which is 
what the needy is hoping for. In this sense, all care is reactive. But their hope at the 
same time exceeds their own needs, for they are placing trust in the innovative creativity 
of their fellow-men that is to surpass the dead-lock situation in which the needy have 
ended up. In that sense, an understanding of care solely in terms of reactiveness without 
spontaneity would be deficient. 
In his own Reply to Bollnow, Marcel has responded that he "... never sought to 
create a philosophical system"; if Bollnow found spontaneity to be an underdeveloped 
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concept his (Marcel's) philosophy, it is only a matter of inattention, not of indifference 
[Reply appended to Bollnow 1984, p. 202]. But it is a topic that may not go unattended in 
a foundational study on clinical ethics. For it is only this most fundamental level, that the 
critical issues of our third chapter on the professional ethics, notably the topic of altruism 
(see, e.g., p. 71), can and must be addressed. 
In the next subsection I will examine this issue in more detail. However, we should 
not depart from Marcel without assessing more carefully whether Bollnow's criticism of 
Marcel is fair. If Marcel's own response sounds more like an elusion, a considerably 
stronger defense is provided by O'Malley. He maintains that we are - once more - misled 
by a false distinction. The contrasting notions of active spontaneity and passive respon-
siveness are inadequate to describe the person's role at the heart of the situation [see 
O'Malley 1966, p. 11]. Elsewhere, Marcel criticizes Sartre's interpretation of the case of 
the w2aiter. Sartre claims that the waiter is caught in an impossible attempt to overcome 
the radical duality between being-for-himself versus being-for-others. But, so Marcel 
contends, how could the waiter at all become aware of his duality (and consequently try to 
overcome it), if transcending the duality is impossible? By the very fact of keeping up the 
role - which presumes recognizing it as role - the waiter is transcending it and, as it were, 
establishing a domain outside the condition as waiter [see Marcel 1956, p. 64]. 
Having established that Sartre's interpretation is mistaken, that the duality between 
man's contingent facticity and his free choice cannot be radical, we must beware of 
jumping to the conclusion that this »domain outside the condition as waiter« is identical 
with man being a freely acting subject. An infinite regress would follow and Sartre would 
be proved right. What, then, does Marcel mean? 
We have already seen Marcel reaching the same conclusion as Scheler that man can 
only constitute himself as interiority inasmuch as he takes cognizance of the reality of the 
world and of other human beings (see footnote 87 on p. 168). "This means that his 
distinction from others is no more insularization than his co-participation is a coalescence. 
Sensation is not interposed between me and the world in the manner of an object, no more 
than memory is wedged between me and my past. ... Now, this means that my embodied 
self cannot be regarded as merely passive with respect to the world, nor yet as simply 
active." [O'Malley 1966, p. 89-90]. Any attempt to locate the »domain outside the 
condition as waiter« in between the waiter's active subjectivity and his passive objectivity 
is fundamentally erroneous because it violates the existentialist tenet that man's essence is 
not substantial but dynamic. "... [T]he indefectible element in us we will only be aware 
of intermittently. I do not communicate with myself all the time." On the contrary, I am 
more often decentered and alienated. "To demand that this element of self-presence 
would be continuous, is to seek to confer onto it a mode of existence that is typical of the 
most rudimentary object, the nearest there is to nonexistence" [Marcel 1959, p. 160]. We 
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would then treat man, "... so conceived as subject, as in fact an object" [O'Malley 1966, 
p. 69]. 
Hence, the assumption that the state of »being called« to care is essentially character-
ized by »passive objectivity«, and that, therefore, this state is at odds with man's »active 
subjectivity«, his power to spontaneous creativity, draws on a mistaken distinction (that is, 
in as much as that distinction is taken to be radical, such as Sartre does). This conclusion 
has far-reaching consequences, notably for the issue with which we started out this 
chapter: The concept of autonomy. "Autonomy only has significance in a context where 
there is something to be administered ... but nothing in my life or my presence, insofar as 
they are mine, admits of this concept being applied. My life and my activity are the more 
mine, the more I commit myself in them" [O'Malley 1966, p. 108; emphasis added]. 
Now »committal« is primarily a matter of »en-thrusting« oneself, of full-heartedly »handing 
oneself over« to the course of events, as opposed to remaining at a safe distance. So the 
more I commit myself, the less I am autonomous (in the libertarian sense of the term). 
Summarizing: The idea that »subjective autonomy« can only be genuine if and in as 
much as man is acting completely spontaneous is fundamentally mistaken. First, as we 
have already seen Heidegger emphasizing, the human being is never completely active but 
always reactive because he is thrown into life, thrown into the world, and can never catch 
up (see p. 204 and p. 209). Second, man not only is forced by his thrownness into a 
social condition; his fellow human beings determine to a large extent what he is. As 
Luijpen has pointed out, a mother is a mother because of her children, a man is an 
Amsterdammer because of the Amsterdammers, a smoker because of the smokers, a baldy 
when he is teased, a negro when he is discriminated [see Luijpen 1973, p. 316]. Many of 
our qualities, notably the important ones, derive their meaningfulness from other human 
beings. "... [T]o exist", thus Luijpen, is "to be by others" [p. 315]. 
But even if the most spontaneous and autonomous act on my part is already a 
reaction to a world forced upon me, to behavior directed towards me; if, moreover, my 
individual subjectivity is determined to a large extent - if not mostly - by others rather 
than myself, is there any sense left in talking about my personal, free, creative self? 
The reader is reminded once again that the line of argumentation in this study is not 
aimed at, first, proving that a particular understanding of the nature of man is correct 
(notably man as a creative, social being), and that, consequently, the phenomena of hope 
and care make sense, and thus the idea of a beneficent doctor-patient relationship and, 
finally, the discipline of clinical ethics. Rather, the process of reasoning has gone exactly 
the other way. We have taking for granted that health care providers engaged in clinical 
medicine do make moral, contentful judgments about the well-being of their patients, and 
justifiably so. Given this starting point, we have set out examining the possibility 
conditions of clinical ethics: If there exists such clinical ethical discourse, what must be its 
structure? What is the role of the health care provider if we want to hold on to the 
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meaningfulness of such discourse? What kind of relationship must exist between patient 
and provider if such meaningful discourse is considered possible? And finally, what kind 
of anthropological theory must be presumed for all the previous phenomena to be 
understandable? 
If, at this stage of our argument, we were to conclude that the idea of man being 
individual and creative as well as caring and social does not make any sense, it would 
have detrimental consequences for our project. Fortunately, as of yet we have only 
started wondering whether such an understanding of the human being makes at all sense. 
In the final subsections of this chapter, I will try to show that, indeed, a quite convincing 
account can be provided of this anthropological thesis. 
Personhood: A Problematic Concept 
The manifold anthropological theories that pretend to provide an understanding of the 
human being as individual yet social, as creative yet responsive, as free yet caring, take 
the notion of »personhood« as central. Unlike the concept of authenticity, the concept of 
the person has a long and extremely rich history. The authoritative German historical 
dictionary of philosophy which devotes as little as half a page to the concept of authentici-
ty, needs as many as 68 full pages to outline the concept of the person [Ritter 1972]. The 
concept of the person owes it coming into being to the early Romans; many a Medieval 
scholar debated it; and it has become a key concept in contemporary thought. The 
concept surfaces in a variety of areas, such as theater, linguistics, law, sociology, 
psychology, theology, anthropology, and ethics. 
Obviously, its extraordinary multiplicity of connotations complicates any analysis, let 
alone definition of the concept. Person, personhood, personality and other related terms 
allow for manifold interpretations. Remarkably, however, in the course of history similar 
combinations of interpretations return in spite of those very connections having been lost 
in between. Fuhrmann [1972], for example, points out that Augustine, writing in the 4th 
century AD, in his teachings on the Trinity apparently felt it necessary to mitigate the 
connotation of absoluteness then existing, with relationality, unaware of the fact that the 
term originally had meant »role« or »social function«, a connotation rather similar to 
relationship. Likewise, the connotation of inherent value resurfaces at different moments 
in the history of the concept without any evident continuity. Apparently, personhood is at 
the heart of a »set« of conceptual connections that are less contingent as may seem at first 
sight. 
Naturally, those seemingly self-evident connections also elicit fallacious reasoning, 
ranging from equivocation to circular arguments. The concept frequently is applied to 
circumvent the natural fallacy -- or rather, to mask the use of this fallacy. For example, 
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advocates of a right to abortion often argue that only if a human being has consciousness 
it has a right to life Why9 Because a human being who does not have such qualities as 
consciousness, cannot be said to be a person And if a human being cannot be said to be 
a person, it does not have a right to life In logical terms (C -» R) л (->C -» ~>P) Л 
(->P -» -iR) But this is similar to ( i R -» -iC) л (-iC -» ->P) Л (->P -» -iR), which is 
a logical necessity (-<R -» -iR) In other words, if a human being does not have a right 
to life, he does not have a right to life m In the case of advocates of a right to life, 
some minus signs switch places, but the result is the same If a human being does have a 
right to life, he does have a right to life 
If the manifold meanings of the concept of the person and the consequent risk of 
misusing the concept in a fallacious manner is one reason to be extremely cautious 
invoking this concept, another reason is the pretentious character of personalist anthropol­
ogies such as Scheler's Not only does Scheler provide a very rich ontological account of 
the nature of humanness (moving beyond any and all forms of anthropological dualism), 
his theory at the same time intends to provide a more convincing alternative to both 
formalist deontology and teleology/consequentialism [see Scheler 1980, ρ 370] 
Although such moving beyond the natural fallacy by constructing a single theory that 
links anthropological and ethical visions is perfectly in line with the general purpose of 
this chapter, it is neither possible nor necessary to examine in detail Scheler's thinking ~ 
let alone, the similar yet diverging viewpoints of other advocates of a personalist anthro­
pology If, however, it could be shown that a personalist understanding of humanness is 
at least as convincing as the anthropological viewpoints implied by the kind of libertarian 
theories of bioethics that do not allow for clinical-ethical judgments, at least an equal 
balance in the burden of proof would be restored between opponents and advocates of a 
climcal-ethical approach to dilemmas in everyday medical practice and care 
Personhood: A Rich Concept 
As mentioned m the previous subsection, the concept of the person and related terms like 
personhood and personality, have manifold yet related meanings that, together, yield a 
very rich perspective on humanness At least six connotations are of direct relevance to 
125 For an example of this use of the concept of the person, see De Wert and De Wachter 
[1990J The authors argue that not every fetus has an absolute right to life, for this right 
depends on the developmental stage of the fetus Why7 Because the characteristics of 
being a person gradually come into existence during the development of the fetus [p 82] 
The authors do not explain why it matters whether a human being is a person or not 
However, it is obvious that it is presumed that only persons have an absolute right to life 
And there we have the third implication that turns their argument into a logical necessity 
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our topic: (1) The original meaning of theater mask and social role, in Roman times was 
already enriched with the (2) the connotation of linguistic identification. Under the 
influence of Christian theology, personhood became to signify (3) the unitary identity or 
integrity of God in spite of His plurality. Soon, the concept became to denote the equally 
peculiar (4) nature of man, which is grounded in - and here we move beyond the natural 
fallacy - his (5) inherent dignity. Why? Because man essentially is a (6) relational being. 
All five previous connotations merge in this sixth fundamental anthropological insight that 
man finds his individuality is his relationality. But let us first examine each of these six 
connotations in more detail. 
1. mask I role. The exact origins and literal meaning of the term »person« have not 
been established with certainty, but the most likely source is the Etruscan term »phersu« or 
»mask«, which was latinized into »persona«. It became a common term in the Roman 
world of theater, where mask where very important since the main indication of the 
character played by actor would be the kind of mask he was wearing. The architectural 
design of the large Roman theaters excellently carried the spoken words from the stage 
down below to the highest visitors' rows. But the architecture, obviously, could not 
improve the visitor's sight and those sitting on top could not see the actors' facial 
expressions. The logical solution was a large, expressive mask. 
No wonder, the mask became to be identified with the »role« played by the actor. It 
was only a small step from here to »persona« coming to signify the »role« played by a man 
on the social stage, his role in society, his role in life. »Persona« denoted both positive 
characteristics, such as being a »democratic politician«, or negative ones, such as being a 
»liar« or, more generally, the feigned »image« one tries to display [see, e.g., Cicero 1976, 
§ I: 107-1151. 
Although the term »persona« would undergo radical changes in the course of the 
early Christian times (see hereunder), this connotation of »image« would remain powerful, 
notably in reference to the biblical passage "Deus personam hominis non accipit" [Biblia 
Sacra, Gal. 2,6], God accepts no man's person, He does not go by a man's prestige.126 
Whatever the kind of role, in any event the term persona denoted an »apparent role« 
played by man rather than his »real nature«. In fact, in the aforementioned work Cicero 
(106-43 ВС) distinguished four different roles that every person »performs« simultaneous­
ly: One that has to do with our humanity more generally; one with our individual 
characteristics; one with the environmental and situational conditions; and one with our 
126. The New King James' translation as "God shows personal favoritism to no man" may 
more or less adequately confer the meaning of the passage, but the original meaning of 
the word »persona« has been completely lost for it is the »person« of man, rather than 
God's »person« that is not taken into account by God in his judgement. The same, 
though in a different manner, is true for translations (such as the Dutch) where it is said 
that "God does not know the prestige of persons". 
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freely chosen social and professional position [see De Officiis, Book § I: 107,115]. 
Almost 2000 years later, a very similar theory would be developed by the psychologist 
Jung who viewed personhood as the balanced adaptation to one or more roles a person 
plays in life. 
2. linguistic identification. Cicero's listing of roles, though not meant to yield, when 
taken together, a characterization of the particular individual, borders on such an attempt. 
Indeed, the term persona did acquire this connotation of denoting the particularity of 
individuals during later Roman times. Parallel to the maximum of three persons that 
could be on a theater stage simultaneously, Roman linguists used the term »persona« to 
identify the three grammatical »players«: I/we, you/you, and (s)he/they, the P', 2nd and 3"1 
»person« (singular/plural). Similarly, in Roman law (of the imperial era), the word person 
was used to indicate individual people, not unlike our common modern use in such 
sentences as 'there were four persons involved'. 
3. unitary identity in spite of plurality. It was, however, only with the rise of 
Christian theology that the idea of unity or integrity (Lat.: integer = whole) in spite - or 
because - of plurality became a topic of discussion. For God was one; being God, there 
could only be one God (even the pagan philosopher Plato had come to that conclusion a 
couple of centuries earlier). And yet, God had become man as well, without losing his 
divinity. At the Council of Alexandria (362 AD) it was therefore decided to introduce the 
Latin word »persona« to indicate God the Father and God the Son, and, at the instigation 
of Tertullian (±155/60 - after 220), God the Spirit as the third divine person. One God, 
but three divine persons. It should be emphasized that the divine persons do not indicate 
three »aspects« of the one God, three sites that, as humans, we are unable to grasp at once 
(like the front and the back side of a building that can never be seen at once). The 
doctrine of the Trinity had moved beyond the understanding of persona as a mere role. 
The pernicious consequences of the opposite view (defended by the so called 
»Monarchianists« in the 2ni1 and 3rd century AD, opposed by Tertullian, and deemed 
heretic by various consecutive popes) were visible mostly in reference to the person of 
Christ. For in a monarchian perspective, Christ would be either divine and divine only, 
and therefore but one way in which God had »appeared« to mankind; or Christ was 
inspired with an infinitely high degree of wisdom and power by God, but entirely human 
nonetheless. If, on the other hand, Christ is genuinely divine and genuinely human at 
once, the term »persona« cannot refer to a mere aspect of God's being; it apparently 
indicates a unitary way of »being«, comprising both the divine and the human. God, one 
yet three persons; Christ, divine and human, but one person. 
4. the nature of being human. Man, obviously, is not divine like Christ, but he is 
created by God and, unlike other living beings, has been granted a »soul«, warranting 
everlasting life. Soon, this extraordinary nature of man is being indicated with the term 
»person« as well. But the term »person« is not simply identical with the term »human«. 
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As the first formal definition of personhood provided by Boethius (480-524) reveals: 
Persona est "... naturae rationabilis individua substantia", the person is the individual 
substance of a rational nature [Boethius 1988, § V.III, p. 74]. The emphasis is placed 
more and more on the individuality rather than the species. In the person the universal 
characteristics (of being human by nature) remain universal, but as an individual sub-
stance. Thomas Aquinas (1225/26-1274), would later stress that the concept of the person 
does neither pertain to an essence nor to a nature, but to the subsistence of an essence, 
that is, the way it exists as this particular being. Although particular singular beings 
cannot be defined, nevertheless the general character of the singularity can be defined and 
that is what the concept of the person is meant to do [see Aquinas 1963, § la.29,1) 
5. inherent dignity. In the Middle Ages the original, theatrical meaning of the word 
»persona« got lost completely; a different, Arabic word, namely »mask«, replaced it. But 
the connotation of function, image, and prestige did not, that is, the positive connotation 
of »merit« or »dignity«. In the early 12th century we find an anonymous Normandy 
scholar distinguish between the value (persona) a human being has by nature, and his 
value as a result of sacramental anointment and confirmation. Alexander from Hales 
(±1185-1245) explicitly includes this element of dignity in his definition: "Persona est 
hypostasis distincta proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente" (Lat.: the person is the hyposta-
sis (or substance) that distinguishes itself by the property (its own feature) pertaining to 
dignity, or - more freely - that is characterized by it being of value) [Alexander de Hales 
1951, § I,XXIII,9; see also Principe 1967; Kible 1972] 
Thus, the medieval merging of the connotations of individuality and of dignity 
allowed for the development of an anthropological concept that is at the same time an 
ethical denominator. Man derives his »particularity«, his »individuality« from his dignity; 
conversely, man's »dignity« exists in his being universal yet individual. At about the 
same time (i.e., the 12th century), the foundations are laid for the »person« as bearer of 
legal rights, who is also accountable for his actions. This connotation of »subject of rights 
and duties« would later even be loosened completely from its original foundation in 
humanness. Thus, we can now speak about institutions as »legal persons« (as opposed to 
human individuals remaining »natural persons«). 
6. relationality. Before we turn to the sixth and last connotation to be discussed 
more at length, let us briefly summarize what we have learned about the concept of the 
person so far. Ever since the 13th century, »person« had been an important denominator 
of individuality and particularity of the human being. Remarkably, however, personhood 
had never been understood in essentialist terms. In proposing the notion of the »person«, 
the question may already have arisen whether we are not violating the very starting point 
of all existentialist thinking - thereby putting in doubt all that has been said in the earlier 
subsections of this chapter -, that is, the thesis that there is no such thing as man's 
essence, or at most, that man's essence is his existence. "Rather than trying to grasp 
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man's essence ..., existentialism inquires into the structures of human existence which are 
constituted by the possibilities appropriated by an individual in the course of a life-time" 
[Árnason 1988, p. 4; emphasis added - JW]. Disregarding some 700 years of philosophi-
cal development, we may perhaps conclude that Thomas Aquinas was already thinking 
along similar lines when he emphasized that the concept of the person does not pertain to 
an essence but to the way a man exists as this particular being. But personalist philosophy 
- both in its medieval and its more modem versions - undoubtedly digresses from 
existentialism where the latter would maintain that every man is nothing but what he 
makes of himself [see Mounier 1952, p. 30]. 
Even though in the course of history the original meaning of the word »person« may 
(at times) have gotten lost, the connotation of role or function - both linguistically and 
socially - remained present and influential, and may have led to the development of the 
outlined »existentialist« understanding of human nature. Moreover, any concretization of 
such a »dynamic« understanding of man naturally will bring ethical reflections into the 
debate about merit and dignity. 
But where do we find unity in such a plurality of connotations: Personhood as the 
denominator of particularity, yet not so particular that nothing more can be said about it; 
personhood as denominator of man's »essence« (as opposed to the accidental and changing 
aspects of his being), yet in a dynamic sense; personhood as the denominator of man's 
given nature, yet also of his own moral stand. A comparison with Sartre's three pairs of 
unresolvable opposites (see p. 213) urges itself upon us, and likewise the question, 
whether, as Sartre maintains, unification is impossible. 
As we have seen in our brief review of the theological debate on the Trinity and 
Christ's nature, the answer may have to be sought in the notion of »relationality«. It is 
only in relation to the theater public that there is any sense for the actor on stage to depict 
another character than he really is, to wear a mask, to be »some person«; it is only in 
relation to fellow-human beings or society at large that an individual can fulfill a social 
role; it is only in relationship to his fellow-men that the individual can acquire dignity and 
be of merit; it is only in relationship to the f/Father that there can be a s/Son, and vice 
versa. This perspective, Mounier argues, was radically new; the Greeks simply had no 
idea of the essential unity of mankind. "Even the conception of the Trinity, emerging 
from two centuries of controversy, produces the astounding idea of a Supreme Being 
which is an intimate dialogue between persons, and is of its very essence the negation of 
solitude" [Mounier 1952, p. xiv]. It is, in sum, only in relationship to the world in which 
he lives that the individual can ex-(s)ist meaningfully (Lat.: ex-sistere), can step outside 
his current being, escape the solitude of his determination, and project ahead to new ways 
of being (see also p. 209). "Common opinion notwithstanding, the fundamental nature of 
the person is not originality nor self-knowledge nor individual affirmation. It lies not in 
separation but in communication" [Mounier 1952, p. 17]. 
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Does this mean that man's individuality, his being a person, is identical with his 
communal relationality? Theunissen concludes that traditionally two different answers are 
given: An affirmative one, that is, the person is indeed relationality; and a negative, that 
is, notwithstanding the significance of relationality for humanness, man is absoluteness 
(Lat.: ab-solutus: loosened from) [see Theunissen 1966, p. 466-467]. 
The first answer is given, among others, by Buber, Hartmann, and Binswanger. 
They take the meaning of the term »ex-(s)istence« as literally as possible. In opposition to 
the way of »being« that is characteristic of all »things«, to exist as a person means to be 
able to exceed one's own boundaries, to relate to something else and in particular to 
somebody else. Without a Thou, I simply cannot be; I only exist in the relationship to a 
Thou. Man only becomes a truly human being in his relationship to the other, that is to 
other people, to society, to the outside world. According to Binswanger, there is no such 
thing as a human »essence« that precedes relational behavior. Being relational constitutes 
man's very »essence«. 
One of the problems facing this most consistent of interpretations of personhood is 
that the essence of humanness ends up having two »poles«, »mine« and the »other's« (there 
is a »mine« to me as well as a »the other« to me). These anthropologists, consequently, 
reserve the term »subject« for »my« side of this relationship. Obviously, this raises 
questions about the status of the »subject« in relation to the »person«. Wherein would lie 
the »subjectivity« of Christ — to take the person proper as an example? Even more 
problematic: If there is a subjective pole to the personal relationship, one would expect the 
other pole to be objective. But the mere vocabulary seems to cast us back to Sartre's 
dubious interpretation of the nature of assistance, which would run counter to the 
personalist tenet that the relationship between persons - such as in the event of assistance 
or care - is always a relationship between integer persons. We already saw Marcel 
objecting to Sartre's analysis of assistance in terms of a subject-object relationship: In 
being freely responsive to the call (not the demand) of the other, I do not tum myself into 
the other's means but »restore myself« [see McCown 1978, p. 20]. Conversely, the other 
can only be the »detour« along which I concretize my own personhood if the other remains 
the other as opposed to being reduced by me to sameness, a mere means to my self-
realization. 
Disagreeing with this first relationalist interpretation of the concept of a person, the 
second group of anthropologists, represented by Scheler and Guardini, acknowledge the 
fundamental ability of man to enter into a relationship, but do not consider personhood to 
consist in this relating to the other. Personhood does neither emerge out of man's relating 
to the word, nor does its persistence depend on such relating to a Thou; it is absolute, 
equally absolute as man's God-given soul traditionally is understood to be. 
This second answer seems more in line with our common linguistic use of the term 
»person«, but it invokes a new fundamental question: Why would man - in Lévinas' 
240 CHAPTER 6 
vocabulary - »long« for the other if he does not need the other to complete his own 
selfhood, if the human being is not in any sense deficient [see Lévinas 1969, p. 175]. If 
relationality is not constitutive for man's most fundamental and essential mode of being 
(i.e., personhood), why engage actively in relationships? Why care? 
Various attempts have been undertaken to overcome this last duality between 
absoluteness and relationality. We have already encountered Sporken's thesis that man is 
a being that must become what he already is (see p. 207). Mounier calls the person "an 
inside in need of an outside" [Mounier 1952, p. 4]. Another, more detailed solution has 
been suggested by the German philosopher-psychiatrist Von Gebsattel (whose views on the 
doctor-patient relationship we will review in the next chapter). Being inspired by both 
Scheler and Guardini, Von Gebsattel, considers the relational aspect of the human nature 
to be fundamental though not essential for the coming-about of man's personhood. Unlike 
Buber, Hartmann and Binswanger, he maintains that each human being, from the very 
beginning of his existence, has an individual, unique essence, which he calls the person — 
and I take it, Von Gebsattel, being a devout Catholic, had in the back of his mind the idea 
of a God-given soul. Notwithstanding man being a unique person from the very begin-
ning of his existence, he must yet become a »personality« [see Von Gebsattel 1959]. For 
as a person, man is only a potential being. Man is not created as something that is 
already fully determined in his way of being, like a stone, a tree, or a cat. Man is created 
as a potential being, who still has to grow, to actualize his potentiality, to develop his 
potentiality into reality, that is into a »personality«. The person achieves this "actual 
existence" in the I - Thou relationship [Von Gebsattel 1964e, p. 309]. By means of the 
relationship to the other, the absolute being of the original person is "... transferred into 
the reality of its worldly form of existence" [Von Gebsattel, 1959, p. 538]. The person, 
therefore, is not the result of a series of acts, a life history, a process of self-determina-
tion, all in relation to the other; but the necessary precondition, the fundament, and the 
final goal of such a process of self-realization. 
Actual existence on earth as a unique human being is a matter of relating oneself to 
the other, the Other (with a capital, i.e., God), or the other as the world in which one 
lives (Daseinswelt); but also the other as one's own self, whether healthy and directable to 
perform medical care, or painfully acting up, estranged through mental disorders or 
somatic diseases, and in need of care. In relating to the other, at the same time man 
relates to himself. And it is only through these »intentional« relationships that he 
actualizes his potentials. The result of this process is what Von Gebsattel calls man's 
personality. Religiously neutral as this may sound - it has intentionally been written to do 
so by the present author - Von Gebsattel makes no attempt whatsoever to hide the 
Christian connotations of his personal anthropology. The person constitutes not merely 
the ability to develop, because plants and animals have that capacity as well. The person 
essentially is the »ought-to-be« (Ger.: Sein-Sollen). Realizing one's person into a 
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particular personality is man's most fundamental task in life, but at the same time a matter 
of free choice, a God-granted choice which can be accepted or renounced. Every man 
desires to accept, to determine, realize, and complete his own being. But according to 
Von Gebsattel, deep in every man's interior also hides a secret nihilism, a tendency not to 
be what one already is. He maintains that this secret nihilism actually is the source of a 
number of severe psychological diseases, such as neuroses and some psychoses (see for 
Von Gebsattel's ideas on the nihilistic tendencies of man [Von Gebsattel 1954d, 1954c and 
1959]). 
In case of a neurosis, the patient no longer actualizes his personality by means of 
relating intentionally to the Daseinswelt, but by directly focussing on his own self. The 
Daseinswelt no longer is the most important object of his attention, but his own ego. The 
neurotic patient is fixated on himself [see Von Gebsattel 1959]. In case of a psychosis the 
process of intentional relation has totally come to a halt. The person is alienated from his 
Daseinswelt. He no longer experiences the world in which he lives as a personal world, 
as a world that is his world, as a world in which he feels - so to say - at home. The 
psychotic patient experiences the world no longer as a Daseinswelt, but merely as a 
collection of meaningless objects, as emptiness. Now that the world only conveys 
meaninglessness and emptiness, his own existence becomes equally meaningless and 
empty. The psychotic patient becomes alienated from his Daseinswelt and from himself 
[see Von Gebsattel 1954e]. The patient suffering from a depersonalization syndrome 
essentially is suffering from radical loneliness and solitude. 
This is not the place to further examine the challenging features of Von Gebsattel's 
medical anthropology or the manifold complexities of a personalist anthropology more 
generally. Rather, we must focus again on the issue that led us to examine the concept of 
personhood in the first place: The need for an anthropology that (like the existentialist 
philosophy of authenticity) takes man to be individual and creative, but (unlike most 
existentialist theories) can also make sense of the human phenomena of care and solidari-
ty. The answer to this need, so I have argued, is a personalist anthropology. In reference 
to Von Gebsattel, I have showed that it is even possible to adopt a more »absolutist« 
personalist stance (thereby circumventing the risk of slipping back into a vocabulary of 
subject-object relationships), yet preserve the significance of human relationality, if we 
complement the notion of »person« with that of »personality«. In order for a person to 
actually ex-(s)ist (and become a personality), man needs the other. Thus, solitude is 
incompatible with personal life, care is not. 
This, then, would be the answer to the question raised earlier in reference to Marcel 
(see p. 230), that is, how it can be that in caring for another I am »liberated onto my own 
freedom«. Fellowship, being-for-others, not only is compatible but constitutive of, and 
even conditional for being-for-oneself. The hope that my fellow-man places in me is for 
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us because it provides me with an opportunity to actualize my own personhood. It is 
impossible to be genuinely creative by relying on myself only. 
What Socrates in Plato's Meno [1980d] proved when he had a young slave work out 
a geometrical problem, was not that the youngster had innate (mathematical) ideas, but 
that obtaining synthetic, that is, innovative knowledge, presumes openness to what is new, 
presumes receptivity for novelty. It was not a case of »anamnesis«, Socrates did not help 
the youngster »recollect« what the latter already knew. Instead, Socrates helped the slave 
to come to see what he had not seen before, what was genuinely new. This is what 
Noddings calls the "affective-receptive" or "receptive-intuitive mode" of consciousness 
which is "qualitatively different" from the "instrumental" or "analytic-objective mode in 
which we impose structure on the world" [Noddings 1986, p. 30-35]. The artist Miro, 
Noddings recalls, once explained his creativity in terms of having his hands guided when 
he painted. The mathematician Gauss spoke of »being seized by« mathematics [p. 22]. 
Creation involves always more than analysis and instrumental application of what is 
already given. Caring, creating a better world for those in need, similarly involves 
receptivity for what is yet to be synthesized. 
To care, then, is to be responsive in a dual sense. As mentioned earlier (see p. 
230), genuine care obviously is a matter of responding to the needs of the other; his needs 
are to be addressed. But care is also a matter of responding to opportunities that will 
allow one to actually address those needs. We already saw O'Malley objecting against 
Bollnow's separating passive responsiveness and active spontaneity (see p. 231). Creative 
spontaneity presumes being affected and responsive (in an innovative, synthetic manner). 
Says Noddings: "Instrumental thinking may, of course, enhance caring; that is, I may use 
my reasoning powers to figure out what to do once I have committed myself to doing 
something. ... [But] as we convert what we have received from the other into a problem, 
something to be solved, we move away from the other. ... The other's reality becomes 
data, stuff to be analyzed ..." [1984, p. 35-36]. Caring is being responsive; conversely, 
being spontaneous, creative, and free is to care. In caring for the other, I take care of 
myself. This is the essence of man being a relational being, a person. 
Personal Care and Care-ful Personhood 
In his Sein und Zeit, Heidegger takes »Sorge« (Ger. : care) to be the appropriate denomina-
tor of the unity of the structure of human Dasein [see Heidegger 1986, p. 192]127. It is 
127. Sorge is the "Strukturganzheit des Seins des Daseins", not the unity of Dasein as such [p. 
230]. The latter is to be found in by man's »being-onto-death«, the »temporality« of 
being. 
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due to »Sorge« that man can become what he can be in his freedom towards his ownmost 
possibilities (his project) [see Heidegger 1986, p. 199]. Many a contemporary »care-
ethicist« has seen this metaphysical thesis (or a similar variety) as a possible foundation of 
an ethical theory of care [see, e.g., Griffin 1983; Noddings 1986; Fry 1990]. But it is at 
least questionable whether Heidegger's »Sorge« comes anywhere close to the »care« of, for 
example, a »caring« nurse engaged in patient »care«. Of all different connotations of 
»care« in the area of medicine, probably the one coming closest to Heidegger's »Sorge« is 
the generic word »health care«. Here, »care« means nothing more - and nothing less -
than »business«, being busy with the matter of health, taking care of health issues. Being 
thrown into life yet free to influence the course of his life, man is always engaged in the 
praxis of »taking care of« (Ger.: besorgen) his life. 
Heidegger's »Sorge« definitely is not simply a natural sentiment, like the type of 
caring one commonly sees between mother and child ~ let alone, animals [see Fry 1990, 
p. 14]. If care were a natural inclination (as some care ethicists contend), being careless 
would not be a vice but a matter of a (slightly) deviant natural constitution. Contrary to 
this view, I agree with the common opinion that being a caring person is a virtue, and 
that, consequently, it is within the range of free choices whether or not to care. Again, 
we should not lose sight of the fact that we are not trying to find an explanation of the 
phenomenon of care in terms of »causae efficientes«, of how one human comes to care for 
another. What we are trying to explain, rather, is why it makes sense for man to care 
about his fellow-men. 
Heidegger's »Sorge« is indeed nonmoral, but only because it precedes, like the whole 
of Sein und Zeit, all ethical discourse (see p. 206). In that sense, Heidegger's »Sorge« 
may still help us to »make sense« of the phenomenon of interhuman care. But I agree 
with Zwart that Heidegger's »Sorge« is too much directed towards »being« as such. It 
represents "... an indeterminable anxious awareness about the anonymous other without a 
face, about being without beings" [Zwart 1992, p. 256]. What we are trying to come to 
terms with is not anxiety driven carefulness, but the phenomenon of intersubjective human 
care that is achieved out of hope and in creative freedom. In the previous subsection, we 
have seen that a personalist anthropology can account of this kind of care. It is because 
of a person's need to care that it makes sense for him to answer to the obliging call of his 
fellow-man in need of care. 
There remains, however, one unsolved problem. As mentioned, in the context of a 
personalist anthropology, it makes perfect for man to care for his needy fellow-man; but 
not taking care of one's neighbor does not seem to undermine personal being. Notably 
the advocates of an absolutist personalism underscore that ex-(s)istence is primarily a 
matter of relating to what I am not, to the other; but not necessarily to other human 
beings. I may also actualize my personhood in relationship to God or to the world around 
me. Even if we grant that God is a personal being and relating to Him is (at least) equal 
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to relating to other human beings and qualifies as »personal caring«, there is a problem 
when it comes to caring about animals, plants, and even inanimate objects. Why care 
about the hungry beggar on the corner of the street when one has already lots of cats to 
care for? The point is not that cats - in this view - are of equal value of humans; the 
beggar may very well deserve the food given to the cats much more than the animals. In 
fact, the cat owner may be well aware of the call of the beggar. But even so, the cat 
owner may see no need to start caring for the beggar because he already cares for his 
cats, and in them, for himself. Now my cat example may be unconvincing, but what 
about the artist who finds his fulfillment in creating new paintings? Would he be in need 
of fellow-human beings? 
Noddings has argued that genuine care presumes that carer and cared-for are 
mutually responsive, that is, the carer must acknowledge the need of the cared-for while 
the cared-for must acknowledge the care provided. This rules out genuine caring for 
plants and inanimate objects.128 But it also rales out caring for people whom I do not 
encounter (e.g., because they live in another country) and for future generations. 
Noddings accepts these consequences, but at the same time admits such acceptance is 
"painful", and goes on to argue that we nonetheless should "... be sensitive to those we 
cannot encounter or have not yet encountered ..." [Noddings 1986, p. 152]. How come 
this is »painful«? In what sense could it be painful when it is perfectly moral? Unless, of 
course, it is not perfectly moral. Was it not this very sense of »painfulness«, of »distur-
bance« and even »shocking contrast« that calls upon us, thereby constituting a moral 
obligation? 
Contrary to Noddings, I would argue that the essential difference between inanimate 
objects, plants and animals on the one hand, and persons - whether living in my house, in 
the Sahara desert, the future, or a woman's womb - on the other, is that the former do not 
have a »face« while the latter do. My fellow-man »faces« me, he calls upon me while 
withstanding any reduction to MEness (see p. 173, 174). Notwithstanding her significant 
contributions to the development of a care ethics, Noddings is fundamentally mistaken 
when she overlooks the primacy of the other in setting the moral norm. According to 
Noddings, whether or not a pregnant woman shall care for an unborn fetus depends on the 
sacredness that the pregnant woman confers upon it. If there is no "formal relation" 
between mother and fetus, there cannot be an obligation to care [p. 88]. Likewise, 
"[w]hen we take a creature [such as a cat - JW\ into our home, name it, feed it, lay 
affectionate hands upon it, we establish a relation that induces expectations" [Noddings 
128. According to Noddings, it also rules out a caring relationship between God and man. In 
a Christian (nondeist) perspective, this conclusion naturally would not follow given God's 
personal nature and His ongoing involvement in this world. 
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1986, ρ 157] In other words, according to Noddings it is the carer rather than the to-be-
cared-for who originally sets the moral norm 
Noddings is quite unwilling to accept all the logical consequences of this position 
While allowing for abortion, she rejects infanticide uncompromisingly "Suppose the child 
is born and the mother admits no sense of relatedness May she commit infanticide9 
Since the infant, even the near-natal fetus, is capable of relation - of the sweetest and most 
unselfconscious reciprocity - one who encounters the infant is obligated to meet it as one-
caring [that is, as care-provider - JW\ She may not ethically ignore the child's cry to 
live" [p 89] Why not7 Or more precisely What could be the source of moral obliga­
tion if the mother sincerely demes to experience any more of a relation with her newborn 
than with the stray cats that she does not take into her home either7 
Again, Noddings own language provides the answer Because it is the child that is 
calling upon us But so are those starving in the Sahara desert I may not have encoun­
tered them in person, but they are crying out for help and I am under the moral obligation 
to provide help The same is true for future generations, and for the unborn Why else 
would an unwanted pregnancy pose a moral dilemma to the pregnant woman if not 
because she is aware of the moral obligation towards the fetus that she knows to be inside 
of her, a moral obligation that she also knows will become ever more apparent as the 
fetus grows, until her child will face her directly 
Only human beings resist reduction to MEness They do not become beings of 
moral worth because I give them a name, let them in my house, lay hands on them, in 
sum, assign them a place in my life They resist such reduction to MEness, and yet they 
appeal to me Conversely, only in other human beings can I find an opportunity to 
genuinely EX-(s)ist, to take distance from my MEness in my fellow-man's OTHERness m 
order to return to myself enriched and grown God created heaven and earth and all the 
plants on it But in spite of all the beautiful life surrounding man in paradise, God found 
man to be alone And He created every possible animal and brought them to Adam to see 
what he would call them And Adam gave names to all the animals But for Adam, He 
did not find a vis-a-vis that fit him And since it was not good for the man to remain 
alone, God created them male and female [see Genesis 1-2] 129 
Summary Assessment 
I have started out this chapter quoting the American bioethicist Churchill criticizing the 
loneliness-idealism that pervades much of contemporary American social theory as well as 
129 I am indebted to Prof Peperzak [see 1987, ρ 138] for pointing out this biblical example 
of existential loneliness 
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bioethics (see p. 201). Indeed, a libertarian approach to bioethics implies the denial of the 
significance of fellowmanship for a theory of ethics. They overestimate the freedom and 
manipulative powerfulness of man while underestimating the positiveness of intersubjec­
tive care. To the extent that people lack fellow human beings, they will lack insight into 
their own predicament. Other people are mirrors for our self-knowledge and imperative 
for our personal fulfillment. 
I then set out to examine the existentialist philosophy of authenticity. Life is always 
»forced upon« man, Heidegger argues, because a human being can never cause his own 
coming into being; in fact, he always »runs behind« his own existence. Man never leads 
an »original« life; for the most part he lapses into the life that anybody lives. It follows, 
then, that the notion of a freely chosen private life is mistaken and cannot function as a 
criterion of to-be-respected patient-decisions. Autonomy (in the libertarian sense of the 
word) fails to do what it is commonly supposed to do: Provide a criterion of distinction 
that can be invoked to settle moral controversies between patients and providers. 
The existentialist notion of authenticity better reflects the dual nature of human life, 
that is, a life of being created and of creating, of being shaped and of shaping, of falling 
ill and of surmounting illness. But I also concluded that Heidegger, and even more so 
Sartre, fail to provide a positive alternative when it comes to interpersonal care. Man is 
thrown back onto himself. In spite of arguments to the contrary by Sartre (and even more 
so, by his French contemporary Camus), the main thesis of Sartre's Huis Clos seems to be 
unsurmountable: "L'Enfer, c'est les autres", Hell, that's the others [Sartre 1947, p. 92]. 
In opposition to this pessimistic view, we have seen Marcel propose a philosophy of 
hope. The added value of hope over and beyond any of the preceding anthropological key 
concepts is the aspect of Ά joined, intersubjective journey into the openness of future. The 
existential anxiety of being thrown into life, which cannot be subdued by merely relying 
on one's own freedom, can, however, be overcome by placing faith in the creative 
capabilities of other human beings. 
We have seen that this most speculative presumption - Ricoeur once argued that a 
philosophy of hope may be the "closing point" of all philosophical discourse where reason 
and faith merge [Ricoeur 1970, p. 55] - can be made more intelligible when it is placed in 
the context of an encompassing personal ist anthropology. Undeniably, the introduction of 
the notion of personhood raises manifold new philosophical quandaries, if only because 
personhood is one of the richest anthropological concepts around. Yet it is only in the 
context of a personalist anthropology that the phenomenon of »care«, which is clearly 
fundamental for any veritable theory of clinical ethics, and, hence, has been taken for 
granted from the start of this study, can acquire meaning and become a sensible phenome­
non. 
In other words, to defend the possibility of careful clinical ethical discourse, to 
underpin this most »ordinary« aspect of daily medical practice and health care, we have 
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had to take ever more distance from the world of practical undertakings and enter the 
philosophical world of fundamental ontological concepts. This seems very odd, almost 
paradoxical. But it only does so if it is already presumed that the worlds of daily practice 
and distantial reflection are separate worlds. One might as well conclude that this 
presumption apparently is mistaken: There is no meaningful practice without (implicit) 
ontology, and there cannot be a meaningful ontology without practical engagement. Let 
us, then, in the final chapter examine the practical implications of the theoretical reflec-
tions espoused in the foregoing chapters. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE PATIENT - PROVIDER RELATIONSHIP 
It is only when ... the person of one's 
fellow man in its logos is included... 
that medical practice is complete 
Von Gebsattel 1955f, p. 375 
Introduction 
In previous chapters, it has been pointed out that many established bioethics theories, 
notably those that adopt a more or less atomistic-libertarian perspective on the nature of 
man and human societal life, assume a moral anthropology of man as a self-sufficient 
being, who ideally is independent of the world, and even of his own body. This anthro-
pology, I have argued, explains - at least in part - the failing connections between medical 
practice and medical ethics. The contemporary paradigm of bioethics fails to adequately 
and convincingly address the world of the sick and their care providers. 
I have shown that it is possible, in spite of a seemingly unsurpassable moral 
pluralism in contemporary western societies, to outline a plausible anthropology of man as 
a social being, for whom fellow-manship is not only possible, but essential. In light of 
such an anthropology, it also becomes possible to talk again about the notion of sympathie 
intersubjectivity. By adopting a phenomenological-hermeneutic approach to medical-moral 
quandaries, an ethical evaluation can be realized of the clinical situation in which the 
individual patient and his individual care provider(s) interact, without losing sight of the 
unique, personal aspects of the case. 
However, in the past two chapters, the consecutive analyses have tended to lead us 
ever further away from that clinical situation. The nature of this study, that is, a (i) 
philosophical study of (ii) the possibility conditions of (iii) clinical ethics, has precipitated 
this departure. First, even if philosophy concerns itself with practice, there will always be 
»aporias« or »gaps« between the philosophical reflections and the actual undertakings [see 
Wieland 1989]. Second, rather than engaging in clinical ethical reflections on concrete 
cases, this study intends to examine the possibility conditions of clinical ethics. And 
third, the actual clinical-ethical discourse on the clinical situation to a large extent is the 
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prerogative of those in the situation, the patient and his care provider(s), as opposed to 
bystanders, such as bioethicists. Sympathie intersubjectivity can only be experienced, 
never thought up. "... [TJhere is an irreducible personal element in the doctor-patient 
relationship satisfied only by mutual physical co-presence" [Bosk 1993, p. 114, note 1]. 
Even the introduction of extremely detailed and sensitive real-life case descriptions, so 
called »thick« descriptions, cannot provide the same »insight« into the situation as 
experienced sympathie intersubjectivity can. 
Although this study is located at the meta-Ievel of a transcendental analysis of the 
possibility conditions of clinical ethics, the final goals of this project - as of all philoso-
phy - is to make a difference in actual life. In as much as this project is aimed at 
contributing in its own modest way to the relief of human suffering, it must constantly 
balance philosophical distance to everyday routines with concernful proximity to clinical 
care. And it is inherent in clinical care, notably in the case of suffering, that the care 
provider often must act, notwithstanding unanswered questions (see also p. 58). Hence, it 
is imperative to now tum back to that clinical reality. 
Viktor von Gebsattel: Some Introductory Comments 
The proper way to proceed, then, would be to provide as detailed and nuanced a descrip-
tion as possible and interpretation of the complex world of the patient-provider relation-
ship. However, the framework of this study, let alone the scope of a single chapter, does 
not allow for such an analysis. Instead, I have chosen to draw from the work of one key 
author only, the German physician-philosopher Viktor von Gebsattel (1883-1976). 13° 
This choice is justified not only because of Von Gebsattel's perceptive writings on the 
doctor-patient relationship, but also because of his sensible philosophical approach. As 
mentioned in the former chapter (see p. 240), Von Gebsattel was personally acquainted 
with Scheler and a supporter of his personalist approach. 
If Scheler can be blamed for not conforming to the rigor of Husserl's phenomenolo-
gical method, for taking phenomenology to be an avenue to, if not identical with existen-
tial philosophy, this criticism would all the more apply to Von Gebsattel. In spite of his 
deep interest in philosophical questions and extensive formal training in philosophy, Von 
Gebsattel was first and foremost a practicing physician. His writings reflect the ongoing 
struggle to philosophically evaluate medical practice without losing sight of the essence of 
that practice. This is the primary justification for starting out this chapter on the patient-
provider relationship with a summary examination of Von Gebsattel's ideas. 
130. For a short biography of Viktor von Gebsattel in English, I refer to a forthcoming 
publication [Welie 1995]. 
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In as much as Von Gebsattel was an eclectic scholar, blending philosophical ideas 
from a variety of different sources with clinical insights, and lacking philosophical rigor 
and consistency, his medical-anthropological writings were well received by his col-
leagues, physicians as well as philosophers. According to his French contemporary 
Minkowski, he set an unattainable example for psychiatrists [see Minkowski 1958, p. 
318], a statement which his Dutch contemporary Buytendijk seems to have confirmed [see 
Wiesenhütter 1976, p. 197]. On the occasion of his 70th birthday Binswanger, Heideg-
ger, and other contemporary celebrities gave lectures at the Würzburg University. A 
special honorary volume was published, and again at his 75th, as well as at his 80th 
birthday. To the last volume primary advocates of philosophical-medical anthropology 
contributed, such as the psychopathologists Binswanger, Minkowski and Straus, the 
psychologist-physiologist Buytendijk, the philosopher Tellenbach, Von Gebsattel's students 
Caruso and Wiesenhütter, and younger members of the school such as Christian, Bräuti-
gam, and Plügge. 
Notwithstanding all this fame during his life-time, the philosophical ideas of Von 
Gebsattel nowadays are poorly known. Little has been translated into English and few 
scholars have commented on his writings.131 Various reasons can be given for that 
historical memory-loss. One reason would be that as a whole the medical anthropological 
movement more or less disappeared from the fore, to be studied only by a few historians 
of medicine and philosophers interested in such esoteric issues as »the essence of man« 
and »the purpose of being«. According to some contemporary medical professors, such 
issues are merely a matter of "unrealistic abstractions". The physician should not take 
any such patient questions seriously; on the contrary, the patient must learn "... to view 
the world with different, sober eyes" [Smulders 1984, p. 39]. 
Philosophical insights are no longer considered of much importance for medical 
practice. The German Jahrbuch für Psychologie und Psychotherapie, which was renamed 
Jahrbuch für Psychologie, Psychotherapie und medizinische Anthropologie in 1959 - not 
unlikely at the instigation of Von Gebsattel who also wrote the explanatory preface to the 
first renamed issue -, changed names again in 1972 and became the Zeitschrift fiir 
klinische Psychologie und Psychotherapie. But this answer only raises a more critical 
question: Why did the whole of the anthropological movement disappear in the historical 
archives? 
More convincing would be the explanation that Von Gebsattel considered himself 
first of all a clinical psychiatrist rather than a theoretical philosopher. Maybe it was the 
131. See [Von Gebsattel 1958, 1995] and the Foreword to [Tellenbach 1980]. The only 
American author discussing Von Gebsattel extensively is Spiegelberg, who in his 1986 
Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry dedicates a full chapter to Von Gebsattel. 
See also [Welie 1985]. 
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continuous confrontation with the reality of unique patients, that made him hesitate to 
develop his ideas into a theoretical and thus generalized framework of thoughts. This, 
actually, would be in line with the very objective of medical anthropology. As Ten Have 
already explained, "... medical anthropology ... is the draft for an anthropologically 
oriented medical practice, but at the same time the result of this practice, as the practice 
always precedes the theory" [Ten Have 1983, p. 15]. 
In the homage volume in celebration of Von Gebsattel's 70th birthday, Von 
Gebsattel's pupil Caruso writes: "The appraisal of Von Gebsattel's existential anthropolo-
gy ... will not be easy, diverse as his publications are, concisely formulated, and 
excitingly literary in their presentation ..." [1952, p. 135]. But neither meticulous, nor 
comprehensive, I must add. Von Gebsattel never published a comprehensive theoretical 
work. Wiesenhütter has explained that writing voluminous books simply was not his 
teacher's »cup of tea« [see Wiesenhütter 1976, p. 198]. But this explanation does not 
explain why writing such volumes was not his cup of tea. 
Certainly, the problem cannot have been his inability to put down on paper the 
comprehensive theory he had in his mind. Von Gebsattel did not lack literary talents. 
Hence the question arises whether Von Gebsattel at all had such a comprehensive theory 
in mind. And yet, with the exception of Siebeck perhaps, there has been no other 
physician of that generation, who has recognized and analyzed the agenda of the medical 
anthropological movement as clearly as Von Gebsattel [see Verwey 1984, p. 222-223]. 
Maybe - just maybe - there is an inherent paradox - if not contradiction - in the notion of 
any philosophical theory of clinical medical practice. 
Von Gebsattel's Understanding of Diseased Existence 
In the field of medicine, Von Gebsattel's contribution pertains mostly to two related 
topics: His understanding of human existence, including diseased existence, and his views 
of the doctor-patient relationship. Moreover, Von Gebsattel's relating these two to one 
another is itself of interest to our project. 
In the former chapter, I have already reviewed his understanding of the nature of 
personhood and touched on the consequences of this understanding on nosology (see 
p. 240). There we saw that Von Gebsattel takes certain neuroses and psychoses to reflect 
a secret nihilism, a tendency not to be what one already is. Theories that explain disease 
by referring to voluntary immoral human behavior or sin, often have been made in the 
history of medicine and nowadays as well. The AIDS epidemic, for example, has led to a 
revival of such theories. However, when Von Gebsattel relates disease to free will, he is 
not interested in blaming the patient, holding him liable and even making him pay for the 
consequences. Neither does he look for a justification to let patients fend for themselves. 
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On the contrary, the point he wants to make is that whoever is eager to help patients, has 
no real chance to genuinely succeed without first understanding them as persons, as 
unique human beings, with a free will that has been embodied in a particular way of life, 
a particular somatic and psychological constitution, a particular personality 
Diseases cannot be reduced to mere organ-damage without loosing a very important 
aspect, maybe the most important aspect of diseases, that is, that they affect man in his 
very essence and become part of his personality Diseases are part of individual somatic 
and psychological constitutions But they are also part of personalities, of life-histories, 
and as such they can be related to that most basic character of man His free will Having 
a free will, according to Von Gebsattel implies that man can choose or refuse to develop 
his potentiality In other words, he is free to choose for non-existence It is this refusal, 
this negative choice, that can result in, for instance, a major depression or a depersonal-
ization syndrome 
Of even more importance to the present chapter is the much less surprising notion 
that mental as well as somatic diseases influence the existence of man Man suffers from 
his disease, but man is not blindly caught in his disease like an animal is [see Von 
Gebsattel 1964"] Man, as much as he suffers, is always able to take distance from his 
disease, to view the disease as the »other«, and to relate to his own disease Consequent-
ly, disease influences the personal self-realization of man Man always incorporates the 
experience of disease in a unique, personal way The reality of suffering is not merely a 
symptom of a damaged or threatened organism, but a unique expression of human 
existence 
This anthropological view has significant consequences for Von Gebsattel's under-
standing of the doctor-patient relationship If being diseased is more than having caught a 
bug, if being diseased essentially is the patient's expression of his humanness, then the 
doctor-patient relationship must at all times acknowledge, respect and incorporate this 
»personal« aspect of disease 
The Three Stages of the Doctor-Patient Relationship: The Immediate Stage 
In his article on The Meaning of Medical Practice [Von Gebsattel 1964d]132 Von Gebsat-
tel maintains that the scientific relationship between physician and patient cannot be an 
original relationship The very idea to develop a biomedical science presupposes the need 
to do so It presupposes the apparent lack of means to adequately care for patients' needs, 
which in turn presupposes somebody crying out for help And, trivial as it may sound, it 
also presupposes somebody who experiences the urge to help, which presupposes he heard 
132 An English translation of the article under this title is forthcoming [Von Gebsattel 1995] 
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this cry, which m turn presupposes this person is willing to listen Thus, we find two 
human beings, one in need of help, the other willing to help but unable to do so adequate-
ly It is this feeling of inability which has led and still leads people to engage in the study 
of medicine and the biomedical sciences, and to even devote their whole life to it 
Perhaps, Von Gebsattel was too idealistic in assuming that youngsters decide to go to 
medical school or become biomedical scientists out of such humanitarian emotions But 
that is not to say this must be the case for medicine to make sense Moreover, without 
such humanitarian a foundation of the patient-provider relationship there is no guarantee 
that the relationship itself will be humanitarian The atrocities of the Third Reich are the 
most gruesome examples of inhumane acts by medical professionals committed in the 
name of scientific medicine In one of his last articles Von Gebsattel quotes his colleague 
Von Weizsäcker who is supposed to have said that standing trial in Nürnberg were not 
primarily simplistic, derailed, or corrupted individual physicians, but "the spirit of 
scientific medicine" [Von Gebsattel 1964e, ρ 421, Von Gebsattel 1964d, ρ 60] 
As mentioned, the medical anthropological movement has died a silent death 
Instead, contemporary bioethicists nowadays try to curb physicians' power by assigning 
the right to self-determination to patient and a host of other derived rights such as the 
right to information, choice of health care provider, confidentiality, refusal of treatment, 
etc But the very fact that these rights need to be assigned, in many an instance even by 
positive law, implies that they are not grounded in the patient-provider relationship itself 
If agencies external to medicine, such as the law, have the power to influence the moral 
standards of medical practice positively, other external agencies may just as well (come to 
again) exert negative influences It did in the past, and it may very well again in the 
future 
In one of his 1940 publications, Von Gebsattel Cites the following outcry of one of 
his patients "Is it the physician whom I am talking to or is it my fellow man7" In this 
outburst, according to Von Gebsattel at the same time that other, complementary question 
is expressed "Am I a suffering human being or just a psychiatric patient9" [1940a, ρ 6] 
These two opposites can be reconciled only if the patient-provider relation is not charac­
terized by mere technical aspects, related to the skills and power of medicine, but also by 
another, internal aspect [see 1940", ρ 7-8], or as Von Gebsattel writes four years later 
[B]y an effectiveness that is grounded in reality and an attitude that is grounded in 
sincerity " [1964\ ρ 29] Thus, the patient will have both faith and trust in the 
physician His faith concerns the physician as a member and representative of a profes­
sion, because the patient has no knowledge of the real skillfulness of the individual 
physician The patient's trust, however, concerns the individual physician himself In his 
faith, the patient views the physician as a skillful authority, in his trust, as a loving fellow 
human being [see Von Gebsattel 1954a, ρ 274] 
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A genuine relationship of care, therefore, must start with trust, which cannot be the 
result of agreements, but precedes any future agreement. This trust must be established 
immediately in the encounter between a human being calling for help and another human 
being responding with an offer to help. This stage, which Von Gebsattel calls the 
»elementary-sympathetic stage« or »stage of immediateness« precedes any scientific 
approach, and must be recognized as such [see Von Gebsattel 1964d]. For only then is the 
physician able to recognize that the second stage in the encounter between him and his 
patient, the stage of true medical thinking, planning, and acting, the so called diagnostic-
therapeutic stage, is a stage of alienation. 
The Diagnostic-Therapeutic Stage 
The first stage in the physician-patient relationship cannot be skipped, but essentially, it is 
not typical for the physician-patient relationship. Von Gebsattel calls this stage the 
elementary-sympathetic stage because the patient's cry for help is audible for every fellow 
human being. One does not need such means as scientific knowledge and diagnostic skills 
to hear the cry for help of a fellow human being. The relationship is immediate. 
Although the first stage is not necessarily typical for medical practice, it factually is. 
One does not need to be a physician to hear the cry for help of a sick fellow man, but as a 
matter of fact, patients do go to physicians and ask them for help [see 1948\ p. 659]. 
For only those who can swim, can save a drowning man. Physicians are the only fellow 
human beings having the technical skills to help. 
Hence the relationship between doctor and patient is characterized by inequality. 
However, the technical power which the physician has and the patient has not, is not the 
only and not the most important cause of the inequality between doctor and patient. The 
traditional status difference between doctor and patient is not the primary cause either, nor 
any kind of patient incompetence due to sickness or pain. On the contrary, the patient at 
this stage is the only competent participant in the relationship. He is suffering, not the 
physician; he is diseased, anxious, nauseated, in pain, frightened, handicapped, old, not 
the physician. Von Gebsattel stresses that despite the deepest sympathy, compassion and 
support of the health care provider towards the patient, the fact remains that the latter is 
suffering whereas the former is not [see Von Gebsattel 1964d, p. 70]. The only way to 
bridge this distance is biomedical science. Skillful scientific diagnosis enables the 
physician to leam a little bit more about the pain and disease of the patient, enough to 
open some possibilities for effective help. The elementary-sympathetic stage, therefore, 
must be followed by the stage of true medical thinking, planning, acting, that is, the 
diagnostic-therapeutic stage. 
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Indispensable as the second stage may be in order to become acquainted with the 
objective needs of the patient, it implies an alienation from the patient as a person, as the 
subject of these needs. This alienation between physician and patient is, as such, not 
problematic. It becomes problematic when it is no longer recognized as an estrangement 
but considered an original and genuine doctor-patient relationship. It becomes problematic 
when it is no longer recognized as an inevitable but temporary stage which should be 
surpassed. When the patient never was recognized as a unique person to start out with, 
and never will be recognized again as such, when the patient was, is, and will always be 
but a case among many other similar cases, then there is something fundamentally wrong 
with medicine and in particular with the patient-provider relationship. 
This second stage, therefore, must be succeeded by a third stage which can annul the 
alienation induced by the second mode of the encounter between patient and physician. 
This third stage, Von Gebsattel calls the personal or partnership stage. 
The Persona] Stage 
If pain and disease are private experiences causing existential distance between health care 
provider and patient, and if a scientific approach alienates the physician from the patient, 
thereby in some way increasing this distance even further, the question arises what 
possibly can constitute the basis of this personal partnership. What, other than being 
human, do physician and patient share? Nothing, it seems, but nothing other than being 
human is needed to complete the medical act and turn the patient-provider relationship into 
a personal relationship. What, then, is the difference between this third stage and the 
first, which, after all, was based on sympathy, a basic human »act« as well? 
Prior to analyzing this question it should be remarked that the three stages are not, at 
least not essentially, chronological stages that succeed one another in time. Literally, Von 
Gebsattel calls them "Sinnstufen", meaningful stages, stages at which the encounter 
between doctor and patient has a distinct significance, stages at each of which the 
relationship should be interpreted differently. In a footnote Von Gebsattel characterizes 
these three Sinnstufen as "dialectical stages" [1954f, p. 377, footnote 1]. The »thesis« of 
immediate sympathy, and the »antithesis« of scientific alienation, must be encompassed by 
a new »synthesis« of personal partnership. Thus, the personal stage must contain elements 
of both other stages. 
This may sound as an escape from the question at hand by the present author, and he 
indeed cannot deny that it partially is. For it is at the personal stage that we run up 
against considerable unclarity in Von Gebsattel's writings. Unfortunately, Von Gebsattel 
has not explained very clearly what exactly this synthesis is all about, and even more so, 
how it can be realized. 
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The first issue, then, in need of clarification reads: Is the new synthesis, or as Von 
Gebsattel calls it elsewhere, the personal factor in the healing process [see, e.g., 1954a], 
essentially an ethical verity or a therapeutical tool? Obviously, the two cannot be 
separated totally, but there is a fundamental difference. If the personal stage primarily 
concerns the moral status of medical practice, then every encounter between doctor and 
patient, whether it involves minor surgery or the treatment of a dying cancer patient, 
should be staged in three levels, and not merely those that are in need of a special healing 
method because standard medicine has little more to offer. This interpretation of the 
concept is supported by Von Gebsattel's warning that personalist psychotherapy - and we 
probably may generalize: personalist medicine or personalist health care -, is not a new 
method of healing, to be discussed in medical handbooks as one method among many. 
That would be equally incorrect as devoting a separate chapter to moral medicine among 
many other, apparently immoral methods of healing [see 1959, p. 553]. 
However, elsewhere Von Gebsattel maintains that there are situations in which the 
patient's disease is not the result of some objectifiable somatic or mental disorder that can 
be treated with second-stage medical interventions, but the expression of his personal, 
secret nihilism, the healing of which requires a personal response from the physician. 
How exactly this healing is to be realized, and whether the care provider must be a 
physician, remains unclear. In 1928, Von Gebsattel concedes that the healing power of 
the personal relationship has not yet been carefully examined [see 1954b, p. 281]. In his 
publications from the early forties, he provides some insight in this difficult and contro­
versial matter [see, e.g., 1940a, 1940\ 1964a, 1964ь]. But more than ever, Christian 
moral theology is a necessary precondition for understanding and accepting of Von 
Gebsattel's insights. 
A decade later, Von Gebsattel still cannot answer the question as to what exactly 
constitutes the healing power of third-stage personal-medical interventions. He actually 
concludes that this answer cannot be given as a theoretical answer, but only in an 
existential effort [see 1954c]. Furthermore, he admits that the personal element never can 
be the sole therapeutical tool, as it seems to have become in the 
Freudian »Übertragung« (G.: transference) [see 1954a]. It actually should never be 
employed as a therapeutical tool, but at most as an »appeal« to the patient to turn away 
from nihilism. The physician may not take away the patient's personal responsibility, nor 
is it his task to convert the patient to his own moral point of view [see 1948a, p. 126-127]. 
The care-giver who tries to turn the personal element in a therapeutic method has become 
a minister instead of a physician or psychotherapist [see 1954e, p. 351]. 
The recognition of the limits of medical practice is a crucial element of the personal 
stage of the doctor-patient relationship and this is one of them: Not to medicalize the 
nihilistic tendencies in man's existence. Another limit is not to forcefully establish the 
third stage. The first stage does not need any activity at all to be realized, but mere 
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passive suffering and passive sympathy. The second stage does require activity, but only 
from anonymous, »exchangeable representatives« of two »classes« of human beings, 
physicians and patients. The third stage, however, requires active communication between 
unique, individual persons, between partners. But as with any relationship between 
partners, it cannot be enforced. As Von Gebsattel's last published sentence reads: 
"Whoever tries to establish it arbitrarily and violently is in danger of violating the law of 
freedom in the other, thereby calling in question the very partnership which he is trying to 
establish" [Von Gebsattel 1964", p. 73-74]. 
Remaining at the second stage, at which the patient is but a case among many others 
and the physician but one health care provider among many others, would imply disre-
gard, even denial of the meaningfulness of the situation [1948a, p. 120]. Any occurrence, 
unimportant as it may seem, in which human beings play a role is significant, that is, 
bears some meaning in the unique life-history, the personal self-realization of those human 
beings. Remaining at the second stage, therefore, entails the danger of losing sight of the 
respect for the uniqueness of individual human beings, the respect which care provider 
and patient owe one another as partners in personal existence. 
Respect is the essence of the third stage of the physician-patient relationship. But the 
respect Von Gebsattel has in mind certainly is not the libertarian »leaving your fellow man 
alone«, or in the words of the Engelhardt: "... [A]cquiescing in the policy that persons 
may do with themselves and consenting others whatever they wish, despite what others 
may think or feel in the matter" [Engelhardt 1986, p. 13]. Von Gebsattel thinks more in 
terms of »Ehrfurcht« (Ger.: awe), an attitude of devotion and reverence at the same time. 
Devotion, because the patient is the physician's neighbor who as such deserves to be 
looked after (Lat.: re-spectus). Reverence because the patient's neighborship is vested in 
God. "When the patient is no longer a neighbor, that is, when the secret of his existence 
disappears, the secret that makes him a representative of the suffering Christ, the last 
spark of awe in the physician will extinguish, the personal rapport to the patient will be 
lost ...", Von Gebsattel argues in his 1948 publication on professional ethics [1948\ p. 
657]. Consequently, the physician must first examine his own position in this relation-
ship. He must examine the status of his »ethos«. 
Von Gebsattel concludes his 1953 article on the structure of medical practice with 
the statement that recognition and observance of the structure of medical practice in its 
three dialectical stages constitutes the »ethos« of the physician. But this interpretation, 
obviously, is insufficient, for in that case there is really no third stage but only two, two 
that must be lived through consciously and conscientiously, but two only. A more 
detailed answer, Von Gebsattel has provided in his earlier publications of 1948 on 
Christian professional medical ethics and on the ethos of the physician [see 1948a and 
1948c]. In both articles, however. Christian theology emerges again as the decisive and 
unescapable background of Von Gebsattel's thinking. 
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Von Gebsattel was born and raised in a thoroughly Catholic environment. And 
unlike his friend Scheler who felt forced by the outcome of his philosophical reflections to 
leave the Catholic Church, Von Gebsattel never seems to have felt even the slightest 
inclination to develop a religiously neutral medical anthropology and anthropologic 
medicine. As many valuable ideas Von Gebsattel's articles may present for the religiously 
neutral reader who is concerned about the ethical quality of contemporary health care, for 
Von Gebsattel there was no doubt that only a medical practice drenched in Christianity has 
a chance of resisting the ever increasing temptation of the biosciences with their compul-
sory reductivism and disregard of the personal individuality of the patient. 
The ethos of the physician is not identical with the aggregate of ethical guidelines, 
moral principles, and written and unwritten rules of conduct which make up so called 
"professional ethics" [Von Gebsattel 1948\ p. 654]. Rather, it is the very foundation of 
any professional ethics. Without it, professional ethical standards are floating in the air, 
to be blown away by the slightest turbulence. Professional ethical standards are influ-
enced too much by the empirical-historical context, that is, political tendencies, legal 
codes, social circumstances, public opinion, etc., to be a dependable guideline for medical 
practice [see 1948\ p. 656]. If the physician's ethos cannot be the outcome of a socially 
established code of behavior, it must be developed out of an understanding of individual 
existence, out of an analysis of the fundamental possibility of personal being which the 
encounter with his patient provides [see 1948a, p. 120]. The third stage, therefore, must 
be characterized by communication that "... includes the person of the fellow man in its 
logos" [Von Gebsattel 1954f, p. 375]. And this »logos«, obviously, is man's »rapport« to 
the "transcendental", that is, ultimately to God, his Creator [p. 377]. It is only in that 
perspective that human beings are "Unvertretbar" (Ger.: unique) [1954f, p. 377] yet 
fellow-men [see 1948a, p. 126] 
The Silent World of Doctor and Patient 
It has been convincingly argued by others that the history of the doctor-patient relationship 
cannot be characterized as one based on respect for another as persons of equal worth, 
equal moral perception, equal social standing. In that sense, Von Gebsattel's call for a 
personal doctor-patient relationship can hardly be viewed as an appeal to return to a long-
standing tradition. The history of the doctor-patient relationship has been one of cautious-
ly protected distance instead of existential sharing and caring; of bold self-assertion by 
physicians rather than self-critical reflection; of silence rather than communication [see, 
e.g., Katz 1984]. Von Gebsattel's views represent an ideal yet to be realized. 
But surely, much has changed over the past decades — so one might object. The 
silence has been broken, physicians now provide more information to patients than ever 
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before. Granted, patients are better informed, but why? As Katz has pointed out, as late 
as 1981, the American Medical Association (AMA) proffered the view that the patient's 
right to information was generated by forces outside the medical profession rather than 
being an essential ingredient of good clinical practice [see 1984, p. 23]. Informed consent 
is based on social policy [see American Medical Association 1981, § 8.07]. 
Katz has adamantly argued against this understanding of the patient's right to 
informed consent. But there is an element of truth in the AMA's view. The profession's 
»justification« for maintaining silence may have had more to do with the ongoing attempts 
to safeguard control and social status than with the professed concern about possible harm 
to patients (a thesis never validated scientifically). It may have had more to do with the 
physicians' own distrust of their patients (being worried that patients may start doubting 
the healing powers of physicians and refuse suggested treatments), than the professed 
importance of patient trust. But the informed consent advocates did little to counter these 
medical misconceptions about the essence of a genuine care relationship. Instead of 
underscoring the properly professed (if seldom realized) mutual trust among provider and 
patient, informed consent was justified in terms of physicians knowing little if anything 
about the personal values and interests of their patients, and, moreover, being unable to 
come to know such things. Hence, patients better distrust their physicians. 
Written contracts, informed consent forms, disclaimers, codified laws, and last but 
not least law suits, are but a few signs of the distrust ruling the patient-provider relation-
ship. While such legal documents may clarify, redefine, and create order, they do not 
truly solve problems of disagreement. On the contrary, they affirm the existence of the 
problem and in a way, sanction its existence. Why is it that friends do not ask another to 
sign a contract when one borrows the other's car'? Why is it that couples do not draft a 
contract when they marry, specifying all duties and penalties for a future failure to fulfill 
those duties? It is not merely that there is no need for a written legally binding agree-
ment; even the suggestion of a contract in such a context would be inappropriate. 
Contracts, and laws more in general, affirm distrust, provoke and generate it. Personally, 
I cannot deny that a strange feeling of distrust creeps up on me when, upon entering the 
office of an American physician or dentist, a hospital, or even the blood bank, the 
doctor's assistant welcomes me with a friendly smile while handing over a stack of forms 
which I am supposed to carefully read and sign. As Siegler comments: "[M]istrust 
encourages rules and regulations, which instead of inspiring more trust tend to result in 
mutual suspicion and recriminations between doctor and patient" [Siegler 1992, p. 68]. 
Naturally, the preceding line of argumentation is not meant as an objection against 
the patient's right to informed consent. In fact, informed consent is a necessary condition 
of a personal patient-provider relationship. But it is not a sufficient condition. And when 
it is turned into a sufficient, and hence sole condition, paradoxically it may undermine 
trust. Instead of patient empowerment, it may lead to patient abandonment. 
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In reference to Isaiah Berlin's Two Concepts of Liberty [1969], Katz [1984] has 
argued that patients do not object against provider paternalism because it restricts their 
freedom — this would be the theoretical argument of a libertarian bioethicist or lawyer. 
Patients complain about being patronized, about being taken for granted and ignored as 
individual persons. It is recognition they are seeking, recognition as persons with an 
important contribution to make to the healing of their own selves. Simply informing 
patients and leaving them alone with their decisions is a form of patient abandonment. 
Says Bosk: "The value-neutral, non-directive style [of genetic counseling practiced by 
Nightingale Hospital's genetic counselors - JW], which encouraged clients to state an 
agenda, allowed genuine issues to emerge. The emphasis on providing correct informa-
tion as the core task in genetic counseling meant that these genuine issues were simulta-
neously identified, acknowledged, and ignored" [Bosk 1993, p. 151; emphasis added -
JW\. 
In the course of this study I have argued against the thesis that human beings, and 
providers and patients alike, are black-boxes and, hence, moral strangers. I have shown 
that the opposite thesis is at least as convincing. But I have also emphasized that coming 
to understand another's personal interests and values is not that easy. It requires effort, 
commitment and self-criticism. It is much easier to simply overrule the patient and 
impose some kind of treatment; and it is much easier to simply leave it up to the patient to 
take responsibility and make the decisions. 
I remember being called into the hospital by a nurse from a pediatric ward. A 
thirteen year old boy was suffering from severe laryngeal carcinoma for which he should 
receive chemotherapy. Such treatment, however, also suppresses the bone marrow and 
ever so often a blood transfusion may be required to continue the chemotherapy. But the 
parents, and likewise the boy, were Jehovah's Witnesses and adamantly refused any and 
all transfusions. A conference was called and although the attending pediatrician had 
already made her opinion clear in advance, she did attend the meeting with the nurses, 
social worker, hospital minister, clinical psychologist and some residents and medical 
students, and myself as discussion leader. 
After one of the nurses had summarized the situation, the pediatrician contended that 
she would go ahead and make sure that the boy would receive a transfusion if his blood 
cell and platelet count had decreased to level x. This boy was too young to decide for 
himself and she felt no obligation whatsoever to respect what she considered an absurd 
religious conviction: To accept and even require all medical treatments, but refuse a blood 
transfusion. I asked what the boy's chances were but she evasively answered that the 
chemotherapy could save him. Some of the nurses silently shook their heads. I then 
asked the physician how she was going to perform the transfusion legally. The boy was 
over 12 and hence, calling in the Child Protection Agency to temporarily take over 
parental authority would not work. Although it was extremely difficult to communicate 
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with the boy (he was voiceless due to his laryngeal carcinoma, the parents were around all 
the time, and the clinical psychologist who was assigned the task to really »check him 
out«, for unclear reasons never did), this was not a typical emergency situation where, 
lacking sufficient certainty about the patient's own wishes, the Public Prosecutor could 
grant permission for an emergency transfusion. She answered that she had already called 
the prosecutor who promised he would grant permission anyway. 
As was to be expected, many of the other care providers present objected to the 
pediatrician's point of view, but they were less clear about the proper alternative. One of 
the nurses felt that she could not be required to provide less than adequate care. The 
patient (and parents) had the right to refuse the medical treatment and care offered, but 
they should not select and pick what was to their liking, and expect the staff to fix the 
resulting harm to the patient. Once a pleasant and active little boy notwithstanding his 
severe illness, now he was bedridden due to severe tiredness. A single transfusion would 
»bring him back to life« again. And yet his father was always checking to make sure that 
no speck of blood was injected back into the patient after drawing blood for diagnostic 
purposes. If the parents did not want the boy to live, let them be consistent and take him 
out of the hospital but not rum the care providers into accomplices. 
So there we have both extreme views. On the one hand the benevolent physician, 
who - I should emphasize - had made a very serious effort to talk with both patient and 
parents as well as other care providers, but remained convinced that she should overrule 
the patient's and parents' wishes, and even managed to get the Public Prosecutor to go 
along. On the other hand the nurse who acknowledged the patient's right to autonomously 
refuse any and all treatments, but was quite unwilling to share responsibility for the 
consequences. Both were about to abandon the patient and parents in their existential 
crisis. 
What saved the team, both interprofessionally and in relation to patient and parents, 
was their willingness to continue talking about it. In a period of six weeks, I attended 
three two-hour meetings. But as one of the nurses said, it was on everybody's mind all 
the time: 'There is just nothing else we talk about. It's the topic of discussion during 
every official meeting as well as every coffee break. It's driving everybody crazy'. It 
would have been so much easier to settle for either of the two extremes and get on with 
the daily routines. 
It was the willingness to keep talking and to remain involved that finally, during the 
third conference, allowed a practical break-through. It had become clear that we would 
not get the explicit consent of the parents to give a blood transfusion, but it was equally 
clear that the parents were themselves committed to saving their son. It was decided that 
the pediatrician would again meet with the parents and convey once more her plan to call 
the Public Prosecutor once she felt that a blood transfusion had become medically 
indicated. If the parents would neither protest explicitly nor take the child away, it would 
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be understood as a silent consent. The team, on the other hand, would have to accept that 
this silent acceptance would and could not imply calm cooperation. The only way for the 
parents to come to terms with this pragmatic compromise would be to underscore its 
inconsistency. No doubt, the father would continue to interfere with the daily care and 
object and protest. 
Later I heard that things happened as expected. The parents left the boy in the care 
of the team, though not without daily protests. The pediatrician let the blood cell and 
platelet levels sink far below the predicted level χ at which she had professed to call the 
Prosecutor. Finally, the chemotherapy turned out not to have the desired effect. The boy 
was transferred to another ward for radiotherapy without ever receiving a forced blood 
transfusion. 
But what happened to him afterwards, nobody from the staff had ever attempted to 
find out. While we generally avoid silence and find the most noisy of places the most 
entertaining, we cautiously guard the silence when death may be among the items voiced. 
News about disasters, murders and wars is much appreciated, as long as such things 
happen at a safe distance. Things change when we are drawn into such situations 
personally, when the child dying is the child we tried to save. Silence, then, is so much 
more comforting. 
But it is also deceptive. It allows for the flourishing of misconceptions in the minds 
of both patient and providers. A perceptive analysis of the autobiographical accounts of 
both Philip Blaiberg (the second patient to receive a heart transplant) and his surgeon, 
Christiaan Barnard, led Katz to conclude that the mutually guarded silence about airing 
important concerns resulted in Blaiberg identifying with Barnard's needs and interests, 
while the latter's own needs and wishes became "hopelessly intertwined" in Barnard's 
mind with those of Blaiberg and even those of the late Washkansky (Barnard's first heart 
transplant patient who died 18 days after the surgery) [1984, p. 140]. In Chapter 5 we 
found the philosopher Scheler argue that the problem is not first and foremost to figure 
out someone else's personal needs, interests and values, but one's own (see p. 169). 
Speaking from his own experience as both a physician and psychoanalyst, Katz warns for 
the danger of transference and countertransference [see 1984, p. 142-150]. "It is 
dangerous nonsense to assert that in the practice of their art and science physicians can 
rely on their benevolent intentions, their abilities to judge what is the right thing to do, or 
their capacities for conducting their rounds with humanity, patience, prudence and wisdom 
— all supposedly acquired through on-the-job training. It is not that easy" [Katz 1984, p. 
xxi]. What, then, is required to act benevolently as well as beneficently? 
264 CHAPTER 7 
Physicians' Assessment of Their Patients' Good. An Impossible Ideal? 
Katz admits that in his book on the Silent World of Doctor and Patient, he has not "... 
tried to specify in any detailed fashion how physicians and patients must and can 
converse with one another." He has merely attempted "... to identify the preconditions 
for informed consent and to draw attention to the consequences of its rejection" [Katz 
1984, p. 227]. I, too, have taken for granted from the onset that health care providers are 
able to act beneficently and outlined the philosophical possibility conditions of such a care 
relationship. I have argued that a case for the virtue of beneficence can be made, 
provided the »black-box« hypothesis is discarded (see p. 128). In the former two 
chapters, I have suggested an alternative understanding of human relationality which 
authors like Thomasma and Pellegrino may rather underwrite. 
But even if they were to do so, the feasibility of a beneficent patient-provider 
relationship is not guaranteed. For even if care providers are sympathically able to gain 
insight in the interests of their patients, even if they are able to share in their patient's 
reality, there remains the "decisive gap" [Toombs 1992, p. xv] between the medical and 
the patient's perspective. Physician and patient, thus Toombs argues, are living in two 
different worlds (see p. 146). There exists "a fundamental disagreement" between doctor 
and patient that concerns the nature of illness: "... [IJllness represents two quite distinct 
realities — the meaning of one being significantly and distinctively different from the 
meaning of the other" [Toombs 1992, p. xi]. We also saw Von Gebsattel arguing that it 
is only because of this medical perspective, so alien (and alienating) to that of the patient, 
that the care provider can provide effective assistance. But Von Gebsattel's thesis could 
imply that it is impossible for the care provider to unite both perspectives in a single 
treatment plan. 
In advancing a theory of sympathie intersubjectivity, we may have been able to move 
beyond the patient-provider dichotomy but, so it seems, we are still left with the dichoto-
my between the medical perspective and patient's. Patient autonomy may not have to be 
proffered as the only safeguard against provider paternalism, but there still is the danger 
of medical paternalism. But is Toombs right? Is the medical world radically different -
in the phenomenological sense of the term - from the world of the patient? 
The right to autonomy and self-determination allows the patient to behave as he 
wishes — even when that is foolish (in the eyes of all bystanders). But remarkably, the 
moral truthfulness of medical science has not seriously been challenged by the autonomy 
movement. A few examples may clarify this point. 
From a medical perspective what is important is prevention of disease, cure, relief of 
symptoms, and finally the improvement of medical science. On the basis of such a - more 
or less »objective« - standard, one could rank medical interventions on a scale ranging 
from »very beneficial« to »very harmful«, (i) Measles vaccination, for instance, has a 
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strong preventive effect, while the chances for the side-effect of measles vaccination 
(encephalitis) are relatively very small. From a medical perspective, therefore, measles 
vaccination is a very good medical intervention, (ii) The radical excision of a frontal lobe 
brain tumor gives a high chance for a 5 year survival and a relatively small chance for the 
side effect of this treatment. Hence, lobectomy is a good treatment, but clearly less good 
than measles vaccination, (iii) Though technically possible and quite effective, the 
amputation of women's healthy breasts to prevent breast cancer at a later age, generally is 
considered poor medical treatment, (iv) Finally, taking out organs for transplantation 
from a dying patient is simply unacceptable to virtually all physicians. 
But what happens to this rating when the medical perspective is exchanged for that of 
particular patients? (i) If the patient considers any kind of vaccination an interference 
with God's plan and, hence, a mortal sin, he is allowed to refuse vaccination. But his 
reasoning will not influence the conventional medical rating of measles vaccination, (ii) If 
the patient with the frontal lobe tumor is a computer-scientist or a chess player and, as a 
result of lobectomy would become unable to exercise his metier, he may take surgery to 
be a unsatisfactory option. But again, that evaluation will not change the medical rating 
of lobectomy, neither generally nor for the case of this particular patient, (iii) Though 
generally considered poor medical treatment, some women may consider dual breast 
amputation indicated because they fear cancer and feel they can do without their breast. 
But physicians will not perform the surgery, (iv) And finally, I know of a dying 17-year-
old girl who requested that her organs be extirpated while she was still alive and the 
organs in transplantable condition. For her that was the only way to give some meaning 
to the suffering she went through and her dying at such a young age. For her, it was 
good medical treatment. The surgeons refused. 
Taking patients' subjective perspectives may induce - to speak with Nietzsche - an 
»Umwertung aller Werte«. What was considered the best medical intervention suddenly 
becomes the worst, while the worst medical intervention becomes the best. Is the medical 
evaluation the right one, the only right one? Is the patient's evaluation the right one, the 
only right one? Physicians make a difference between effects and side-effects. But why 
do they call the positive effects of medical treatment simply effects, and the negative 
effects side-effects? Why not call the positive effects the side-effects. Apparently the aim 
of the physician, the intention he has when prescribing the treatment, makes the difference 
in the evaluating of some form of treatment. But in that case, the evaluation in terms of 
effect versus side-effect changes depending on the intentions of the evaluator, like the 
patient or his family. 
Granted, nowadays epidemiological experts assess quality of life issues and the 
impact of medical treatment on that quality. And fortunately, such data influence patient 
care. But they have not caused a radical revision in the basic norm of medical science: 
To prevent and heal disease in order to extend life. This norm is so deeply ingrained in 
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the enormous body of medical sciences, that quality assessment, patient rights and the 
bioethics movement have not been able to reach it and force a modification onto the 
system. So, the paradoxical case could occur that some good medical care is harmful to 
the patient. It could happen that being a good medical scientist and being a caring healer 
seem to be incompatible ideals. 
Obviously, the presumed objectivity of medicine only holds in so far there is a single 
undisputable goal: Postponing death. The medical benefit of treatment is primarily 
measured in the light of this goal. If the patient agrees (which is a precondition for any 
treatment), the physician is allowed to induce pain (burn treatment), nausea (AIDS-
medication), hair loss (radiotherapy), sleeplessness (anti-convulsant drugs), convulsions 
(electroshock therapy), and loneliness (long-term hospital care) in order to postpone death. 
On the other hand, the physician is not allowed, even if the patient agrees, to induce death 
in an attempt to reduce pain, nausea, etc. Many even consider pain mitigation that 
increases the risk of premature death to be immoral. And while few would force 
painkillers on a patient if the latter refuses to take those medications, many more 
physicians consider it their duty to force life-saving treatment on a patient, whom they 
have deemed mentally incompetent because he refuses life-saving treatment. Postponing 
death has become the single most important criterion of good medical treatment. 
Although many health care providers stress that the patients' well-being is equally 
important, the biomedical sciences as a whole remain structured around the goal of 
postponing death. 
There may be many causes for this »single-mindedness«. One reason, at any rate, is 
that the goal of postponing death is much easier to operationalize than patient well-being 
(see also p. 106, 107). The success of postponing death can be measured relatively 
easily. It may not be known exactly how much time has been gained for a particular 
patient, but sound empirical research using non-treatment comparison groups usually 
results in clear numbers. On the other hand, the effectiveness of treatment that is 
intended to increase the well-being of patients is much harder to measure. 
Postponing death may be an objective goal in that it is hardly disputed and relatively 
easy to develop into an empirical science; it nonetheless concerns a value choice. Life 
and death may be inherent in the nature of organic earthly beings; but that fact, in and by 
itself, does not constitute sufficient explanation for the development of a biomedical 
science fully based on the goal of preserving life and postponing death. It is the fact that 
we, society in general and the health care professions in particular, have chosen this goal 
as the single most important goal of the biomedical sciences. And despite all contempo-
rary emphasis on the radically pluralistic nature of modern society, the »single-minded-
ness« of medicine has not been challenged seriously. 
It may be contended that, even though a matter of choice, medicine could never have 
chosen any other value: Medicine's very essence is to protect life and postpone death. 
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Before examining this claim, it must be stressed that this statement runs the risk of turning 
into a pure analytical statement. If medicine per definition is protecting life and postpon­
ing death, if the word medicine is but a synonym for protecting life and postponing death, 
there is little more to say. But those who claim this, obviously, do not merely intend 
their claim to be a tautology. They mean that medicine as we know it, as it has historical­
ly developed over time, as it is practiced by those people who we identify as health care 
providers, ought to be a matter of protecting life and postponing death. The statement 
that medicine, indeed, has always been like this is not any longer proof of a definition but 
an a posteriori proof of an a priori claim. 
As mentioned, the alternative to a »single-minded« medical science would be 
replacing the goal of protecting life and postponing death. But any other single goal 
would again lead to disregard of individuality. On the other hand, science needs generali­
ties. Is there a third alternative where both the scientific status of medicine and the 
patients' individuality would be done justice or is this, indeed, an impossible ideal? 
Physicians' Assessment of Their Patients' Good. An Example 
In an attempt to locate such an ideal alternative, several scientific models to assess the 
patients' good have been developed of late. One such model that seems very promising at 
first sight, is so called conjoint measurement of utilities. The essence of the model can be 
summarized as follows.133 
Having grown anxious about the passiveness with which oncological patients 
accepted both their disease and the manifold medical interventions suggested to them, Van 
Daal (professor of radiotherapy) and members of his team began to invite patients to more 
actively participate in treatment choices, only to find out that patients were virtually 
unable to make choices. When faced with the alternatives of laryngectomy and radiother­
apy for their laryngeal cancer, patients had great difficulty weighing the probable gain of 
longer survival against the loss of voice, in spite of videos presenting both options, a 
counseling session with the otolaryngologist, and one with the radiotherapist. 
In conjunction with mathematical psychologists, a method was developed to assist 
patients in their choices. Patients were asked to choose some 25 times between a certain 
number of life years (adjusted to their own real probabilities) and a level of voice quality. 
For example, 2 years of survival versus hoarse voice; 5 years versus no voice, etc. The 
same series of questions would be repeated two more times in the following days. Using 
133. This model was developed by a multidisciplinary team of the Catholic University of 
Nijmegen, The Netherlands. For a more detailed discussion of the model, including its 
mathematical aspects, see for example [Stalpers е.a. 1989; Maas and Stalpers 1992]. 
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conjoint measurement, a ranking could be made in the patient's preferences, suggesting 
either surgery or radiotherapy, which would be presented to the patient. The final choice, 
naturally, would be left to the patient. 
The advantages of the method seem obvious. It combines the »authentic« volitions of 
the patient with scientific medical data into an objective calculus of utilities. But what 
really was entered into the equation? In terms of the patient's interests only his voice; 
moreover, only a limited (3 or 5) number of voice levels. But can man's ability to speak 
adequately be interpreted in such quantitative terms? The patient's expected survival is 
the second factor in the equation, and it is automatically entered as a number. But again, 
is life, when weighed against other values, ever thought of in quantitative terms? 
An elucidative example to the contrary is the researchers' finding that patients 
generally tend to be much less willing to sacrifice the first couple of years to voice quality 
than later years (without there being any suggestion that the later years would be medical-
ly more compromised). This finding defies the logic of the method, but it is not at all 
irrational. It has been argued by many philosophers that life, like health, is itself not a 
final goal but derives its value from being a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for 
such final goals as happiness. But happiness, the sense of completion, is - as we have 
seen the existentialists arguing - highly dependent on man's own shaping life, projecting 
ahead, determining the future. Naturally, the further ahead in time, the vaguer the 
determined plans, the less valuable the years seem. 
What happens, then, in conjoint measurement and similar presumably »scientific« 
methods of assessing patient utilities, is a reduction - if not corruption - of the patient's 
perspective to the medical perspective. The patients' difficulty in choosing between 
laryngectomy and radiotherapy is not one of mathematical difficulty in calculating burdens 
and benefits, but one of having to opt for one of various kinds of life in the face of a 
depressing facticity. Instead of addressing the core of the problem, the method moves 
around it. 
The finding that patients are pleased with the tests and feel more certain in their 
choice does not undo the fact that this method, presuming to discover the »real« wishes of 
the patient, simply covers up the problem.134 In spite of the laudable intentions of the 
developers to the contrary, psychometric measurement of existential choices is but an 
extremely sophisticated form of medical paternalism. That patients not only accept such 
134. Let alone, that it has not been examined whether the increased ease in making a choice 
may have been caused (in part) by the fact that the patient was simply required to deal 
with the problem over a longer period of time (three tests were taken) and in a systematic 
manner. The question remains what would have happened if patients, in addition to the 
two meetings that they had with the otolaryngologist and the radiotherapist, would not be 
tested but have the three extra meetings with a care provider anyway, going over the 
(dis)advantages more or less systematically. 
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measurements but are pleased with them, only shows that provider paternalism is not 
necessarily disliked by patients. It may, in fact, be an instance of what Katz called 
countertransference, the unconscious transference of providers' beliefs onto patients. 
Separating Competencies 
If conjoint measurement of utilities does not provide the third alternative by which both 
the scientific status of medicine and the patients' individuality are done justice, our 
discussion of this method does provide a hint as to where the real alternative to medical 
paternalism and radical patient autonomy must be found: In a proper separation of 
competencies: (1) the goals are to be decided from the patient's perspective (without first 
being reduced to scientifically processable quantities); (2) the readability of such goals, 
however, is to be assessed with medical scientific methods. The medical interventions 
which are to effectuate the desired goals tend to also have other, so-called it'de-effects. 
Whether the benefits of the effect(s) of the treatment in the light of the desired goals 
outweigh the burdensomeness of the side-effects is again up to the patient to decide. The 
decision-making process, then, is not one of negotiation between physician and patient, 
but of mediation between the patient's goals and the means medicine can offer to that 
effect. 
For example, the statistics about the effectiveness of resuscitation attempts have been 
examined in a host of studies. For a hospital population, the average chance of a lasting 
return of cardio-pulmonary functions is approximately 38%. But if the goal of resuscita-
tion is taken to be life discharge from the hospital, the chances drop to 14% [see Van 
Delden 1993]. What is the proper goal of resuscitation cannot be decided in reference to 
medical parameters only. Whether a resuscitation attempt is good medical practice, 
depends to a large extent on the meaningfulness of such an attempt, given both the 
statistical effectiveness percentage and the patient's own frame of moral significance. It is 
very well possible that a particular patient (like medicine more in general) assigns great 
value to life and thus considers an effectiveness rate of 38% sufficient for a resuscitation 
attempt to be meaningful. Another patient may be less attached to life as such, but would 
like to gain a few more days to see his brother one more time, and thus agrees even to an 
effectiveness rate of less than 38%. A third patient definitely does not want to end up in 
a coma and therefore turns down resuscitation although he has more than a 38% chance to 
survive an attempt. 
It should be emphasized again that the point is not one of separating tasks and 
persons, of empowering the physician with the right to decide about effectiveness issues 
and the patient with the right to decide about the meaningfulness of treatments. It is a 
matter of distinguishing between perspectives, between the scientific medical-professional 
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perspective (that enables the kind of effective help that the layman is unable to provide) 
and the perspective that one attains when taking the patient's stance. Many a patient 
nowadays comes into the physician's office with a considerable amount of medical 
knowledge, and those suffering from chronic diseases over time may acquire more 
scientific insight in their particular disease than their care providers. Conversely, health 
care providers can leam to view diseases and disorders from a patient perspective. 
Contemporary medical literature, fortunately, has been enriched with an increasing 
number of narratives about physicians' attempts to understand their patients' way of 
coming to terms with disease and handicaps. 
But even the most scientific, skillful, learned, wise, engaged and sympathie care 
provider will come to face two limits that frustrate the delineation of a synthetic - in Von 
Gebsattel's sense of the term - treatment plan for his patient. (1) All of his medical 
scientific knowledge is based on generalities and can never be tailored to the individual 
patient without sacrificing in part either scientific justification or patient individuality. 
(2) And all of his humanistic insights and intersubjective sympathy notwithstanding, his 
patient's personal needs, interests, and values can never be completely assessed. "[T|he 
person qua person cannot function as content of our judgment" [O'Malley 1966, p. 98] 
In the remainder of this chapter both aporias will be addressed consecutively. 
Professional Health Care as an Art 
The answer that is traditionally given to the first aporia - how can medical care be 
scientifically warranted yet tailored to the individual patient's personal and at times unique 
benefits - is the claim that medicine is both a science and an art (see also p. 44). The 
physician - and any care provider more generally - is a scientist in as much as he can 
»surpass« his own, biased view and adopt a neutral, reduplicable, »blind« perspective on 
the world, while at the same time reducing the patient to general nosological and 
therapeutical categories. But he is an artist in as much as he is able to grasp the unique-
ness of his patient's needs and interests - at least in health care matters -, which in turn 
requires that he cultivates his own personal and colored view on the world. 
However, if medicine is (in part) an art - and I would agree that it is -, the moral 
quality of the care to be provided to a large extent will rely on the personal »virtuousness« 
of the care provider. That is to say, the notion of person-bound »virtue« rather than 
person-neutral principles, rules, duties or rights becomes a key notion in clinical ethics. 
Obviously, the point is not that health care providers should be committed to altruistically 
devote their knowledge and skills to their patients' well-being. Even in an ethical system 
built from more tangible elements such as rights, rules and principles, the morality of the 
actual care provided will depend on the care providers' willingness to abide by such 
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rights, rules and principles. The point is, rather, that if medicine is an art, the moral 
quality of the care provided relies not only on the personal intentions of the care providers 
but also on their personal moral insights. 
In agreeing to the view that clinical medicine in its moral aspect is an art rather than 
a science, I am also answering in part the question raised towards the end of the third 
chapter. There we wondered whether the kind of practical wisdom required for the 
process of clinical ethics to take place is the prerogative of physicians (and health care 
providers more in general). If providing effective medical treatment and care requires the 
ability to carefully assess the patient's health care needs against the background of medical 
technical possibilities, as well as the ability in this process to balance the patient's 
individuality and the general categories of the biomedical sciences, both of which abilities 
surpass the level of sympathie immediacy that is at the basis of the patient-provider 
relationship but, as such, is really pre-medical in nature, the kind of practical wisdom that 
is required for the process of clinical ethics is indeed the prerogative of physicians and 
health care providers more in general. 
This answer, however, also brings back the single most important objection raised in 
Chapter 3 against such a professional prerogative, that is, subjective relativism. If in the 
structure of clinical ethical discourse professional virtuousness plays a crucial role, isn't 
the very cogency that characterizes such discourse as ethical discourse at stake? 
I could start addressing this problem by pointing out that the alternative, that is, a 
more scientific ethical structure, would soon turn out to be less unbiased, less »objective« 
than may seem at first sight. As was already pointed out in Chapter 4, the modern 
authority of the scientific perspective to a large extent is due to a wide-spread »conver-
sion« to the scientific stance (see p. 108). Says Kuhn, "... the parties to ... debates [on 
the superiority of one scientific theory to another - JW] inevitably see differently certain 
of the experimental or observational situations to which both have recourse. Since the 
vocabularies in which they discuss such situations consist, however, predominantly of the 
same terms, they must be attaching some of those terms to nature differently, and their 
communication is inevitably only partial. As a result, the superiority of one theory to 
another is something that cannot be proved in the debate. Instead, ... each party must try, 
by persuasion, to convert the other" [Kuhn 1970, p. 198]. 
But such an indirect defense of virtue ethics cannot suffice. We need to demonstrate 
not only that virtue ethics is no less objective than the scientific perspective, but that, in 
fact, virtue ethics sufficiently objective to qualify as a cogent ethical discourse. Two such 
positive defenses come to mind, both of which concern the possibility of holding the actor 
responsible for his actions — after all, the primary danger of subjectivism is the ensuing 
immunity of the actor. In order to be held responsible for one's deeds, at least two 
conditions must be fulfilled: (i) The actor must have been able to act morally; that is, 
»artistic« medical practice must be teachable and learnable; and (ii) the structure of his 
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action (see p. 18) can become an object of a critical question-and-response debate between 
judge(s) and actor. 
Teaching Medical Virtues through Conductive Deliberation 
If being a virtuous health care provider presupposes a kind of practical wisdom that is not 
shared by all human beings but the prerogative of physicians, there must be a way to 
obtain such wisdom. Now, »artistic« knowledge and skills undoubtedly are not and cannot 
be obtained along similar lines as their scientific counterparts. But evidently, they can be 
learned and even taught to some extent. Granted, the greatest artists tend to be the most 
gifted; education merely fosters such pregiven talents. But again, that is true of the 
grandmasters of science as well. Presumably, the best clinicians likewise will be those 
who come to the world of medicine with a pregiven talent for clinical analysis and 
practical ethical discernment. But most physicians simply become good physicians via 
education and training. 
It is often claimed - most recently by Pellegrino and Thomasma in their 1994 study 
on The Virtues in Medical Practice [p. 179J - that virtues are best taught by example. 
While there is little doubt that exemplary senior care providers influence the behavior 
and - in the long run - the disposition of the newcomers in the field, I would maintain that 
such having an impact does not always qualify as teaching. The oncologist who cares 
more about his world-wide research study than about the well-being of his research 
subjects may cause his medical students to turn away from the area of experimental 
medicine or even oncology. But one can hardly say the oncologist taught his students a 
lesson. The same is true of the reverse example where a senior surgeon stimulates his 
interns by taking great care to communicate with each and all of his patients on a personal 
basis. 
It is only when such exemplary behavior becomes intentional and methodological, 
that is, aimed at showing the student the road towards (Gr.: met-hodos) virtuousness, that 
it qualifies as teaching. Bernstein may have inspired many a music student and instilled a 
desire to follow the master, but it is only the few lucky students who got a chance to 
participate in his classes who really learned from him and became better or even virtuoso 
musicians as a result. It is possible to be taught by and learn from the greatest artists, but 
it will never be easy. That is to say, both teacher and student have to be committed to the 
exchange of such practical wisdom. And what is true of the musical arts is all the more 
true of ethics. As Katz has warned us, coming to understand patients as persons, "... 
requires as committed and as rigorous a study" as learning the scientific basis of medicine 
[Katz 1984, p. xxi]. Difficult, yet possible. 
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But how exactly? In the second chapter, I concluded that the structure of clinical 
ethical discourse is characterized by contents (which is typical of any arts) rather than 
formality (from which the sciences derive their objectivity). How, then, is such moral 
content communicated in a cogent manner? The answer suggested in the second chapter is 
via conductive arguing. We are now in a position to further elaborate on the nature of 
such conduction. 
We already saw Wellman, from whom we borrowed the term »conduction«, define it 
as a process of reasoning in which (1) a conclusion about some individual case (2) is 
drawn nonconclusively (3) from one or more premises about the case (4) without any 
appeal to other cases. If we grant that the second element is characteristic for any kind of 
artistic approach, while the third is shared by most (if not all) attempts to address moral 
issues in an argumentative manner, we are left with the first and the fourth elements of 
Wellman's definition. The first element of this definition illustrates the relevance of 
conduction for clinical ethics, but it is also the one where problems start. For how is it 
possible to phrase a truthful proposition about what is utterly individual? Moreover, how 
is it possible to make any statement about another human being's individuality? The 
fourth element exacerbates these problems even further. How can it be that a contentful 
argument is a priori; that is to say, past experience with various similar cases or even a 
single analogous case is not required? 
This study can be summarized as an extended attempt to show that, in effect, a case 
can be made for contentful yet cogent discourse about individual patients' well-being. The 
critical phase in such discourse is the moment of conversion. Conversion based in 
intersubjective sympathy and the heteronomy of the other, which in mrn are based in an 
anthropology characterized by the notion of care, warrants contentful yet cogent discourse. 
Conduction, then, starts with a care provider being converted by the needs (and 
interests) of his patient in her diseased, disordered, or handicapped situation. This 
original conversion is characterized by relatively much insight in the patient's unique 
predicament and relatively little generalizable (i.e., scientifically relevant) knowledge. To 
provide effective care, this balance has to be redressed by disregarding in part the former 
while expanding the latter kind of knowledge. Irrespective the kind of treatment or care 
to be effected, its moral quality will hinge on a balanced synthesis between unique content 
and generalizable form. 
This is in fact what a good piece of art does. The novelist or dramatist may take the 
greatest care to depict their main characters as unique individuals that lead a very personal 
life, unlike the lives of the readership or theater audience. And yet that very uncommon 
portrayal at the same time is transcended (rather than abstracted or reduced) into a more 
universal horizon of significance, thus teaching all readers and auditors a meaningful 
lesson. 
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Now I would contend that the structure of good (in the aesthetic sense) pieces of art, 
and likewise the structure of good (in the moral sense) clinical medical judgments, is 
analogous to conductive arguments. Conductive arguments surpass the merely individual 
constants, without discarding the predicate constants (as mathematical arguments do). 
Although a claim is made relying on an individual case only, the method leading up to the 
conclusion about that case qualifies as a genuine argument, because the claim transcends 
the purely contingent peculiarities of the case into a level of intersubjective validity. 
It is only via a process of conductive deliberation that the clinician can reach a 
scientifically valid diagnosis and prognosis as well as a beneficent treatment plan. It is 
only on the basis of that same process of conduction that a clinician will be able to 
restructure his amalgam of sympathically gained insights and scientific ideas into a 
discourse that he can communicate back to the patient, in an attempt to convert the latter 
into accepting the proposed treatment plan. And it is via the same conductive process of 
explication that an experienced clinician can methodically teach and convert those new in 
the field. Conduction is the heart of that famous clinical experience and wisdom gained 
only by engaging in practice, that is lauded by many but explained by few. 
Critical Evaluation through Conductive Deliberation 
This also brings us to the second condition for a nonsubjectivist clinical ethics, that is, the 
possibility of critical evaluation of the care providers' actions. As was already concluded 
in the second chapter, the peculiar structure of the clinical-ethical debate precludes a 
validation via formal, person-neutral logic (for that would imply that the insights provided 
by moral discernment in the end are reducible to general, theoretical knowledge). How, 
then, are third persons to assess the clinical-ethical practice of health care providers? 
In the previous paragraphs, I have argued that conduction enables sufficient 
explication of insights originally based on intersubjective (that is, between patient and 
provider) sympathie conversions to warrant the possibility of education in the area of good 
clinical analysis. However, such explicative conduction notwithstanding, a disparity will 
remain between the original, patient-based conversion of the teaching physician, and the 
conversion of a third person such as a medical student, which conversion is based on the 
conductive account by the teaching clinician about the patient. This disparity constitutes 
an unsurpassable limit to any methodic teaching in the art of clinical thinking. 
In the context of education, that limit is not (or does not need to be) problematic, 
because the creative abilities of any human being and the student's own experience of 
practical life will in time sufficiently complement what methodic teaching could not 
deliver. But what about the critical evaluation of the (senior) practitioner? The same 
disparity seems to immunize the professional care provider from legal accountability in 
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that he can always claim that his primary insights resulting from the original patient-based 
conversion can never be adequately communicated to third persons, such as his evaluating 
judges. 
Although there is some truth in the claim that the professional practice of clinical 
medicine cannot be evaluated by non-professionals in full -1 have confirmed earlier in this 
chapter that the wisdom required for the process of moral health care is, indeed, the 
prerogative of health care providers - this professional prerogative is not grounded in and 
justified by the original patient-based conversion, but in and by the consequent merging of 
these primary sympathie insights and the categories of biomedical science. The delicate 
balancing that is required for this merger to remain moral (that is, effective yet always in 
the best interest of the individual patient) involves the kind of clinical wisdom that 
characterizes the professional care provider. 
The same conclusion was already reached in the third chapter when discussing the 
legal notion of the medical exception (see p. 78). The law acknowledges the need for 
professional discernment in clinical medicine. It cannot evaluate in full whether in a 
particular individual case effective (i.e., life-extending) medical treatment is nonetheless 
maleficent to the individual patient. It cannot nor needs to specify which medical 
invasions in the bodily integrity of patients are and which aren't in the interests of 
patients. Once the domain of medical (as opposed to, e.g., social, psychological, pastoral 
etc.) care has been determined, society can and should only judge professionals via a 
disciplinary legal system, that is, in reference to formal legal norms but substantial 
professional norms. But the determination of the medical domain itself obviously falls 
outside the professional prerogative, for if it did not, medical professionals would indeed 
be completely immune to any societal criticism. 
Does this imply that a physician cannot appeal to the original patient-based conver-
sion as a justification for his actions? Not necessarily, but he cannot formulate this appeal 
in terms of his professional prerogative. Any human being facing this needy fellow-man 
may be converted to the belief that something must be done to counter those needs (even 
when such undertakings require violating the law). The war veteran, having faced the 
tremendous suffering that is done to war victims, may be converted to the belief that 
violence is never justified and in turn refuse any and all military service. Green-Peace 
activists may be so abhorred by the butchering of young seals that they feel obligated to 
hinder the hunters by blocking the free traffic of their vessels. A mother may be so 
disturbed by the foresight of her terminally ill daughter going through many more weeks 
of intensive medical care that she decides to turn off the ventilator herself. 
In most of such instances, the law (i.e., society) will not accept an appeal to 
conscience. Much will depend from the probable strength of such a conversion of 
conscience, which in turn will depend on the intersubjective closeness between the convert 
and the source of that conversion. An eighteen year old youngster who never in his life 
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has faced the horrors of war, yet refuses military services; the yuppy who used to wear 
seal fur coats but now feels the sudden need to be more engaged in the environment; the 
on-call resident who, virtually at the spur of the moment, agrees to euthanize Debbie; all 
stand considerably less of a chance to find their appeal to conscience accepted by society 
than the people listed in the former paragraph. Unless, of course, the injustice protested 
against is so flagrant that even those not directly confronted with it, including the judges, 
come to realize its immorality — as in the case of slavery and apartheid. 
The previous arguments lead to the conclusion that the more medical care is tailored 
to the patients' individual needs and interests, the less it can be evaluated by non-profes-
sionals (or by professionals who do not have a personal care relationship with these 
patients). Who, then, can guard against professional health care becoming all too 
paternalistic? The answer is quite simple, yet forgotten all too often: The patients 
themselves. Although the world of the patient is not closed off for health care providers, 
although sympathie conversions enable care providers to share in that world, in order to 
develop an effective treatment plan care providers have to alienate themselves again from 
their patients. Notwithstanding cautious balancing between the patients personal interests 
and available scientific and technological means, alienation will occur. It is only by an 
explicit attempt to maintain the care relationship originally established on the basis of 
primary intersubjective sympathy, that medical care will attain the status of »personal 
care«. 
Von Gebsattel therefore emphasized that the third stage in the physician-patient 
relationship must be characterized by communication. And for the same reason, there has 
been an increased emphasis on the importance of informing patients and the need to obtain 
informed consent. Unfortunately, it is rarely pointed out that »consent« literally means 
»thinking, feeling together«. Informed consent - and even more so, mutually informed 
consent -, then, is but an explication of sympathy, the sentiment that is immediately 
shared by human beings135. Interpreted in this manner, informed consent is not the 
single most important practical translation of patient autonomy, but a necessary ingredient 
of any beneficent care relationship. 
The Problem of Benevolent Maleficence 
The conclusion that informed consent need not be interpreted as a defensive bioethical 
precept (i.e., as the patient's protection against provider paternalism), does not imply that 
there is no need for such a defensive precept. As pointed out earlier (see p. 270, 277), 
135. The reader is reminded that Smith may have explicitly chosen the term »sentiment« for 
the kind of feeling/thinking that goes on in sympathy (see p. 157). 
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even the well-intentioned, altruistic, sympathie care provider will run up against two 
serious quandaries, which in effect are insolvable. I have shown that the first aporia, that 
is, the gap between patient individuality and scientific biomedical knowledge and 
technology can be bridged (not closed) by (re)structuring health care as an art. Even so, 
the imperative to strive towards informed consent remains. 
Viewing medicine as an art, however, does not solve the second, more fundamental 
aporia: In spite of all humanistic insights and intersubjective sympathy, the patient's 
personal needs, interests, and values can never be completely assessed. As mentioned, the 
person qua person cannot function as content of our judgment (see p. 270). Both 
libertarian and personalist anthropologies take the view that there is a private nucleus to 
man which cannot become an object of intersubjective knowledge and should be respected 
as such. But such respect is not easy to achieve for the simple reason that the object of 
the respect is unknown. Even the well-intentioned, benevolent and cautious health care 
provider may end up taking too paternalistic a stance, which, when implemented in 
practice, would lead to a violation of the patient's privacy. The problem of genuine 
benevolence turning out not to be beneficent will be the topic of the remainder of this 
chapter. 
As I have argued in Chapter 4 (see p. 138), the question what is to be done should 
not precede the question what is the moral course of action. The essence of clinical ethics 
as a philosophical discipline cannot be to provide ready answers to the manifold moral 
questions emerging in the course of everyday health care practice. The discipline of 
clinical ethics should not attempt - nor be expected - to outline what moral views may be 
imposed on whom, by whom, and in what circumstances, but outline how physician and 
patient can discover what is beneficial in the case at hand. At most, clinical ethics can 
provide guidance by addressing the context in which such questions arise, the larger 
horizon of meaning that will function as a point of reference to those facing the dilemma 
and the need to decide. 
Obviously, that is not to say, that such practical problems are beyond morality. The 
starting point of this study has been the very assumption that patients and care providers 
are able to adequately address the practical moral problems they face in the process of 
medicine and care. The answer to the problems, however, has to be given by them, and 
they bear the responsibility for their ensuing actions. Any attempt to delegate that 
responsibility to bystanders sooner or later will undermine the trust that is essential to a 
genuine care relationship. 
The human capacity to intersubjective sympathy, the philosophical-ethical method of 
phenomenological-hermeneutical evaluation of the situation, and a cautious professional 
balancing of patient interests and biomedical science and technology, should enable a 
joined search for a course of action that addresses the needs of the patient while respecting 
the interests of care providers and other people involved — all, of course, barring such 
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unfavorable circumstances as lack of time, language problems, quarrels among the team 
members or the patient's family, etc. But even under favorable circumstances it may 
happen that the will to do good cannot be translated into good actions. A patient refusing 
life-saving treatment may be doing so for reasons so personal in nature, so much linked to 
his most private selfhood, that care providers will simply be unable to get a sufficient 
grasp of the patient's reasons. Conversely, the care provider may be convinced that those 
reasons, whatever the patient's private »logos« may be, nonetheless are harmful to the 
patient. Earlier in this chapter (see p. 261), I gave the example of the pediatrician who, 
upon talking with both patient and parents as well as other care providers, remained 
convinced that she should overrule the patient's and parents' refusal of blood transfusions 
and, if necessary, use legal force to implement such a transfusion. 
Fortunately, in the case cited, the deadlock situation could be surpassed by continued 
interaction with all persons involved in the care. But things could have taken a different 
course, for instance, if patient and parents had been more adamant in their refusal and if a 
transfusion had become unavoidable. Then, and only then, the question no longer reads: 
'What is the right course of action', but: 'Who has the right to decide'. At this moment, 
however, we also leave the field of clinical ethics proper to enter that of health law. It 
goes almost without saying that the law will be equally unable to genuinely »solve« the 
impasse that has arisen; but it may be able to "settle" the conflict and, hopefully, thereby 
reconcile parties [Van Tongeren 1991, p.33] and maintain the kind of peace advocated by 
Engelhardt (see p. 98). 
Compassionate Provider Beneficence versus Legalized Patient Abandonment? 
The conclusion to the previous subsection suggests a clear mark of distinction between 
ethics and law. Ethics concerns itself with moral dilemmas and uncovers methods for 
assisting patients and care providers in their attempts to locate the right course of action. 
However, since many health care situations require prompt action, the law has to come to 
assistance when ethics and/or those involved in the case fail to promptly reach sufficient 
insight in the right course of action. 
Unfortunately, things are not that simple. There are too many parallels between 
ethics and the law. To mention just two: As I argued earlier (see p. 17, 250), ethics in 
general, and even more so, clinical ethics, in the end is always aimed at (re)directing 
actual life. On the other hand, any legal decision-making strategy, even if reduced to 
flipping coins, implies an evaluative judgment. These parallels between bioethics and 
health law no doubt have contributed their share to the rise of procedural bioethics. 
This, in and by itself, justifies a closer examination of the (dis)similarities between both 
disciplines. But there is a second pressing reason to compare them. 
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From the outset, this study has assumed with intentional naivety that there is 
something like a patient-care provider relationship. At times, I have expanded that 
relationship to include family on the one hand and the care team on the other. But even 
in those instances, it was presumed that there are basically two parties engaged in this 
relationship. By artificially isolating this relationship from the larger social context and 
disregarding the interrelationships between this two-party relationship and »external« 
parties, I was able to concentrate on the »internal« aspects of the patient-provider 
relationship. In doing so, I was also able to gain more insight in the moral aspects of that 
relationship and on that basis, advance the development of a foundation of clinical ethics. 
But that reduction was artificial and the question simply had to resurface to what extent 
patient and provider are directed, even restrained in their interactions by the »external« 
environment in which they necessarily have to operate. Stated bluntly: What if patient 
and care provider manage to uncover what they consider the right course of action, but 
the outside world objects? 
In line with the first few paragraphs of this subsection, the obvious answer would be: 
Leave it up to the law. It is a matter of conflict and when it cannot be resolved by a 
multi-party ethical exploration of the situation, a settlement is in order; and that is food 
for lawyers. But again, the many corollaries between ethics and law preclude such a 
simple answer. Moreover, in the situation sketched, it is not so much that patient and 
provider are unable to agree on the morally right course of action in the given situation; 
rather, the situation has so much expanded that it has become impossible to gain sufficient 
an overview of the situation to even start uncovering the right course of action. 
Given the likelihood of every clinical situation expanding when approached from a 
nonreductionist perspective that encompasses the larger social context, one could of course 
also give exactly the opposite answer to the question raised. That is, one could simply 
consider the clinical situation to be the patient and provider's turf only, notwithstanding 
the reality of a larger social context. Such an artificial reduction may not be optimal, but 
if we are to choose between taking serious the extreme complexity of social-clinical 
situations on the one hand, that is, granting their incomprehensibility and, consequently, 
accepting a purely procedural approach; and, on the other hand, addressing as much as 
possible the social context without, however, losing sight of the primacy of the patient-
provider relationship such that a wanting but substantial answer can be given and acted 
upon, the latter alternative seems to be preferable. After all, the very reason to embark 
on this study was the spreading sense of dissatisfaction among those engaged in health 
care with a procedural approach to moral questions. Even Engelhardt had to admit that 
there is a price to be paid for living in a society that lacks encompassing moral perspec-
tives: A body of bureaucratic rules and regulations [see Engelhardt 1986, p. 24] 
Now, if society, that is, all providers, patients, and potential patients alike, is better 
off relying in principle on the smaller units of patient-provider relationships as opposed to 
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encompassing care structures and systems; if the price of bureaucracy is too high and the 
peace it buys too negative; and if such noninterference and nondiscrimination may in the 
end do patients - and providers alike - more harm than good; why at all invite third 
persons (notably lawyers) into the patient-provider relationship? Even in those instances 
when patient and provider are unable to find one another in an agreeable course of action, 
when situational interpretations remain questioned in that convincing arguments are 
lacking, why rely on the law and its negative principles of noninterference and nondis-
crimination to »settle« the disagreement? If - as I have tried to argue - the sympathie 
rapport between care provider and patient enables the former to gain insight in the 
interests and values of the latter, and if, on that basis, a physician can be benevolent to his 
patient, it seems logical to accept - at least on principle - some form of paternalistic 
beneficence as well. Is such compassionate beneficence that fosters the patient's best 
interests not to be preferred over legalized patient abandonment? 
The question is phrased with rhetorical excess. But given the pervasiveness of 
libertarian thought in western societies since the Enlightment, we seem to have great 
difficulty thinking in terms other than libertarian non-interference or violent oppression. 
There can be little doubt that the libertarian negative principles of individual autonomy, 
noninterference, and nondiscrimination have been of great benefit to societies all over the 
world as a shield against much violent oppression. But we have paid a price as well: 
Fragmentation, brokenness, loneliness, abandonment. 
As mentioned in the fourth chapter (see p. 138), one should not lose sight of the fact 
that the notion of a right to respect for personal autonomy as it functions in contemporary 
bioethics, is first and foremost a political concept. Before inviting legal principles and the 
ensuing system of procedural regulations into the traditional »sanctity« of the patient-
provider relationship, we should at least think twice. 
On the other hand, playing clinical ethics and health law off against each other, 
obviously, would not be a wise strategy in the light of the unstable condition in which the 
patient-provider relationship finds itself nowadays. In an attempt to save the best of both, 
while answering some of the urging practical questions raised, in the last sections of this 
chapter I will examine some of the general differences between a legal and an ethical 
approach to clinical dilemmas, focussing, next, on two particular issues: First, the issue of 
compulsory treatment of patients, and secondly the physician's duty to inform and refer. 
Finally, I will evaluate the significance of these (dis)similarities in the light of the clinical 
problem discussed in the fourth chapter, the case of Mr. Jones. 
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Ethics versus Law 
The reflections advanced in the former subsection have already made clear that it is not 
easy to provide a sharp distinction between ethics and law. Any single distinguishing 
criterion probably can be questioned, but one trait seems to stand out: Whereas the ethical 
approach would be a »positive« one, the legal is a »negative«. Hereby, positive does not 
mean good, and negative bad. Rather, it refers to their »charge« (in the electrical sense of 
the term1'"'). A few examples may clarify this thought. As we have already argued, a 
theory of ethics cannot be founded on negative contrast experiences only but requires 
positive ideals, values to strive for (see p. 175); on the other hand, the law takes its 
starting point in conflicts. To provide direction, an ethical theory cannot limit itself to a 
description of what is not in accordance with the good life; it must set out to suggest a 
positive account of the good life. Legal codes, on the other hand, are repressive: They 
list what is forbidden, rather than the optimal course of action (generally, it is consider-
ably easier to clearly specify in a decisive way what is not in accordance with the ideal 
than what is in accordance). Rather than attracting people into acting virtuously by 
convincing them that a virtuous life is indeed a good life, the strategy of the law is to 
keep people from committing the undesired deeds by threatening them with punishment. 
Hence, the law employs aversive means to reach its goal. 
This »negative« character of the law is also reflected by the anthropology it assumes. 
Whereas ethics, and notably clinical ethics, is founded on the insight that the human being 
is essentially social and human relationships are cemented together by mutual trust, the 
law adopts the view that, notwithstanding intersubjective sympathy, the behavior of men is 
never completely predictable and may at times turn out to be a hindrance to one's personal 
welfare. That is not to say that from a legal perspective, human beings are all enemies to 
another. Rather, from a legal perspective what matters is not what my fellow-man may 
be willing to do for me, but what he willingly or unwillingly might do against me (which 
also explains the primary interest of the law for consequences as opposed to intentions). 
Hence, it is wise to always distrust prior to trusting. 
In this perspective, then, all human interactions are suspect and potentially coercive. 
Not only physically forcing a caesarian section onto a pregnant woman counts as coercion; 
encouraging the continuation of a pregnancy, recommending radiation over surgery, 
advising to forego amniocentesis, suggesting, proposing, even mentioning a certain course 
of action may be viewed as a violation of the patient's autonomy, since any word of a 
health care provider carries his role-related authority. In fact, the mere presence of a 
136. Obviously, the analogy is rather weak, because there is no real qualitative difference 
between a positive and a negative charge. It is not the case that positively charged objects 
attract while negatively charged objects repel. 
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fellow human being can be seen as a limitation of one's freedom, since such presence 
implies that there now is somebody else who knows about me. Sartre has argued that 
shame is the fundamental attitude through which the existence of the other is revealed to 
me [Sartre 1943, p. 275-276]. 
Whether it is the most fundamental attitude I dare to doubt, but shame is the most 
apparent example of the impact of the mere presence of a fellow human being on an 
individual's sense of freedom. I may sense condemnation, hilarity, disgust, or for that 
matter, genuine admiration and praise of my fellow men towards me; in all cases I may 
end up feeling kind of uncomfortable, too much in the picture, warm and blushing, and I 
might wish I were alone. 
Though anxious about possible benevolent maleficence, nobody would want his 
fellow-men never to relate to him. Nobody opts to be the single inhabitant of the world. 
Yet the privacy that is essential to every human being frustrates social accountability, 
which is a necessary precondition of a moral world. The answer to this serious problem 
is provided by the law. Law, I would define, is a system of guidelines for action which 
sets a supposedly non-individual standard of the good, thereby making each individual 
accountable and the actions of one's fellow human beings predictable. 
But this predictability is realized in a very »negative« manner and, therefore, justified 
only if it is as minimal as possible. The law, then, ought to be standing by, awaiting 
conflicts, verifying before intervening. In sum, the law must maintain restraint. More 
importantly, since the very purpose of law is to regulate social situations where people 
(may) ¿«agree about the moral status of certain practices, the contents of each individual 
law cannot be established through substantial reasoning (alone). Hence, the final 
justification of a particular law, in so far as its contents are concerned, must be formal. 
In the course of history, various such formal systems have been suggested (and imple-
mented), ranging from trials by ordeal to highly complicated democratic legislative 
procedures. It should be emphasized, however, that the obliging authority of each and 
every law cannot be grounded in the same formal procedure.137 
137. This distinction is denied by the theory of »legal positivism«, in that it assumes that both 
contents and authority are »set« (Lat.: positus) by some formal decision making proce-
dure. But for a legal positivist it will remain unclear why at all people would (1) 
establish laws and (2) acknowledge their authority. If one were to answer the first 
question by claiming that people cannot trust one another and, in order to prevent a war 
of all against all, binding rules for »the game of life« have to be established, then the 
second question cannot be answered. For if distrust is the foundation of laws, how can 
one trust that those who make the laws, who judge and enforce, will not abuse their 
power; how can one be sure that the letter of the law will indeed be adhered to? Because 
all participants in this social contract promised to abide by these common laws? But why 
should one trust that everybody will keep his promise? Because all participants previous-
(continued...) 
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Yet all hinges on the authority of the law if it is to effectively settle conflicts by 
establishing beyond contention what moral views may be imposed on whom, by whom, 
and m what circumstances Restraint must be balanced with authoritative decisiveness 
Ethical speculations can afford to remain tentative Ideals typically provide direction but 
may be unattainable The law, on the other hand, cannot be hesitant and must make 
clear-cut and commanding decisions Ethical theories flourish when being questioned and 
criticized, because the ideal not only is hard to attain m practice, it is equally difficult to 
come to understand Wonder and doubt nurture better understanding of the good life, and 
as such, are necessary ingredients of the ethical perspective On the other hand, issuing 
laws that are bound not to be obeyed, not only will fail to yield the desired results, such 
laws will also undermine the general authority of the law 
Furthermore, to be able to settle contentions, legal rules must directly and with 
certainty be applicable to real life situations And they must be enforceable to guarantee 
impact Consequently, legislators cannot be satisfied with the kind of descriptive, 
hermeneutic analyses outlined in the fifth chapter of this study, that try to communicate 
certain insights about the good in an attempt to convert those who are willing to listen 
Legislators simply must decide on and set a standard of the good, even if such a standard 
does not (and principally cannot be expected to, given the uniqueness of each individual 
being) meet with general consensus In this sense, laws are contingent, for whatever the 
method that is used to establish the law, there will always be an element of unreasoned 
choice 
Engelhardt is correct in assuming that the maintenance of a peaceful society - which, 
unlike him, I take to be the function of the law rather than ethics - requires an authorita-
tive method of conflict resolution It requires a method which a large majority of society 
is willing to abide, because it believes it to be the correct method The authority which 
the law requires is not the authority that absolute truth, absolute goodness, absolute 
justice, etc , carry For even among those who know truth, goodness, and justice, many 
137 ( continued) 
ly agreed to do so? Obviously, an argumentum ad infinitum emerges which can be 
prevented only by assuming the existence of some transcendental warrant that people can 
be trusted 
Notice that in the theory proposed by me, laws are not explained from distrust, but from 
the recognition that the good of people cannot be fully known While trusting one 
another's benevolence, there is always the principle impossibility to discover the good of 
every single unique fellow human being Hence, people must »settle« for a system of 
obliging laws, accept certain formal procedures to decide about the contents of those 
laws, and respect the authority of judges to interpret and apply the law Any attempt to 
provide a foundation for this »settling« is likely to induce an infinite regress of debates on 
second-order decision making (who should decide what should happen), third-order (who 
should decide who should decide what should happen), fourth-order, etc [see also 
Schauer 1992] 
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act in ways that are not consistent with their very own knowledge. What is needed is the 
kind of cognizance that guides, directs, controls human behavior. Besides fear, (nowa-
days) only negotiated agreement seems able to bring about this effect. 
We have also seen that Engelhardt was unable to prove the intelligibility of the 
authoritative nature of agreement through negotiation. He relies fully on the empirical 
fact that agreement through negotiation has historically proven to be the most successful 
method of conflict resolution. This failure disqualifies agreement through negotiation as 
the cornerstone of a theory of ethics, even more so, since there turns out to be a more 
intelligible method (i.e., conversion). But this failure does not reduce the usefulness of 
negotiated agreement as a foundation of law. On the contrary, conversion may be more 
intelligible a method, it may actually make the contemporary success of agreement 
through negotiation intelligible, but it cannot function as the cornerstone for any modern 
(western) lawful state. It lacks the authority which history, particularly modern history, 
has shown negotiation to enjoy. Agreement through negotiation, therefore, is the 
preferred method of conflict resolution for a system of (health) law. 
As we have seen in Chapter 4 (see p. 104), negotiated agreement is itself not without 
problems, notably regarding issues where no agreement can be negotiated out. However, 
this is of less importance in a political system. Though a political system should strive for 
perfect justice, there is an undeniable difference between what is theoretically conceivable 
and what is practically feasible. Everyday life requires some kind of guideline, imperfect 
as it may be from a theoretical perspective, but one that will be obeyed by large enough a 
section of society to be law. The goal of law is not perfect justice, but the most peaceful 
society as can be realized at the particular moment in history and at the particular place on 
earth. Compromise is unavoidable, compromise between the various conversive processes 
that are partially the result of the laws, much more so the predecessors of any possible 
laws. 
The limitations of the legal system, that is, the contingent nature of the contents of 
laws and, even more so, of the rulings of judges, necessitate restrained application and 
perpetual awareness of these limitations. The superficial image of an organized and 
structured system of seemingly concise and definite rules, and the widespread awe for the 
legal profession, tend to conceal those limitations, particularly in a society struck by what 
appears to be an ever growing moral pluralism. Given their contingent nature, laws are 
bound to cause harm, which can be reduced only by granting judges the right to transcend 
the law. However, the verdicts of judges, unlike ethical argumentations, are not confined 
to what reason can reveal. Of course, the discretionary latitude of judges is restrained by 
the legal structure itself, by past jurisprudence, and by the hierarchy of the judicial 
system. But in essence, judges are granted the power to transcend the law, to pass a 
moral judgment with binding consequences. Given the principle impossibility to reach an 
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absolute, unquestionable moral judgment for individual and unique situations, one must 
wonder whether it is best to always leave it up to judges to pass such a judgment. 
Obviously, the legal system would be undermined if such judgmental authority would 
be allotted to others as well. As I have argued in detail elsewhere [Welie 1992], the 
current legal approach to the problem of euthanasia in The Netherlands, is one such 
example where, in fact, the power to pass binding judgment is allotted to physicians. 
Though euthanasia still is illegal, in Dutch jurisprudence there are various indications that 
the courts are allowing physicians to trespass the criminal law if and only because their 
»professional« view suggests ending the patient's life is better than abiding the criminal 
law. Such a spread of power is extraordinary dangerous, given the contingency of such 
arbitrary decisions. But from this observation, it follows as well that one ought to be 
careful with organizing all of social life by means of the legal system when it can be 
foreseen that legal judges are not the best judges in conflictual situations. One such 
problematic area of social life is the area of health care. 
This has important consequences for a »policy« of clinical decision-making, which 
brings us back to the issue of »force« and »power« in the clinic. If we are to view health 
law as channeling the power traffic between all involved in health care, it can only do so 
if we have a clear answer as to what counts as force. As mentioned earlier, from a legal 
perspective virtually all human actions are potentially coercive. By his mere presence the 
physician may direct the patient in a certain course of action (for example, to undergo 
radiotherapy). But this observation also implies that there could be no way around 
coercion. Requiring explicit informed consent for any and all medical interventions may 
itself be coercive. A more precise and distinctive criterion of unwarranted force must be 
developed to set the limits of legal interventions in clinical care. As already announced, I 
will try to do so in reference to two fundamental topics: The right to refuse medical 
treatment and the right of care providers to guide patients. 
Empowering the Patient: The Right to Refuse 
The single most important legal measure directing contemporary medical practice, is the 
attribution to patients of an enforceable right to refuse any medical interventions, or even 
stronger, not to have to undergo any medical treatment without first providing consent. 
Most often the legal right to refuse treatment is defined and defended in terms of 
contractual freedom. Medical treatment is a commodity that a patient may, if he so 
wishes, try to obtain from the expert who can provide it. Conversely, a health care 
provider may offer medical treatment and care that a patient, if he so wishes, may consent 
to undergo. In both instances, however, the patient pulls the strings. He may enter a 
contract and, barring such exceptional situations (e.g., detoxication from addictive drugs) 
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where patients beforehand agree to compulsion, he may also step out of the contract at 
any time he wishes to do so ш 
As argued above, such social contract theories assume distrust, which in principle 
can never be the basis of any social relationship In the previous chapter, I have 
suggested a different understanding of human social life But it does not follow from a 
personalist anthropology that patients do not have the very same right to refuse medical 
treatment In fact, in a personalist context it makes equally much sense to grant patients 
the right to final decision-making power First, the pragmatic justification of patient 
autonomy as a means to settle conflicts remains equally applicable But more importantly, 
the consent of the patient remains a necessary (if not sufficient) condition of a moral 
patient-provider relationship Assuming that medical treatment must be beneficent, at any 
rate it may not be maleficent, that is, harmful This, m turn, implies the duty not to 
impair a patient's very essence His capability to freely fulfill his own selfhood Human 
life, in essence, is self-creative life Forcing medical treatment onto a person is a 
violation of that essence — or in religious terms, man's God-given soul 
Respect for patient autonomy stems from the acknowledgement that as a person, the 
patient, like any other human being, has the capability to fulfill his own existence This 
capability entails a duty towards himself, a responsibility towards his Creator, and a right 
towards his fellow human beings Respect for patient autonomy is a matter of reverence 
for this creative capability, consisting, among others, of granting the patient final decision­
making power instead of forcing medical treatment onto the patient, be it apparently the 
most optimal treatment in all other regards 
Knowing what is the best treatment for a patient does not in and by itself include the 
right to impose such treatment on the patient (except, maybe, in cases of puerile immatu­
rity or indisputable mental incompetence) Even God, who obviously knows and wants 
what is the best for each of us human beings, healthy or diseased, cannot impose that 
ultimate goodness on us without jeopardizing the essence of our humanity, that is, to 
freely choose for the good 
The patient's right to autonomy, then, is founded on a particular anthropological 
understanding of man's essence, rather than the assumption that such an understanding is 
impossible Consequently, respect for patient autonomy does not imply the duty not to 
138 The term »contract« is used m a rather broad, legal-philosophical sense (see also Chapter 
4), and not in reference to any positive-legal version of contracts — which would be 
impossible given the manifold national differences in contract law For example, 
nowadays, in Dutch positive law, the doctor patient relationship is viewed as being 
contractual, not merely when it comes to the economics of that relationship, but also m 
regards to the kind of health care to be provided Disregarding an advance directive 
would be taken to be a breach of contract But m American positive law, such violations 
of patient rights would be dealt with under tort law 
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interfere with a patient's life and to leave him alone. Nobody can claim the right to be 
left alone, for that would imply requiring other people not to act benevolently. Nobody 
can require his fellow human being to act contrary to what the latter sincerely believes to 
be beneficent. Such a requirement would be as much a violation of the right to autonomy 
(this time the right to autonomy of the benevolent actor) as would be forcing beneficent 
treatment on somebody. 
It may be objected that the right to autonomy implies, if not the right to be left 
alone, the right to be spared of benevolent yet maleficent actions. Even if it is frequently 
possible to discern what is truly beneficent in the case at hand, all too often benevolent 
actions have turned out to be maleficent when physicians, by their mere presence and role 
related authority, have pressured patients into undergoing medically indicated treatment 
that squared with their patients' best interests (as perceived by the latter). It is better if 
health care providers err on the safe side, refrain from benevolent actions altogether, and 
leave it totally to the patient to determine the right course of action. 
This objection hinges on the presumption that the safer side is the one where care 
providers suspend judgments on the patient's good, and leave it up to the patient to make 
such judgments. Obviously, such an attitude may result in patients making decisions that 
are not in their best interests, but - so this objection would read - in the light of the 
espoused anthropology in which man is understood essentially as a self-creative being, the 
harm done to those (few) who would be forced into accepting maleficent medical 
treatments, will outweigh the harm that (many) others may do to themselves in voluntarily 
refusing beneficent treatment. 
But this »utilitarian« calculus is extremely dubious. It presupposes that individual 
freedom is by far the highest value, easily outdoing values such as health, painfreeness, 
and even life; executing one's freedom is the greatest good, hindering such execution the 
greatest vice. Except for a rare radical existentialist, however, few would hold this view. 
Of course, libertarians cherish freedom as well, but not because it is a value in and 
by itself. Given the presumption that man is a black-box and each individual therefore the 
best judge of his own interests, in a libertarian perspective freedom becomes a necessary 
condition for any person to foster his interests. Moreover, it is the only conditional value 
of a priori standing because all other values can only be set by the individual and after he 
has been granted sufficient freedom to so. 
However, having effectively undermined the black-box hypothesis as the only 
reasonable understanding of man's nature, and having suggested instead an anthropology 
that does allow for the a priori determination of human values other than freedom, 
consistency no longer obliges us to err on the side of radical freedom. In my view 
freedom remains an extremely important value since man is essentially a self-creative 
being. But contrary to the existentialists, I would agree with the libertarians that it is only 
a conditional value. For man's completion is not to be found in just any self-creation, as 
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long as it is established freely, but in the recreation of what he already is, that is, in the 
fulfillment of his personhood. In this respect, the value of life is a powerful contender of 
freedom when ranking values, and so would be values like health and painfreeness. Even 
stronger contenders may be values that are conditional for other values, but enjoy a 
certain degree of finality as well, such as human company and care. Nevertheless, when 
freedom seems to be at odds with any of these other values, we should not so much »err« 
on the side of freedom, but give freedom the benefit of the doubt, if only because 
individual freedom has been found to be a powerful means in maintaining societal peace. 
Giving freedom merely the benefit of the doubt, as opposed to assigning freedom 
moral primacy, also has consequences for the range of possible exceptions. While a 
patient from a personalist perspective has a right to free decision-making, he certainly 
does not have a duty to do so. What do I mean? As already argued, when libertarians 
want to leave it completely up to the patient to make the final decisions about his own 
health care, they not only consider the patient the best judge of his own interests. They 
must also take for granted that it is worse to paternalistically harm patients' best interests 
(e.g., by imposing medically indicated treatment that turns out to violate patients' values), 
than to be negligent by not fostering their interests (e.g., by not forcefully protecting 
patients against harm they are about to do to themselves). But that means that patients not 
only have the right to determine their own course of medical treatment; they should do so 
as well. In any event, providers will always have to assume that patients do so if they are 
to protect the rights of those patients who in fact determine their own course of life. 
If, on the other hand, it is not self-evident that patients are the only proper judges of 
their interests, if there are ways to more »objectively« assess patients' best interests, we 
still may give the individual the benefit of the doubt when it comes to his interests and his 
only. But the individual cannot claim a right to such benefit of the doubt when other 
patients' interests are at stake as well. In other words, there is insufficient ground to 
establish a policy of leaving it completely up to the individual patients to judge their own 
interests. Disrespecting a patient's ability to self-determination by acting on his behalf in 
an attempt to foster his best interest but against his will, can be justified only in exception-
al cases. But the possibility of exceptions certainly cannot be ruled out a priori, that is, 
the possibility of morally warranted compulsory medical treatment and/or care, even in 
the case of competent patients. 
As mentioned before, few people deny the justifiability of such compulsion in case of 
young children and patients who will become competent again as a result of treatment 
(e.g., emergency medical treatment). But considerably less obvious is the category of 
people who have been competent and have left clear instructions as to what ought to be 
done in case of incompetency. It certainly is not self-evident that their past wishes prevail 
when there now are manifold indications that such abiding by those wishes may be 
harmful. Take the case of an elderly patient who, sometime in the near past completed an 
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advance directive stating that under no circumstances should he ever be resuscitated 
because he is tired of living. However, instead of a severe cardiac arrest the patient 
suffers a series of Transient Ischemic Attacks (TIAs) with a detrimental effect on his 
mental capacities. Superficially, he even seems to have become a different person(ality). 
But the attacks have had little effect on his mood. As a matter of fact, he seems a much 
happier than before. What should be done if he suffers a cardiac arrest after all? Why 
going by his past wishes, when it is not clear that resuscitation will harm his present 
interests? Why not look at his current condition which seems to warrant resuscitation? 
If there is any justification for abiding by his past decision, then only that his current 
interests are best served if his past wishes are granted. Again, it is not that his current 
interests have remained the same as specified in the past — for how could we ever verify 
that they are? In fact, his personality change suggests the contrary. The argument would 
have to be that man's interests are generally best served when his (past) decisions are 
implemented. That is to say, the single most important value is self-determination. It is 
only when we underwrite this existentialist assumption - which is much stronger than the 
libertarian justification of respect for patient autonomy »by default« - that advance 
directives will override any kind of present interests. But this assumption has already 
been found very questionable, to say the least. 
It should be emphasized, however, that such overriding past wishes can only be 
justified to the extent that the condition of the patient has changed so much that one can 
justifiably speak of a partial rupture with the past. This rupture in the continuity of the 
life of the patient suffering from a series of TIAs distinguishes this case from the one 
described by Childress and paraphrased in the former chapter (see p. 219). To conclude 
that there has occurred such a significant rupture requires strong evidence. The mere fact 
that somebody has turned severely ill, or even terminally ill, in and by itself does not 
constitute such a rupture. Death is not the other side of life; it is the completion of life on 
earth. 
Finally, what about the competent patient who presently withholds consent to (life-
saving) medical treatment? Could compulsory medical treatment and/or care ever be 
justified in such instances? We will pick up this delicate question after we have discussed 
in more detail the second most important condition (besides patient competency) of 
veritable consent, that is, it being based on all relevant information. 
Empowering the Care Provider: The Right to Guide 
The previous subsection I started out with the thesis that the single most important legal 
measure directing contemporary medical practice, is the attribution of an enforceable right 
of patients to refuse any medical interventions offered, or even stronger, a right not to 
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have to undergo any medical treatment without first having been provided the opportunity 
to grant consent. Although this right is not an absolute right, that is, loosened from the 
actual situation and condition of the patient, the care provider's duty of obtaining consent 
prior to engaging in treatment may not be set aside lightly. 
While patient consent (or the refusal thereof) generally may be disregarded when the 
patient is incompetent, it is less clear when such consent warrants providing the consent-
ed-to treatment. At first sight, it seems obvious that a patient's consent is valid only if a 
patient has been given sufficient information to understand the alternatives, the possible 
benefits and burdens involved, the likelihood of those occurring, the consequences of 
turning down one or the other alternative, etc. A care provider, therefore, not only is 
obligated to obtain consent and to respect any refusal, but also to provide all information 
that may be relevant to the patient in order to make such decisions. Consequently, in 
many countries the patient's right to information has been expanded tremendously, 
including not only truthful information about the patient's diagnosis, prognosis and all 
possible treatment options, but also truthful information concerning the side-effects of such 
treatments, unlimited access to all the patient's records, and even names and addresses of 
other care providers who are willing to offer services that the attending physician refuses 
on ethical grounds (e.g., abortion or euthanasia). But is it self-evident that the right to 
consent includes the right to all potentially relevant information? 
In the previous subsection, it already was pointed out that the right to consent is not 
an unlimited right. A patient cannot require the care provider to abandon him. He may 
not expect the care provider, who is primarily called to provide care in and by the face of 
suffering (and not because she is contracted to do so), to simply back off when the patient 
refuses treatment. She is called to engage in a care relationship and to attempt to 
convince her patient that a particular kind of treatment is indicated. Requiring care 
providers to disregard that call would be detrimental to the possibility of any genuine 
саге-ful relationships based on sympathie intersubjectivity, mutual trust, and benevolence. 
Obviously, those who have remained convinced, notwithstanding the previous 
chapter, of the greater plausibility of an atomistic anthropology as opposed to one that 
takes mutual care to be an essential human ontological category, will also remain of the 
opinion that all such attempts (including visiting the patient, talking to him, and proffering 
professional advices) are forms of unjustified coercion. Remarkably, the same advocates 
of such a strong right to respect of patient autonomy tend to assign a considerably weaker 
right to respect of autonomy to the care provider. A physician should not proffer his own 
professional insights when the patient takes those to be irrelevant or even maleficent, but 
he should bring forward as options for the patient alternatives that he takes to be malefi­
cent for the patient. However, the premise from which the right to consent was deduced, 
that is, the freedom of the patient to determine his own course of life, does not in and by 
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itself lead to the conclusion that patients have a right to be informed about all possible 
alternatives that they (but not the care and information provider) could find relevant 
An example from a non-health care setting may clarify this thought The right to 
autonomy is not limited to matters of health and disease It was already pointed out that 
the right to self-determination did not originate in the health care setting, but in the more 
encompassing political scene Man has a right to self-determination in virtually every area 
of life If, for example, a tourist is hungry and upon entering a restaurant, he is offered a 
certain dish, the waiter cannot force the dish onto the tourist Only after the tourist has 
consented, should the waiter serve his guest That is not to say, however, that the tourist 
has the right to be informed about the exact ingredients of the dish, other cheaper dishes 
on the menu, or even the prices at the restaurant around the comer One might contend 
that the waiter should not abuse the hunger of the tourist and his unacquamtance with the 
town, by suggesting the most expensive dish Also, the waiter is obligated not to lie when 
answering any questions of the tourist But he may refuse to provide the requested 
information And certainly, he is not obligated to point the tourist to the nearest Amster­
dam »coffee shop« that has soft drugs on the menu In not referring the tourist, the waiter 
is not violating the former's right to self determination 
But surely, the medical situation differs significantly from the sketched interaction 
between tourist and waiter7 Unlike the tourist, the patient most often cannot simply 
postpone the fulfillment of his needs and shop around for a better deal In fact, much of 
the information that the patient might be able to gather by shopping around would be more 
difficult to comprehend and assess than the items and prices on restaurant menus The 
patient would still be dependent on care providers explaining the possible relevance of 
such complex data These factors restrict the freedom of choice of the patient 
Granted, compared with a purchaser of foods and drinks, a purchaser of health care 
goods and services tends to be restricted in his choice But it still does not follow that the 
care provider is morally obligated to compensate this imbalance That conclusion only 
follows if a care provider, unlike a businessman, not only is obligated not to do harm 
(e g , not to lie)139, but also to foster the patients' interests Naturally, I myself will not 
have any difficulty with that conclusion, but libertarians who only accept contracts as the 
source of moral obligation cannot so easily accept such an extra-contractual obligation on 
the physician's side to provide information to the patient that in his professional opinion 
may harm the patient Even so, what information would the patient take to be relevant 
and beneficial9 Even if the defensive story of physicians that patients become terribly 
139 In Chapter 3, I already argued that neither health care professionals nor businessmen 
have a right to harm other people Adherence to the principle of non-maleficence, 
therefore, is not a sufficiently distinctive criterion of care providers (see ρ 73) 
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depressed and lose hope as a result of bad news is only true in a handful of cases, not all 
information can be guaranteed to be beneficial beforehand. 
What if information is itself not a value but a condition of free decision-making? 
Without information there is no free consent, and without free consent, no benefit? 
Again, it is not self-evident that information always renders choices more free. More 
information often renders the making of a decision more difficult, more burdensome, and 
thus, less free. We all have regretted now and then, 'if only I had not known about this 
other possibility; it would have made the decision so much easier'. It is not without 
reason that in our information era people have started claiming the right not-to-be-
informed. Not only do people protest against the unrequested provision of stacks of 
commercial catalogues and flyers, patients have started claiming the right not-to-be-
informed about their condition. Patients have claimed a right to freedom from informa­
tion. Freedom, then, cannot require information as a necessary precondition. 
There is a second reason why more information does not necessarily imply a more 
free decision. Information provided is never mere information. There is always some­
body who provides that information, a place and a moment at which the information is 
provided, a manner and a language in which the information is provided. All these 
factors »color« the information and influence the will of the receiver in very subtle ways 
that in essence are coercive. No information can ever be presented in a noncoercive 
manner. Even if the physician would take off his white coat, his identification badge and 
stethoscope, even if he would do his utmost not to express his personal preferences in the 
information provided, the fact that it is a professional, an expert who is providing the 
information - after all, the patient's very reason for consulting the physician is the need of 
expert information -, will have some coercive influence on the patient. All care relation­
ships are coercive to some extent, violate patients' (and providers') freedom, and hence 
are immoral to that extent. 
Naturally, this pessimistic conclusion only follows in the context of an atomistic 
anthropology. That is, the conclusion that all provision of information, even all nonverbal 
communication is coercive to some extent. In the context of an саге-ful anthropology as 
espoused in the previous chapter, all such influences would retain their cogent power but 
without the pejorative connotation of coercion. One would rather qualify such influences 
as conducive. The contorted face of the sacked traveller on the side of the road does not 
reduce the Samaritan's freedom; like the Lévite and the priest before him, he could have 
walked by. Rather, the sacked traveller provides the Samaritan with an opportunity to do 
a good deed, thereby fulfilling his own personhood. If anything, the sacked traveller 
therefore increases the Samaritan's freedom. 
By analogy, the same can be argued about the patient approaching the physician for 
help. But also about the physician approaching the patient with a particular advice. It 
isn't just the information retained in that advice that increases the patient's freedom. It is 
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the presence of another human being who cares, who is willing to share in the patient's 
adversity, who goes about seeking an answer, who provides new hope, who can be 
trusted. The care provider does not only have the right to behave conducively towards 
patients; he has the duty to do so. Prudent guidance is never a limitation of a patient's 
freedom, but opens up new horizons, new options, new possibilities. It is an essential 
element of care. It is care proper. 
The Case of Mr. Jones Revisited 
I started this chapter with a summary of Von Gebsattel's understanding of the nature of 
the patient-provider relationship. The ensuing subsections have shown that various 
problematic aspects notwithstanding, Von Gebsattel's ideas have remained of interest and 
significance. The final test, however, lies in the confrontation with the same case that 
functioned as test case for the competing models discussed in Chapter 4, the case of Mr. 
Jones refusing life-saving treatment (see p. 116). 
There, we were mostly concerned with the issue of the competency to autonomous 
decision-making: Is Mr. Jones currently able to make decisions about his own life and 
death? The existentialist concept of authenticity may not be more promising on all fronts 
than autonomy as foundational principle, it does add one crucial insight: The essence of 
human life disappears out of sight if its temporal character is reduced to a series of 
present actions. Whenever one starts looking for a criterion that allows physicians to 
distinguish between sudden, unexpected decisions of their patients to be or not to be 
respected (without recourse to the patient's past or future), one has already presumed that 
such a distinctive criterion can disregard the temporal character of human life. 
Undeniably, the attending physician cannot evade deciding whether or not to grant 
the patient's request. But this decision cannot be reduced to the momentary application of 
a presentable concept either. If existentialism has taught us one lesson, it is that human 
life is not reducible to present decisions. Human existence is a matter of promise and 
trust, both for patients and health care providers. It requires bearing responsibility, being 
creative, taking risk. In the provider's willingness to do so the patient's hope is vested. 
To expect, even to desire an outsider to take over that responsibility is to violate the 
patient's trust. Outsiders, health lawyers and clinical ethicists alike, cannot and should 
not attempt nor be requested to make contentful decisions on individual patients' care. 
They may be able to render insightful contributions to the clinical-ethical debate on an 
individual patient's case, but if there is any real meaning to the concept of a professional-
medical »ethos«, it is the aforementioned (see p. 91) agapistic, that is, personal and 
care-fid, responsiveness to the health care needs of a fellow human being as they are 
opened up to the physician through his professional insight. 
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It is not possible to decide beforehand, that is, independently from the individual 
case, what will be the proper balance between guiding the patient towards his own benefit 
and respecting the patient's wishes for the sake of the same benefit. This openness of the 
future poses a risk for both patient and provider, which in turn explains the temptation for 
both to render their relationship more predictable via laws. But the same openness is also 
a necessary condition for a better future. If it were possible to make such decisions 
beforehand, the future would be closed. Time could not bring anything genuinely new. 
Life would be »just one damn thing after another« (see p. 225). Hence, legalization of the 
patient-provider relationship may in fact have the paradoxical effect of reducing the 
possibilities for improving the patient's condition. 
If it is not possible to decide beforehand what will be the right course of action in 
cases such as Mr. Jones', what can we say about his case? Or rather, what does the case 
itself conduce us to conclude? We may remember that Mr. Jones was a 70 year old 
bachelor and former school principal who had been undergoing five years of hemodialysis. 
When he suffered a pericarditis requiring intensified dialysis, he refused any further such 
treatment. Mr. Jones had always taken the treatment well. He had been able to cope 
with his severe handicaps and continued his normal job in spite of the many hindrances. 
He had managed to lead a productive and meaningful life, and the diseases that medically 
constituted a severe decrease of normal functionality, had not at all forced him to 
passivity. In fact, he had always retained a good mood. 
So what do these sparse biographical details about Mr. Jones tell us in regards to his 
decision to forsake further hemodialysis and die consequently? Was his decision in 
conflict with his past attitude? Did it constitute a sudden breach with his past, opting for 
death rather than the life that he had cherished for such a long time? Was his decision 
unauthentic, a token of hopelessness, or even of nihilism finally taking over? 
As mentioned earlier, it will not do to simply focus on the decision-making compe-
tency of Mr. Jones, as if there are only two kinds of patient decisions, those made by 
competent patients that therefore necessarily are to their own benefit, or decisions that are 
clearly harmful to them, and therefore cannot have been made while being competent. 
The Socratic argument that knowing what is the good will necessarily cause the person to 
behave accordingly and that, consequently, human beings never knowingly and voluntarily 
opt for what is harmful [see Plato 1980*, Protagoras §345d-e], I take to be considerably 
less convincing than Von GebsatteFs view that in addition to a tendency towards the good, 
there is also a nihilistic tendency not to become what one already is, that is, not to foster 
one's own interests. In the latter view, patients may very well be competent yet make 
choices that will harm them. 
To the extent and for the very reason that nihilistic decisions are, by definition, only 
aimed at harming and even annihilating a human being's good - be it his own good -, they 
do not command the respect of fellow-men. This lack of intrinsic respectability empowers 
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the care provider to counter such decisions, which is not to say, however, that just about 
any means to do so are morally acceptable. Firstly, there are external legal limits (that 
may differ per country) to a health care provider's rights to interfere in the freedom of his 
patients. When committed to a Dutch mental institution, patients may be forcefully cared 
for, but not medically treated. Secondly, and more importantly, there are limits to the use 
of force that are internal to a patient-provider relationship of which trust is a necessary 
condition. While conductive conversations aimed at conversion are compatible with 
intersubjective trust, forcefully imposing medical treatment on a patient generally is not. 
»Generally«, because in the case cited earlier in this chapter (see p. 261) where a 
Jehovah's Witness boy and his parents refused blood transfusions, paradoxically what may 
have inspired trust was the willingness of the pediatrician to run a risk by going against 
the parents' wishes, but doing so openly. The physician's willingness to fight for their 
son must have been inspiring, notwithstanding her diverging opinion on the morality of 
blood transfusions. As it turned out later, their trust was justified. The pediatrician and 
her team fought for the child, accepting ever lower blood cell and platelet levels, and in 
the end never forced the transfusion onto the patient. 
The case of the Jehovah's Witness patient and his parents was, however, relatively 
easy in that both parents and pediatrician were fighting to save the child's life rather than 
to annihilate it. Granted, the parents were more worried about eternal life, the physician 
about earthly life, and hence, they differed in their opinions about the acceptable means to 
protect life. But the situation becomes considerably more complex when patient and 
provider no longer share a common goal, when one no longer cares about life and the 
goods and interests entailed in human existence, while the other remains committed to 
these values. In such instances, a procedural, legally warranted solution is the easiest way 
out, but not necessarily the best. 
Did Mr. Jones refuse further dialysis because he had given up and now could care 
less? Did he at all choose for death and against life? The little information that we have 
been given suggests otherwise. Rather than choosing against life, Mr. Jones chose for 
life, be it a life that now had to be completed. The moment had come to acquiesce in the 
inevitable. Rather than viewing death as the other side of life, Mr. Jones knew it to be 
the necessary end of life. He was not seeking death, but ready to accept it. 
How Mr. Jones' decision was interpreted by his own care providers we are not told. 
After the various conversations that were held with him but failed to convert him, it was 
decided to grant the patient his wish, yet to also let him know he should feel free to return 
for dialysis at any moment. Mr. Jones said good-bye to some of his friends and former 
students and died the next day, three days after the last dialysis. 
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Final Assessment 
This study started out with the observation that there is an undeniable discordance between 
mainstream bioethics advocating respect for patient autonomy as reigning moral principle 
and clinical-medical practice implicitly or explicitly relying on the ideal of care provider 
beneficence. Since the professionals' position is the more attractive - even staunch 
libertarians such as Engelhardt admit that patient autonomy only gains primacy »by 
default« -, I have raised the question whether it is indeed impossible to develop a cogent 
ethical discourse that adequately accounts for the more or less unique aspects of the 
clinical case, notably for the individual patient in his particular situation. 
My brief examination in the second chapter of different formats of cogent ethical 
discourse, led me to agree with Engelhardt that the traditional formats of logical reasoning 
in ethics (i.e., deduction, induction, and different varieties of casuistry) fail to deliver the 
desired clinical-ethical discourse. But that conclusion does not force us, as Engelhardt 
maintains, into completely abandoning the quest for cogent moral consensus via rational 
deliberation. We found that the practice of medicine is, indeed, guided by a different 
»directive« that can be reduced to logical parameters only, but a rational directive 
notwithstanding. Conductive reasoning allows one to draw reasonable, and hence cogent 
conclusions about some individual case, by focussing on the case itself instead of 
appealing to other cases or general moral rules. However, conductive reasoning is 
nonconclusive to the extent that it always, that is, in principle, allows for new relevant 
aspects to be brought forward that could change the conclusion significantly. This 
»nonconclusive (in the logical sense) conclusiveness (in the ethical sense)« is due to the 
crucial contribution of »practical wisdom« to the analysis and discourse. Practical wisdom 
is the single most important characteristic of what I have called the »professional ethic« of 
health care providers. 
The concept of a professional ethics often is fought because it is believed that health 
care providers are unable to gain insight in the benefits and interests of their patients, 
which is the most important aspect of the aforementioned practical wisdom. Lacking this 
ability, a professional ethic would necessarily be a subjectivist ethic. In chapters four, 
five and six, I have shown that a different kind of anthropology can be defended both 
negatively and positively. Rather than being »black-boxes« to another, patient and 
provider are engaged in a саге-ful relationship based on intersubjective sympathy, trust, 
and benevolence. 
If one accepts that care is a fundamental concept for any anthropology, it becomes 
possible to understand the phenomena of both sympathically grasping the needs of one's 
fellow-man and obligingly being grasped by those same needs. This primary yet cogent 
human intersubjectivity forms the basis of the patient-provider relationship, or - in Von 
Gebsattel's terminology - the immediate stage of this relationship. This immediate 
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intersubjectivity constitutes the »kernel« that must - in the sense of »calls to be« - and can 
be developed into a beneficent relationship because its sympathie footing allows, in 
principle, for the explication of the good of the persons involved. 
However, a genuinely effective relationship also presumes that the care provider 
gains a more precise insight in the individual patient's good and knows how such 
beneficent treatment and care can be realized. To provide the second kind of »technical« 
knowledge, an intricate system of medical sciences has been developed which has been 
progressively more successful. But the first kind of insight has remained excessively 
difficult to obtain. Moreover, as Von Gebsattel already pointed out, the medical scientific 
perspective requires the physician to alienate himself from the individuality of his patient 
and to translate the question about the patient's personal good into the question about 
patients' generic good, thereby making it ever more difficult to leam about the individual 
patient's good. 
The solution to the problem that is suggested traditionally as well as by Von 
Gebsattel is to presume that medicine (and health care) is a science as well as an art. In 
Chapter 2, we have already encountered the claim that scientific medicine becomes an art 
by the clinician's ability to adequately judge what is unique about the individual and, more 
importantly, balance these individualist insights with the general categories of biomedical 
science and technique. 
This act of balancing must be the prerogative of the care provider because it requires 
personal engagement, an attitude of hope, and the willingness to take risks on the part of 
both patient and provider. It cannot be taken over by third persons. And consequently, 
these third persons can never evaluate in full the undertakings of those engaged in the 
provision of health care. But that is not to say that health care providers do not carry 
respons(e)-ibility; they are not immune to critical evaluations. Conductive reasoning 
should warrant contentful yet cogent ethical discourse between care providers, patients and 
third persons. 
However, as mentioned before, conduction is logically nonconclusive. The single 
most important source of this nonconclusiveness - besides the formal structure of the 
argument - is the patient's individuality. A human being's unique selfhood, what makes 
him a person unlike any other person, cannot be spoken about without already being 
translated into more general categories. Now, respect for a patient's personhood does not 
entail patient abandonment. In the context of a care-ful human relationship, respect not 
only allows for but requires benevolent guidance. It does not, however, allow for forceful 
infringements on patient's free, in the sense of authentic, choices. 
It follows, then, that I conclude to a kind of »blend« of the paternalism and autonomy 
models of the patient-provider relationship. The difference between Pellegrino and 
Thomasma's blend and my blend, is that they accept the black-box assumption underlying 
the autonomy-model yet advocate a paternalistic action-theory, whereas I accept the 
298 CHAPTER 7 
anthropological hypothesis underlying the paternalism model, yet argue that an autonomy-
based model nonetheless ought to be chosen as action-theory. The three of us agree, 
however, in one significant regard: There is a place for paternalistic beneficence in health 
care. As mentioned before, Pellegrino and Thomasma shy away from the term paternal-
ism. I don't see any reason to do so. Maybe it is but a sign of our modern culture in 
which God is no longer a father, in which the best fathers presumably are those that don't 
behave like fathers, and in which godfathers only invoke associations with the Maffia, that 
the sole agreed-upon vice of health care providers is paternalism. 
SUMMARY 
The FIRST CHAPTER of this study starts out with a cursory analysis of the manifold 
critiques by practicing clinicians about the impractical nature of much contemporary 
bioethical thinking. It is concluded that their plea for a theory of bioethics that is 
practically relevant in the sense that it can guide the clinical care of particular patients by 
physicians, nurses and other care givers, is appropriate. Yet it has, indeed, not been 
adequately responded to by those engaged in ethical theory development. 
This plea for a theory of clinical ethics has not gone unnoticed by contemporary 
bioethical theoreticians, but many of the attempts to meet the demands of practitioners 
have been made from within the existing methodological framework of applied ethics; that 
is, applied ethics is refined to accommodate ethical discourse about the individual patient's 
case. The inadequacy of those attempts lies in the fact that applying theoretical ethics to 
the clinical situation either results in a non-cogent ethical discourse about the case at hand, 
or a cogent discourse in which the unique characteristics of the case at hand are inade-
quately taken into account. The fundamental problem remains: How to develop a cogent 
ethical discourse that adequately accounts for the more or less unique aspects of the 
clinical case, notably for the individual patient in his particular situation. 
It should be emphasized that the main question underlying this study is not whether 
clinical ethics (in the sought practical sense) is at all possible. Rather, the question is 
under what conditions such a discourse is possible, assuming that it is, in fact, possible. 
It is not a question about the possibility of clinical ethics, but about the a priori »possibili-
ty-conditions« of this possibility: Not how is clinical ethics possible, but why. 
In the first part of the SECOND CHAPTER, I provide arguments for the thesis that 
the proper goal of ethics is to provide a cogent directive discourse to guide humans toward 
moral behavior by favoring (as opposed to »setting«) a particular course of action. I 
critically examine various »conventional« bioethical methods of logically presenting such a 
course of action (deductivism, inductivism, casuistry, and situation ethics). I show that 
these four methods, while providing elements for a theory of clinical ethical discourse, fail 
to provide a convincing account of the »possibility-conditions« of such discourse. 
This cursory examination of contemporary attempts to refine applied ethics forces us 
to reconsider the structure of the discourse we are seeking: What is the nature of the 
cogent discourse that applied ethics is able to provide at a more theoretical level and that 
clinically oriented bioethicists are now trying to discover at the individual case level? In 
order to uncover an answer to this question, first the nature of persuasion is reexamined in 
an attempt to clarify the essence of cogency. I then go on to evaluate a fifth candidate for 
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a method of cogent clinical ethical discourse: Conduction. Conduction is characterized as 
the sort of reasoning in which a conclusion about some individual case is drawn noncon-
clusively from one or more premises about the case without any appeal to other cases. 
This definition underscores the dissimilarity with both deduction and induction. Cogency 
is primarily provided by the contents of the advanced conductive arguments. 
The lack of formal structure and the reliance on contents of conductive arguments 
precludes the development of a logic of conductive arguments that would be separate from 
and independent of ethics. One cannot judge the validity of such conductive ethical 
arguments while ignoring their moral content. Thus, the cogency of the argument 
advanced can only be assessed by a process of »reproduction« (German: nachvollziehen) of 
the argument, thinking it through once more, resulting (or not) in a verdict of acknowl-
edgement and affirmation. A conductive argumentation will be followed not first and 
foremost because of its logical format but because it concerns people, because it inspires 
them to follow suit, and because its concrete contents convinces them. 
If the structure of clinical ethical discourse is, indeed, conductive in nature, a keen 
interpretation of the elements of the case at hand is required, which in turn underscores 
the significance of »moral discernment« and »practical wisdom« of those involved in the 
provision of care. Since the insights that make up this kind of wisdom are beyond 
description in rational terms, the structure of the clinical ethical discourse can be clarified 
only via an examination of the personal »ethos« of the care provider. 
In the literature two forceful objections to the notion of such practical wisdom have 
been raised, (i) It exists, but is limited to professionals. That is to say, clinical ethics is 
the prerogative of clinicians, (ii) It does not exist in any meaningful sense; morally 
problematic clinical cases, therefore, must be solved differently (i.e., via contractual 
agreements). The THIRD CHAPTER examines the first (i) objection. I argue that the 
concept of professional »ethos« is indeed an important aspect of clinical ethics. Physicians 
have often contended that medical ethics is of a peculiar nature, a fact which separates it 
from conventional ethics: Clinical medical ethics is a professional »ethic«. The latter 
thesis could, however, imply that the practical wisdom of physicians largely or even fully 
escapes critical examination. Hence, bioethicists have shied away from such notions as 
»professional wisdom«, »moral experience of health care professionals«, »physician 
paternalism« and »extraordinary or supererogatory rights and duties of care providers«. 
Indeed, it is only to the extent that clinical ethical discourse is open to critical examination 
that it can at all be characterized as ethical discourse as opposed to subjective taste: De 
gustibus non est disputandum, about matters of taste one cannot argue. But from that, it 
does not follow that there cannot be a role for the phenomenon of practical ethical wisdom 
in a theory of clinical ethics 
I argue that a strong case can be made for a professional ethic in the sense that the 
contents of the patient-provider relationship to a large extent escape critical review. If the 
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structure of clinical ethical discourse is characterized by a complex and ongoing process of 
interpretation of the clinical situation, yielding insights that are validated and communicat-
ed via conductive argumentation, all of which presumes a horizon of moral meaning 
shared by both care providers and patients, and a personal openness towards morally 
significant issues as well as the kind of practical wisdom that allows patients and care 
providers to gauge the moral significance of the situation at hand against this shared 
background, — this complex process must (to a large extent) be confined to the health care 
context. On the one hand, the clinical situation of suffering, disease, handicap, aging, 
dying and death seems to be so foreign to everyday life that clinical ethics must reflect 
that specificity. On the other hand, the actions of health care professionals undertaken in 
response to this peculiar situation, both at the individual and the institutional level, seem 
to differ to such an extent from common human undertakings as to warrant the character-
ization of a »professional practice«. 
A plea for a professional practice and the implied professional ethic does not entail a 
reduction of clinical ethical discourse to subjectivism, provided we can demonstrate that it 
is possible to think (in a meaningful and reasonable way) of the patient-provider relation-
ship as a moral relationship, as a relationship which is grounded in morality. In other 
words, the possibility-conditions of such a regionalized, professional ethic must be 
elucidated. In Chapter 3, I therefore examine different models of a professional clinical 
ethic. After a more detailed specification of the notion of professional ethic, I discuss 
whether at all a case can be made for a professional ethic, that is, whether the practice of 
health care is sufficiently distinct. I survey various aspects of medical practice that are 
commonly quoted as foundations of such a professional ethic (notably the special knowl-
edge and expertise of health care providers and their presumed extraordinary altruism), as 
well as the so called »separatist thesis« suggesting that professional ethic is sufficiently 
distinct as to consider it a separate kind of ethics. I refute the latter thesis and move on 
to discuss the significance of professional roles. This discussion will necessitate a 
reexamination of the nature of clinical »practice«. I argue that the practice of clinical 
medicine derives its peculiarity from the fact that all undertakings are always aimed at 
improving the patient's interests and are evaluated in that light as well. 
But that presumes that the care provider is in fact able to gauge the personal needs 
and interests of his individual patient, to obtain knowledge of the patient's personal 
sickness, pain, fear, and suffering, as well as his sense of happiness, life-plans, interests, 
and values. In other words, it presumes the possibility of intersubjective »sympathy«. 
The notion of sympathy will turn out to be of crucial significance to the theory of 
clinical ethics advanced in this study. But first, in the FOURTH CHAPTER, I consider 
the second (ii) claim against the notion of a professional ethic: The radical denial of the 
possibility of such intersubjectivity and hence of a professional ethic. I show that the 
arguments leading up to this denial are flawed; moreover the suggested contractual 
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alternative must assume the very same intersubjectivity it denies. A close examination of 
this second claim, as well as various disappointing past attempts to move beyond contrac-
tual models, reveal two main causes of this denial (sometimes explicitly presented in the 
work of those authors, sometimes implicitly). 
The first cause I call the underlying »black-box« hypothesis. This view assumes that 
the human being essentially has a one-way communicative relationship with the world: He 
knows the world, but the world does not know him (insofar as he is an individual). 
Except via explicit utterings, the benefits of other people (such as patients) cannot be 
traced. Human beings are moral strangers to one another, not because they have different 
moral convictions, but because man's interests, values, and moral beliefs are completely 
hidden for other human beings. 
Morality becomes a private affair. Firstly, because morality is deemed to be 
(almost) purely a matter of personal preference. Nowadays there exists a plurality of 
commonly adhered to, but quite different moral convictions, many of which are incompat-
ible, but all of which are equally true; there is no justifiable method to evaluate and 
decide between them. Secondly, morality is private in that a person's preferences, his 
intrasubjective moral framework is inaccessible to third persons. Individuals are the 
single (and thus best) judges of their own good. Consequently, there is but one moral 
principle that emerges out of this plurality of private moralities as binding for all members 
of society: Autonomy. The sole way to behave beneficently towards another is to 
acknowledge and respect the freedom and self-determination of each and every individual 
~ obviously, within the limits of their not disproportionately harming the freedom and 
self-determination of others. To guarantee this, procedures must be established. The 
same holds for the relationship between health care providers and patients: It is guided 
primarily by the principle of respect for another's autonomy and procedural justice. 
Clearly, this perspective on bioethics is of prime interest to the project of this study 
in that it frustrates, even undermines the possibility of clinical ethics. Having discussed 
the more procedural version of this libertarian understanding of bioethics - such as is 
defended by the leading contemporary bioethicist Tristram Engelhardt in his book The 
Foundations of Bioethics [1986] (and in a modified form by Veatch) -, I look at the work 
of authors (e.g., Beauchamp, Childress, Faden, McCulIough and Miller) who underwrite 
the primacy of the principle of autonomy but advocate a less procedural interpretation of 
this principle. In reference to a clinical case of a patient refusing life-sustaining dialysis, 
four increasingly substantive interpretations of autonomy are examined. It is concluded, 
however, that each of these versions fails to provide a genuine alternative to Engelhardt's. 
libertarian interpretation, because all four assume - what I take to be a fundamental 
misconception - that patients and care providers are moral strangers to another, lacking 
insight into one another's good. 
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I then move to Pellegrino and Thomasma's defence of provider beneficence for the 
patient's good. I argue that in emphasizing the patient's good rather than his decision-
making freedom Pellegrino and Thomasma are heading in the right direction, but 
nonetheless fail to get where they (and I) want to get. However, examining their 
approach yields a more precise diagnosis of the causes of that failure, one of which being 
the aforementioned second cause of the tendency among contemporary bioethicists to think 
in libertarian terms only, that is, the assumption that ethics must provide the foundation 
for health policy, with a consequent emphasis on, and preoccupation with, problem-
solving, decision-making and procedure. The distinction between benevolence and 
beneficence, aspiring the good of the patient versus implementing it, is all too often over-
looked. This distinction will be considered in more detail in the final chapter of this 
study, but only after I have laid out the philosophical basis for an alternative, non-
libertarian and non-procedural theory of clinical ethics in the fifth and sixth chapters. 
This brings us to the FIFTH CHAPTER. In this chapter, I set out to develop an 
alternative to the »black-box« hypothesis that man is inaccessible to any third person. As 
Scheler remarks in his 1926 book on sympathy, the problem how it is possible to be 
aware of the other in his otherness, is one of the fundamental themes in philosophical 
anthropology. However, I argue, as does Scheler, that a convincing argument can be 
made in favor of human intersubjective »sympathy«. I use the term sympathy in the rather 
literal sense of »feeling together«, »feeling along« with another human being, »sharing« a 
particular awareness or experience. This notion of sympathy is not new in the history of 
philosophy, dating back to ancient Greek philosophies. Notable advocates of an ethics 
based on sympathy are the British moralists of the 18th century (e.g., Butler, Smith, and 
Hume). However, rather than establishing the feasibility of genuine intersubjectivity, 
these authors paradoxically confirm the black-box hypothesis. An alternative understand-
ing of intersubjectivity will be developed in reference to 20th century phenomenologists 
such as Scheler and Lévinas. 
While acknowledging the significance of sympathy for a theory of ethics, Scheler 
contends that an ethics based on sympathy is circular. But this conclusion is challenged 
by Lévinas who maintains that in »facing« our fellow human being a normative element is 
immediately present, that is, my fellow-man sets a cogent norm. My fellow-man never 
appears to me as just any other object, but always as a particular other human being who 
calls upon me obligingly. This insight leads Lévinas to conclude that ethics, rather than 
metaphysics or anthropology, is the prima philosophia. 
And yet, understanding the particular otherness of the other individual such that I can 
respond practically, requires a process of hermeneutics, of interpretation. Any interpreta-
tion of the particular otherness of the other, in turn, presumes an interpretive horizon of 
meaning, a more general understanding of otherness. Although the horizon of meaning 
arises in the process of interpreting the case at hand, the horizon does not emerge »out of 
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nothing«, nor can it emerge from the case only, if there is to be sufficient distance 
between the unique aspects of the case and the horizon of meaning for the interpretation to 
be a genuine assessment of the case. The horizon of meaning, therefore, must be 
anchored in a pre-existing existential awareness, an anthropology in which the facts of the 
case can be ordered to yield a meaningful, innovative interpretation ~ which brings us to 
the SIXTH CHAPTER. 
Hence, the starting point of this chapter is the insight that any theory of clinical 
ethics must be grounded in a medical anthropology that, firstly, can make »sense« of 
human pain, weakness, age, suffering, etc. It is not that pain and suffering, or even age 
and death, must have positive value, let alone be desirable. Rather, it should be possible 
to assign a particular »meaning« to these phenomena, to describe, analyze, comprehend, 
evaluate them. They must be situationable in the interpretative horizon of human 
existence for a theory of clinical ethics to be feasible. Without interpretation, the 
»decisive gap« between those in need and those able to provide assistance would remain 
for lack of »objective« insight into the proper care indicated by the patient's suffering. 
Secondly, such a foundational anthropology must be able to make »sense« of the phenome-
non of »caring« in the sense of »providing care«: Why is it that man notices and acknowl-
edges the call of another human being in pain? Why share in someone else's weakened 
life? Why take his life to be of such importance that it actually sets a norm that out-
weighs one's own? 
Obviously, such questions should not be understood as an attempt to »prove« that 
sympathically revealed norms are in fact morally correct. Such an attempt would in fact 
undermine the whole notion of sympathie intersubjectivity and normativity. What is at 
stake is an understanding of the nature of man in which human fellowship is not secondary 
but primary, or at least, equally original with human individuality, such that the phenome-
na of sympathy and care can provide the foundation of the patient-health care provider 
relationship and any »contracts« that are issued in this context, rather than the reverse. 
Sympathy may be the »apex stone« in the arch of clinical reasoning that binds the care 
provider on one side and the patient on the other. But for such sympathy to be possible, 
for there to be an arch, the two columns of patient and provider must on principle be 
»archeable«. A possibility condition of sympathy is an anthropological notion of man that 
makes understandable such primordial connectiveness, a "quasi-organic unity" in Plotinus 
words. 
Undoubtedly, the topic we are taking up in this chapter is even more encompassing 
than the topic addressed in the former chapter. It is utterly impossible to even attempt a 
summary discussion of the many writings on the nature of human being - even if limited 
to those texts with immediate relevance to the health care context - and to do justice to 
those fine analyses. This chapter, even more so than the former, will therefore be rather 
eclectic, borrowing from such authors as Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, Marcel, Scheler and 
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Mounier whatever ideas seem to foster the advancement of the project of this study. This 
eagerness to correlate their anthropological insights with my own project will also become 
evident in the periodic (though not necessarily systematic) evaluative references to the 
clinical context -- which really is the topic of the next chapter. At times these references 
will be direct, almost confronting, rather than cautious and prudent. Notably in reference 
to ontological works like Heidegger's Sein und Zeit it may be objected that such confron-
tation does not do sufficient justice to the peculiar nature of that book. But then, the point 
is not to yield a fair, let alone complete assessment of Heidegger, but only to see what 
lesson he and other philosophers can teach bioethics. 
I again take the libertarian tradition in bioethics, such as advocated by Engelhardt, as 
a starting point for two reasons. Firstly, Engelhardt argues against the possibility of a 
commonly agreed upon understanding of the nature of man. As I try to show, his theory 
of bioethics nevertheless presumes - implicitly but unmistakably - a particular understand-
ing of the nature of man, as well as of the diseased human being. It is that understanding 
which in fact provides the foundation of Engelhardt's libertarianism. Secondly, even if in 
the end Engelhardt's anthropological understanding will be found lacking in various 
essential aspects, his theory obviously does have its strong sides. To gain plausibility, any 
alternative theory will have to address those sides. 
The development of such an alternative anthropology that convincingly can serve as a 
foundation of clinical ethics will begin with an analysis of various existentialist anthropol-
ogies that take authenticity rather than autonomous self-sufficiency to be primordial. It is 
shown that an ethics of authenticity better reflects the dual nature of human life, that is, a 
life of being created and of creating, of being shaped and of shaping, of being thrown and 
going free, as well as falling ill and surmounting illness. Hence, it can make more sense 
of such phenomena as pain, weakness, handicap, age, suffering, and death, in sum, man's 
fundamental dependence on the care of his fellow-men. But remarkably, it cannot make 
sufficient sense of the phenomenon of providing such care. In an existentialist framework 
of thought, man is thrown back onto himself and turns out to be as lonely as he is in a 
libertarian framework. 
The kernel for an anthropology that can make sense of man's need both to be cared 
for and to care for others is found in Marcel's philosophy of hope. The added value of 
hope over and beyond any of the preceding anthropological key concepts is the aspect of a 
joined, intersubjective journey into the openness of future. The existential anxiety of 
being thrown into life, which cannot be subdued by merely relying on one's own freedom, 
can, however, be overcome by placing faith in the creative capabilities of other human 
beings. 
Marcel's rather speculative philosophy of hope gains considerable strength when it is 
grounded in a personalist anthropology. Undeniably, the introduction of the notion of 
personhood raises manifold new philosophical quandaries, if only because personhood is 
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one of the richest anthropological concepts around. Yet it is only in the context of a 
personalist anthropology that the phenomenon of »care«, which is clearly fundamental for 
any veritable theory of clinical ethics, and, hence, has been taken for granted from the 
start of this study, can acquire meaning and become a sensible phenomenon. 
Looking back, finally, at these sixth chapters, it so turns out that in order to 
underpin the most »ordinary« aspect of daily medical practice and health care, that is, 
careful clinical ethical discourse, I have had to take a tremendous detour away from the 
world of practical undertakings, via the philosophical world of fundamental ontological 
concepts, but also back to the practical implications of these theoretical reflections — 
which is what the SEVENTH CHAPTER is intended to do. Chapter 7 reexamines the 
patient-provider relationship in light of the questions raised in the second, third and fourth 
chapters, and the findings of the fifth and sixth. The first subsection of this chapter is 
devoted to a discussion of one author, Von Gebsattel, a philosopher well acquainted with 
the work of such (befriended) contemporaries as Heidegger and Scheler, but also and 
foremost a practicing psychiatrist. One of Von Gebsattel's most important publications 
concerns the nature of the doctor-patient relationship. He discerns three phases: The 
elementary-sympathetic stage, the diagnostic-therapeutic stage, and the personal stage. 
1. If care is a fundamental concept for any anthropology, it becomes possible to 
understand the phenomena of both sympathically grasping the needs of one's fellow-man 
and obligingly being grasped by those same needs. This primary yet cogent human 
intersubjectivity forms the basis of the patient-provider relationship, or - in Von Gebsat-
tel's terminology - the elementary-sympathetic or immediate stage of this relationship. 
This immediate intersubjectivity constitutes the »kernel« that must - in the sense of »calls 
to be« - and can be developed into a beneficent relationship because its sympathie footing 
allows, in principle, for the explication of the good of the persons involved. 
2. However, a genuinely effective relationship also presumes that the care provider 
knows how such beneficent treatment and care can be realized. To provide this kind of 
»technical« knowledge, an intricate system of medical sciences has been developed which 
has been progressively more successful. But the medical scientific perspective also 
requires the physician to alienate himself from the individuality of his patient and to 
translate the question about the patient's personal good into the question about patients' 
generic good, thereby making it ever more difficult to learn about the individual patient's 
good. 
3. The »reparation« of the rapport between patient and physician that was established 
in the first phase but broken in the second, constitutes the essence of the third phase. Von 
Gebsattel, unfortunately, has not been very clear on how this personal stage can be 
realized, how to provide effective care that is tailored to the individual patient's needs and 
interests. 
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The solution to the problem that is suggested traditionally (as well as by Von 
Gebsattel) is to presume that medicine (and health care) is a science as well as an art. 
Scientific medicine becomes an art by the clinician's ability to adequately judge what is 
unique about the individual and, more importantly, balance these individualist insights 
with the generalist categories of biomedical science and technique. 
This act of balancing must be the prerogative of the care provider because it requires 
personal engagement, an attitude of hope, and the willingness to take risks on the part of 
both patient and provider. It cannot be taken over by third persons. And consequently, 
such third persons can neither evaluate in full the undertakings of those engaged in the 
provision of health care. But that is not to say that health care providers do not carry 
respons(e)-ibility; they are not immune to critical evaluations. Conductive reasoning 
should warrant contentful yet cogent ethical discourse between care providers, patients and 
third persons. 
However, as mentioned before, conduction is logically nonconclusive. The single 
most important source of this nonconclusivity - besides the formal structure of the 
argument - is the patient's individuality. A human being's unique selfhood, what makes 
him a person unlike any other person, cannot be spoken about without already being 
translated into more generalist categories. Now, respect for a patient's personhood does 
not entail patient abandonment. In the context of a care-ful human relationship, respect 
not only allows for but requires benevolent guidance. It does not, however, allow for 
forceful infringements on patient's free, in the sense of authentic, choices. 
It follows, then, that I advocate a kind of »blend« of the paternalism and autonomy 
models of the patient-provider relationship. The difference between Pellegrino and 
Thomasma's blend and my blend, is that they accept the black-box assumption underlying 
the autonomy-model yet advocate a paternalistic action-theory, whereas I accept the 
anthropological hypothesis underlying the paternalism model, yet argue that an autonomy-
based model nonetheless ought to be chosen as action-theory. It is concluded that 
notwithstanding the importance of a prudent balance of power, the proper task of clinical 
ethics is to develop a cogent discourse that is grounded in an anthropological understand-
ing of the personal worlds of patients and clinicians, and that can guide them towards a 
careful and trustworthy relationship. 
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Het EERSTE HOOFDSTUK van dit proefschrift begint met een korte analyse van de 
diverse vormen van kritiek die praktiserende artsen hebben geuit over het gebrek aan 
toepasbaarheid in de klinische praktijk van vele hedendaagse bioethische opvattingen en 
gedachten. Ik concludeer dat zij terecht pleiten voor een theorie van de bioethiek die 
relevant is voor de praktijk, in die zin dat zo'n theorie artsen, verpleegkundigen en andere 
verzorgenden bij de klinische zorg die zij aan individuele patiënten bieden, moet kunnen 
raden. Het kan niet ontkend worden dat de theoretici van de bioethiek vooralsnog 
onvoldoende gehoor hebben gegeven aan dit pleidooi. 
Nu is het niet zo dat dit pleidooi voor een theorie van de klinische ethiek onopge-
merkt is gebleven. Maar de pogingen van hedendaagse theoretici om aan de verwachtingen 
van clinici tegemoet te komen, geschieden vrijwel altijd vanuit het vooraf gegeven 
methodologische kader van de zogenaamde »toegepaste ethiek«. Toegepaste ethiek wordt 
verfijnd om zo het ethische discours over de individuele patiënt te kunnen plaatsen. Deze 
pogingen zijn ontoereikend, omdat toepassing van ethische theorieën op de klinische 
situatie ofwel in een vrijblijvend ethisch discours over de betreffende casus resulteert 
ofwel leidt tot een logisch-dwingende dialoog die echter de unieke karakteristieken van de 
betreffende casus onvoldoende in zich kan opnemen. Het meest eigenlijke probleem blijft 
onopgelost: Hoe kan een dwingend discours ontwikkeld worden dat voldoende recht doet 
aan de meer of minder unieke aspecten van de klinische casus, in het bijzonder aan de 
individuele patiënt in diens eigen situatie. 
Met nadruk zij opgemerkt dat de fundamentele vraag die aan dit proefschrift ten 
grondslag ligt, niet luidt of klinische ethiek (in de praktische zin van het woord) überhaupt 
mogelijk is. De vraag is veeleer onder welke voorwaarden een dergelijk discours mogelijk 
is, ervan uitgaand dat dat discours inderdaad mogelijk is. Het gaat dus niet om de 
mogelijkheid van klinische ethiek, maar om de voorwaarden die a priori aan deze 
mogelijkheid gesteld moeten worden; niet waardoor klinische ethiek mogelijk is, maar 
waarom. 
In het eerste deel van het TWEEDE HOOFDSTUK onderbouw ik de stelling dat het 
eigenlijke doel van de ethiek is om een dwingend discours te ontwikkelen dat mensen kan 
loodsen naar moreel gedrag door een bepaalde handelswijze voor te stellen (i.t.t. op te 
leggen). Ik bespreek verschillende »conventionele« bioethische methoden om een derge-
lijke handelswijze met een zekere logica voor te stellen (deductivisme, inductivisme, 
casuïstiek en situatie ethiek). Ofschoon deze vier methoden bouwstenen leveren voor een 
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theorie van klinische ethiek, verschaffen zij onvoldoende inzicht in de mogelijkheidsvoor-
waarden van het klinisch-ethische discours. 
Deze korte bespreking van hedendaagse pogingen om de toegepaste ethiek te 
verfijnen dwingt ons tot een hernieuwd onderzoek naar de structuur van het beoogde 
discours: Wat is de aard van het dwingende discours dat de toegepaste ethiek biedt op een 
meer theoretisch vlak en dat voorstanders van een klinische ethiek zouden willen ontwik-
kelen op het niveau van de zorg voor de individuele patiënt? Om deze vraag te kunnen 
beantwoorden onderzoek ik eerst het mechanisme van overreding om zo de essentie van 
ethische dwingendheid op het spoor te komen. Daarna evalueer ik een vijfde kandidaat 
voor een methode van discoursontwikkeling: conductie. Conductie kan worden gedefi-
nieerd als een argumentatieproces waarbij een conclusie wordt getrokken (maar niet 
logisch-dwingend afgeleid) over een individuele casus, uitgaand van een of meer premis-
sen over de casus, doch zonder beroep te doen op andere casus. Deze definitie onder-
streept nog eens het verschil tussen conductie enerzijds en deductie en inductie anderzijds. 
De dwingendheid wordt in het geval van conductie vooral door de inhoud van het 
argument gegarandeerd. 
Het gebrek aan formele structuur en het gewicht van de inhoud voor de graad van 
dwingendheid van conductieve argumenten beletten de ontwikkeling van een logica van 
conductieve argumenten die onafhankelijk is van de ethiek. Men kan de validiteit van 
conductieve argumenten derhalve niet bepalen, als men de morele inhoud negeert. Dat 
betekent tevens dat de dwingendheid van een conductief argument slechts kan worden 
vastgesteld via een proces van »reproduktie« (Ger.: Nachvollziehung) van het argument, 
van hernieuwde overdenking die wel of niet resulteert in een oordeel van erkenning en 
beaming. Een conductief argument zal niet eerst en vooral worden geaccepteerd vanwege 
zijn logische vorm, maar omdat het mensen aangaat, omdat het hen inspireert tot 
navolging en omdat de concrete inhoud hen overtuigt. 
Indien de structuur van het klinisch-ethische discours inderdaad conductief van aard 
is, dan is een nauwkeurige interpretatie van de elementen van de betreffende casus 
noodzakelijk. Dat onderstreept wederom het belang van de »morele onderscheidingskracht« 
en »praktische wijsheid« van diegenen die betrokken zijn bij de zorg van patiënten. 
Aangezien de inzichten waaruit een dergelijke wijsheid bestaat zich niet laten beschrijven 
in rationele termen, kan de structuur van het klinisch ethische discours slechts worden 
verhelderd door middel van een analyse van het persoonlijke »ethos« van de zorgverlener. 
In de literatuur zijn twee zwaarwegende bezwaren geopperd tegen de idee van een 
dergelijke praktische wijsheid, (i) Zij bestaat, maar is slechts bereikbaar voor diegenen die 
beroepshalve werkzaam zijn in de zorgverlening. Zij is, met andere woorden, het 
prerogatief van clinici, (ii) Zij bestaat niet op enigerlei betekenisvolle wijze. Problemati-
sche casus moeten dan ook op een andere wijze worden opgelost (ni. via contractuele 
overeenkomsten). In het DERDE HOOFDSTUK wordt het eerste (i) bezwaar onderzocht. 
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Ik betoog dat aan het concept van een professioneel »ethos« inderdaad een belangrijke 
functie toekomt binnen de klinische ethiek. Artsen hebben dikwijls gesteld dat medische 
ethiek bijzonder van aard is, hetgeen afzondering van de algemene ethiek rechtvaardigt: 
Klinische ethiek is een beroepsethiek (professional »ethic«). Deze thesis zou echter kunnen 
impliceren dat de praktische wijsheid van artsen zich grotendeels of zelfs geheel onttrekt 
aan een kritische evaluatie. Bioethici schuwen dan ook noties als »professionele wijsheid«, 
de »morele ervaring van professionele zorgverleners«, »medisch paternalisme«, en 
»buitengewone en de persoon overstijgende rechten en plichten van zorgverleners«. Nu 
kan er inderdaad slechts sprake zijn van een klinisch-eí/z¿sdz discours voor zover dat 
discours niet immuun is voor een kritische evaluatie: De gustibus non est disputandum, 
over smaak valt niet te twisten. Maar daaruit volgt niet dat er geen plaats kan zijn voor 
praktische wijsheid in een theorie van de klinische ethiek. 
Ik betoog dat er veel te zeggen is voor een professionele ethiek in de zin dat de 
inhoud van de relatie tussen patiënt en zorgverlener in belangrijke mate niet onderhevig 
kan zijn aan een kritische evaluatie. Indien de structuur van het klinisch-ethische discours 
wordt gekenmerkt door een voortdurend proces van interpretatie van de klinische situatie, 
dat inzichten voortbrengt die hun geldigheid ontlenen aan en overgebracht worden door 
conductief argumenteren, wat weer een horizon van morele betekenissen vooronderstelt 
die zorgverleners en patiënten delen, alsmede het soort persoonlijke ontvankelijkheid voor 
moreel relevante aangelegenheden en het soort praktische wijsheid waardoor patiënten en 
zorgverleners in staat zijn om de morele betekenis van de betreffende situatie in te 
schatten ~ dan moet dit proces (grotendeels) bepaald worden door en beperkt zijn tot de 
context van de gezondheidszorg. Enerzijds is de klinische situatie met al haar lijden, 
ziekte, handicaps, sterven en de dood zo vreemd aan het dagelijkse leven, dat de klinische 
ethiek aan die specificiteit recht moet doen. Anderzijds verschillen de handelingen die 
individuele zorgverleners en instellingen van gezondheidszorg verrichten in antwoord op 
die bijzondere situaties dermate van de dagelijkse menselijke praktijken, dat er met recht 
gesproken kan worden van een »professionele praktijk«. 
Een pleidooi voor een professionele praktijk en de daarmee samenhangende beroeps-
ethiek hoeft het klinisch-ethische discours niet automatisch terug te voeren tot subjectivis-
me, mits we kunnen aantonen dat we de relatie tussen patiënt en zorgverlener kunnen 
vatten (op enige redelijke en betekenisvolle wijze) als een morele relatie, als een relatie 
die gefundeerd is in moraliteit. Met andere woorden: De voorwaarden die een dergelijke 
beroepsgebonden ethiek mogelijk maken, moeten worden verhelderd. In Hoofdstuk 3 
onderzoek ik dan ook de verschillende modellen van een professionele ethiek. Na een 
meer gedetailleerde specificering van de notie van een beroepsethiek onderzoek ik of er 
überhaupt voldoende argumenten zijn voor een beroepsethiek, d.w.z. of de^praktijk van de 
gezondheidszorg zich voldoende onderscheidt van de dagelijkse praktijk. Ik bespreek 
verschillende aspecten van de zorgverleningspraktijk die vaak aangehaald worden als 
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fundering voor een beroepsethiek (zoals de bijzondere kennis en expertise van zorgverle-
ners en hun verondersteld buitengewoon altruisme), alsmede de zogenaamde »separatisti-
sche these«, die ervan uitgaat dat de beroepsethiek zo bijzonder is, dat er gesproken moet 
worden van een separate ethiek. Laatstgenoemde these zal ik verwerpen om vervolgens de 
betekenis van een beroepsmatige rol te onderzoeken. Deze discussie geeft aanleiding tot 
een hernieuwd onderzoek van de aard van de klinische »praktijk«. Ik betoog dat de 
praktijk van de klinische geneeskunde haar eigenheid ontleent aan het feit dat alle in dat 
kader verrichte handelingen altijd erop gericht zijn de belangen van de patiënt te dienen en 
ook in dat licht geëvalueerd moeten worden. 
Maar dat veronderstelt dat de zorgverlener ook in staat moet worden geacht om de 
belangen van zijn individuele patiënt in te schatten, om kennis te verwerven over de 
persoonsgebonden aard van de ziekte, de pijn, de angst en het lijden van zijn patiënt, 
alsmede van diens zin voor geluk, levensplan, belangen en waarden. Met andere woorden, 
het veronderstelt de mogelijkheid van intersubjectieve »sympathie« 
De idee van intersubjectieve sympathie zal van cruciaal belang blijken voor een 
theorie van de klinische ethiek zoals die verdedigd wordt in deze studie. Maar eerst wordt 
in het VIERDE HOOFDSTUK het tweede (ii) bezwaar tegen de notie van een beroepse-
thiek onderzocht: De radicale ontkenning van de mogelijkheid van zulke intersubjectiviteit 
en daarmee ook van de mogelijkheid überhaupt van een beroepsethiek. Ik laat zien dat de 
argumenten die wel ter ondersteuning van dit bezwaar worden aangevoerd, niet steekhou-
dend zijn. Bovendien ligt aan het aangevoerde alternatief, namelijk een contractueel 
model, dezelfde vooronderstelling die nou net aangevochten wordt, ten grondslag. Een 
nadere beschouwing van dat tweede bezwaar en van enkele in de literatuur beschreven, 
maar weinig overtuigende pogingen om niet in een contractueel model te blijven steken, 
brengen de twee belangrijkste oorzaken van die radicale ontkenning aan het licht die 
expliciet of impliciet in het werk van de beschreven auteurs naar voren komen. 
De eerste oorzaak karakteriseer ik als de »zwarte doos« (black-box) hypothese. Deze 
hypothese gaat ervan uit dat de communicatieve relatie van de mens tot de wereld door 
eenrichtingverkeer wordt gekenmerkt: De mens kent de wereld wel, maar de wereld de 
mens (voor zover hij een individu is) niet. Tenzij expliciet geuit, blijven de belangen van 
medemensen (zoals patiënten) voor derden verborgen. Mensen zijn morele vreemdelingen 
voor elkaar, niet omdat ze er verschillende morele opvattingen op na houden, maar omdat 
ieders interessen en morele waarden geheel voor de ander verborgen blijven. 
De moraal wordt dan een privé-aangelegenheid, want de moraal wordt enerzijds 
geacht (vrijwel) geheel een kwestie van persoonlijke voorkeur te zijn: Er bestaat heden ten 
dage een pluraliteit van morele opvattingen die elkaar veelal uitsluiten, maar toch even 
waar(achtig) zouden zijn; er bestaat in elk geval geen goede methode om die opvattingen 
te evalueren en geschillen te beslechten. Anderzijds is de moraal een privé aangelegenheid 
in die zin dat de morele voorkeuren van individuen, hun persoonlijk morele kader, 
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ontoegankelijk is voor derden. Individuen zijn de enige (en dus de beste) beoordelaars van 
hun eigen goed. Er kan dan ook maar aan één moreel principe algemeen verbindende 
geldigheid worden toegekend in deze pluralistische leefwereld: het zelfbeschikkingsrecht. 
De enige manier om anderen goed te doen is het zelfbeschikkingsrecht van elke mens te 
erkennen en te respecteren — natuurlijk binnen de grenzen die datzelfde recht stelt waar 
het derden betreft. Om dit te garanderen moeten er procedures worden opgesteld. 
Hetzelfde geldt voor de relatie tussen patiënt en hulpverlener. Ook die relatie wordt 
genormeerd door het principe van respect voor elkanders zelfbeschikkingsrecht en 
procedurele rechtvaardigheid. 
Het zal duidelijk zijn dat dit perspectief, dat de mogelijkheid van klinische ethiek in 
twijfel trekt, grote relevantie heeft voor mijn eigen studie. Na de meer procedurele versie 
van de liberale benadering van de bioethiek te hebben besproken - zoals die verdedigd 
wordt door de vooraanstaande bioethicus Engelhardt in diens boek The Foundations of 
Bioethics [1986] (en in gewijzigde vorm door Veatch) -, beschouw ik het werk van 
auteurs (b.v. Beauchamp, Childress, Faden, McCullough en Miller) die weliswaar het 
primaat van het principe van de autonomie onderschrijven, maar een minder procedurele 
interpretatie van autonomie voorstaan. Verwijzend naar een klinische casus over een 
patiënt die voortzetting van dialyse weigert, bespreek ik vier interpretaties van autonomie 
die telkens een graad substantiëler van aard zijn. Toch concludeer ik dat elk van deze 
interpretaties faalt als overtuigend alternatief voor Engelhardts liberale interpretatie, omdat 
zij alle vier - mijns inziens ten onrechte - vooronderstellen dat patiënten en zorgverleners 
morele vreemdelingen zijn ten opzichte van elkaar, die geen weet hebben van elkanders 
goed. 
Ik vervolg derhalve met Pellegrino's en Thomasma's verdediging van de opdracht 
van zorgverleners tot weldoen. Ik beargumenteer dat Pellegrino en Thomasma terecht de 
nadruk leggen op het goed van de patiënt in plaats van op de vrijheid tot het nemen van 
beslissingen. Toch slagen zij er niet in hun (en mijn) doel te bereiken. Een nauwkeurige 
analyse van hun benadering leert ons echter wel meer over de oorzaken van dat falen, in 
elk geval over de hierboven al aangekaarte tweede oorzaak van de neiging van heden-
daagse bioethici om slechts in liberale termen te denken: De opvatting dat het de taak van 
de ethiek is om het fundament voor beleid te leggen en, daaruit voortvloeiend, de 
preoccupatie met het oplossen van problemen, besliskunde en procedure. Het onderscheid 
tussen welwillendheid (benevolence) en weldoen (beneficence), tussen het goed van de 
patiënt nastreven en het ten uitvoer brengen, wordt te vaak over het hoofd gezien. Dit 
onderscheid zal derhalve opnieuw aan de orde worden gesteld in het laatste hoofdstuk van 
deze studie, en wel nadat in de tussenliggende twee hoofdstukken de wijsgerige basis is 
gelegd voor een alternatieve, substantiële theorie van de klinische ethiek. 
Daarmee zijn we beland bij het VIJFDE HOOFDSTUK. Dit hoofdstuk wil een 
alternatief schetsen voor de »zwarte doos« hypothese dat de mens niet toegankelijk is voor 
314 SAMENVATTING 
derden. Zoals Scheler al in 1926 in zijn boek over de sympathie schreef, is het probleem 
hoe de ander als ander te kennen een van de meest fundamentele thema's uit de wijsgerige 
antropologie. Met Scheler laat ik echter zien dat een overtuigend argument kan worden 
geleverd voor de mogelijkheid van intersubjectieve »sympathie«. Ik gebruik die term in de 
letterlijke betekenis van »samen voelen«, »meevoelen« met een ander, een bepaald besef of 
ervaring »delen«. Deze notie van sympathie is niet nieuw in de geschiedenis van de 
wijsbegeerte. Zij gaat terug tot de antieke metafysica. Tot de bekende voorstanders van 
een ethiek op basis van sympathie moeten de Britse Moralisten van de achttiende eeuw 
worden gerekend (т.п. Butler, Smith en Hume). Toch hebben deze auteurs uiteindelijk 
niet de mogelijkheid van echte intersubjectiviteit aangetoond, maar juist de zwarte-doos 
hypothese bevestigd. Voor een meer overtuigend alternatief moeten we bij twintigste-
eeuwse filosofen als Scheler en Lévinas te rade gaan. 
Ofschoon Scheler de betekenis van sympathie voor een ethische theorie onderkent, 
meent hij toch dat een ethiek op basis van sympathie circulair is. Maar die conclusie 
wordt aangevochten door Lévinas. Deze stelt dat een normatief element onmiddellijk 
aanwezig is in het »gelaat« van de ander. Dat wil zeggen: Mijn medemens stelt een 
dwingende norm. Mijn medemens verschijnt nooit als ding onder andere dingen, maar 
altijd als een bijzondere andere mens die mij oproept. Op grond van dit inzicht kwam 
Lévinas tot de uitspraak dat de ethiek en niet de metafysica de prima philosophia is. 
Wil echter een begrip van de ander in diens anders-zijn ook praktische uitwerking 
vinden, dan is een proces van hermeneuse, van interpretatie vereist. Elke interpretatie van 
het bijzondere anderszijn van de ander veronderstelt op haar beurt weer een interpreta-
tieve, betekenisvolle horizon, een meer algemeen begrip van anders-zijn. Ofschoon die 
betekenisvolle horizon ontstaat in het proces van interpreteren, kan die horizon toch niet 
uit het niets voortkomen. Maar zij kan evenmin uit de casus alleen kan worden afgeleid, 
wil er voldoende afstand blijven tussen de unieke aspecten van de casus en de betekenis-
volle horizon, zodat de interpretatie ook het karakter heeft van een echte waardering. De 
interpretatieve horizon moet derhalve verankerd zijn in een voorgegeven existentieel besef, 
een antropologie waarbinnen de feiten van de casus op een betekenisverrijkende manier 
kunnen worden geordend. En hiermee hebben we het thema van het ZESDE 
HOOFDSTUK aangesneden. 
Uitgangspunt van dit hoofdstuk is dus het inzicht dat een theorie van de klinische 
ethiek gegrond zal moeten zijn in een medische antropologie waarin ten eerste 's mensens 
pijn, zwakte, ouderdom, lijden, etc. zin krijgen. Dat wil natuurlijk niet zeggen dat pijn en 
lijden, of zelfs maar ouderdom en dood, een positieve waarde moeten krijgen, laat staan 
nastrevenswaardig zouden zijn. Het gaat er veeleer om dat het mogelijk moet zijn om deze 
fenomenen een betekenis te geven, ze te beschrijven, te analyseren, te begrijpen en te 
evalueren. Ze moeten situeerbaar zijn in de interpretatieve horizon van de menselijke 
existentie, wil een theorie van de klinische ethiek mogelijk zijn. Zonder interpretatie zou 
SAMENVATTING 315 
er een onoverbrugbare kloof blijven bestaan tussen hen die in nood zijn en hen die hulp 
zouden willen bieden, maar dat niet kunnen, omdat hun onbekend blijft welke zorg 
»objectief« gezien geboden is door het lijden van de patiënt. 
Ten tweede moet een dergelijke antropologie - om als fundament te kunnen dienen -
zin kunnen geven aan het fenomeen van de »zorg« in de zin van »zorg verlenen«: Waarom 
merkt de mens de noodkreet van zijn medemens op en geeft gehoor aan diens roep om 
bijstand? Waarom zouden we delen in het verzwakte leven van de ander? Waarom zou het 
leven van de ander zo belangrijk zijn, dat het zelfs een norm stelt die hoger is dan de 
eigen norm? 
Genoemde vragen zijn er natuurlijk niet op gericht om het »bewijs« te leveren dat de 
normen die ons in de sympathie blijken, ook moreel juist zijn. Een dergelijke poging zou 
in feite de notie van de sympathische intersubjectiviteit en normativiteit volledig ondermij-
nen. Het gaat om een begrip van het mens-zijn waarin medemenselijkheid niet secundair, 
maar primair is; of in elk geval van gelijke oorsprong als de menselijke individualiteit. 
Dan kunnen fenomenen als sympathie en zorg de basis vormen van de relatie tussen 
patiënt en zorgverlener en van »contracten« die eventueel in die context worden opgesteld, 
in plaats van het omgekeerde. De sympathie mag dan de »sluitsteen« zijn in de boog van 
klinisch redeneren die zorgverlener en patiënt met elkaar verbindt. Maar sluitsteen en 
boog veronderstellen wel dat de twee pilaren, namelijk patiënt en hulpverlener, in principe 
»boogbaar« zijn. Een mogelijkheidsvoorwaarde van sympathie is dus een antropologische 
begrip van de mens dat een dergelijke primaire verbondenheid, een notie "quasi organi-
sche eenheid" in Plotinus' woorden, insluit. 
Ongetwijfeld is het onderwerp dat we in dit hoofdstuk aan de orde stellen, nog 
omvattender dan dat in het voorafgaande hoofdstuk. Het is onmogelijk om in het bestek 
van één hoofdstuk zelfs maar een korte samenvatting te geven van de vele geschriften over 
de menselijke aard - al zouden we ons beperken tot teksten met een directe relevantie voor 
de context van de gezondheidszorg - en tevens recht te doen aan de scherpzinnigheid van 
de verschillende analyses. Dit hoofdstuk zal derhalve, meer nog dan het vorige, een 
eclectisch karakter hebben. Ik grasduin in auteurs als Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, Marcel, 
Scheler en Mounier en kies uit hun werk wat in dit project te pas komt. Mijn haast om 
hun antropologische inzichten te correleren aan mijn eigen project zal ook blijken uit de 
periodieke (zij het niet systematische) evaluatieve verwijzigingen naar de klinische context 
(wat eigenlijk het onderwerp is van het laatste hoofdstuk). Deze verwijzingen zullen soms 
nogal direct en confronterend zijn in plaats van behoedzaam en prudent. Met name ten 
aanzien van Heideggers ontologische opus Sein und Zeit zou tegengeworpen kunnen 
worden dat een dergelijke confrontatie onvoldoende recht doet aan de eigenheid van dat 
boek. Maar ik ben dan ook niet uit op een redelijke, laat staan alomvattende evaluatie van 
Heidegger; ik wil slechts laten zien welke les hij en andere wijsgeren de bioethiek leren. 
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Ik neem de liberale traditie in de bioethiek, zoals die verdedigd wordt door bijvoor-
beeld Engelhardt, wederom als uitgangspunt en wel om twee redenen. Ten eerste heeft 
Engelhardt betoogd dat het onmogelijk is om te komen tot een algemeen aanvaard begrip 
van de menselijke natuur. Ik laat zien dat zijn bioethische theorie desalniettemin op 
impliciete maar onmiskenbare wijze een bepaald mensbeeld vooronderstelt, ook ten 
aanzien van de zieke mens. Het is in feite dat mensbeeld dat de fundering vormt van 
Engelhardts liberale bioethiek. Maar ook al blijkt Engelhardts antropologie in verschil-
lende opzichten deficiënt, toch heeft zij ook haar sterke kanten waarvan elke alternatieve 
theorie zich rekenschap zal moeten geven. En dat vormt de tweede reden. 
De ontwikkeling van een dergelijke, meer overtuigende fundering van een theorie 
van de klinische ethiek begint met de analyse van verschillende existentiële antropologieën 
waarin authenticiteit in plaats van autonome zelfgenoegzaamheid als uitgangspunt fungeert. 
Ik laat zien dat een ethiek van de authenticiteit beter de tweeledige aard van de mens 
weerspiegelt: Enerzijds geschapen en anderzijds scheppend zijn, gevormd en vormend 
zijn, in het leven geworpen en vrijelijk in het leven staand, maar ook ziek wordend en 
ziekte te boven komend. Binnen een dergelijk ethisch kader krijgen fenomenen als pijn, 
handicap, ouderdom, lijden en dood meer zin, ofwel 's mensens wezenlijke afhankelijk-
heid van de zorg van zijn medemens. Opvallend is echter dat in een dergelijke ethiek van 
de authenticiteit het fenomeen van de zorgverlening maar moeilijk een plaats gegeven kan 
worden. In een existentialistisch denkkader blijft de mens teruggeworpen op zichzelf en 
blijft hij uiteindelijk even eenzaam als in een liberaal denkkader. 
Een vruchtbare aanzet tot een antropologie waarin zowel het menselijke verlangen tot 
het ontvangen van zorg als tot zorgverlenen een plaats krijgen, vinden we in Marcels 
filosofie van de hoop. De meerwaarde van de hoop in vergelijking tot de eerder genoemde 
antropologische grondbeginselen ligt in de gemeenschappelijke, intersubjectieve weg naar 
de openheid van de toekomst. De existentialistische bezorgdheid om het aspect van de 
geworpenheid, die ook niet kan worden teniet gedaan via de eigen vrijheid, kan men 
echter wel te boven komen door hoop te stellen in de creatieve mogelijkheden van 
medemensen. 
Marcels nogal speculatieve filosofie van de hoop wint aan overtuigingskracht, 
wanneer zij wordt verankerd in een personalistische antropologie. Ongetwijfeld roept de 
introductie van het persoonsbegrip weer allerlei nieuwe vragen op, al ware het maar, 
omdat dat begrip een van de meest veelzijdige is die de wijsgerige antropologie rijk is. 
Toch krijgt het fenomeen van de zorg, dat waarlijk fundamenteel is voor een theorie van 
de klinische ethiek en dat derhalve vanaf de aanvang van deze studie eigenlijk een vooraf 
gegeven vanzelfsprekendheid werd geacht, pas in een personalistische context voldoende 
zin en betekenis. 
Wanneer wij tenslotte terugkijken op de voorafgaande zes hoofdstukken, dan blijkt 
dat wij om dit meest vanzelfsprekende aspect van de alledaagse medische praktijk, 
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namelijk het zorgzame klinisch-ethische discours, te onderbouwen, een enorme omweg 
moesten maken die ons wegvoerde van de praktijk van alledag naar de wijsgerige wereld 
van ontologische grondbeginselen, maar die ons nu - in het ZEVENDE HOOFDSTUK -
ook weer terugvoert naar de praktische implicaties van die theoretische reflecties. In dit 
hoofdstuk wordt opnieuw de relatie tussen patiënt en zorgverlener beschouwd in het licht 
van de vragen uit het tweede, derde en vierde hoofdstuk en de bevindingen van het vijfde 
en zesde. Het eerste deel van dit hoofdstuk is gewijd aan een bespreking van één auteur, 
Von Gebsattel, die als filosoof goed bekend was met het werk van contemporaine 
wijsgeren als Heidegger en Scheler, maar zelf eerst en vooral praktiserend psychiater was. 
Een van Von Gebsattels belangrijkste publikaties betreft de relatie tussen arts en patiënt. 
Hij onderscheidt drie fasen: 1. De elementair-sympathieke fase, 2. de diagnostisch-
therapeutische, en 3. de personale fase. 
1. Als zorg inderdaad een grondbeginsel is voor de antropologie, wordt het inzich-
telijk dat de mens op sympathische wijze de noden van zijn medemens begrijpt en tevens 
gegrepen wordt door die noden. Deze primaire en dwingende menselijke intersubjectiviteit 
vormt de basis van de relatie tussen arts en patiënt, of, zoals Von Gebsattel deze ook wel 
noemt, de onmiddellijke fase van die relatie. De onmiddellijke intersubjectiviteit vormt de 
kern die erom vraagt ontwikkeld te worden - en dat ook kan - tot een relatie die het 
welzijn van de patiënt bevordert, omdat het sympathische karakter ervan de explicitatie 
van dat welzijn mogelijk maakt. 
2. Een effectieve relatie veronderstelt echter ook dat de hulpverlener weet hoe dat 
welzijn in concreto gerealiseerd kan worden. Om in dit soort »technische« informatie te 
voorzien is een complex systeem van medische wetenschappen ontwikkeld dat in toene-
mende mate succesrijk is gebleken. Maar het medisch-wetenschappelijke perspectief vergt 
ook van de arts dat hij afstand neemt van de individualiteit van zijn patiënt en de vraag 
naar het persoonlijke welzijn van zijn patiënt vertaalt in de vraag naar het welzijn van 
patiënten meer in het algemeen, waardoor het echter weer moeilijker wordt om zicht te 
houden op het persoonsgebonden welzijn van de individuele patiënt. 
3. Het herstel van de verhouding tussen patiënt en arts, zoals die in de eerste fase 
was ontstaan, maar weer verbroken werd in de tweede, vormt de essentie van de derde 
fase. Von Gebsattel heeft helaas veel minder duidelijk beschreven hoe die derde fase 
gerealiseerd kan worden, hoe effectieve zorg verleend kan worden die toch afgestemd is 
op de noden en belangen van de individuele patiënt. 
Het antwoord dat traditioneel (en ook door Von Gebsattel) gegeven wordt, luidt dat 
geneeskunde (en gezondheidszorg) zowel wetenschap als kunst is. Wetenschappelijke 
geneeskunde wordt tot kunst door de bekwaamheid van de arts om goed in te schatten wat 
uniek is aan het betreffende individuele geval en vooral om de patiëntgebonden inzichten 
in evenwicht te brengen met de algemene categorieën van biomedische wetenschap en 
techniek. 
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Dit balanceren moet het prerogatief zijn van de zorgverlener, omdat het persoonlijk 
engagement vereist, een attitude die in het teken van de hoop staat, en de bereidheid van 
patient én hulpverlener om risico's te nemen Daarom kan dat balanceren ook met 
eenvoudig door derden worden overgenomen En om dezelfde reden kunnen derden ook 
met de praktijken van zorgverleners volkomen evalueren Maar dat betekent niet dat 
zorgverleners geen ver-antwoord-elijkheid dragen, ZIJ zijn met gevrijwaard van kritische 
evaluaties Conducüef redeneren moet een dwingend en inhoudelijk discours russen 
zorgverleners, patiënten en derden waarborgen 
Zoals echter hierboven al is opgemerkt, leidt conductief redeneren logisch gezien met 
tot dwingende conclusies De belangrijkste oorzaak - naast de formele structuur van het 
argument - is gelegen m de individualiteit van de patient Over het unieke zelf van de 
mens, dat wat hem tot een persoon maakt als geen ander, kan niet worden gesproken 
zonder dat het reeds is vertaald in categorieën van meer algemene strekking Respect voor 
de persoon van de patient vergt echter niet dat de patient alleen gelaten zou moeten 
worden In de context van een zorgzame intermenselijke relatie laat respect met alleen 
weldadige sturing toe, maar vereist dat zelfs Het staat echter geen gedwongen inbreuken 
toe op de vrije, in de zin van authentieke keuzen van de patient 
Hieruit volgt dat ik, evenals Pellegrino en Thomasma, de paternalistische en de op 
autonomie gecentreerde modellen van de relatie tussen patient en hulpverlener met elkaar 
verweef Het verschil met genoemde auteurs is dat zij de zwarte-doos assumptie onder-
schrijven, die aan het autonomie-model ten grondslag ligt maar een paternalistische 
handelingstheorie verdedigen, terwijl ik de antropologische vooronderstelling van het 
paternalisme wel onderschrijf, maar betoog dat - niettegenstaande het belang van een 
prudente machtsbalans - het de eigenlijke taak van de klinische ethiek is om een dwingend 
discours te ontwikkelen dat is gegrond in een antropologisch begrip van de persoonlijke 
werelden van patiënten en clinici en dat hen kan loodsen naar een relatie die gekenmerkt 
wordt door zorg en vertrouwen 
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TYPOGRAPHIC SIGNS 
Du. Dutch 
Eng. English 
Fr. French 
Ger. German 
Gr. Greek 
It. Italian 
Lat. Latin 
blabla.3 See footnote 3 at bottom of page (may be continued on next page). 
1987b More than one 1987 article of this author is quoted or paraphrased in this study 
(see Bibliography for different 1987 references). 
italics typographic emphasis to: 
1. point the reader's attention to the word (group) (e.g., every situation in 
need of a moral evaluation is always and necessarily a unique situation); 
or 
2. mark an unusual word group (e.g., the α priori nature of ethics is not a 
matter of subjective opinion); or 
3. to indicate the title of a book or chapter (e.g., Fletcher's Situation 
Ethics is one of the best known examples of situation ethics. 
» ... « semantic emphasis to remind the reader that the word (group) is being used in 
a specific and sometimes uncommon meaning 
" ... " literal quotation from other author. 
' ... ' 1. indicates a statement by a hypothetical third person; or 
2. replaces any double quotation marks used by the quoted author in the quoted 
fragment. 
[ ] reference to a publication listed in the Bibliography. 
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[p. ..] reference to a page of the work of the author quoted literally 
Without additional bibliographic information about the author and his work, 
the quote is taken from the same source as the preceding quote or para-
phrase. 
[see p. ..] reference to a page of the work of an author paraphrased 
Without additional bibliographic information about the author and his work, 
the paraphrase is taken from the same source as the preceding paraphrase or 
quote. 
(see p. ..) reference to a page in this book 
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Abandonment: 280 
Abandonneront: 262 
Abortion: 53, 78, 98, 244 
Absurdity: 214, 223 
Accident: 187 
Action theory: 126, 128 
Actions: 58 
definition: 17, 18 
in relation to knowledge and values: 
66, 71, 88, 89 
versus actors: 81 
Acton: 319 
Adam and Eve: 197, 245 
Adduction: 49 
Advance directives: 289 
Aesthetics 
see ethics 
Agape: 91 
Agich: 202, 230, 319 
Aid (Sartre): 215 
AIDS: 252 
Alexander de Hales: 319 
Alienation: 255 
Altruism of professionals: 71, 75, 76, 
91 
Ambiguity: 135, 214 
American dream: 200 
American Medical Association: vii, 6, 
65, 69, 81, 82, 115, 123, 125, 
200, 201, 245, 251, 260, 286, 
319, 323, 329-332 
1847 code of ethics: 69, 200 
Amor fati: 225 
Analogy: 41, 48, 56 
Anamnesis: 242 
Anscombe: 38, 319 
Anthropology: see ethics 
Antibiotics: 106 
the Anyone / das Man (Heidegger): 
210-211 
Apocalypse: 194 
Appelbaum: 319 
Appleton Consensus: 27 
Applied ethics: 6, 7, 15 
and casuistry: 48 
Aquinas: 237, 238, 319 
Arguments 
deductive arguments: 35 
ethical versus epistemological: 32 
theoretical versus practical: 38 
Aristotle: vii, 6, 16, 37, 38, 43, 45, 
183, 319, 172 
Art: 270-272 
versus science in medicine: 270 
Aspirations: 17 
Augustine: 102 
Auschwitz: 174, 175 
Autarchic experiences: 191 
Authenticity: 122, 203 
and conjoint measurement of utili-
ties: 268 
and respectability: 212 
etymology: 204 
in art: 226 
versus bad/good faith: 214 
Authority: 27, 33, 34, 283 
doctrinal authority: 33, 53 
fallacy from authority: 53 
Autobiography: 205 
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Autonomy: 115, 116, 201, 286, 287 
as a right of noninterference: 202 
as being left alone: 99 
as transcendental condition of ethics: 
99 
Miller's four variations: 119 
versus heteronomy: 24 
Availability: 225 
Awe: 258 
Bad faith: 213 
Bailey: 117, 319 
Barnard: 263 
Bayles: 69, 319 
Beauchamp: viii, 6, 7, 94, 115, 116, 
119, 121, 123, 124,211,212, 
217, 302, 313, 319, 322 
Beauvoir, de: 213, 320 
Beggar: 157, 173-175, 180-182, 244 
Behaviorism: 31 
Being-for-itself 
versus being-for-others: 213, 230 
Bell: 203, 213-215, 320 
Beneficence: 125 
as respect for patient 
self-determination: 94 
versus benevolence: 126, 128, 138 
Benevolent maleficence: 276, 287 
Berg: 65, 320 
Berlin: 261, 320, 321, 323, 324, 330 
Bernstein: 272 
Biblia Sacra: 320 
Binswanger: 239, 240, 251 
Bioethics 
criticism from practitioners: 3, 32 
definition: 16 
meaning of the term: 16 
new discipline: 3, 65 
problem-solving: 4 
Black-box: 130, 197 
definition: 127 
Blaiberg: 263 
Blank: 224, 320 
Body: 202 
Body experience: 146 
Boethius: 237, 320 
Bollnow: 225, 228, 230, 231, 242, 
320 
Bosk: 261, 320 
Bougas: 220, 320 
Bowie: 83, 85, 320 
Boyle: 102, 320 
Bräutigam: 251 
Breast amputation: 265 
British Moralists: 149 
Brody: 42, 320 
Brugmans: 155, 320 
Buber: 173, 239, 240 
Buchler: 49, 320 
Butler: 12, 149, 150, 157, 158, 171, 
303, 314, 320 
Buytendijk: 251 
Callahan: 61, 113, 320 
Callicles: 180-182 
Camus: 13, 18, 93, 198, 199, 205, 
214, 218, 223, 224, 246, 304, 
315, 320 
Cancer - chosing between therapies: 
267 
Cantrell: 137, 321 
Caplan: 136, 321 
Care: 175, 198, 216, 242-244 
providing care: 229 
Carson: 321 
Carter: 227, 228, 321 
Cartwright: 164, 321 
Caruso: 251, 252, 321 
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Case 
of Jehova's Wittness patient: 261, 
295 
of Mr. Jones: 116, 219, 222, 293 
refusing treament (taken from Chil-
dress): 219, 222, 226 
Case law: 41 
Case book: 46 
Cassell: 169, 192, 321 
Casuistry: 34, 42, 46 
versus situation ethics: 47, 48 
CELAZ: 321 
Certainty - lack thereof: 133 
Chance - versus choice: 222 
Cherry: 169, 321 
Children: 288 
Childress: viii, 6, 7, 52, 94, 115, 
116, 121, 123, 124, 138,202, 
219, 222, 226, 289, 302, 313, 
319, 321 
Chismar: 159, 167, 321 
Choice: 209, 213, 218, 219 
and determination: 218 
of cancer therapy: 267 
versus chance: 222 
Christ: 236, 238, 239, 258 
Christian: 251 
Churchill: 151, 200, 201, 245, 321 
Cicero: 235, 236, 321 
Circle: 193 
Circularity in ethics: 20, 54, 193 
and the concept of the person: 234 
Civil disobedience: 82 
Clinical efhicists: 27 
Clinical ethics 
definition: 5 
function: 9, 10 
method: 5, 21 
versus applied ethics: 6 
versus clinical medicine: 43 
Clinical medicine versus medical 
science: 44, 52, 58 
Co-realization: 168 
Codes of ethics: 16, 87 (see also 
AMA) 
Coercion: 281, 286, 290 
Cogency: 15, 171 
Commitment: 232 
Communication in the patient-provider 
relationship: 259 
Community: 201 
Community of feeling: 158 
Competency: 118, 119, 122, 202, 289 
Compliance: 117 
Conditionality: 58 
Conduction: 53, 55, 273 
and conversion: 273 
definition: 55 
versus sympathie imagination: 151 
Confidentiality: 84, 85 
Conflict of duties: 185 
Conflict resolution: 132 
Conflicting moral experiences: 180 
Conflicts: 283 
settling versus solving: 278 
Congar: 102, 321 
Conjoint measurement of utilities: 267 
Conscience: 33, 34, 192 
Consensus: 28 
and moral language: 114 
as all-partial perspective: 115 
in the natural sciences: 105 
on outcomes: 113 
Consent - etymology: 276 
Consistence: 289 
Consistency: 122, 124, 217, 218, 222 
Contract: 115 
Contracts: 260 
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Contractual model: 113 
Contrast experience: 175 
Convergence of evidence: 56 
Conversation: 60, 61 
versus conversion: 61 
Conversation ethics: 61, 113, 114 
Conversion: 98, 101, 102, 104, 273 
definition: 101, 102 
etymology: 102 
in Hume's theory of moral senti-
ment: 155, 164 
intellectual, moral and religious: 
102 
versus conversation: 61 
via conduction: 273 
Countertransference: 263, 269 
Craemer-Ruegenberg: 321 
Creation: 242 
Curiosity: 209 
Daal, van: 267 
Dancy: 183, 184, 321 
Dasein: 208 
Daseinswelt: 241 
Debbie: vii, 47, 276, 319 
Decision-making: 277 
Deduction: 35, 39, 55 
versus conduction: 55 
versus induction: 36 
DeGrazia: 7, 35, 43, 52, 321 
Delden, van: 269, 321 
Deontology: 184 
Dependency: 202 
Depersonalization: 241 
Descartes: 59 
Despair: 225 
Destiny: 225 
Determination: 222 
Detoxication: 285 
Devettere: 75, 322 
Diagnosis: 189, 274 
Diagnostic-therapeutic stage: 255 
Dialysis: 116 
Dissensus: 44, 101 
in the Christian Church: 101 
District Court of Alkmaar: 77-79, 322 
Distrust: 132, 260, 281 
Does de Willebois, van der: 4, 322 
Doubt: 59 
Downie: 70, 71, 73, 74, 82, 83, 86, 
322, 332 
Dualism: 202, 203 
Duty to refer: 290 
Edelstein: 84, 322 
Effective deliberation: 120, 121 
Effectiveness of medical treatment: 
264 
Effectiveness of treatment: 269 
Elementary-sympathetic stage: 255 
Emilsson: 147, 148, 322 
Emotions: 17, 31 
Engelhardt: viii, 13, 28, 31, 32, 61, 
92, 94-101, 104, 105, 108-113, 
115, 127, 133, 136, 139, 143, 
177, 199, 201, 204, 258, 278, 
279, 283, 284, 296, 302, 305, 
313, 316, 322 
Eschatology: 194 
Ethic: 67 
Ethical 
versus antiethical: 19 
versus nonethical: 19 
Ethical analysis - definition: 16 
Ethical arguments: 32-34 
circularity: 54 (see also circularity 
in ethics) 
logical terms: 56 
versus epistemological arguments: 
32 
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versus fallacies: 53 
versus love: 50 
versus practical behavior: 33, 34 
Ethics 
and aesthetics: 21, 50, 274 
and anthropology: 193, 206 
and ontology: 206 
as hermeneutics: 22 
as metapraxis: 186, 193 
definition: 6, 16, 19 
etymology: 16 
in relation to actions: 16 
limits: 19 
meaning of the term: 16 
versus business: 73 
versus ethic: 67 
versus etiquette: 19, 22, 24 
versus law: 23, 48, 77, 80, 134, 
137, 279, 281, 283 
versus logic: 35, 56 
versus meta-ethics: 21, 22, 66 
versus moral psychology: 177 
versus morality: 9, 16, 22 
versus politics: 21, 61, 113, 133 
versus science: 27, 30 
versus technology: 30, 136, 137 
Ethics committees: 27, 114, 131, 135, 
137 
Ethos: 46, 62, 67, 90, 91, 258 
versus professionalism: 259 
Etiquette: 22, 23 
definition: 22 
etymology: 23 
versus ethics: 19 
Euthanasia: 78, 285 
Dutch court cases: 77 
medical exception: 77 
Evalation - actor versus act: 184 
Evaluation - of provided care: 274 
Existentialism: 204, 206 
Experiences: 17, 45 
Experiments in ethics: 40 
Explanatory context - versus guiding 
context: 30 
Expression - the meaning thereof: 165 
Face - the human face as moral 
source: 172 
Facticity: 213 
Faden: 94, 115, 119, 123, 211, 212, 
302, 313, 322 
Faith - versus trust: 254 
Fallacies: 53 
formal versus nonformal: 53 
Fallacy of quatemio terminorum: 166, 
207 
Families: 279 
Farm: 49, 322 
Fatherhood: 298 
Feagin: 180, 323 
Feelings - private or shared: 165 
Feigl: 323 
Fellow-feeling: 157 
Ferreira: 153, 154, 157, 323 
Fisher: 4, 117, 323 
Fletcher: 48, 49, 48-52, 75, 323, 337 
Force: 98, 195, 257, 281, 285 
as patient pursuasion: 118 
indirect: 100 
sanctioned force: 100 
Force majeure: 79 
Francis: 102 
Free will: 33 
Freedom: 213, 214 
as obligation (Sartre): 214 
as transcendental condition of ethics: 
99 
two conceptions (Berlin): 261 
Freud: 257 
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Friendship: 85 
Fry: 243, 323 
Fuhrmann: 233, 323 
Future: 209, 217, 219-221 
Futurism: 220 
Gebsattel, von: 13, 240, 241, 
249-259, 264, 270, 276, 293, 
294, 296, 297, 306, 307, 317, 
321, 323, 324, 328, 334, 335 
Gelven: 206, 324 
Gewirth: 80, 81, 324 
Ghandi: 175 
Gillon: 6, 74, 76, 325 
Goals: 269 
Goals of medicine: 266 
Gogh, van: 175 
Good: 124, 125, 130 
assessment thereof: 267 
of different persons: 51, 72 
the medical versus patient's perspec-
tive: 264, 265, 268, 269 
who knows versus what is: 131 
Good faith: 213 
Goudge: 49, 325 
Grace: 101, 102 
Graeser: 147, 325 
Green: 52, 174, 275, 325, 326 
Green-Peace: 275 
Griffin: 243, 325 
Guardini: 239, 240 
Guiding context - versus explanatory 
context: 30 
Guignon: 211, 325 
Guilt: 208 
Gürtler: 148, 325 
Habermas: 172, 193, 325 
Harrison: 152, 325 
Hartmann: 239, 240 
Have, ten: 4, 15, 27, 109, 136, 203, 
252 
Haynes: 117, 325 
Heaven - on earth: 226 
Heidegger: viii, ix, 13, 123, 187-190, 
198-199, 204-212, 216-218, 220, 
223, 225, 229, 232, 242-243, 
246, 251, 304-306, 315, 317, 
324-326, 335 
Heim: 204, 206, 326 
Hell: 246 
Helm: 221, 326 
Hermeneutics: 22 
apophantic level: 187 
hermeneutic circle: 192, 193 
interpretation versus explication: 
188 
versus phenomenology: 187 
Heteronomy: 177, 187 
and etiquette: 25 
of the other human being: 174 
High Court of Amsterdam: 326 
High Court of Leeuwarden: 326 
Hippie: 149, 326 
Hippocratic Oath: 84 
Hirsch: 117, 326 
Hobbes: 149-151, 326, 328 
Holm: 117, 326 
Homo mensura est: 183 
Hope: 95, 176, 216, 225, 230 
Horizon of interpretation - physician's 
versus patient's: 145 
Horvat: 205, 216, 326 
Hostage: 174 
Human rights: 114 
Hume: 12, 60, 149-157, 159-161, 
164-166, 173, 303, 314, 321, 
323, 325-326, 328, 332 
Identity: 213 
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Ignorance: 178 
Illich: 65, 326 
Imagination: 152 
in sympathy: 151 
Immoral action: 19 
Impartial observer: 97 
Individualism: 200 
Individuality: 29 
Induction: 36, 39, 55 
Infanticide: 98, 245 
Information 
in the provider-patient relationship: 
259 
right not-to-know: 292 
Informed consent: 260, 262, 276 
Intentionality: 208, 240 
Intentions - assessment of intentions: 
120 
Interpretation: 214 
as freedom: 213 
Interpretation of the other: 172 
Intersubjectivity: 143 
as foundation of sympathy: 165 
Intuitions: 17 
Jensen: 52, 66, 69, 71, 88-90, 326 
Jonsen: 5, 6, 37, 38, 42-48, 62, 326 
Judges: 284, 285 
Judgment - of actions versus persons: 
81 
Justice: 174, 179 
Kahane: 59, 60, 326 
Kant: vii, ix, 36, 96, 97, 115, 173, 
184, 185, 195, 201, 212, 229, 
326, 334 
Katz: 65, 259-261, 263, 264, 269, 
272, 327 
Kerkhof: 151, 155, 327 
Kible: 237, 327 
Kimsma: 136 
King, Martin Luther: 175 
Klein: 117, 327 
Kline: 220, 327 
Krayskamp: 327 
Kuhn: 271, 327 
Langemeijer: 77, 327 
Law: 23, 195, 279 
versus ethics: 281 
versus roles: 82 
Legalism: 48 
Lévinas: viii, 12, 144, 172-176, 191, 
194, 215, 229, 239, 240, 303, 
314, 327, 329, 335 
Libertarian bioethical theory: 200 
Life-support: 106 
Lingis: 327 
Lipps: 164, 167, 327 
Living-will: 122 
Logic - in conductive reasoning: 56 
Loneliness: 201, 202, 215 
Lonergan: 102, 320, 327 
Love: 50, 174 
Love-ethics: 51 
Lucidity: 214 
Luijpen: 167, 232, 327 
Lustig: 39, 327 
Luther: 95 
Lyon-Loftus: 327 
Maas: 267, 327 
Machan: 75, 76, 327 
Machiavelli: 328 
Maclntyre: 26, 328 
Macklin: 212, 216, 328 
MacNabb: 153, 328 
Maffia: 298 
Majority agreement: 135 
Manenschijn: 153, 328 
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Marcel 13, 168, 173, 198-200, 205, 
206, 216, 224-231, 239, 241, 
246, 304, 305, 315, 320, 328, 
329 
Marginal assessment 120 
Marriage 85 
Maxim 47 
McCown 239, 328 
Medical exception 77, 275 
Medicine - the goal(s) of medicine 
106 
Mercer 157-164, 171, 173, 174, 185, 
186, 328 
Memtt 137, 328 
Meta-ethics 21, 22 
Meursault 218, 219 
Mew 195, 328 
Mieth 58, 63, 175, 179, 186, 
191-194, 328 
Military service 275 
Mill 115 
Miller 94, 115, 119, 121-124, 211, 
212, 302, 313, 328 
Minimalist ethics 21,61 
Minister 257 
Minkowski 251, 328, 251 
Monarchianism 236 
Moral 
versus immoral 16 
versus nonmoral 16, 18 
versus prudent 21 
Moral cogency 9, 15, 17, 21, 26, 
29, 55, 63 
de facto versus de iure 47 
in nonconclusive directives 61 
source 30, 31 
Moral conflicts 136 
Moral experience 97, 193 
subjective or objective 190 
Moral management 115, 135 
Moral point of view 115 
Moral reflection 122 
Moral strangers 94, 115, 175 
versus common-sense 144 
Morality 
and individuality 29 
definition 16 
etymology 16 
versus ethics 16 
Motivation 184 
Mounier 13, 198, 238, 240, 305, 
315, 328 
Munchhausen-Trilemma 20 
Napley 328 
Narratives 190 
of/about patients 146 
Natsoulas 167, 170, 171, 328 
Natural fallacy - definition 199, 207 
Negative ethics 175 
Negotiated agreement 95, 98, 104 
and bargaining power 99 
the lack thereof 109, 110, 112 
versus force 108 
Negotiation - versus mediation 269 
Neighbor - love your neighbor 51, 
75, 174, 210 
Neu 329 
Neurosis 241 
Nielsen 21, 47, 329 
Nietzsche 225, 265 
Nieuwkerk 117, 329 
Nihilism 206, 241, 257 
Noddings 242-245, 329 
Nonethical actions 19 
Noninterference 116 
Normality in medicine 106 
Nota 188-190, 329 
Nürnberg trials 254 
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O'Malley: 168, 227, 228, 231, 242, 
329 
Organ donation: 265 
Orthodoxy: 97 
Otherness: 166 
Ozar: 197, 329 
Pain versus suffering: 168, 169 
Parable of the Good Samaritan: 103, 
178, 185, 292 
Parmenides: 220 
Pascal: 43 
Past: 217, 219 
Paternalism: 126, 298 
self-imposed paternalism: 80 
Paternalistic guidance: 289 
Patient-provider relationship 
differences in expertise: 255 
irreducible element: 250 
Von Gebsattel's three stages: 253 
Patienthood: 202 
Peace: 98 
Peirce: 49, 221 
Pellegrino: viii, 54, 58, 68, 95, 
125-132, 197, 204, 264, 272, 
297, 298, 303, 307, 313, 318, 
329 
Peperzak: 174, 191, 245, 327, 329 
Père Paneloux: 181, 182, 224 
Persistent vegetative state: 106 
Personal or partnership stage: 256 
Personal thoughts: 167 
Personalism - versus existentialism: 
238 
Personhood: 29, 62, 163, 168, 233, 
238, 239 
and dignity: 237 
and role: 235 
as relationality: 237 
becoming versus being human: 207, 
240 
etymology: 235 
person versus personality: 240 
versus nature or essence: 237 
Persuasion: 53, 58 
Phenomenology - versus hermeneu-
tics: 187 
Philips: 329 
Phronesis: 45, 53, 62 
Physician - versus minister: 257 
Pieper: 16, 329 
Plato: ix, 41, 82, 100, 130, 147, 148, 
181, 183, 195, 220, 236, 242, 
294, 329, 330 
Play: 214, 223 
Pleasure from pain: 179 
Pleasure from suffering: 154 
Plotinus: 144, 147-149, 162, 163, 
198, 304, 315, 322, 325, 330 
Plügge: 251 
Pluralism: 28, 93, 95, 96 
descriptive versus normative: 96 
Policy making: 133 
Polytheistic presumption: 97 
Port: 117, 330 
Possibility conditions: 10 
Practical syllogism: 37, 38 
Practical wisdom: 43, 45, 50, 52, 62, 
90 
Practice: 52, 66, 69, 88 
Prichard: 178, 179, 330 
Principe: 100, 237, 313, 315, 328, 
330 
Principlism: 52 
Profession - versus occupation: 69 
Professional duties: 200 
Professional ethic: 67 
altruism: 71, 75 
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as situation ethic: 68 
as situation ethics: 87 
professional expertise: 70 
role: 81 
separatist thesis: 76 
voluntary commitments: 69 
Professional ethics: 6, 46 
Professional morality: 67 
Promise: 218, 227 
Protagoras: 183 
Prudent - versus moral: 21 
Psychosis: 241 
Pursuasion: 53 
Quotations: 27, 53 
Raphael: 320, 330 
Rational argument: 97 
Rationality: 29, 30, 32 
versus taste: 29 
Rawls: 42, 47, 330 
Raz: 18, 30, 319, 330 
Reformation: 96, 101 
Refusal of treatment: 106, 116, 285 
Relationality: 237, 239 
Relativism: 25, 44, 46, 48, 51, 53, 
60, 90, 95, 97, 271 
Relevancy: 37, 41 
Rentsch: 172, 330 
Resoluteness: 210 
Respect - etymology: 258 
Responsibility: 17, 18, 21, 50, 81, 
137, 208 
grounded in heteronomy: 178 
Responsibility for actions: 18 
Resuscitation: 269, 289 
Revelation: 97 
Richardson: 39, 330 
Ricken: 330 
Ricoeur: 246, 331 
Right not-to-know: 292 
Rights: 254 
Ritter: 323, 327, 331 
Role: 82-84 
and faith: 254 
Roscam Abbing: 7, 331 
Ross: 331 
Rothman: 65, 331 
Ruddick: 4, 331 
Rues: 331 
Rule: 47 
Sartre: 13, 123, 198, 199, 203, 205, 
206. 213-217, 223-225, 229-232, 
238, 239, 246, 282, 304, 315, 
320, 331 
Schauer: 283, 331 
Scheirton: 27, 331 
Scheler: viii, 12, 13, 144, 157, 158, 
160-171, 173, 177, 180, 194, 
198, 231, 234, 239, 240, 250, 
259, 263, 303, 304, 306, 314, 
315, 317, 321, 329, 331 
Scheman: 158, 331 
Schillebeeckx: 175, 176, 331 
Schopenhauer: 163 
Schrader: 150, 332 
Schrien 332 
Self-knowledge: 145 
Self-sufficiency: 200, 201 
Self-understanding: 205 
Separatist thesis: 76 
Shame: 282 
Sherover: 203, 208, 332 
Shipley: 332 
Side-effects: 265 
Sidgwick: 6, 137, 332 
Siebeck: 252 
Sieghart: 70-74, 332 
Siegler: 4-6, 8, 9, 22, 137, 260, 326, 
332 
INDEX 349 
Sight - and sympathy: 148 
Simpson: 117, 332 
Sin: 252 
Sincerity: 213, 216, 217 
Situation ethics: 48 
versus casuistry: 47, 48 
Skeat: 117,332 
Skepticism: 20, 196, 206 
Skinner: 117, 332 
Slater: 200, 201 
Smith: 12, 72, 73, 149-155, 157, 160, 
161, 165, 166, 276, 303, 314, 
320, 327, 328, 330, 332, 333 
Smulders: 332 
Social context: 279 
Socrates: 130 
Solidarity - versus solitarity: 224 
Sorge (Heidegger): 229, 242 
Specificationism: 52 
Spencer: 150, 332 
Spicker: 200, 332, 333 
Spiegelberg: 103, 188, 251, 333 
Spinoza: 96, 97 
Spontaneity: 230 
Sporken: 207, 240, 333 
Sprague: 151, 154, 177, 183, 333 
Spreeuwenberg: 4, 333 
Stalpers: 267, 327, 333 
Staubach: 137, 333 
Stoa: 147, 228 
Straus: 251 
Streminger: 157, 333 
Style: 211 
Subjectivism: 27, 53 
Suffering 
as weakness: 180 
of hunmans versus animals: 253 
pleasure thereof: 154 
Suicide: 223 
Supererogation: 184 
Supererogatoriness: 183 
Supererogatory duties: 18 
Supreme Court of The Netherlands: 
78, 79, 333, 339 
Syllogisms: 37, 38 
Sympathy: 143, 255 
active versus passive: 158 
and approval: 152, 154, 155 
and individual feelings: 148, 163 
and parental love: 156, 158, 163 
as agreement of feelings: 158, 161 
as community of feeling: 158, 163 
as emotion infection: 157, 162 
as emotional identification: 157, 162 
as feeling for somebody else's feel-
ings: 164 
as foundational principle of ethics: 
161 
as imagination: 151 
as knowing how somebody else is 
feeling: 158, 161 
as pity: 158 
as principle of connectiveness: 147 
as virtue: 150 
etymology: 90 
in ancient cosmology: 147 
passive versus active: 173 
versus egoistic concern: 149 
Synoptic argument: 192 
Taboos: 59, 60 
Taxonomy: 44 
Taylor: 204, 325, 333 
Teaching medical virtues: 272 
Technology: 30, 32 
Tellenbach: 251, 333, 251 
Temporality: 216, 218 
Tertull ian: 236 
Theunissen: 239, 333 
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Thick descriptions: 250 
Thrownness: 204, 209 
Time: 220, 221 
and novelty: 225 
as a rope: 221 
four zones (Peirce): 221 
Tongeren, van: 3, 136, 138, 191, 
278, 333, 334 
Torture: 178, 179 
Tragedy: 154 
Transference: 257, 263 
Transparency: 210, 216 
Trinity: 233, 235, 236 
Trust: 85, 226, 227, 260 
Truth: 32, 60, 95, 191 
as standing unchallenged: 97 
definition: 58 
versus warrant: 59 
Universality: 36 
Utilitarianism: 51 
Utilities: 267 
Vaccination: 265 
Vandenbroucke: 334 
Vanderbilt: 23, 24, 334 
Veatch: viii, 46, 67, 94, 113-115, 
302, 313, 334 
Veil: 176 
Verhoeven: 183, 334 
Verwey: x, 252, 334 
Virtues: 272 
Visscher, de: 22, 334 
Vitek: 42, 334 
Voting: 135 
Waiter - and informed consent: 291 
Waiter (Sartre's on faith): 213, 230-
231 
Wal: 22, 334 
Walton: 334 
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